

National Transportation Safety Board

Office of Research and Engineering

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COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER

Specialist's Factual Report

December 20, 2024

WARNING

The reader of this report is cautioned that the summary and transcript of a cockpit voice recorder audio recording is not a precise science but is the best product possible from a National Transportation Safety Board group investigative effort. The summary and transcript or parts thereof, if taken out of context, could be misleading. The summary and transcript should be viewed as an accident investigation tool to be used in conjunction with other evidence gathered during the investigation. Conclusions or interpretations should not be made using the summary and transcript as the sole source of information.

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A. ACCIDENT

Location: Ashland, Oregon
Date: April 7, 2023
Time: 1652 Pacific daylight time (PDT)
2352 coordinated universal time (UTC)
Airplane: Compagnie Daher TBM 700, private, N6924G

B. COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER SPECIALIST

Specialist: Steven Smith
Mechanical Engineer (Recorder Specialist)
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

C. FEDERAL CARRIAGE REQUIREMENTS

The event aircraft, N6924G, was operating as a Title 14 *Code of Federal Regulations* (CFR) Part 91 flight. The event aircraft was manufactured in 2021 and was operating such that it was not required to be equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR).

Although not required by regulation, a CVR was installed and operating at the time of the accident.

D. DETAILS OF THE INVESTIGATION

A CVR group was not convened. The NTSB Vehicle Recorder Division received the following combination recorder:

Recorder Manufacturer/Model:	L-3 Lightweight Data Recorder (LDR)
Part Number:	1000-1210-11
Recorder Serial Number:	000002054786

1.0 L-3 Lightweight Data Recorder Description

The L-3 LDR is a crash-protected multi-function recorder providing both flight data recorder (FDR) and CVR functions along with provisions for GPS data and video capture. Information is stored in a digital format using solid-state flash memory in an embedded USB drive as the recording medium.

The CVR portion records at a minimum, 120 minutes of digital audio stored on solid state memory modules. The audio is recorded and stored in 10-minute segments. Two channels are recorded: one channel for the pilot and front seat passenger combined, and one channel for the cockpit area microphone (CAM).

1.1 L-3 Lightweight Data Recorder Damage

Upon arrival at the laboratory, it was evident that the exterior of the recorder had sustained some heat damage as shown in figure 1. However, the unit was able to mount (connect) to laboratory computers and the audio information was extracted from the recorder normally, without difficulty.



Figure 1. Top and side view of the L-3 LDR as received by the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory.

1.2 L-3 Lightweight Recorder Audio Recording Description

The audio data downloaded normally from the recorder and produced files consistent with the logic of an L-3 LDR model 1000. Ten-minute audio segments downloaded from the recorder contained stereo audio tracks. These stereo audio tracks contained one channel that was associated with the aircraft CAM and one channel that was a combination of the pilot's and front seat passenger's hot mic. The quality of both channels was good, meaning that most of the crew conversations could be accurately and easily understood.

One of the 10-minute audio files was determined to be corrupt. Audio file 9, the corrupted file, should have recorded audio when the aircraft was on the ground at Crater Lake/Klamath Regional Airport (KLMT), Klamath Falls, Oregon. Therefore, 10 minutes of audio on the ground at KLMT was not available.

Each channel's audio quality is indicated in table 1.¹

Table 1. Audio Quality.

Channel Number	Content/Source	Quality	Duration
1	CAM	Good	1:57:44
2	Captain/First Officer	Good	1:57:44

¹ Appendix A comprises the CVR Quality Rating Scale.

1.3 L-3 Lightweight Recorder Timing and Correlation

Timing on the transcript was established by correlating the CVR events to common events on the FDR portion of the recorder. Specifically, the stall protection activations and the weight on wheels parameters were correlated from the FDR data. Due to the corrupted audio file, two different offsets were created for each flight segment:

Flight 1: CVR Local time (PDT) = CVR elapsed time + 14:54:24 (hh:mm:ss)

Flight 2: CVR Local time (PDT) = CVR elapsed time + 15:04:26 (hh:mm:ss)

Timing in the CVR summary is expressed in local time, PDT, unless otherwise noted.

1.4 L-3 Lightweight Recorder Description of Audio Events

In agreement with the investigator-in-charge, a CVR group did not convene. A summary of events from the CVR follows.

