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Accidents · NTSB CEN14FA278 · Final report

Amateur-built LANCAIR IV accident near Duluth, Minnesota, June 7, 2014

On June 7, 2014 at about 4:21 pm local time, a 2005 amateur-built LANCAIR IV, registered N86NW, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (climb to cruise) near Duluth, Minnesota (Duluth International Airport). It was a ferry flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's failure to maintain airplane control while operating in instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions, which was due to spatial disorientation resulting from erroneous heading and bank angle information shown on the primary flight display. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's impairment due to diphenhydramine and his improper decision to operate in IFR conditions with the airplane over gross weight and at an aft center of gravity.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 7, 2014 · about 4:21 pm local time
Place
Duluth, Minnesota · Duluth International Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Amateur-built LANCAIR IV, built 2005
Registration
N86NW · no longer on the register · serial LIV-552
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Ferry flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot/owner was ferrying the airplane from the United States to Europe, and he had installed an auxiliary fuel bladder in place of the rear seat. Before takeoff, the airplane's fuel tanks were topped off, and 60 gallons of fuel were added to the auxiliary fuel bladder. The estimated weight of the airplane during takeoff was about 509 lbs over its maximum gross weight. The estimated center of gravity (CG) of the airplane was 93.2, which was near the aft limit of the CG range. The flight departed in marginal visual flight rules conditions and, soon after takeoff, climbed into instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions while passing through 1,000 ft above ground level. Air traffic control (ATC) cleared the pilot to fly a northeasterly heading and climb to 12,000 ft, but the pilot did not acknowledge the instruction, and radar track data indicated that the airplane turned right within 1 minute after departure. ATC instructed the pilot to turn back on course, and the pilot complied. The airplane continued on course for about 1.5 minutes, but then it turned right again while still in a climb. ATC instructed the pilot to turn back on course, but the pilot did not respond. The airplane continued to turn right, reached a maximum altitude of about 6,600 ft, and then entered a steep, descending right turn. ATC instructed the pilot to climb immediately, but there was no response, and the airplane continued the steep descending turn and impacted a lake about 5 minutes after departure. A comparison of the radar track data with the flight data recovered from the airplane's primary flight display (PFD) and multifunction display revealed discrepancies between the two data sources regarding airspeed, bank angle, heading, wind speed, and wind direction, indicating that erroneous information was being displayed on the PFD during the flight. Specifically, the flight data indicated periods of straight and level flight when the radar track data indicated the airplane was banking and changing heading. The erroneous information would have made it difficult for the pilot to control the airplane and navigate effectively in IFR conditions. The reason for the erroneous flight data could not be determined. The pilot's toxicology report indicated 0.146 ug/ml diphenhydramine (a sedating antihistamine) in cavity blood, which was above the therapeutic range of 0.0250 to 0.1120 ug/ml. Although diphenhydramine undergoes postmortem redistribution, the postmortem level detected suggests that the pilot likely had impairing levels of diphenhydramine in his system at the time of the accident. To maintain control of the airplane, the pilot would have needed to recognize that the PFD display was faulty and use the information from the standby attitude indicator, turn and bank indicator, and magnetic compass. However, it is likely that diphenhydramine, which impairs cognitive and psychomotor performance, diminished the pilot's ability to recognize and manage the erroneous PFD indications. The pilot's failure to acknowledge the clearance to turn to the northeast and climb to 12,000 feet only a few seconds after he initiated contact with ATC suggests that his attention was diverted for some reason about that time. The pilot verbally acknowledged and responded to a subsequent call to return to course. However, after about 1.5 minutes the airplane again deviated from course and entered a steep descending turn, most likely due to the pilot experiencing spatial disorientation as a result of the erroneous heading and bank angle information on the PFD and his ineffective use of standby flight instruments in restricted visibility conditions. The airplane's aft CG and over gross weight condition would have reduced the airplane's longitudinal stability, and this likely also contributed to the loss of control.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Aircraft loading event during prior to flight
  2. Flight instrument malf/fail during enroute (climb to cruise)
  3. Loss of control in flight during enroute (climb to cruise) defining event
  4. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during enroute (climb to cruise)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Navigation system › Attitude & direction › Malfunction
  • cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Spatial disorientation › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Clouds › Effect on operation
  • factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • factor Personnel issues › Physical › Impairment/incapacitation › OTC medication › Pilot
  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Aircraft capability › Maximum weight › Capability exceeded

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 2,500 hours in all; 22 in this make and model
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 666 hours
  • Last inspection: condition inspection, September 20, 2013
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,800 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Walter XM601E (turboprop); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: DLH Duluth MN at 4:16 pm
  • Destination: CYYR Goose Bay
  • Flight plan: IFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 140° at 9 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 1,000 ft; a few clouds at 300 ft
  • Temperature: 52°F (11°C), dew point 50°F (10°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.05 inHg
  • Observation at 4:22 pm from DLH, 8 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

22 documents, released by the NTSB on October 30, 2015. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.