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All persons listed were interviewed by NTSB personnel unless otherwise stated:

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The following is a summary of conversations:

## LEFT-SEATED PILOT (LSP) INTERVIEW WITH NTSB (ZK)

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**LSP:**

So, when I fly it, normally I use ForeFlight, and that mission is recorded on the map, and you can save it, which I did, so this one's listed as Minden to Minden, dated yesterday. And so, a Form 5, you normally go out, you fly out, you do turns, coordinated turns. I then did an instrument approach in, and the instrument approach, I did a mist, I overflew the airport. Slow me down if you wish.

**ZK:**

So you did a missed, but what kind of approach were you doing?

**LSP:**

It was the RNAV 34, which is, IPRO approach. Having done that, I came around. That was the pattern here. This is 3-95. I came around and did a short-field landing on 34. And that would be this line here. And after the landing, and of course you're on the radio.

This is an uncontrolled airport. But you're on the radio making announcements of what your intentions are. And I went ahead and gave you the intention. My intention was to go back into the left downwind for Minden. And I did that. Straight out.

**LSP:**

So, having done that, I went ahead and it was a touch and go. Short field, came around, came out about where Starbucks is, did my crosswind, and then transitioned into downwind. That was my transition at this point. Looking at the time frame here, I can go ahead and pull the airplane through. I came around crosswind, , I was at 5,299 on the crosswind, came around to the end of downwind transition. The downwind is normally flown at 5,700, which is 1,000 above ground. At that point I was still climbing, I was at 5,475 at 87 knots. By the way, the time stamp on that is 9:46, by the way.

**ZK:**

9:46 and what?

**LSP:**

It was 9:46. It doesn't have seconds? No, I'm sorry. They may be somewhere, but I don't...

**ZK:**

37.

**LSP:**

Look at you, I did not know that. You've used this before. That's where the accident happened. Normal, as you know from your experience, normal downwind, this is normal downwind. I wasn't far out, I wasn't close in, that was a normal downwind pattern. Clearly, he got me right there. And by the way, I knew him, which is unfortunate.

**LSP:**

And at this point, when the accident happened, I thought the engine had blown, because I never saw him. We got a radio call about here that indicated that what I thought was a sling was entering on a 45 for 34, is what I heard. As soon as I heard that, RSP, who is in the right seat, he's an instructor pilot, we both sat up, looked out the window, and looked around. Normally the 45 is about, as you know, right here. Both of us looked up, looked for him. I asked RSP to look down at his ForeFlight on the ADS-B. There was no signature on the ADS-B.

**LSP:**

And as you've indicated, impact happened about there, 9:47, in about 38 seconds. I thought the engine had blown because I had never seen an airplane, never saw traffic. Other than the radio call, we had responded to say that CAP 2744 crossed wind to downwind. I don't remember the verbiage I used, but I would have said downwind. I didn't hear any further radio calls. Impact happened. I went ahead, and we then came in for landing on 12, dead state.

**ZK:**

So, the impact you were at, let's put it at 5,400 feet.

**LSP:**

I would think the impact was around 5,400 feet.

Okay, so that's pretty much what happened. Impact happened at 5,400 feet thereabouts. Normal, we were still climbing. Normal pattern is flown at 5,700.

**ZK:**

So, let's go back to you shooting the RNAV. Were you under the hood?

**LSP:**

No. I was never under the hood.

**ZK:**

Your goggles or anything?

**LSP:**

No, no, no impact. It was low clouds. We were not in the clouds. So there was no glare, no issue. Air was clear and calm. It was good, good flying weather.

**ZK:**

And you hear him for the first time...

**LSP:**

We heard him. ... And again, you know, I'm finding that my memory is faulty just because of the, whether it be stress or whatever, is I think we heard him right about here. And that's when both of us popped up, looked out, neither of us were heads down. That airplane, being the G1000, we fly like VFR pilots just because that's CAP. And so our eyes are outside.

**ZK:**

And you didn't recognize his voice?

**LSP:**

I was not aware. I was not aware that it was Don Bartholomew, nor did I hear Globe Swift. I thought I heard Sling when I heard it.

