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Accidents · NTSB WPR23LA306 · Final report

Boeing CH-46E accident near Springerville, Arizona, August 5, 2023

On August 5, 2023 at about 10:20 pm local time, a 1968 Boeing CH-46E (helicopter), registered N461WY, was destroyed in an accident during enroute near Springerville, Arizona. It was a firefighting flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The flight crew’s misidentification of a No. 2 torque sensing system signal conditioner malfunction when both engines were performing normally, which resulted in their attempt to execute a single-engine steep approach and landing without sufficient engine power. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the torque sensing system signal conditioner.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
August 5, 2023 · about 10:20 pm local time · cases in 2023
Place
Springerville, Arizona · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Boeing CH-46E, built 1968 · all CH-46Es on the register
Registration
N461WY · registry record · serial 154831
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Firefighting flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot in command (PIC) reported that the crew had performed firefighting water drop activities for about 2 hours. After they had filled the bucket with water and began to climb, they heard an extremely loud horn in their helmets—loud enough that it was difficult to understand what was being said. The pilot noticed that the No. 2 engine torque indicator was “maxed out” and the No. 1 torque indicator was about 60%. The pilot released the water in the bucket and initiated a turn to an open field. The pilot then slowly retarded the No. 2 engine control lever out of the FLY position (which took it out of the governing range and into manual mode) to match the torque. He noted that the torque for both engines matched about 90%. Upon turning final for his intended landing field, the pilot noticed that the descent rate increased. The pilot told his copilot to jettison the bucket as he placed the No. 2 engine control lever back into the FLY position. Subsequently, the helicopter landed hard and rolled onto its right side. The engines were shut down and the co-pilot and crew chief assisted the pilot in exiting the helicopter while a postimpact fire ensued. Postaccident examination of the wreckage showed no evidence of a preimpact engine failure or anomaly that would have precluded normal engine operation. The examination determined that a flex shaft failure did not occur because the cockpit torquemeter displayed Nf values on both engines and each engine’s flex shaft continuity was confirmed. The No. 2 engine signal conditioner, torquemeter relay box, and both torquemeters were destroyed in the post-crash fire and could not be examined. Helicopter performance calculations for the conditions at the time of the accident show that each engine was only capable of producing a maximum of 85% torque. Neither engine could produce the 100% torque required to trigger the aural overtorque tone, nor was capable of producing the 107% or higher torque required to activate the overtorque indicators on the torque meter. Accordingly, a maximum beep failure did not occur, because neither engine could produce the torque required to trigger the overtorque alarms. When the PIC heard the overtorque alarm and saw a split in the torque needles, he diagnosed the problem as a “high side failure,” meaning that the engine was producing uncommanded maximum/topping power. However, neither pilot said that they looked to see if either rotation speed of the power turbine (Nf) needles were at zero; in fact, the PIC saw that both Nf needles were reading accurate power turbine speeds. After the PIC retarded the No. 2 engine, the overtorque tone did not go away once the engines were indicating less than 100% torque. Because the pilot’s torquemeter (which records overtorque events generated by the No 2 engine signal conditioner) indicated 143% overtorque, and all 3 overtorque indicators were red, the No. 2 engine signal conditioner likely malfunctioned and provided false torque readings and overtorque warnings. Once the PIC took the No. 2 engine out of its governing range, the No. 2 engine was at minimum power, and performance calculations show that the helicopter was not single-engine capable in level flight or hover. The PIC subsequently made a steep landing approach that required more power than was available with one engine. Realizing the need for additional power, the PIC moved the No. 2 engine rapidly to the FLY position; however, that rapid movement likely activated the fail-freeze circuitry, freezing the engine at the minimum power position and switching it to manual mode. Without additional power from the No. 2 engine, the landing approach descent rate could not be arrested and resulted in a hard landing.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of engine power (partial) during enroute defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Indicating/recording systems › Central warning › Malfunction other cases naming the instruments and avionics
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Aircraft capability › Engine out capability › Attain/maintain not possible
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Flight crew

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 11,885 hours in all; 305 in this make and model; 6 in the last 30 days; 9,620 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: November 2, 2022
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 476 hours in all; 61 in this make and model; 56 in the last 90 days; 35 in the last 30 days; 339 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: June 28, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: minor injuries

Other crew

  • Seat: rear
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 13,512 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, April 3, 2023; 211 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 24,300 lb
  • Seats: 3
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine 1: Ge T58-GE-16A (turboshaft); 1,357 hours total
  • Engine 2: Ge T58-GE-16A (turboshaft); 1,889 hours total
  • Fire on the ground
  • Operator: Sky Aviation CORP

The flight

  • Departed from: KSOW Show Low AZ at 8:00 pm
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 230° at 14 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 91°F (33°C), dew point 39°F (4°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.27 inHg
  • Observation at 3:15 pm from KSOW, 44 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KSOW 052215Z AUTO 23014KT 10SM CLR 33/04 A3027 RMK AO2

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew3

Photographs from the investigation 5 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them

The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

17 documents, released by the NTSB on July 16, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

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The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/WPR23LA306.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.

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