Piper PA-31-350 accident near Anchorage, Alaska, September 11, 2000
On September 11, 2000 at about 9:13 pm local time, a Piper PA-31-350, registered N27179, was substantially damaged in an accident near Anchorage, Alaska (Anchorage International airport). It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of the TRACON air traffic controller to issue a wake turbulence advisory to the pilot, and a wake turbulence encounter by the pilot. Factors in the accident were the pilot's inadequate visual lookout, the failure of the TRACON controller to notice an aircraft as a heavy jet, and insufficiently defined TRACON procedures used to facilitate prearranged coordination of aircraft through radar segments.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 11, 2000 · about 9:13 pm local time
- Place
- Anchorage, Alaska · Anchorage International · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA-31-350 · all PA-31-350s on the register
- Registration
- N27179 · no longer on the register · serial 31-7752091
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
An airline transport pilot was returning from a charter flight in a twin-engine airplane and was in radio and radar contact with an FAA TRACON approach controller in Class C airspace. The pilot was given air traffic advisories for airplanes departing a satellite airport, but was not given an advisory about a McDonnell Douglas MD-11 airplane that was on final approach to land at the Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport. The pilot said he did not specifically recall seeing the MD-11. The accident airplane encountered wake turbulence from the MD-11 that produced a violent vertical wind shear. The pilot then noticed the MD-11 airplane. After landing at a satellite airport, he notified the FAA of the wake turbulence event. Radar data revealed the MD-11 was on the glide path for landing at Anchorage, and the pilot of the MD-11 was in radio contact with the tower. The accident airplane crossed the flight path of the MD-11 at a 90 degree angle, about 900 feet msl, and about 55 seconds after the MD-11. When the accident airplane encountered the wake turbulence, it was 300 feet below the flight path of the MD-11 and separated by 2.47 miles. A postflight inspection of the airplane revealed substantial damage to the right wing. The Anchorage International Airport is within Class C airspace, which has a high volume mix of air carrier, general aviation, and military aircraft. Class D, Class E, and Class G airspace surround, and underlie the Class C area. In addition, the airspace is subject to Federal Aviation Regulation Part 93 (FAR 93). FAR 93 outlines geographic segments and special rules for operating at airports within the area. An air traffic controller is required to separate small aircraft operating behind heavy aircraft by 5 miles, and issue traffic advisories, and safety alerts including wake turbulence cautionary advisories. The TRACON utilizes certain prearranged coordination procedures to improve the traffic flow of aircraft through TRACON radar segments. Controllers are required to view a full data block on their radar screen when using prearranged coordination. The air traffic controller did not have a full data block displayed. The TRACON procedures manual does not contain a procedure for challenging, and verifying, the use or non-use of prearranged coordination between controllers. The air traffic controller did not notice that an aircraft designation symbol displayed on his screen indicated a heavy aircraft, and he did not issue a wake turbulence advisory. A heavy aircraft designator ('H' if assigned) is displayed on all radar data blocks (full or partial).
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 15,200 hours in all; 1,000 in this make and model; 400 in the last 90 days; 110 in the last 30 days; 14,800 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,718 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, June 20, 2000; 39 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 7,250 lb
- Seats: 8
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Lycoming IO-540-JSBD (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: Sleetmute AK at 2:00 pm
- Destination: PAMR Anchorage AK
- Runway 0
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 140° at 10 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 9,000 ft; scat at 3,100 ft
- Temperature: 52°F (11°C), dew point 43°F (6°C)
- Altimeter: 29.00 inHg
- Observation at 4:00 pm from PAN, 4 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.