**ZK:**

And you were looking in this direction?

**LSP:**

Normally, someone on the 45, when I... You know this. Normally the 45 comes in about right here. When I'm looking for traffic, when I'm on 34, I'm looking in that direction for traffic coming in, as well as listening on the radio.

**ZK:**

Is that a normal height for you to be at? You said normally...

**LSP:**

I'm climbing. So I've taken off, even though I'm under climb power, that I'm still climbing, I don't usually get to a pattern altitude until I get to about maybe abeam of numbers at 5,700. So clearly, the way it came in, he came in, forgive me, this is a guess. He came in this way. It became non-standard.

**ZK:**

And so, the first thing you see is...

**LSP:**

And by the way, and forgive me, you've asked me regarding the approach. Always, what I do on any instrument check rides, the person in the right seat is looking outside, they are scanning for traffic. RSP, being an instructor pilot, knows that, and he would have done that. So in this case, I didn't have goggles on, I did not have a hood on, and I was scanning the outside.

**ZK:**

Were either of you wearing sunglasses?

**LSP:**

Both of us were wearing sunglasses. No, forgive me, it wasn't bright. I'm wearing the glasses I'm wearing right now, which do darken with sun. There was no glare issue because of the overcast. It was darker than today.

**ZK:**

How tall are you?

**LSP:**

6'2".

**ZK:**

How is your iPad mounted?

**LSP:**

Normally, what I do is I have a strap that comes around, and it's strapped to my knee. It doesn't block a window. I don't like flying that way though. For me, the iPad is secondary—my scan is outside, and the G1000 is primary.

**ZK:**

What were you planning on doing, continuing, going around? Were you going to do another short field?

**LSP:**

No, we were done. When it happened, I gave you the time. We were within the defined limits of a Form 5, and I was told that I passed. We were going to land the airplane. By the way, my experience is I have greater than 1,600 hours. A lot of high-performance time, a lot of instrument time, and so this is not to mention the glider pattern.

**ZK:**

Yeah. Is this a normal distance for you?

**LSP:**

In what way?

**ZK:**

Normal distance for you to go north?

**LSP:**

Yeah, that's depending upon what the traffic loading is. If it's heavy traffic loading, I may expand it out a little bit. This one was true just because it was a missed approach. Rather than doing the standard missed approach, we elected to go back into the pattern, and it was offset a little bit. But in terms of how close we are to the runway, that's about right.

**ZK:**

Well, you went missed and then did a lap around, and then...

**LSP:**

Oh, I'm sorry. That is correct. So, in this case, the RNAV 34 did the missed, came around, did a short field. Short field. It was touch and go. Once the short field was done, I accelerated down the runway. There's plenty of runway, and I got into position.

**ZK:**

So when you said that you didn't know that you hit anyone, what were the first indications? What happened as you're climbing and turning to downwind?

**LSP:**

About here, my first indication was a bang. My initial reaction was that the engine blew. I did not see any, other than being aware of that traffic, not knowing where he was. Though, at that point, I was pretty heavily loaded because we had oil on the windscreen, and the cowling had folded up over the windscreen.

**ZK:**

What side of the cowling, do you know?

**LSP:**

It was on the right side. Actually, the entire cowling came up, and at that point, RSP, being the check pilot, took over. He was looking through the oil access door and also looking out to the right. But at that point, both of us were pretty heavily loaded because of the loss of the prop. There were heavy vibrations. CAP is pretty good in terms of crew coordination, so we went through the shutdown procedure. We talked about fuel isolation. We talked about where to land. It was decided that we'd go for Runway 12 based on altitude, airspeed, and the rest, and then we went for it.

**ZK:**

Did you declare an emergency?

**LSP:**

No. The "Mayday" happened about on the runway when we touched down. Okay, but that was based on workload. If we had had a higher altitude, we were only, I don't know, 800 feet up, there wasn't much time. That was an interesting exercise.

**ZK:**

Did RSP see anything out the window either?

**LSP:**

Well, he did because he's the one that was aiming at the runway. He told me, looking through the oil access door, that about here it blew off. You can see on the airplane, there's a little damage to the tail where it hit the tail.

