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Accidents · NTSB ANC12FA066 · Final report

Piper PA-32R-301 accident near Fairbanks, Alaska, July 19, 2012

On July 19, 2012, a Piper PA-32R-301, registered N432LT, was destroyed in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Fairbanks, Alaska. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The noninstrument-rated pilot's decision to continue visual flight into instrument meteorological conditions likely leading to spatial disorientation, which resulted in a loss of airplane control and in-flight structural failure.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 19, 2012
Place
Fairbanks, Alaska · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA-32R-301 · all PA-32R-301s on the register
Registration
N432LT · no longer on the register · serial 3213099
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The noninstrument-rated pilot and one passenger were flying as part of a group of three airplanes on a sightseeing tour. The accident airplane and one of the other airplanes in the group encountered deteriorating weather and made an unplanned stop at an airport along their route of flight. After receiving fuel and updated enroute weather, both pilots decided to depart for their original destination. During the second attempt to fly to the destination airport, the two airplanes again encountered deteriorating weather conditions. The pilot of the accident airplane decided to maintain visual flight rules, and the pilot of the other airplane requested an instrument flight rules clearance to the destination airport. A short time later, the pilot of the accident airplane contacted air traffic control and stated that he was having difficulty maintaining visual conditions and subsequently requested an instrument clearance. The pilot reported climbing through 6,800 feet for 7,000 feet, then no further communications were received. The wreckage was located on a brush- and tundra-covered hillside; the left wing had separated from the airplane inflight, followed by the separation of other airplane components before impact. Given the reported weather, the pilot's lack of an instrument rating, his request for an instrument clearance, the wreckage path, and the lack of any mechanical anomalies, it is likely that the pilot encountered instrument meteorological conditions and became spatially disoriented while attempting to climb to a higher altitude. It is also likely that the pilot then lost control of the airplane, and entered a steep spiraling dive from which he was unable to recover. During the dive, the aerodynamic forces increased to the point that the left wing separated from the airplane, which tightened the spiral, and led to the in-flight structural failure of other sections of the airplane.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. VFR encounter with IMC during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Loss of control in flight during enroute (cruise)
  3. Aircraft structural failure during enroute (cruise)
  4. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusio › Spatial disorientation › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Experience/qualifications › Qualification/certification › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Directional control › Not attained/maintained
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Below VFR minima › Contributed to outcome

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 804 hours in all
  • Last flight review: September 17, 2011
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,243 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, June 26, 2012
  • Seats: 7
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Lycoming IO-540 SER (piston); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground
  • Operator: West Valley Flying Club

The flight

  • Departed from: PFYU Fort Yukon AK
  • Destination: PAFA Fairbanks AK
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 190° at 3 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: overcast at 7,000 ft; a few clouds at 1,700 ft
  • Temperature: 57°F (14°C), dew point 46°F (8°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.95 inHg
  • Observation at 7:53 pm from PAFA, 43 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.