Piper PA-31-350 accident near Kodiak, Alaska, January 5, 2008
On January 5, 2008 at about 5:43 pm local time, a Piper PA-31-350, registered N509FN, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Kodiak, Alaska (Kodiak airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 6 people were killed, 3 people were seriously injured and 1 person had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of company maintenance personnel to ensure that the airplane's nose baggage door latching mechanism was properly configured and maintained, resulting in an inadvertent opening of the nose baggage door in flight. Contributing to the accident were the lack of information and guidance available to the operator and pilot regarding procedures to follow should a baggage door open in flight and an inadvertent aerodynamic stall.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- January 5, 2008 · about 5:43 pm local time · cases in 2008
- Place
- Kodiak, Alaska · Kodiak · cases near this airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 6 people were killed, 3 people were seriously injured and 1 person had minor injuries.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA-31-350 · all PA-31-350s on the register
- Registration
- N509FN · no longer on the register · serial 31-7952162
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airline transport pilot and nine passengers were departing in a twin-engine airplane on a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 air taxi flight from a runway adjacent to an ocean bay. According to the air traffic control tower specialist on duty, the airplane became airborne about midway down the runway. As it approached the end of the runway, the pilot said he needed to return to the airport, but gave no reason. The specialist cleared the airplane to land on any runway. As the airplane began a right turn, it rolled sharply to the right and began a rapid, nose- and right-wing-low descent. The airplane crashed about 200 yards offshore and the fragmented wreckage sank in the 10-foot-deep water. Survivors were rescued by a private float plane. A passenger reported that the airplane's nose baggage door partially opened just after takeoff, and fully opened into a locked position when the pilot initiated a right turn towards the airport. The nose baggage door is mounted on the left side of the nose, just forward of the pilot's windscreen. When the door is opened, it swings upward, and is held open by a latching device. To lock the baggage door, the handle is placed in the closed position and the handle is then locked by rotating a key lock, engaging a locking cam. With the locking cam in the locked position, removal of the key prevents the locking cam from moving. The original equipment key lock is designed so the key can only be removed when the locking cam is engaged. Investigation revealed that the original key lock on the airplane's forward baggage door had been replaced with an unapproved thumb-latch device. A Safety Board materials engineer's examination revealed evidence that a plastic guard inside the baggage compartment, which is designed to protect the door's locking mechanism from baggage/cargo, appeared not to be installed at the time of the accident. The airplane manufacturer's only required inspection of the latching system was a visual inspection every 100 hours of service. Additionally, the mechanical components of the forward baggage door latch mechanism were considered "on condition" items, with no predetermined life-limit. On May 29, 2008, the Federal Aviation Administration issued a safety alert for operators (SAFO 08013), recommending a visual inspection of the baggage door latches and locks, additional training of flight and ground crews, and the removal of unapproved lock devices. In July 2008, Piper Aircraft issued a mandatory service bulletin (SB 1194, later 1194A), requiring the installation of a key lock device, mandatory recurring inspection intervals, life-limits on safety-critical parts of forward baggage door components, and the installation of a placard on the forward baggage door with instructions for closing and locking the door to preclude an in-flight opening. Postaccident inspection discovered no mechanical discrepancies with the airplane other than the baggage door latch. The airplane manufacturer's pilot operating handbook did not contain emergency procedures for an in-flight opening of the nose baggage door, nor did the operator's pilot training program include instruction on the proper operation of the nose baggage door or procedures to follow in case of an in-flight opening of the door. Absent findings of any other mechanical issues, it is likely the door locking mechanism was not fully engaged and/or the baggage shifted during takeoff, and contacted the exposed internal latching mechanism, allowing the cargo door to open. With the airplane operating at a low airspeed and altitude, the open baggage door would have incurred additional aerodynamic drag and further reduced the airspeed. The pilot's immediate turn towards the airport, with the now fully open baggage door, likely resulted in a sudden increase in drag, with a substantive decrease in airspeed, and an aerodynamic stall.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during initial climb defining event
- Aerodynamic stall/spin during initial climb
- Loss of control in flight during initial climb
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Doors › Cargo/baggage doors › Incorrect service/maintenance other cases naming the airframe structure
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Repair › Maintenance personnel
- factor Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Training › Emergency proc training › Manufacturer
- factor Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Availability of policy/proc › Manufacturer
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter
- Flight time: 9,437 hours in all; 400 in this make and model; 179 in the last 90 days; 74 in the last 30 days
- Last flight review: September 1, 2007
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 13,130 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, December 18, 2007; 27 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 7,368 lb
- Seats: 10
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Lycoming TIO-540 Serie (piston); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Lycoming TIO-540 Serie (piston); 0 hours total
- Operator: Servant Air, Inc.
The flight
- Departed from: ADQ Kodiak AK at 5:43 pm
- Destination: HOM Homer AK
- Runway 36, 5,013 ft by 150 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 300° at 17 knots, gusting 26
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds at 1,600 ft
- Temperature: 25°F (-4°C), dew point 14°F (-10°C)
- Altimeter: 28.96 inHg
- Observation at 5:53 pm from ADQ
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 5 | 3 | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
23 documents, released by the NTSB on February 19, 2009. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N509FN: not on the register today · the record of its deregistration
- Piper PA-31 Navajo and Chieftain 934 registered today · the model family and its accident history
- Piper 44,840 aircraft on the register
- Engine: Lycoming TIO-540 Serie 5,074 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Engine: Lycoming TIO-540 Serie 5,074 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Kodiak Airport · nearest airport
- Homer Airport · bound for
- Accidents and incidents in Alaska 5,932 since 1982 · 823 in the last ten years
- Alaska 9,144 aircraft registered
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ANC08MA038.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
