Airbus AS350 accident near Delta Junction, Alaska, August 3, 2017
On August 3, 2017 at about 10:00 pm local time, a 2008 Airbus AS350 (helicopter), registered N351SH, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing near Delta Junction, Alaska. It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot’s failure to maintain clearance from a steel frame attached to a tracked drilling unit. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to visually identify the steel frame during the reconnaissance process.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 3, 2017 · about 10:00 pm local time
- Place
- Delta Junction, Alaska · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Airbus AS350 B3, built 2008
- Registration
- N351SH · no longer on the register · serial 4598
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The helicopter pilot reported that he was transporting a passenger to a remote drilling site where a tracked drilling unit was stationed. He reported that he landed into the wind, which necessitated descending over bordering trees into the drilling site. The helicopter touched down on the dirt, and upon lowering the collective, he reported that he heard a "bang," and the helicopter slowly started to "pick up a ground wobble." The pilot shut down the helicopter, and both occupants exited without further incident. A postaccident inspection revealed that the blue and red main rotor blades sustained substantial damage from impacting a black 1.5-inch steel frame attached to the tracked drilling unit, which is used to mount a canvas weather shelter for the drilling crews. The pilot reported that the steel frame was not visible to him from above as he was descending into the drilling site. The pilot further reported that he had made multiple landings at the drilling site in the past 3 months and that, with the previous landings, he had landed farther past the tracked drilling unit, and the steel frame was always behind the helicopter. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. The Federal Aviation Administration Helicopter Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-21A, 2012) discusses high and low reconnaissance procedures and states, in part: The purpose of conducting a high reconnaissance is to determine direction and speed of the wind, a touchdown point, suitability of the landing area, approach and departure axes, and obstacles for both the approach and departure. A low reconnaissance is accomplished during the approach to the landing area. When flying the approach, verify what was observed in the high reconnaissance, and check for anything new that may have been missed at a higher altitude, such as wires and their supporting structures (poles, towers, etc.), slopes, and small crevices.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Miscellaneous/other during landing
- Collision during takeoff/land during landing defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during landing
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring environment › Pilot
- cause Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Ground equipment › Effect on operation
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 14,998 hours in all; 2,300 in this make and model; 340 in the last 90 days; 167 in the last 30 days; 14,800 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: May 12, 2017
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,823.7 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, June 19, 2017
- Maximum gross weight: 4,961 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Safran Helicopter Engines Arriel 2B1 (turboshaft); 3,800 hours total
- Operator: Soloy Helicopters, LLC
The flight
- Departed from: 76AK Delta Junction AK
- Destination: 76AK Delta Junction AK
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 180° at 13 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 11,000 ft; a few clouds at 6,500 ft
- Temperature: 72°F (22°C), dew point 46°F (8°C)
- Altimeter: 30.12 inHg
- Observation at 8:53 pm from PABI, 35 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
2 documents, released by the NTSB on August 31, 2017. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 9 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Photos (Courtesy of Operator) | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Other NTSB records under N351SH the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.