The summary is divided into two sections. The first portion of the summary will begin with the flight from Rogue Valley International-Medford Airport (KMFR), Medford, Oregon to KLMT. The second portion of the summary will include the event portion of the flight, which occurred on the flight leg from KLMT back to KMFR. During this leg, the flight instructor created a flight scenario that included a deviation to Ashland Municipal Airport-Sumner Parker Field (S03), Ashland, Oregon.

The first flight summary of events from the CVR is provided in Appendix B, table 2. The second flight summary of events from the CVR is provided in Appendix C, table 3.

Submitted by:

Steven Smith
Mechanical Engineer (Recorder Specialist)

APPENDIX A. CVR QUALITY RATING SCALE

The levels of recording quality are characterized by the following traits of the cockpit voice recorder information:

Excellent Quality Virtually all of the crew conversations could be accurately and easily understood. The transcript that was developed may indicate only one or two words that were not intelligible. Any loss in the transcript is usually attributed to simultaneous cockpit/radio transmissions that obscure each other.

Good Quality Most of the crew conversations could be accurately and easily understood. The transcript that was developed may indicate several words or phrases that were not intelligible. Any loss in the transcript can be attributed to minor technical deficiencies or momentary dropouts in the recording system or to a large number of simultaneous cockpit/radio transmissions that obscure each other.

Fair Quality The majority of the crew conversations were intelligible. The transcript that was developed may indicate passages where conversations were unintelligible or fragmented. This type of recording is usually caused by cockpit noise that obscures portions of the voice signals or by a minor electrical or mechanical failure of the CVR system that distorts or obscures the audio information.

Poor Quality Extraordinary means had to be used to make some of the crew conversations intelligible. The transcript that was developed may indicate fragmented phrases and conversations and may indicate extensive passages where conversations were missing or unintelligible. This type of recording is usually caused by a combination of a high cockpit noise level with a low voice signal (poor signal-to-noise ratio) or by a mechanical or electrical failure of the CVR system that severely distorts or obscures the audio information.

Unusable Crew conversations may be discerned, but neither ordinary nor extraordinary means made it possible to develop a meaningful transcript of the conversations. This type of recording is usually caused by an almost total mechanical or electrical failure of the CVR system.

APPENDIX B. CVR SUMMARY - FLIGHT LEG 1

The summary begins at 14:54:26 PDT with click and knob sounds observed on the CAM. For this flight, the pilot receiving instruction was the pilot flying (PF) and the instructor was the pilot monitoring (PM). In addition to flying the aircraft, the PF made all the radio communications while the PM provided training. The callsign for this aircraft was N6924G (six-niner-two-four-golf).

Table 2. CVR Summary Flight Leg 1.

Time PDT (HH:MM:SS)	Observation
14:54:26	Click and knob sounds were observed on the CAM.
14:54:32	The PM said, "seems like you've got a flow going."
14:56:28	The PM told the PF to manually enter field elevation for KLMT.
14:58:23	The PF and PM checked their oxygen masks.
15:09:42	Sounds consistent with the engine starting up were observed.
15:14:00	The PF requested instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance for a training flight to KLMT.
15:14:11	Medford ground cleared N6924G to Klamath via the JACKSON ONE DEPARTURE, and to climb and maintain 11,000 feet (ft). They would then expect 17,000 ft five minutes after. They were instructed Cascade departure frequency (124.3) and to squawk 4745. The PF read back the instructions.
15:16:10	The PF contacted Medford ground and said, "Medford ground. T-B-M six-niner-two-four-golf. holding short alpha at charlie two with information juliet for taxi."
15:16:18	Medford ground cleared the aircraft to taxi to runway 32 via taxiway alpha.
15:19:11	The PF said to the PM that he filed at too high an altitude, since it was only a 17-minute flight to KLMT.
15:24:59	The PF reported to tower that they were holding short runway 32.
15:26:24	Medford tower cleared the aircraft for departure. The PF read back the takeoff clearance.
15:27:07	The PF noted that the autothrottle was on and it was set to FMS (flight management system).
15:27:18	Sounds consistent with takeoff roll were observed on the CAM.
15:27:51	The PF said, "there's your rotate."
15:28:12	Tower instructed the aircraft to contact Cascade departure. The PF acknowledged the instruction.
15:28:34	The PF contacted Cascade departure.

