Airbus Industrie A320-233 incident near Atlanta, Georgia, July 13, 2004
On July 13, 2004 at about 4:00 pm local time, a Airbus Industrie A320-233, registered N951LF, suffered minor damage in an incident near Atlanta, Georgia (Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta Int). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 110 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of company maintenance personnel to secure the nacelle/cowl doors, which resulted in a separation of the doors during takeoff initial climb.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 13, 2004 · about 4:00 pm local time
- Place
- Atlanta, Georgia · Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta Int · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 110 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Airbus Industrie A320-233 · all A320-233s on the register
- Registration
- N951LF · no longer on the register · serial 460
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The flight departed runway 27R, and immediately after takeoff, a passenger reported seeing a "cover" come off the No. 1 engine. The captain felt the airplane "shutter," declared an emergency, and returned the airplane to the airport and landed without further incident. Examination of the airplane revealed both sides of the No. 1 engine fan cowl were separated. The inboard fan cowl door was found approximately 7.5 nautical miles west southwest of the airport, and the outboard fan cowl door was found beside the runway. Examination of the latching mechanisms on each cowl door revealed no evidence of failure or mechanical malfunction. A mechanic stated he opened the fan cowl for the No. 1 engine prior to the flight, and he could not recall if the cowl doors were fully latched. A review of data provided by the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada revealed that, between 1991 and September 2000, there were ten similar cowl door separation events documented worldwide, and each involved the cowl doors having been opened prior to the flight. Examination of the incident airplane revealed it was equipped with the modifications outlined in Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2003-18-06 amendment 39-13297, which mandates the installation of a hold-open device for the cowl doors, as well as a modification of the latch handles to ensure that unfastened latch handles will hang down. A review of the operator's A320/321 preflight checklist revealed it included for each engine, "Check the fan cowl doors." During post-incident examination, a visual walk-around was performed with the undamaged No. 2 engine cowl in various unlatched configurations. Examination revealed unlatched cowl doors can appear closed flush when the hold-open device is overridden in preparation for latching, and unfastened latches that hang down may be obscured from view by the shape of the fan cowl. In response to this incident, Airbus Industrie issued an Operator's Information Telex to "A319/A320/A321 V2500 operators." The telex recommended that, in addition to mandatory compliance with AD 2003-18-06, operators consider the following: "... strictly adhere to AMM Task 71-13-00 for proper latching and closing of fan cowl doors after each maintenance action requiring cowl opening. ... It is essential that a flight crew member visually inspects the fan cowl doors prior to each flight to ensure that they are closed and latched."
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 5,800 hours in all; 730 in this make and model; 159 in the last 90 days; 56 in the last 30 days; 2,000 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: June 1, 2004
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 4,037 hours in all; 367 in this make and model; 86 in the last 90 days; 53 in the last 30 days; 2,130 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: November 1, 2003
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 32,672.4 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, May 1, 2004; 520 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 169,754 lb
- Seats: 166
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: International Aero Engines V2500-EA5 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: International Aero Engines V2500-EA5 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Ryan International Airlines, Inc.
The flight
- Departed from: KATL Atlanta GA at 3:40 pm
- Destination: KMCO Orlando FL
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 310° at 10 knots, gusting 15
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds at 3,000 ft
- Temperature: 84°F (29°C), dew point 73°F (23°C)
- Altimeter: 30.03 inHg
- Observation at 3:53 pm from KATL
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 6 | |||
| Passengers | 104 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.