Airbus Helicopters INC AS350 accident near Gustavus, Alaska, September 28, 2018
On September 28, 2018 at about 6:57 pm local time, a 2018 Airbus Helicopters INC AS350, registered N907PL, was destroyed in an accident during enroute near Gustavus, Alaska. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 3 people were killed and 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's failure to maintain main rotor speed after setting the engine fuel control to idle, which resulted in a loss of helicopter control and impact with water.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 28, 2018 · about 6:57 pm local time
- Place
- Gustavus, Alaska · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 3 people were killed and 1 person was seriously injured.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Airbus Helicopters INC AS350 B3, built 2018
- Registration
- N907PL · no longer on the register · serial 8471
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The private pilot had just purchased the helicopter and was returning it to his home airport accompanied by a commercial-certificated safety pilot and two passengers. Video from the cockpit image recorder indicated that the pilot, seated in the right seat, was manipulating the flight controls from takeoff until the accident occurred. The surviving passenger stated that, while en route, the pilot indicated that they would be landing on a beach in order to stretch their legs. The recovered data showed the helicopter flying about 500 to 700 ft over water when the pilots began conversing and pointing toward the shore. The safety pilot, whose hands were on his lap, then raised his right hand in a manner that appeared that he was guarding the cyclic control in anticipation that his assistance or intervention might be required. Shortly thereafter, the pilot twisted the collective twist grip throttle from FLIGHT to IDLE; data from the engine data recorder (EDR) indicated that, at this time, the engine fuel control was set to the idle power setting. Such action is consistent with a practice autorotation. The collective control was adjusted downward slightly, but the main rotor speed (Nr) gauge showed Nr decay from the normal "green" operating range of 375 to 405 rpm to the "yellow" cautionary range of 320 to 375 rpm about 5 seconds after the twist grip was set to IDLE. An Nr value of less than 360 rpm would have resulted in a continuous aural tone to alert the pilots of the low rotor speed. About 7 seconds after the twist grip was set to IDLE, the pilot reached toward the center console, after which the "HORN" caution light illuminated, consistent with the pilot muting the aural tone signaling the low Nr condition. After the horn was muted, Nr continued to decay to a low of 254 rpm. Several small cyclic inputs were observed, then the recorded data ended. The helicopter impacted the water and was destroyed. The four occupants were ejected from the helicopter; one of the passengers survived the accident and swam to shore. Postaccident examination of the helicopter and the recovered data did not reveal any helicopter malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Since recorded cockpit imagery did not capture microphone audio, the reason for the pilot's decision to roll the throttle to IDLE could not be determined, and what conversations the pilots may have had before and during the maneuver could not be determined. The passengers' headphones were muted from the pilots' conversation, and the surviving passenger did not know if they planned to practice an autorotation to the beach. Cockpit video recordings from previous flights indicated that the safety pilot did not guard the flight controls when the pilot was performing takeoffs or landings. It is plausible that the pilot's intention was to practice or perform an autorotation to the beach, with the safety pilot guarding the controls. However, the beach was not the most suitable location for a practice autorotation to landing procedure and was out of the ordinary from their previous flights, as observed on the recorded cockpit imagery. When the twist grip throttle is set to IDLE position during normal flight, Nr will decay unless the pilot takes action to maintain it, such as a reduction in main rotor collective pitch or returning the twist grip throttle to the FLIGHT position. However, after the throttle was set to IDLE, the pilot failed to reduce main rotor collective pitch, which resulted in low rotor rpm. The pilot's action of muting the low rotor rpm alert horn indicated that he was aware of the annunciation to an anomalous condition, but it could not be determined if the pilot understood the nature of why the horn annunciated or the criticality of the situation.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of control in flight during enroute defining event
- Attempted remediation/recovery during maneuvering
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Delayed action › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 1,129 hours in all; 26 in this make and model; 94 in the last 90 days; 25 in the last 30 days
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
Co-pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 15,350 hours in all; 4,350 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
Passenger
- Seat: left
- Injury: serious injuries
Passenger
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 40 hours
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Safran Helicopter Engines Arriel 2D (turboshaft); 40 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: JNU Juneau AK
- Destination: YAK Yakutat AK
- Flight plan: none
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Sky: not recorded; not recorded
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 1 | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
18 documents, released by the NTSB on April 13, 2020. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