Time PDT (HH:MM:SS)	Observation
15:29:06	The PF said, "you said I'm hand flying it. no autopilot?" The PM responded with, "yup. no autopilot."
15:30:50	Cascade departure instructed the aircraft to proceed on course. The PF acknowledged the instruction.
15:32:22	The aircraft was instructed to contact Seattle center (ZSE) on 127.6. The PF acknowledged the instruction.
15:32:49	The PF contacted ZSE.
15:32:56	ZSE instructed the aircraft to climb and maintain 17,000 ft and that KLMT altimeter was 29.86.
15:33:01	The PF requested an altitude change of 13,000 ft. ZSE instructed 14,000 ft, to stay atop the weather. The PF acknowledged the instruction.
15:34:32	The PM mentioned that KLMT may be using runway 32, and that they should prepare that approach. The PF agreed.
15:35:44	The crew listened to the automatic terminal information service (ATIS). The report was "November" and the broadcast reported, "two one five three zulu. winds two two zero at one six. gusts to two. visibility one zero. ceiling six thousand five hundred broken. eight thousand broken. temperature one two. dew point minus three. altimeter two niner eight six. peak winds two four zero at two eight. observed at two one one niner. R-NAV runway one four approach in use."
15:38:38	ZSE confirmed with the aircraft that they received KLMT weather and the approach request.
15:38:43	The PF acknowledged they had the latest weather and that they wanted to fly the RNAV runway 14 approach.
15:38:54	ZSE was unsure if runway 14 was open and wanted to confirm with KLMT.
15:39:53	ZSE confirmed that runway 14 was open.
15:40:01	The PF requested the VOR/DME (very high frequency omnidirectional range/distance measuring equipment) for runway 14 approach.
15:40:07	ZSE asked where they would like to start. The PF responded with a start at waypoint LEIFF and to do the arc approach.
15:40:15	ZSE instructed the aircraft to cross LEIFF at or above 11,300 ft and cleared them for the VOR/DME approach for runway 14 at KLMT. The PF acknowledged the instruction.
15:41:02	The PF was unsure if they were at LEIFF.

Time PDT (HH:MM:SS)	Observation
15:41:56	The PM advised the PF to contact ZSE to request radar position.
15:42:03	The PF asked ZSE if they were at LEIFF.
15:42:10	ZSE confirmed they were at LEIFF. The PF acknowledged and stated, "we'll start our turn."
15:42:20	The PF commented that there was a lot going on as he was conducting the arc approach into Klamath Falls. The PF requested to see the approach.
15:42:34	The PF was discussing with the PM that he could not tell the 20 miles (the distance for the arc).
15:42:49	The PM adjusted the primary flight display (PFD) bearing setting to NAV2 to show the correct distance for the arc.
15:43:00	The PM advised the PF to dial the inbound course, which the PF responded was 134.
15:43:50	ZSE contacted N6924G and requested them to inform them when they were established on the Klamath two zero DME arc. The PF advised ZSE they were established.
15:47:58	The PM asked the PF if they had KLMT in sight. The PF responded with, "yup."
15:47:59	The PM advised the PF to cancel the IFR flight. The PF contacted ZSE and stated that they had KLMT in sight.
15:48:43	ZSE cleared N6924G for a visual approach to KLMT and that they have them in contact with tower shortly. The PF acknowledged the instruction.
15:49:16	ZSE instructed N6924G to contact Kingsley tower at 133.9. The PF acknowledged the instruction.
15:49:36	The PF contacted Kingsley tower stating they were on a visual for runway 14.
15:49:49	Kingsley tower reported N6924G on a three-mile final for runway 14. The PF acknowledged.
15:50:41	"autothrottle." [electronic voice callout].
15:51:34	The PF said that the inertial separators were on.
15:52:56	The PF asked the PM that after landing, they would be taxing back. The PM confirmed that they would land and taxi back.
15:52:59	The PF commented that he wasn't making a "touch n go," for which the PM responded, "no. no. you've got a decent crosswind. so that's enough." The PF acknowledged.
15:53:16	The PF contacted Kingsley tower to report on a three-mile final for runway 14.