**ZK:**

But how did you know it hit the tail?

**LSP:**

Just looking at the damage to the airplane. I didn't hear anything. It was interesting. So it did blow off about here, and even

with the oil on the windshield, it became easier to see. Both of them blew off. This airplane, the cowling comes off as one piece. I think I heard it was recovered.

**LSP:**

87 knots, that's about right. Then we brought it down to 80. That's the most efficient. When you talk to RSP, he'll probably just tell you that he set it up for visual flight because of all the circumstances.

**ZK:**

Do you remember seeing smoke at all?

**LSP:**

Hearsay only. I did not see it. I didn't see anything in that airplane. Somebody told me they saw a ball of fire after the accident. I have no idea beyond that. I'm just hoping that he died on impact—that's my hope.

**ZK:**

And then, what other things did you have in the cockpit? Notepads, anything like that? Is there anything else on your knee board?

**LSP:**

Of course, I had my headset, obviously.

**ZK:**

Is that noise cancellation?

**LSP:**

It is noise, it's a Bose noise cancellation headset. I had it because this was a simple Form 5, and it's pretty well defined. I have the structure of a Form 5 on here, but I did not bring it up. So most of the time, I would do all my notes through ForeFlight. In this case, because it was a simple check ride, I did not. So there was no clutter in the airplane.

**ZK:**

And does RSP have anything?

**LSP:**

What RSP would have is a knee board, including a checklist of what a Form 5 includes. He would have been checking boxes during the flight. During the time of the accident, I don't remember seeing that board. I don't know where it went. He probably threw it on the floor, but you can ask him.

**ZK:**

And what screen are you looking at on the G1000?

**LSP:**

The PFD is simple, a standard setup, and if you wish, it's still operational. We can bring it up on the MFD. I had the flight plan up, but that, to me, wasn't part of my scan. I wasn't interested in the flight plan at that point. My interest during that time would be looking at power settings, TIT (Turbine Inlet Temperature), EGT (Exhaust Gas Temperature), and cylinder head temperatures. At this point, we were on climb power, so I had full mixture, not full throttle. I was probably at 30 inches manifold pressure. RPM, of course, would be top of green, around 2,500 RPM during the climb. I would have maintained that until I got to pattern altitude.

**ZK:**

At what point did you retract your flaps?

**LSP:**

We did not. We never had flaps on the landing. I offered to RSP during the approach that, in a short field, I would use them, but in this scenario, we elected not to use flaps. So there were no flaps deployed.

**ZK:**

When you said low clouds, was it like this, where it's mixed, or was it just overcast?

**LSP:**

No, it was a solid deck. It was 8,000 AGL. We were never in the clouds. The entire check ride was conducted out of the clouds, including the simulated RNAV approach coming in. In fact, when we went over IPRO, we did not fly it at the listed 13,500 feet. We flew it lower, I think, around 8,500 or so.

**ZK:**

And so, when you heard him come in, all you heard was that he was coming in on the 45?

**LSP:**

When I heard his call, I thought I heard him say "Sling." Apparently, that wasn't true. He was on the 45-degree for Runway 34, left downwind, is what I heard. That means I'd be looking in a particular direction, which I mentioned earlier.

**ZK:**

And you said there was light wind. Was it light wind favoring 34, or is that just the preferred runway here?

**LSP:**

Runway 34 is the default because most people like it. My memory is that it was calm, less than 5 knots at that time. We planned for Runway 34, and I did glance at the wind sock. It didn't show full display, so it looked close to calm.

#### LEFT-SEATED PILOT (LSP) INTERVIEW WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER (LEO)

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**LEO:**

Okay. Can you briefly describe for me the events that happened today?

**LSP:**

Yeah, so we were flying what's called a Form 5, which we do every year. At the tail end of it, I had made an instrument approach into Runway 34 and did a missed approach at the end. We were on crosswind, announced the crosswind, which is a 90-degree turn, and then we announced the turn to downwind. At that point, we heard the other airplane announce they were on a 45 for downwind.

**LEO:**

Understood.

