Bell 206L 3 accident near Venice, La, October 9, 2013
On October 9, 2013 at about 12:20 pm local time, a 1991 Bell 206L 3 (helicopter), registered N54LP, was substantially damaged in an accident during takeoff near Venice, La. It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 1 person was killed and 3 people were seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A total loss of engine power due to the liberation of a second stage turbine blade near the blade root due to a high-cycle fatigue crack and subsequent overload. Although extensive testing and materials analysis was performed, the reason for crack initiation could not be determined.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 9, 2013 · about 12:20 pm local time
- Place
- Venice, La · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed and 3 people were seriously injured.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Bell 206L 3 L3, built 1991 · all 206L 3s on the register
- Registration
- N54LP · registry record · serial 51466
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
As the helicopter departed from the oil platform's helipad, witnesses heard a "pop" followed by a high-pitch screeching noise coming from the back of the engine. The helicopter nosed-over and dove into the water with the emergency floats extended. Examination of the engine revealed that one of the second-stage turbine disk blades had liberated due to a high-cycle fatigue (HCF) crack. The crack propagated until the blade separated due to material overload, which resulted in extensive damage to all of the third-stage turbine disk blades and most of the fourth-stage turbine disk blades. Metallurgical analysis of the liberated blade revealed no material anomalies. According to the engine manufacturer, there was no history of second-stage turbine blade failure due to HCF at the same spanwise position as the accident blade. A dynamics analysis of the second-stage turbine wheel revealed no mode crossing within or above the normal engine operating range that would be consistent with HCF initiation at the point where the blade failed. Several potential failure scenarios were also evaluated; however, none yielded any evidence to support the blade failing as it did. The engine was not equipped with an engine-monitoring system that could have identified any anomalies that may have initiated the HCF crack or contributed to the failure of the second-stage turbine blade. Although the surviving passengers stated that the platform was not venting methane at the time of the accident and an eyewitness said he did not see methane being vented, platform operating records revealed that methane was being vented continuously on the day of the accident. However, the actual volume of methane released at the time of the accident and whether it was ingested into the engine on takeoff could not be determined. The HCF crack was a pre-existing condition and was not the result of a sudden ingestion of methane on the day of the accident. A low-level of diphenhydramine, a sedating antihistamine, was detected in the pilot's blood and urine, but it could not be determined if it impaired the pilot's ability to operate the helicopter.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (total) during takeoff defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › Turbine section › Failure
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot, private
- Ratings: single-engine land; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 3,450 hours in all; 177 in this make and model; 3,450 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: July 25, 2013
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 11,238 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, October 3, 2013
- Maximum gross weight: 4,251 lb
- Seats: 7
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Allison 250-C30 SER (turboshaft); 10,671 hours total
- Operator: Panther Helicopters INC
The flight
- Departed from: Mp107D GM at 12:20 pm
- Destination: 06LA Belle Chasse LA
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Temperature: 64°F (18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
- Observation at 11:00 am from 06LA, 72 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 3 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number CEN14FA004.