Cirrus Design CORP SR22 accident near Colorado Springs, Colorado, June 18, 2016
On June 18, 2016 at about 8:11 pm local time, a 2002 Cirrus Design CORP SR22, registered N678Z, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute near Colorado Springs, Colorado. It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 3 people had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A hard landing on rough terrain due to a faulty deployment of the airplane’s airframe parachute system following a partial loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined, because postaccident examination revealed no malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Contributing to the accident was the low altitude deployment of the parachute system.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- June 18, 2016 · about 8:11 pm local time
- Place
- Colorado Springs, Colorado · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 3 people had minor injuries.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cirrus Design CORP SR22 NO SERIES, built 2002
- Registration
- N678Z · registry record · serial 0311
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The commercial pilot was conducting a local flight when he noted a lower-than-normal oil pressure indication and engine roughness. The engine subsequently experienced a partial loss of power and the airplane could not maintain altitude. The pilot deployed the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) at an estimated 472 ft above ground level, and the airplane impacted rough terrain under canopy in a nose-low, upright attitude. A test run of the engine and review of recorded data did not reveal the reason for the partial loss of engine power. Examination of the airframe parachute system revealed that, during deployment of the CAPS, the rocket separated from its lanyard in overstress. Fracture testing of the lanyard revealed that it did not exceed the minimum value in several tests, and the examined lanyard sections did not fully conform to specification; however, it is unlikely that these anomalies resulted in the overstress fracture. Features observed on the CAPS retaining harness suggested that some resistance was encountered when pulling the incremental bridle from the sleeve during the deployment. The cover flap from the retaining harness had discoloration and heat damage consistent with abnormal exposure to the rocket exhaust, and pulled stitches were noted in the vicinity of the sleeve where the incremental bridle was stowed. It is likely that the incremental bridle was not released immediately from the sleeve, which kept the rocket closer to the retaining harness and placed abnormal loads on the lanyards. At some point, the incremental bridle was released from the sleeve and loaded to separate the stitches in the incremental bridle as designed. During a nominal CAPS deployment, the airplane enters a nose-low attitude before leveling off, a stage of deployment referred to as "tail drop." For tail drop to occur, the deployment must be initiated to allow adequate time and/or altitude. During the accident, the parachute inflated fully; however, the abnormal CAPS deployment, as well as low deployment altitude resulted in the airplane touching down in a nose-low attitude before tail drop occurred. Based on static pull tests in the lab, the orientation of the incremental bridle within the sleeve can significantly affect the force required to release the incremental bridle from its stowed position. A review of parachute packing procedures revealed that the orientation of the incremental bridle as it was inserted in its sleeve was not specified. In the absence of any specific procedure for orienting the incremental bridle in the sleeve, it would be possible for the incremental bridle to be inserted in either orientation. The investigation could not determine whether the incremental bridle had been inserted in an unfavorable orientation or if such an orientation would have resulted in the lanyard fracture. Based on review of the parachute deployment and subsequent testing, an exact cause for the abnormal CAPS deployment could not be determined.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (partial) during enroute defining event
- Off-field or emergency landing during enroute
- Hard landing during landing
The NTSB's findings
- cause Not determined › Not determined › (general) › (general) › Unknown/Not determined
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Equipment/furnishings › Parachute › Malfunction
- Environmental issues › Physical environment › Terrain › Sloped/uneven terrain › Contributed to outcome
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,289 hours in all; 30 in this make and model; 40 in the last 90 days; 23 in the last 30 days; 1,170 as pilot in command; 255 on instruments
- Last flight review: June 13, 2015
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 788 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, November 13, 2015
- Maximum gross weight: 3,400 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Cont Motor IO-550-N (piston); 823 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: COS Colorado Springs CO at 7:45 pm
- Destination: COS Colorado Springs CO
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 170° at 9 knots, gusting 16
- Visibility: 9 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds at 7,000 ft
- Temperature: 84°F (29°C), dew point 52°F (11°C)
- Altimeter: 30.36 inHg
- Observation at 7:54 pm from KCOS, 11 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