**LSP:**

Both of us sat up looking for them, including checking the ADS-B. ADS-B shows aircraft locations. I made an announcement immediately that we were on downwind, and then—boom.

**LEO:**

Okay. When you say you shot your missed approach, did you actually go to minimums and then depart, or did you make contact with the runway and then depart?

**LSP:**

Good question, thanks for asking that. No, I went down to decision height and overflow the runway. So what I do is fly the length of the runway, offset to the right so I can see the runway. When I got to the end of the runway, I turned across.

**LEO:**

Were you making an ascent, or were you holding a steady altitude while you were flying the length?

**LSP:**

I was climbing.

**LEO:**

You were climbing.

**LSP:**

Yes, I was climbing from decision height, which was 5,700 feet, and I climbed up to pattern altitude, which is about 5,800 feet.

**LEO:**

Got it. So were you still climbing when you turned onto downwind, or had you already reached pattern altitude?

**LSP:**

I had reached pattern altitude. I looked down and saw I was at 5,800 feet.

**LEO:**

So you were at pattern altitude when you made your turn onto crosswind?

**LSP:**

Yes, I was at pattern altitude, and I turned crosswind to downwind.

**LEO:**

Okay. After the impact occurred, what happened next?

**LSP:**


After the impact, my initial reaction—since I never saw the other airplane—was that we had lost our engine. I thought we had. The cowling came up, so visibility became very poor. We identified Runway 12 as the runway to land on, declared an emergency, and came in for landing on 12.

**LEO:**

Okay.

Emails:

Confirmed N844CP's DataLogger 240916 last entry was @ 16:46:42 (09:46:42 pst) suggesting that accident occurred on the crosswind ~5300' @ 101kts. After the impact, as per standard CAP emergency procedures, mixture was pulled & the master shutoff to mitigate fire hazards. The DataLogger SD Card resides in G1000's MFD i& powered by the primary 28vdc bus. The G1000 PFD, powered the emergency bus, continued to be active



## RIGHT-SEATED PILOT (RSP) INTERVIEW WITH NTSB (ZK)

### RSP:

So, we were flying a Form 5, and we flew high maneuvers and then went and, uh...CAP Form 5 is an annual check ride, and it's fundamental flight maneuvers. We have a list that I can provide if you want to see it. It's just a list of flight maneuvers and procedures to make sure that the pilot is competent and following CAP procedures and regulations. So, we went out, flew high maneuvers—steep turns, stalls, slow flight, etc. Then we vectored onto the final approach fix for the RNAV GPS Runway 34 approach. We flew that in here to a low approach, went around the pattern, and had them initiate a missed approach.

### RSP:

Almost immediately, I broke them off the missed approach, told them to turn left into the pattern because we were going to do pattern work—takeoffs and landings according to the list. That wasn't a surprise; he knew that was going to occur at some point. So, we went around and did a touch-and-go, and that's when the problem occurred. After that touch-and-go, we touched down, climbed out, and turned left crosswind. We were climbing out there.

**RSP:**

As we were turning crosswind to downwind, there was a radio call on CTAF, and it was the other airplane. LSP and I both thought he said he was on the 45 for Runway 34. Generally, that means if you're on downwind, you're going to look west, you're going to look north and west. So, I looked in that direction out my side window as LSP was making that crosswind-to-downwind turn. I was looking out the side window, then scanning out the windscreen, and looking at the MFD for a traffic target. I glanced at the MFD, and there were no traffic targets at all.

**RSP:**

Looked back out, scanned all the way around the airplane, and LSP and I exchanged a few words—"Do you see him?" "I don't see him," that kind of thing. Just seconds after LSP had sat up taller in his seat, he punched the mic button and said, "CAP 2744, left downwind, Runway 34," and that's when we started looking harder. A few seconds later, we had the impact. It was a big impact—a lot of shaking, big noise, and stuff all over the windshield. Then the engine cowl peeled up and came back against the windscreen, and oil was all over the windscreen.

