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Accidents · NTSB CEN16LA115 · Final report

Beech V35 accident near Seymour, Indiana, February 27, 2016

On February 27, 2016 at about 4:25 pm local time, a 1967 Beech V35, registered N2714T, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Seymour, Indiana. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's improper placement of the fuel selector handle between two tank positions, which resulted in a restricted fuel flow to the engine and the initial loss of engine power, and his improper decision to use the high-boost auxiliary fuel pump for an extended period, which resulted in an over-rich fuel mixture condition that prevented the engine from resuming normal operation.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
February 27, 2016 · about 4:25 pm local time
Place
Seymour, Indiana · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Beech V35, built 1967 · all V35s on the register
Registration
N2714T · registry record · serial D-8438
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot reported that the engine began running roughly during cruise flight a few minutes after he switched the fuel selector from the left to the right main fuel tank. He initially switched back to the left main fuel tank, which still contained useable fuel, increased the mixture control to full rich, and turned on the high-boost auxiliary fuel pump. The engine continued to run roughly with occasional backfires and power surges. The pilot then selected the low-boost auxiliary fuel pump and changed back to the right main fuel tank, which contained significantly more fuel than the left main fuel tank. He reported that engine operation briefly improved, before it resumed producing partial power with occasional power surges. The pilot reported that he continued to select different fuel tanks, including the right wingtip tank that only had residual fuel available. Ultimately, the pilot selected the right main fuel tank and the engine continued to operate at partial power. The pilot conducted a forced landing to a nearby interstate highway. Shortly after touchdown, the pilot had to maneuver the airplane to avoid another vehicle and it subsequently entered the grass median separating the northbound and southbound lanes. The airplane's left wing was substantially damaged when it impacted a grass embankment. A postaccident inspection of the airplane established that there was ample fuel remaining within each main wing fuel tank. The wingtip fuel tanks contained about a gallon of fuel each. Both auxiliary fuel pumps functioned normally when electrical power was applied. An operational engine test run was completed without any modifications to the airframe fuel system and using the fuel remaining in each main tank. The engine performed within its normal operating parameters throughout the engine test run and demonstrated the ability to produce maximum static rpm. Additionally, while at a cruise engine power setting, there was no interruption to engine operation while alternating between the right and left main fuel tanks. During the test run, the fuel selector handle was placed between the right and left main fuel tank positions to simulate an inadvertent misplacement of the fuel selector. Normal engine operation continued for about 30 seconds before there was a noticeable loss of engine power and an associated engine backfire from fuel starvation. The fuel selector was immediately repositioned to the right main fuel tank and normal engine operation was reestablished. Ultimately, the operational test run did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal engine operation. The airplane owner's manual stipulates that when there is a loss of engine power, the auxiliary fuel pump should be used momentarily until engine power is regained. However, if engine operation does not improve within a few moments, the auxiliary fuel pump should be turned off. A flight manual supplement further stipulates that if a fuel tank becomes fully depleted, the low-boost auxiliary fuel pump should be turned on while changing fuel tanks; however, the auxiliary fuel pump should be turned off once the engine restarts. Additionally, the flight manual supplement cautions that operating with the high-boost auxiliary fuel pump turned on with a functioning engine-driven fuel pump can produce an over-rich fuel mixture and a partial or total loss of engine power. It is likely that the initial engine roughness was caused by the pilot improperly positioning the fuel selector handle between the left and right main fuel tanks, which resulted in a restricted fuel flow to the engine and the initial loss of engine power during cruise flight. After identifying the initial loss of engine power, the pilot likely repositioned the fuel selector handle to a fuel tank containing useable fuel; however, contrary to operational guidance, he continued to use the high-boost auxiliary fuel pump for an extended period, which likely resulted in an over-rich fuel mixture condition that prevented the engine from resuming normal operation.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of engine power (partial) during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Off-field or emergency landing during landing
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during landing (landing roll)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel selector/shutoff valve › Incorrect use/operation
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel pumps › Incorrect use/operation
  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,216 hours in all; 212 in this make and model; 42 in the last 90 days; 4 in the last 30 days
  • Last flight review: October 24, 2014
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,401 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, October 9, 2015; 60 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,600 lb
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Continental TSIO-520-DB7B (piston); 3,802 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: UMP Indianapolis IN at 3:45 pm
  • Destination: LOU Louisville KY
  • Flight plan: VFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 190° at 10 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 41°F (5°C), dew point 28°F (-2°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.19 inHg
  • Observation at 4:32 pm from IMS, 17 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

9 documents, released by the NTSB on June 16, 2016. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.