Robinson Helicopter Company R44 II accident near Blanco, Texas, October 12, 2012

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

According to track data recovered from a handheld GPS receiver found in the wreckage, the helicopter was on the final leg of a cross-country flight that had originated earlier in the day. According to fueling documentation, the helicopter was refueled, and the flight departed and proceeded on a southeast course toward the intended destination. According to the plotted GPS data, while enroute, about 600 feet above ground level (agl), the helicopter entered a descending left turn to an east-northeast course. About 30 seconds later, after descending about 100 feet, the helicopter entered a climb while on a northeast heading. During the climb, the helicopter's groundspeed decreased from 73 knots to 27 knots. The final GPS data point, recorded about 1 minute after the initial turn from the intended course, showed the helicopter about 800 feet agl at 27 knots groundspeed and about 0.2 mile north-northwest of the accident site. The helicopter wreckage was located in a sparsely populated area with hilly terrain. The debris path was orientated on a south-southeast heading, and the length and distribution of the debris path were consistent with the helicopter impacting rising terrain at cruise speed. Postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed no evidence of a preimpact failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. A postaccident review of meteorological data established that marginal visual flight rules conditions likely existed in the vicinity of the accident site at the time of the accident. The weather data supported increasing low-level cloud development and scattered light rain showers. No strong outflow winds or severe storm signatures were associated with the observed rain showers. The accident flight was conducted in dark nighttime conditions with minimal illumination from ground light sources. The helicopter's flight path during the last minute of GPS data was consistent with the pilot becoming spatially disoriented due to the lack of a discernible horizon that he could use to maintain control of the helicopter. Although the helicopter was equipped with basic attitude instrumentation and avionics, it was not certified for flight under instrument flight rules (IFR). Additionally, although the pilot held an instrument rating for helicopters, his IFR currency could not be verified from available logbook data. According to FAA correspondence, about 5 months before the accident, the FAA had notified the pilot that he was ineligible to hold any class of medical certificate because of his multiple alcohol-related offenses. Although he had been advised multiple times of his ineligibility to hold a medical certificate, flight documentation established that the pilot continued to exercise the privileges of his commercial and flight instructor certificates. Toxicological test results for the pilot were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, ethanol, and all drugs and medications. The helicopter operator reported that the accident occurred during an instructional flight; however, a review of available evidence did not support that the front-seat passenger was receiving flight instruction on the accident flight. According to FAA records, the front-seat passenger had never applied for a student pilot certificate or an aviation medical certificate. Additionally, a pilot logbook was not recovered during the investigation for the front-seat passenger. According to a business associate of both passengers, the front-seat passenger had coordinated the flight to attend a business appointment. According to photographs recovered from the front-seat passenger's mobile phone, on earlier flight legs, he had been seated in the left front seat. According to the helicopter manufacturer, the flying pilot typically would be seated in the right front seat, especially during initial flight instruction. Additionally, a review of the front-seat passenger's mobile phone established that he had been exchanging text messages with a business colleague in the minutes preceding the accident. Specifically, the final outgoing text message was sent about 26 seconds before the helicopter deviated from the direct course toward the intended destination. Therefore, it is unlikely that the passenger was operating the helicopter at the time of the accident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.