**RSP:**

I instinctively got on the flight controls. LSP said, "What happened?" I said, "We hit him. We collided with him." At that point, I said, "I've got it, I've got it, I've got it." I was flying the airplane, and LSP kind of sat back and asked, "What do you need?" I was looking for a place to land out near where the other airplane ended up, as well as looking to get back to the airport. I really wanted to get back on the airfield.

**ZK:**

Take me through it. I'm having a hard time understanding—you're climbing out, you're on upwind?

**RSP:**

Yeah, upwind was uneventful. We turned left crosswind. LSP was making the radio calls. About ten minutes prior, when we were on the instrument approach, I told LSP I'd do the position reports. I was punching the mic button, and nothing happened. I had radio function earlier, but at that point, my radio was dead. So, I told him, "I've got no mic, so you have the communications now." LSP was good with that.

**RSP:**

All the radio calls after that were done by him. I tried the mic button a few more times, but it never came back. So, touch-and-go, upwind, crosswind, normal and uneventful, and then we were making the turn from crosswind to downwind. We were probably established on downwind, more or less wings level, when the collision occurred. That's the best of my recollection—it was a big bang. I remember more after that than I do before that.

**ZK:**

Your first thought was, "We hit the airplane?"

**RSP:**

Absolutely.

**ZK:**

Did you see any part of it?

**RSP:**

No, I never saw the airplane. I never saw any part of that airplane.

**ZK:**

Did you and LSP discuss that?

**RSP:**

Yes, at length. I think we even discussed it in the cockpit—"Did you see him?" "No, I didn't see him," that kind of thing.

**ZK:**

And after that occurred, what did you do to the airplane?

**RSP:**

I got on the flight controls, and I wanted to see if we had control because, at that point, I thought we were going to spin in. So, I was maneuvering the airplane in the general direction of Runway 12, but I couldn't see in front of me. There was a hole in the engine cowl where the oil fill door is. The door was gone, but I could see a little through that hole. I knew the airport was over there, so I was looking out the side window and the windscreen, also looking at Uhart Ranch as a place to put it down.

**RSP:**

It was back and forth—Uhart Ranch, the airfield, Uhart Ranch, the airfield. At some point, I determined that the airplane was controllable, and I decided I could make the airfield, so I went for it. I just kept the nose down and kept it pointed towards the airfield. I didn't secure any systems; I just wanted to keep what I had going. I thought about the emergency checklist—fuel, master, mags, etc.—but I just wanted to keep the airplane going towards where my help was, where it was flat.

**RSP:**

So, I got down into ground effect a little bit short of the runway and had a good amount of speed. I never looked at the airspeed, not once, just flew by attitude. Got down into ground effect, rode the ground effect to the runway, to the pavement, landed, got on the brakes hard because I didn't know if we were on fire or not or even if we had landing gear. When we stopped, I said, "Egress, let's shut everything off and egress." I pulled my handheld radio off my belt and did a mayday call. It was immediately answered by HUD Aviation. I requested EMS and fire to respond and gave a rough location of where I thought the other plane was—northwest of the airfield, on the crosswind to downwind corner. I told them to send fire and EMS out there. She got right back to me with an affirmative response. That's pretty much where it ended. We got out, set the brake, and got out.

**ZK:**

Did you ever see any fire?

**RSP:**

No, we weren't on fire. A witness told me the other plane was on fire when it went in. He said he saw it in two pieces, on fire and nose down. That was a HUD Aviation employee.

**ZK:**

Do you remember any other calls from the other airplane?

**RSP:**

No. There was only that one call. None preceding, and none after that I heard. Well, certainly none after the impact.

**ZK:**

If he was further out, what radio column would he be on if he wasn't on his local frequency?

**RSP:**

Oh, you mean what radio frequency?

**ZK:**

Yeah.

**RSP:**

Based on my knowledge of the area and where he was based, 122.9 is the frequency for his airfield, or Carson City, which uses 123.0. But he was on 123.05, which we were also on. We communicated with one of our other CAP planes that morning before returning to the airfield to do airwork. Our radios were working, because we communicated with the other airplane.

**ZK:**

Do you have a backup frequency where you're also listening to any of those?

