Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 390 accident near South Bend, Indiana, March 17, 2013
On March 17, 2013 at about 8:23 pm local time, a 2008 Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 390, registered N26DK, was destroyed in an accident during enroute (descent) near South Bend, Indiana (South Bend Airport). It was a business flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed and 2 people were seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The private pilot's inadequate response to the dual engine shutdown during cruise descent, including his failure to adhere to procedures, which ultimately resulted in his failure to maintain airplane control during a single-engine go-around. An additional cause was the pilot's decision to allow the unqualified pilot-rated passenger to manipulate the airplane controls, which directly resulted in the inadvertent dual engine shutdown.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- March 17, 2013 · about 8:23 pm local time · cases in 2013
- Place
- South Bend, Indiana · South Bend Airport · cases near this airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed and 2 people were seriously injured.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 390, built 2008
- Registration
- N26DK · no longer on the register · serial RB-226
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), during cruise flight, the unqualified pilot-rated passenger was manipulating the aircraft controls, including the engine controls, under the supervision and direction of the private pilot. After receiving a descent clearance to 3,000 feet mean sea level (msl), the pilot told the pilot-rated passenger to reduce engine power to maintain a target airspeed. The cockpit area microphone subsequently recorded the sound of both engines spooling down. The pilot recognized that the pilot-rated passenger had shutdown both engines after he retarded the engine throttles past the flight idle stops into the fuel cutoff position. Specifically, the pilot stated "you went back behind the stops and we lost power." According to air traffic control (ATC) radar track data, at the time of the dual engine shutdown, the airplane was located about 18 miles southwest of the destination airport and was descending through 6,700 feet msl. The pilot reported to the controller that the airplane had experienced a dual loss of engine power, declared an emergency, and requested radar vectors to the destination airport. As the flight approached the destination airport, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound similar to an engine starter spooling up; however, engine power was not restored during the attempted restart. A review of the remaining CVR audio did not reveal any evidence of another attempt to restart an engine. The CVR stopped recording while the airplane was still airborne, with both engines still inoperative, while on an extended base leg to the runway. Subsequently, the controller told the pilot to go-around because the main landing gear was not extended. The accident airplane was then observed to climb and enter a right traffic pattern to make another landing approach. Witness accounts indicated that only the nose landing gear was extended during the second landing approach. The witnesses observed the airplane bounce several times on the runway before it ultimately entered a climbing right turn. The airplane was then observed to enter a nose low, rolling descent into a nearby residential community. The postaccident examinations and testing did not reveal any anomalies or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Although the CVR did not record a successful engine restart, the pilot was able to initiate a go-around during the initial landing attempt, which implies that he was able to restart at least one engine during the initial approach. The investigation subsequently determined that only the left engine was operating at impact. Following an engine start, procedures require that the respective generator be reset to reestablish electrical power to the Essential Bus. If the Essential Bus had been restored, all aircraft systems would have operated normally. However, the battery toggle switch was observed in the Standby position at the accident site, which would have prevented the Essential Bus from receiving power regardless of whether the generator had been reset. As such, the airplane was likely operating on the Standby Bus, which would preclude the normal extension of the landing gear. However, the investigation determined that the landing gear alternate extension handle was partially extended. The observed position of the handle would have precluded the main landing gear from extending (only the nose landing gear would extend). The investigation determined that it is likely the pilot did not fully extend the handle to obtain a full landing gear deployment. Had he fully extended the landing gear, a successful single-engine landing could have been accomplished. In conclusion, the private pilot's decision to allow the unqualified pilot-rated passenger to manipulate the airplane controls directly resulted in the inadvertent dual engine shutdown during cruise descent. Additionally, the pilot's inadequate response to the emergency, including his failure to adhere to procedures, resulted in his inability to fully restore airplane systems and ultimately resulted in a loss of airplane control.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Engine shutdown during enroute (descent)
- Loss of engine power (total) during enroute (descent) defining event
- Abnormal runway contact during landing (flare/touchdown)
- Miscellaneous/other during landing (aborted after touchdown)
- Loss of control in flight during initial climb
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › (general) › (general) › Pilot
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Gear extension and retract sys › Incorrect use/operation other cases naming the landing gear
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › Passenger
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine controls › Power lever › Incorrect use/operation other cases naming the engine
- Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Experience/qualifications › Total experience w/ equipment › Passenger
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 613.7 hours in all; 171.5 in this make and model
- Last flight review: May 4, 2012
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
Pilot-Rated Passenger
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,877.1 hours in all; 0 in this make and model; 1,705.3 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: September 19, 2006
- Medical certificate: Class 3
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 457.5 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, November 4, 2012; 38 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 12,500 lb
- Seats: 8
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Williams International FJ44-2A (turbofan); 458 hours total
- Engine 2: Williams International FJ44-2A (turbofan); 458 hours total
- Operator: Digicut Systems
The flight
- Departed from: RVS Tulsa OK at 6:56 pm
- Destination: SBN South Bend IN
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 09R, 8,414 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 120° at 13 knots, gusting 17
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 36°F (2°C), dew point 18°F (-8°C)
- Altimeter: 30.13 inHg
- Observation at 8:20 pm from SBN, 1 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
55 documents, released by the NTSB on March 4, 2015. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N26DK: not on the register today · the record of its deregistration
- Engine: Williams International FJ44-2A 118 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Engine: Williams International FJ44-2A 118 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- South Bend International · nearest airport
- Tulsa Riverside Airport · departed from
- Accidents and incidents in Indiana 1,367 since 1982 · 179 in the last ten years
- Indiana 5,705 aircraft registered
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/CEN13FA196.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
