



Memorandum

From: [REDACTED]
To: Record
Date: 25 July 2024
Subject: N134MG Mishap Pilot Statement


1. Background:

- a. My instructor, [REDACTED] and I briefed and completed a training flight in the same aircraft earlier the same day as the mishap flight. There were no anomalies.
- b. After lunch, we again briefed and began the second training flight. I began the flight with a short-field takeoff, and we practiced single-engine maneuvers and stalls in the practice area.
- c. We did many maneuvers with the Left Engine secured, but none with the Right Engine secured, and none with the gear and/or flaps extended. We had no issues maintaining altitude during the maneuvers.
- d. We returned to the airport via an instrument approach (ILS RWY 03) with both engines operating, followed by a Missed Approach Procedure back to Approach Control. We did not extend the gear during that approach because we knew we were going to land.
- e. We executed a second instrument approach (ILS RWY 03) with a simulated Right Engine failure by reducing the Manifold Pressure (MAP) to 14-15 inches of Mercury (InHg) which results in zero thrust, which simulates a failed and feathered engine.

2. Mishap Sequence:

- a. Prior to the Final Approach Fix on the second approach, we were executing the Landing Checklist and extended the landing gear, however the right main landing gear indicator did not show the gear down and locked.
- b. We raised the gear handle and all three landing gear indicated up and locked, which I confirmed visually using the mirror on the left nacelle.
- c. We again attempted to lower the gear and the indications again showed down and locked only for the left main gear and the nose gear. We swapped the bulbs in the indicators for the left and right main gear down indicators to troubleshoot a potentially failed bulb, with no change in results.
- d. The PIC then attempted to lower the gear using the emergency extension method, with no change in the indications.
- e. We transmitted to KOGD Tower that we were having a gear issue, and they approved us to fly parallel to the runway but closer to the tower so that they could visually confirm the right landing gear position. They informed us that it appeared to them as if all three gear were extended. However, neither of us pilots was convinced that the gear was truly locked down, because we experienced some oscillations and asymmetric drag on the aircraft.
- f. We and the Tower controller discussed and he approved us for delaying maneuvers to provide time for the fire trucks to be on station in case the gear collapsed on landing. Tower

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- approved an extension upwind, and then a turn to the right downwind for Runway 03, and advised us to remain below 5,500 ft MSL due to fighter traffic arriving at Hill AFB.
- g. During the delaying circle to the East, the PIC decided to secure the right engine to avoid significant damage to the propellor and engine if the right main landing gear collapsed on landing.
 - h. We completed that circle, and turned to the NE to parallel Runway 03 and extended upwind more than two miles before turning a left crosswind for a left downwind for Runway 03. The aircraft was able to maintain altitude and 92 KIAS (Blue Line or Vyse) with maximum power on the left engine.
 - i. However, when established on the downwind, we were also getting frequent over-boost annunciations that we were exceeding the Manifold Pressure (MAP) limit of 40 inches of Hg. When I retarded the throttle minutely to avoid the over-boost, the MAP would often drop dramatically to 23-25 inches. Incremental movement of the throttle would again result in another over-boost. During this time, in order to maintain altitude and airspeed, I saw a rate of descent whenever I tried to maintain Vyse, or a decay in airspeed whenever I tried to maintain altitude.
 - j. We advised tower that we intended to land immediately, and then they queried us about whether we wanted to wait until fire and rescue was in position. We declined that and maneuvered for to the South to be closer to the runway.
 - k. I advised the PIC that I could not maintain airspeed or altitude, and he took the controls when we were approximately abeam the threshold for Runway 03 still on downwind leg. At that point, it was clear that we were losing altitude so quickly that we could not turn to make a landing on the runway or the airport, so we both began looking for a survivable place to land to the West and Southwest.
 - l. At no time did we discuss restarting the right engine because there wasn't time between when we recognized the energy loss and preparing for the impact, which I estimate at less than ten seconds.
 - m. There was no time for discussion, but I believe the PIC maneuvered the aircraft away from a school and towards a road partially obscured by trees. We clipped the top of one tree, which resulted in a perceptible deceleration, then we hit a second tree, and then crashed on to the road, skidded across the road and the front yard of a house, and came to an abrupt stop when we slide sideways into a tree in the middle of that yard. I can't recall how the aircraft rotated into that orientation.
 - n. When the aircraft came to stop, the door on the right side could not be opened due to the tree that stopped us, so we exited via a large hole in the front windscreen which was shattered and mostly missing.
 - o. 



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