**RSP:**

No, I was listening to the FM—we've got an FM radio in there with a CAP channel. I had that on. I tested it. That's one of

the ways I knew my mic button had worked earlier: I keyed the repeater and listened for the kickback. So, I don't know what happened with the button—it just didn't feel right when it wasn't working. It was like it was jammed.

**ZK:**

And when you say you were also on the FM radio with the CAP channel, what is that?

**RSP:**

Oh, I was just monitoring it. We can transmit on it, but CAP has a proprietary FM system so they can do all their search and rescue coordination without being on the air band.

**ZK:**

Yeah, I get that. Was there anyone else that you were talking to that day?

**RSP:**

On the radio?

**ZK:**

Yeah, or do you recall anyone else being in the area?

**RSP:**

I recall listening to other traffic that was in the pattern when we were departing. There were a couple of targets on the way out when we were departing. I heard them, but we didn't talk to them. We did our usual calls in the blind—just the announcements on CTAF. Those will be on the tape.

**ZK:**

I'm surprised they record everything here.

**RSP:**

At this point, every airport has incidents, so we rely on it heavily because of incidents. If there's ever a question, we pull the tape. I worked in fire and EMS for 40 years, so I'm familiar with pulling the tape whenever there's a question.

**ZK:**

How many hours do you have?

**RSP:**

Just shy of 1,600. I can provide you with those statements I gave to the FAA this morning with a breakdown of my hours and experience.

**ZK:**

I'm also going to send you an accident form, but just out of curiosity, how many hours did you have in the 206?

**RSP:**

A hundred hours as of yesterday in that 206.

**ZK:**

What about total 206 time?

**RSP:**

That's all my 206 time.

**ZK:**

Do you fly with LSP a lot?

**RSP:**

I've flown with LSP several times. We get along well, and we work as a crew very well. I think we have a good working relationship.

**ZK:**

But yesterday's check ride was more independent flying for him, right? Less crew-based?

**RSP:**

Yes, yesterday was more about him demonstrating his competencies.

**ZK:**

And he wasn't on goggles or anything like that?

**RSP:**

Not by the time we were in the pattern, no, not at all.

**ZK:**

But when he was doing the RNAV?

**RSP:**

We didn't do that with goggles yesterday. This was a new approach for us. We went out to see where it started and ended, to get a sense of the terrain.

**ZK:**

Were you both wearing sunglasses?

**RSP:**

These are prescription sunglasses.

**ZK:**

Are they tinted or polarized?

**RSP:**

They are polarized, but I don't have any issues seeing the screens with them.

**ZK:**

Was it sunny that day?

**RSP:**

Yes, it was bright, like today.

**ZK:**

When you heard him, did you hear that he was going to Runway 34, or is that just expected—that people go to 34?

**RSP:**

My best recollection is that he said Runway 34, yes.

**ZK:**

Did you hear what kind of aircraft it was?

**RSP:**

I thought it was a Sling. I didn't think it was a Globe Swift. I didn't recognize the tail number. There are two Slings that are in here every day training. I didn't catch "Swift" versus "Sling."

**ZK:**

How tall are you?

**RSP:**

Six foot.

**ZK:**

Do you fly with an iPad? Where do you mount that?

**RSP:**

Yes, I mount it on my leg. It has traffic information on it as well.

**ZK:**

Do you often get people in here that don't have ADS-B?

**RSP:**

Yes. Oh, please, I was angry about a near miss four years ago with someone who didn't have ADS-B. I made an issue of it then. But yes, it happens.

**ZK:**

The distance and the traffic pattern you were in—was that pretty standard for this area?

**RSP:**

Yes, I looked at where the other airplane impacted and where I thought we were. Our ground track felt very routine for where we normally would be. I haven't looked closely at the altitudes, but it felt like we were in our normal place.

**ZK:**

What's the typical traffic pattern altitude here?

**RSP:**

5,700 feet.

**ZK:**

Do you usually fly above or below that?

**RSP:**

If I'm crossing over the field, I want to go at least 500 feet above pattern altitude and then come back on a 45-degree entry. I don't know if this is relevant to your investigation, but I noticed that in the AIM and the Pilot's Handbook, the diagrams for pattern entries show that if you're coming in on a 45, you should end up midfield on downwind. But what I see every day is that people end up at the crosswind-to-downwind corner, especially here in Carson City.

