Cessna 208 and Piper PA18 mid-air collision near Russian Mission, Alaska, August 31, 2016
On August 31, 2016 at about 6:01 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Cessna 208 (N752RV) and Piper PA18 (N82452), were involved in a mid-air collision near Russian Mission, Alaska. 5 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of both pilots to see and avoid each other while in level cruise flight, which resulted in a midair collision.
The failure of both pilots to see and avoid each other while in level cruise flight, which resulted in a midair collision.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 31, 2016 · about 6:01 pm local time
- Place
- Russian Mission, Alaska · map
- Type
- Accident · mid-air collision
- Injuries
- 5 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Cessna 208 B, built 2014 · all 208s on the register
- Registration
- N752RV · no longer on the register · serial 208B5088
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
- Aircraft 2
- Piper PA18 150, built 1978 · all PA18s on the register
- Registration
- N82452 · registry record · serial 18-7809139
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Other work-use flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative for the Cessna 208 final · quoted from the NTSB record
The Cessna had departed about 3 minutes prior on a scheduled passenger flight and the Piper was en route to a remote hunting camp when the two airplanes collided at an altitude about 1,760 ft mean sea level over a remote area in day, visual meteorological conditions. The airline transport pilot and two passengers onboard the Cessna and the commercial pilot and the passenger onboard the Piper were fatally injured; both airplanes were destroyed. Postaccident examination revealed signatures consistent with the Cessna's outboard left wing initially impacting the Piper's right wing forward strut while in level cruise flight. Examination revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of either airplane. Neither pilot was in communication with an air traffic control facility and they were not required to be. A performance and visibility study indicated that each airplane would have remained a relatively small, slow-moving object in the other pilot's window (their fuselages spanning less than 0.5° of the field of view, equivalent to the diameter of a penny viewed from about 7 ft away) until about 10 seconds before the collision, at which time it would have appeared to grow in size suddenly (the "blossom" effect). From about 2 minutes before the collision, neither airplane would have been obscured from the other airplane pilot's (nominal) field of view by cockpit structure, although the Cessna would have appeared close to the bottom of the Piper's right wing and near the forward edge of its forward wing strut. The Cessna was Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out equipped; the Piper was not ADS-B equipped, and neither airplane was equipped with any cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI). CDTI data would have presented visual information regarding the potential conflict to both pilots beginning about 2 minutes 39 seconds and auditory information beginning about 39 seconds before the collision, providing adequate time for the pilots to react. The see-and-avoid concept requires a pilot to look through the cockpit windows, identify other aircraft, decide if any aircraft are collision threats, and, if necessary, take the appropriate action to avert a collision. There are inherent limitations of this concept, including limitations of the human visual and information processing systems, pilot tasks that compete with the requirement to scan for traffic, the limited field of view from the cockpit, and environmental factors that could diminish the visibility of other aircraft. Given the remote area in which the airplanes were operating, it is likely that the pilots had relaxed their vigilance in looking for traffic. The circumstances of this accident underscore the difficultly in seeing airborne traffic by pilots; the foundation of the "see and avoid" concept in VMC, even when the cockpit visibility offers opportunities to do so, and particularly when the pilots have no warning of traffic in the vicinity. Due to the level of trauma sustained to the Cessna pilot, the autopsy was inconclusive for the presence of natural disease. It was undetermined if natural disease could have presented a significant hazard to flight safety. See-and-Avoid Concept According to Title 14 CFR 91.113, "Right-of-Way Rules," "when weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft." In addition, FAA AC 90-48D, "Pilots' Role in Collision Avoidance," which was in effect at the time of the accident, stated that the see-and-avoid concept requires vigilance at all times by each pilot, regardless of whether the flight is conducted under instrument flight rules or VFR.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Piper PA18 final · quoted from the NTSB record
The Cessna had departed about 3 minutes prior on a scheduled passenger flight and the Piper was en route to a remote hunting camp when the two airplanes collided at an altitude about 1,760 ft mean sea level over a remote area in day, visual meteorological conditions. The airline transport pilot and two passengers onboard the Cessna and the commercial pilot and the passenger onboard the Piper were fatally injured; both airplanes were destroyed. Postaccident examination revealed signatures consistent with the Cessna's outboard left wing initially impacting the Piper's right wing forward strut while in level cruise flight. Examination revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of either airplane. Neither pilot was in communication with an air traffic control facility and they were not required to be. A performance and visibility study indicated that each airplane would have remained a relatively small, slow-moving object in the other pilot's window (their fuselages spanning less than 0.5° of the field of view, equivalent to the diameter of a penny viewed from about 7 ft away) until about 10 seconds before the collision, at which time it would have appeared to grow in size suddenly (the "blossom" effect). From about 2 minutes before the collision, neither airplane would have been obscured from the other airplane pilot's (nominal) field of view by cockpit structure, although the Cessna would have appeared close to the bottom of the Piper's right wing and near the forward edge of its forward wing strut. The Cessna was Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out equipped; the Piper was not ADS-B equipped, and neither airplane was equipped with any cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI). CDTI data would have presented visual information regarding the potential conflict to both pilots beginning about 2 minutes 39 seconds and auditory information beginning about 39 seconds before the collision, providing adequate time for the pilots to react. The see-and-avoid concept requires a pilot to look through the cockpit windows, identify other aircraft, decide if any aircraft are collision threats, and, if necessary, take the appropriate action to avert a collision. There are inherent limitations of this concept, including limitations of the human visual and information processing systems, pilot tasks that compete with the requirement to scan for traffic, the limited field of view from the cockpit, and environmental factors that could diminish the visibility of other aircraft. Given the remote area in which the airplanes were operating, it is likely that the pilots had relaxed their vigilance in looking for traffic. The circumstances of this accident underscore the difficultly in seeing airborne traffic by pilots; the foundation of the "see and avoid" concept in VMC, even when the cockpit visibility offers opportunities to do so, and particularly when the pilots have no warning of traffic in the vicinity. Due to the level of trauma sustained to the Cessna pilot, the autopsy was inconclusive for the presence of natural disease. It was undetermined if natural disease could have presented a significant hazard to flight safety. See-and-Avoid Concept According to Title 14 CFR 91.113, "Right-of-Way Rules," "when weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft." In addition, FAA AC 90-48D, "Pilots' Role in Collision Avoidance," which was in effect at the time of the accident, stated that the see-and-avoid concept requires vigilance at all times by each pilot, regardless of whether the flight is conducted under instrument flight rules or VFR.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Cessna 208 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during enroute defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot of other aircraft
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 18,810 hours in all; 12,808 in this make and model; 147 in the last 90 days; 58 in the last 30 days; 18,560 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: March 18, 2016
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 811 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, July 18, 2016
- Maximum gross weight: 9,062 lb
- Seats: 11
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-140 (turboprop); 1,014 hours total
- Operator: Hageland Aviation Services, Inc.
The flight
- Departed from: RSH Russian Mission AK
- Destination: MDM Marshall AK
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 52°F (11°C), dew point 46°F (8°C)
- Altimeter: 30.09 inHg
- Observation at 5:56 pm from PARS, 5 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 2 |
The factual record for the Piper PA18 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during enroute defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot of other aircraft
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 5,000 hours in all
- Last flight review: September 1, 2015
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: frt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,559.2 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, May 26, 2016
- Maximum gross weight: 1,750 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-320-B2B (piston); 6,054 hours total
- Operator: Renfro'S Alaskan Adventures, Inc.
The flight
- Departed from: BET Bethel AK
- Destination: Marshall AK
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.