Bell 407 accident near Venice, Louisiana, May 2, 2017
On May 2, 2017 at about 11:35 am local time, a 1997 Bell 407 (helicopter), registered N457PH, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Venice, Louisiana (Grand Bay Receiving Station airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 6 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
An in-flight separation of the tip block from the tail rotor blade due to an inadequate blade repair, which resulted in a rotor imbalance sufficient to crack the gearbox attachment studs and gearbox support assembly, and inadequate postrepair test procedures, which failed to detect the inadequate adhesive bonding.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 2, 2017 · about 11:35 am local time
- Place
- Venice, Louisiana · Grand Bay Receiving Station · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 6 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Bell 407, built 1997 · all 407s on the register
- Registration
- N457PH · registry record · serial 53121
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The commercial pilot was conducting a nonscheduled, cross-country passenger flight. He reported that, while en route, he detected an in-flight vibration and made a precautionary landing on an oil platform. As he was shutting down the engine, the vibration increased, and he initiated an emergency shutdown using the rotor brake. Postaccident examination revealed that a tip block and weights had separated from one of the tail rotor blades. Cracks were noted on the tail rotor gear box, which was detached from the tailboom support casting. The casting was entirely fractured and exhibited cracking consistent with overstress separations. The left-side attachment studs were fractured and exhibited reversed bending fatigue fractures. The casting also had cracks at the two forward stud hole locations, and stud hole elongation was noted at the two aft stud hole locations. The separation of the tip block from the tail rotor blade resulted from an incomplete bond area due to a waffle pattern in the adhesive and contamination of the bond line by repair debris. About 50% of the adhesive surface had smooth and glossy surfaces consistent with voids and lack of contact between the adhesive and the tip block, which was likely due to insufficient vacuum pressure being applied while curing the adhesive. The blade tip exhibited worn separation surfaces and the presence of dark material, consistent with engine exhaust, indicating that a crack had formed along the flat side bond line and then progressed until the degraded bond strength was exceeded by operational loads, and the tip block separated. This resulted in a violent rotor imbalance and induced sufficient loads to crack the gearbox attachment studs and produce rapid fatigue cracking in the left-side attachment studs and to crack and nearly fracture the gearbox support assembly. The tip block had been repaired about 65 hours before the flight. According to the helicopter manufacturer, after the repairs were made, the blade passed the postbond pull test of 1,320 lbs, which was equal to the load on the tip block at maximum tail rotor rpm, and it was returned to service. Given the postaccident condition of the adhesive, the postrepair test procedures were not adequate to detect the insufficient adhesive bonding, which resulted in the separation of the tip block from the tail rotor blade. After the accident, the helicopter manufacturer revised its approved repair and inspection procedures. The changes included, in part, a revision to the cure cycle process to use only positive pressure (not vacuum pressure) during the cure cycle that cures the adhesive that bonds the block on the blade tip and an expansion of its postrepair inspection procedures.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Aircraft maintenance event during prior to flight
- Aircraft inspection event during prior to flight
- Part(s) separation from AC during enroute (cruise) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Tail rotor › Tail rotor blade › Failure
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Tail rotor › Tail rotor blade › Incorrect service/maintenance
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Repair › Maintenance personnel
- cause Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Manufacturer
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 3,272 hours in all; 100 in this make and model; 2,377 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: July 6, 2016
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 5,839 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, April 5, 2017
- Maximum gross weight: 5,250 lb
- Seats: 7
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Rolls-Royce 250 C478 (turboshaft); 2,952 hours total
- Operator: Phi, Inc.
The flight
- Departed from: LS08 Boothville LA at 11:29 am
- Destination: NONE Main Pass 311A GM
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 5 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
11 documents, released by the NTSB on November 20, 2017. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 10 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Tail Rotor Examination Notes | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Record of Conversation, Keleher and Price | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 4 | Memo of Conference Call | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 5 | Telecon Notes | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 6 | Materials Laboratory Factual Report 17-061 | PDF, 30 pages | View Download |
| 7 | Old Blanket Repair Approval Tail Rotor Blades, Repair Process | PDF, 16 pages | View Download |
| 8 | New Bell Helicopters' Approved Tail Rotor Repair Procedures | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 9 | Phi Addresses Tail Rotor Tip Block Repair Issue | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 10 | Certification of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 11 | Report Photos | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Other NTSB records under N457PH the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