**ZK:**

Why do you think that is specific to this area?

**RSP:**

I don't know. There are some visual landmarks, like the water ski ponds north of here, about four miles out. People use that for their 45-degree entry and radio calls. If you come in from the water ski ponds, it puts you right at that corner where the accident happened.

**ZK:**

I see. So when you were looking, you said you first looked out the side window, then the front?

**RSP:**

Yes. I looked right first, then scanned forward, then back to the right. I didn't see him there, so I started looking left, back at the screen, and right again—then, bam, impact.

RIGHT-SEATED PILOT (RSP) INTERVIEW WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER (LEO)

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**LEO:**

RSP, can you just kind of describe for me the event that occurred?

**RSP:**

Okay. So, we were on a training flight—touch and go. Turned left onto crosswind.

**LEO:**

And which runway were you on?

**RSP:**

Runway 34.

**LEO:**

Okay, so you were departing Runway 34?

**RSP:**

Yes, departing 34 after a touch and go. Turned crosswind, that's a 90-degree turn.

**LEO:**

Gotcha.

**RSP:**

We were turning downwind when the other airplane made a radio call. LSP was flying, he hit the mic and gave our position—left downwind for Runway 34. He sat up and was looking, and I was also looking in the direction they reported on the 45. They said they were on the 45 to left downwind for Runway 34, which points towards Jacks Valley.

**LEO:**

Got it.

**RSP:**

So, we were both looking in that direction, and then bam! Never saw the airplane, never saw any part of it—just bam.

**LEO:**

And were you guys making your traffic calls for the touch and go? Upwind, crosswind, downwind?

**RSP:**

Yes, we made all our calls—upwind, crosswind, and downwind.

**LEO:**

Okay. You came in on a straight-in approach from an instrument approach, did a touch and go, and were going to continue around the patch to do more takeoffs and landings?

**RSP:**

Exactly.

**LEO:**

And you heard the other plane make a call that they were entering the 45 for downwind?

**RSP:**

Yes, the 45.

**LEO:**

Were they entering the pattern?

**RSP:**

They were on the 45 to downwind, to the best of my recollection.

**LEO:**

So, they were entering the pattern?

**RSP:**

Correct, they were not in the pattern yet; they were coming in to enter the left downwind for Runway 34.

**LEO:**

And at the time of the collision, what happens after that?

**RSP:**

Oh, big noise and a lot of shaking. We lost a prop blade, so the engine didn't run properly. There was oil all over the windshield, and the cowling was in the way. I was looking through a hole in the cowling—through the oil fill door hole. I could see enough through it to head for the runway. I told the other pilot, "I've got the airplane." It was headed for the runway, and I was checking the flight controls to see if we were going to make it or if I had to put it in the field. Once I determined we were going to make the runway, we came in and landed.

**LEO:**

And the cowling blew off, you okay?

**RSP:**

Yeah, I'm okay.

#### WRITTEN STATEMENT

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RSP Bero pertaining to the Mid Air Collision at Minden-Tahoe Airport, September 16, 2024.

On the above date, a mid-air collision occurred between N844CP and an unseen aircraft while conducting CAP Form 5 (CAP pilot evaluation). LSP Daniel and I had flown part of the flight evaluation and returned to KMEV RWY to perform a series of takeoffs and landings, as specified on the Form 5. Prior to takeoff, in the run-up area, I used my yoke microphone push-to-talk button to test the comm radios and the CAP FM radio. When I keyed the CAP FM radio, I heard a digital repeater burst and changed the FM frequency to the analog channel for the same repeater. About this time, CAP2775 was flying and made a brief contact with a Reno CAP station, possibly for a radio check. Then, I changed the audio panel mic selection to Comm 1, 123.05 CTAF and tested it. The Tx indicator illuminated, completing the test.

