Sikorsky S-61N accident near Kekaha, Hawaii, February 22, 2022
On February 22, 2022 at about 8:20 pm local time, a 1962 Sikorsky S-61N (helicopter), registered N615CK, was destroyed in an accident during landing near Kekaha, Hawaii (Barking Sands Navy Base airport). It was an external-load flight under external-load helicopter rules (Part 133). 4 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The improper installation of the fore/aft primary servo by maintenance personnel, which resulted in the attaching hardware backing out and which subsequently rendered the helicopter uncontrollable. Contributing to the accident was the company’s quality control personnel to identify the improper installation before certifying the helicopter for flight.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 22, 2022 · about 8:20 pm local time
- Place
- Kekaha, Hawaii · Barking Sands Navy Base · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 4 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Sikorsky S-61N, built 1962 · all S-61Ns on the register
- Registration
- N615CK · no longer on the register · serial 61814
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- External-load flight · external-load helicopter rules (Part 133)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The accident helicopter was under contract to the United States Navy. The mission for the accident flight involved locating a training torpedo in the open waters, retrieving the torpedo using a recovery basket/cage system, then returning the torpedo to Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) by sling load. According to automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data, after the helicopter departed, it proceeded north-northwest to an area about 44 miles away. After maneuvering in the area, the helicopter proceeded south-southeast to return to PMRF. As the helicopter approached the facility, it crossed the shoreline and began a shallow left turn as it maneuvered to the north, into the prevailing wind. As the helicopter neared the predetermined drop-off site, the left turn stopped, and the helicopter proceeded in a northeasterly direction. Multiple witnesses located near the accident site reported that as the helicopter continued the left turn towards the drop-off site, the turn stopped, and it began to travel in a northeast direction. The witnesses noted that as the helicopter flew about 200 ft above the ground, it gradually pitched nose down and impacted nose first, in a near-vertical attitude. An examination of the wreckage revealed the flight control fore/aft servo input link remained connected at its clevis end to the flight control fore/aft bellcrank, located adjacent to the main gearbox. However, the rod end was partially connected to the fore/aft servo input clevises and its bolt had mostly backed out of its normally installed position. The bolt exhibited no evidence of fractures or visible deformation and its threads exhibited no unusual wear. Therefore, the bolt likely backed out of its normally installed position during the accident flight due to the absence of its nut and cotter pin. This would have caused an uncommanded input to the fore/aft servo, resulting in the helicopter’s nose-down attitude, and the inability of the crew to control the pitch attitude of the helicopter. The fore/aft primary servo was installed on December 28, 2021. About 7.5 flight hours had elapsed from the time the fore/aft primary servo was installed until the day of the accident. The mechanic who installed the fore/aft servo input link to the fore/aft primary servo likely failed to correctly install the attaching hardware. The company’s certified inspector and who oversaw and inspected all of the work at completion, failed to ensure the hardware attaching the fore/aft servo input link to the fore/aft primary servo was installed correctly.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of control in flight during landing defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › Oversight of maintenance › Maintenance provider
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Post maintenance inspection › Maintenance personnel
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Maintenance personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 16,515 hours in all
- Last flight review: December 7, 2021
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: unk
- Injury: fatal
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 7,060 hours in all; 2,682 in this make and model
- Last flight review: December 8, 2021
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: unk
- Injury: fatal
Cabin Crew
- Seat: rear
- Injury: fatal
Cabin Crew
- Seat: rear
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 36,745 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, February 9, 2022; 7 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 21,000 lb
- Seats: 11
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: Ge CT58-140-2 (turboshaft); 18,534 hours total
- Engine 2: Ge CT58-140-2 (turboshaft); 12,121 hours total
- Fire on the ground
- Operator: Croman CORP
The flight
- Runway PHBK, 6,002 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 280° at 6 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 79°F (26°C), dew point 64°F (18°C)
- Altimeter: 30.10 inHg
- Observation at 10:51 am from PHBK
Weather report (METAR): PHBK 222051Z AUTO 28006KT 10SM CLR 26/18 A3010 RMK AO2 SLP193 T02560183 52004
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 4 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ANC22FA018.