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All persons listed were interviewed by NTSB personnel:

The following is a summary of conversations:

[REDACTED]

The pilot stated that he usually works as a corporate pilot for a company in St. George, Utah, flying Eclipse and Phenom turbine-powered airplanes. One of the company owners, who wanted to become a pilot, bought the accident airplane—a Cirrus SR20—about five months before the accident. The pilot went to the Cirrus Service Center in St. George, completed his training, and obtained his certification. He estimates he has about 5,000 total flight hours, with 3,000 in single-engine airplanes and 2,000 in twin-engine turbine aircraft, including 25 hours in the Cirrus. The pilot had been giving flight instruction to the owner in an Alpha trainer, with only one prior 30-minute flight together in the Cirrus.

Two days before the accident, the pilot flew with the owner to Provo, Utah, to pick up the owner's daughter. The purpose of the flight was to drop off the daughter while giving the owner more experience in the Cirrus. They departed with full fuel, as Provo's FBO had no refueling option. The pilot was seated in the right seat, the owner in the left seat, and the daughter in the aft seat, along with about 60 pounds of luggage. The pilot estimated they were 230 pounds below the maximum gross weight.

During the run-up, the pilot noticed a rough left magneto with a 150 rpm drop. Assuming spark plug fouling, he leaned the mixture for several minutes and then repeated the magneto check, which showed normal operation. On takeoff from Runway 19, the pilot felt sluggish acceleration but attributed this to the added weight, as he'd only flown solo or with one passenger before. The airplane reached 71 knots for rotation and climbed normally to about 200 feet AGL before it stopped climbing and wouldn't accelerate, though the engine sounded normal.

The pilot tried troubleshooting by cycling the throttle, adjusting the mixture, and confirming the flaps were at 50%. Despite these actions, the airplane did not accelerate. The gauges indicated an engine rpm of 2,500, and the airspeed was around 70 knots. With rising terrain ahead and no climb, the pilot banked left toward the airport. Realizing he would not make it to the runway, he focused on maintaining a controlled descent to avoid stalling. He landed off-airport on soft desert terrain, flaring aggressively to reduce ground speed. The left wing dropped low, resulting in a hard landing

that sheared off the landing gear. The airplane skidded and spun 180-270 degrees before coming to rest upright.

Immediately after stopping, the pilot saw a fire coming from the engine. He and the passengers quickly gathered their belongings and exited the airplane. The pilot attempted to extinguish the fire with a hand-held extinguisher but was unsuccessful. He noted the fire appeared to originate from the left front of the engine from his perspective. He called 911 and watched as the airplane burned, hearing three distinct pops he thought could be from the fuel tank or ballistic parachute. Law enforcement arrived about 20 minutes after the accident.

The pilot clarified that during the accident flight, the engine and propeller appeared and sounded normal but were not producing thrust. He noted that the fuel boost pump was on, though he couldn't recall which fuel tank was selected, as he had followed the checklist and switched tanks after the run-up. During the landing, the airbags did not deploy.

The pilot explained that in normal operations, he would retract the flaps after reaching 85 knots on initial climb, typically receiving an excessive RPM warning. The RPM would reach around 2,710-2,720, prompting him to reduce throttle to keep it under 2,700. He also mentioned having experienced difficulty starting the engine on several occasions, which he attributed to unfamiliarity with the airplane. The only recent maintenance performed was tire replacement.