We departed Minden to the southeast and a series of maneuvers specified in the Form 5 were performed. I was directing the order of the maneuvers, observing LSP's performance and operation of the aircraft and aircraft systems. This was done a little more than five miles southeast of Minden to be well clear of the traffic pattern. En route to the practice area, I twice attempted to contact CAP 2775 on 123.05 CTAF, who I heard returning to Minden following a training flight south of Minden. The KMEV RNAV(GPS) RWY34 instrument approach had been flown to minimums, and an elective missed approach was initiated. I flew the aircraft for one or two minutes while LSP set up his iPad and avionics for the approach. When LSP took the controls, I vectored him to the IRPOH intermediate fix. LSP flew there and commenced the approach.

At about the ten-mile final approach point, I attempted to make a position report to Minden on CTAF 123.05. At this time, I noticed my yoke microphone push-to-talk switch did not feel right; it did not move as usual, and I checked the G1000 radio display for the Tx symbol. There was no Tx symbol, and at that time, I advised LSP of this and that he would have the

comms. I checked the audio panel to ensure I had the correct radio selected. LSP acknowledged this and made subsequent position reports. The instrument approach was then terminated, as planned, at the left crosswind leg in order to perform more maneuvers. LSP made radio position reports on CTAF 123.05 for each leg as we flew around the traffic pattern.

We flew around the normal RWY 34 left traffic pattern, and a subsequent touch-and-go was then flown. During the climb out from that touch-and-go, we turned crosswind and continued to climb for the next landing. LSP continued to make radio position reports on CTAF 123.05. Upon turning from crosswind to downwind, we heard another aircraft announce something to the effect of "NXXX on the 45 to downwind, runway 34." LSP immediately sat up in his seat and was searching through the windscreen. LSP simultaneously keyed the mic and announced "CAP2744 on left downwind, runway 34." I also searched out the windscreen and right window looking for the aircraft. This is where I believed an aircraft "on the 45" would be seen. I also glanced at the MFD for a traffic target, but no target was seen. I continued searching all the way around the aircraft for the other airplane. LSP and I exchanged brief comments about where the other airplane might be. Moments thereafter, we impacted the other airplane. Immediately I realized we had collided with another airplane. Instinctively, I took the flight controls and said, "I've got it."

The force of the impact created some confusion as to the controllability of the aircraft. There was so much vibration and imbalance that I was concerned solely with getting safely to the ground. The engine cowl was crushed upward, toward the cockpit, obscuring forward vision. Engine oil streamed onto the windscreen, further obscuring vision. While the aircraft rigging no longer felt normal, manipulation of the flight controls showed the aircraft was controllable. I was looking out the right side window for a suitable landing spot while heading back toward the airport. The engine cowl peeled away in the slipstream during glide to the runway. I was also searching for a suitable landing site in the pastures below. At some point, I determined our glide was sufficient to reach runway 12. I turned final and landed on runway 12. Aircraft fuel and power were shut off, and we exited the aircraft.

Immediately before exiting the aircraft, I used my handheld airband radio and transmitted a Mayday. Hutt Aviation answered on the first Mayday call. I requested fire and EMS to locate the other aircraft somewhere northwest of the airport. This was followed by county airport personnel responding to our location. We coordinated with them to help locate the other aircraft.

We remained at our aircraft for the entirety of the initial response and investigation. We spoke with Douglas County Sheriff detectives and FAA. Weather was clear and relatively calm. Please refer to AWOS and surveillance video for specifics. LSP and I had been watching the weather since the previous day as a system was moving through the area. NWS WX was consulted several times via the internet and ForeFlight. Flight planning was per CAP guidance and practices with a preflight briefing and discussion in the squadron building. ForeFlight Wx and NOTAMs were viewed and discussed during this briefing. A CAP Form 5 Expectations document was sent to LSP on August 31.

Equipment condition: the right side yoke push-to-talk failed during the instrument approach. I advised LSP of such and that he would have the radio as I was unable. I had used that PTT to test the FM radio at the beginning of the flight, as well as make a position report earlier during the flight. No other equipment issues were noted. There were no unusual elements causing distractions in the minutes leading up to the collision. These are the facts as I remember them.

RSP Bero September 23, 2024