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Accidents · NTSB ANC17FA049 · Final report

Piper PA-18AS accident near Tyonek, Alaska, August 24, 2017

On August 24, 2017 at about 6:45 am local time, a 1952 Piper PA-18AS, registered N1905A, was destroyed in an accident during enroute near Tyonek, Alaska. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The noninstrument-rated pilot's decision to initiate a visual flight rules flight into dark night, marginal visual flight rules to instrument flight rules conditions, which resulted in a loss of control due to spatial disorientation.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
August 24, 2017 · about 6:45 am local time
Place
Tyonek, Alaska · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
Aircraft
Piper PA-18AS 125, built 1952 · all PA-18ASs on the register
Registration
N1905A · no longer on the register · serial 18-1740
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The noninstrument-rated private pilot had spent the previous 4 days and nights conducting a solo sheep hunting trip and was returning home when the accident occurred. Before departing the remote, mountain airstrip, the pilot contacted a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Flight Service Station (FSS) on his satellite phone for a weather briefing and asked whether visual flight rules (VFR) flight was recommended for his route that night. The flight service specialist (FS-S) provided the pilot with the terminal area forecast for the destination airport; information from the current Area Forecast, which indicated cloud ceilings around 5,000 ft mean sea level (msl), marginal VFR conditions, and rain; and a pilot report from a nearby mountain pass, which advised that VFR was not recommended. The pilot asked several times about a specific mountain pass, and although the FS-S described the conditions at that pass based on FAA weather camera images and expressed pessimism about the prospect of the pilot attempting VFR flight, she did not provide the pilot with the information contained in the Area Forecast for the pass, which indicated instrument flight rules conditions, rain, and mist, as well as isolated moderate turbulence in the area below 6,000 ft msl. The FS-S also did not provide weather radar information, which showed the intended route of flight under an extensive area of precipitation, including areas of moderate or greater intensity. Despite the pessimism of the FS-S on the prospect of the pilot attempting a VFR flight to his intended destination that night, had the FS-S provided the current forecast information for the specific pass and the regional turbulence found in the Area Forecast, as well as a description of the current weather radar depiction for his intended route of flight, the pilot would have had a more accurate picture of the weather over the route of flight. Data obtained from an onboard GPS unit for the last several minutes of flight showed the airplane conduct two descending, spiraling turns. The airplane continued to descend before the data terminated. The airspeed during the last several minutes of the flight ranged from 49 knots to 82 knots. The pilot departed on the flight about 10 minutes before sunset. Twilight conditions during much of the flight would have provided the pilot with some illumination from which to see; however, cloud cover would have decreased the amount of illumination during this period, as would the end of civil twilight, which occurred about an hour after takeoff. Thus, dark night conditions would have existed for at least the last 14 minutes of the flight, as the flight proceeded over a remote area devoid of cultural lighting. The dark night conditions, lack of available ground lighting, and possible instrument meteorological conditions present at the time were conducive to the development of spatial disorientation, and the airplane's flight track is consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. Whether the pilot may have been experiencing fatigue before and/or during the flight given his hunting activities of the previous 4 days, it could not be determined based on the available information. Based on the available radar weather and airplane track data, it is likely that the airplane flew into or came very close to an area of moderate or greater precipitation just before the accident; however, the extent to which the weather contributed to the pilot's spatial disorientation could not be determined. The pilot chose to depart at a time that would have required him to operate in dark night conditions with a lack of cultural lighting, eliminating his reference to a visual horizon and requiring reliance on the airplane's flight instruments for attitude control. The dark night conditions would also have precluded the detection and avoidance of weather.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. VFR encounter with IMC during enroute
  2. Loss of visual reference during enroute
  3. Loss of control in flight during enroute defining event
  4. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during enroute

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Light condition › Dark › Decision related to condition
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Light condition › Dark › Effect on operation
  • cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Below VFR minima › Effect on operation
  • cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Spatial disorientation › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 1,071 hours in all; 606.2 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: May 9, 2017
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: frt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 4,608.6 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, July 6, 2017
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,499 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O-320-A2B (piston); 919 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: Remote Airstrip AK
  • Destination: MRI Anchorage AK
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Visibility: 5 statute miles
  • Sky: overcast at 6,000 ft; scat at 5,000 ft
  • Temperature: 54°F (12°C), dew point 54°F (12°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.56 inHg
  • Observation at 6:53 am from PAEN, 44 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

15 documents, released by the NTSB on October 10, 2019. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.