Time PDT (HH:MM:SS)	Observation
15:53:46	Kingsley tower stated the following, "T-B-M two four golf. one four. wind two four zero at one seven. gusts two zero. cleared to land." The PF acknowledged.
15:54:51	The 500-foot enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) electronic voice callout was observed.
15:54:58	The PM stated they had a pretty good crosswind. The PF acknowledged.
15:55:31	The PM asked the PF, "do you use the transition to slip? or do you use the kick out method?" The PF responded, "I'm gunna kick out."
15:55:46	"airspeed." [electronic voice callout].
15:55:49	"stall. stall. stall. stall." [electronic voice callout].
15:55:51	Sounds consistent with landing were observed.
15:55:54	Sounds consistent with the landing gear touching down were observed.
15:55:57	The PM said, "nicely done."
15:55:59	The PF said, "so that happens every once in a while when you land. the autoselect got dorked up."
15:56:12	Kingsley tower instructed the pilot to turn right on taxiway F and taxi to parking via taxiway G, E, and D, and to remain on tower frequency.
15:57:53	The PM said, "for the next leg...we are going to go back to Medford. you can use the autopilot. all your G-P-S stuff. we'll turn that all back on." The PF acknowledged.
15:58:05	The PM said that the PF would not be able to use the autothrottle. The PF said that wasn't an issue.
16:00:00	The PF contacted Klamath ground and requested contact information for the fixed base operator (FBO).
16:02:47	The PF asked the PM if they wanted to do a flight plan. The PM responded with, "yup."
16:04:24	At this point in the recording, the corrupted audio file was recorded. Ten minutes of audio is missing from this point. End of the first leg from KMFR to KLMT.

APPENDIX C. CVR SUMMARY - FLIGHT LEG 2

The summary begins at 16:15:40 PDT with the aircraft on the ground at taxiway C, holding short of runway 14. The aircraft was ready for departure back to KMFR. For this flight, the pilot receiving instruction was still the PF and the instructor was still the PM. In addition to flying the aircraft, the PF made all the radio communications while the PM provided training.

Table 3. CVR Summary Flight Leg 2.

Time PDT (HH:MM:SS)	Observation
16:15:40	The PF contacted Kingsley tower and reported that they were ready for departure and were at taxiway C holding short of runway 14.
16:15:47	Kingsley tower instructed N6924G to hold short of runway 14. The PF acknowledged the instruction.
16:16:37	The aircraft was cleared for departure on runway 14. The winds were, "two six zero at one five. gusts two three." The PF acknowledged the instruction and stated, "we are on the KINGSLEY SIX" (referencing the KINGSLEY SIX DEPARTURE procedure).
16:17:21	Sounds consistent with takeoff roll were observed.
16:17:50	Sounds consistent with takeoff rotation were observed.
16:17:53	The PF noted that there was a lot of wind on takeoff. The PM agreed and noted that they took off with a little tailwind.
16:18:16	Kingsley tower instructed N6924G to contact departure. The PF acknowledged the instruction.
16:19:06	The PF contacted departure. The PF reported 6,100 ft for 12,000 ft. ZSE acknowledged the aircraft and cleared N6924G at 8,600 ft to Rogue Valley. The PF acknowledged direct to Rogue Valley, at 8,000 ft.
16:19:30	ZSE corrected the PF by saying 8,600 ft. The PF acknowledged the altitude of 8,600 ft.
16:19:34	ZSE informed N6924G that there was mild to light turbulence from 7,000 ft to 13,000 ft with mixed ice reported, north of Klamath Falls. The controller offered a higher altitude if requested. The PF acknowledged, but did not request an altitude change.
16:20:25	The PF stated that they reached 8,600 ft.
16:22:16	The PF stated they were at 12,000 ft and direct to Rogue Valley.
16:22:47	The PM said that they would consider the approach request once they get closer to KMFR and get the weather report.

Time PDT (HH:MM:SS)	Observation
16:23:20	A single chime was observed.
16:23:25	The PM said, "yeah...it's got a little ice on leading edge. just a bit."
16:23:50	ZSE contacted N6924G about the weather, and asked if they would like to deviate.
16:23:57	The PF asked ZSE if they were at 14,000 ft, would they be over top of it. ZSE approved and instructed N6924G to climb and maintain 14,000 ft. The PF acknowledged the instruction.
16:24:24	The crew listened to the ATIS information for KMFR. The following was observed, "Medford airport information kilo. two two five three observation. winds two four zero at eight. visibility one zero. light rain. sky condition few clouds three thousand three hundred. ceiling four thousand six hundred broken. one zero thousand overcast. temps are one three point six. altimeter two niner niner zero. expect the R-NAV G-P-S delta approach landing runway three two. runway three two in use. hold proceed deck and San Francisco airport. Medford five gee NO-TAMS in effect. contact advise you have kilo."
16:25:46	A single chime was observed.
16:25:58	A single chime was observed.
16:26:59	ZSE contacted N6924G. The PF responded with, "discretion down to one two thousand."
16:27:07	The PM stated, "and A-T-C advises that an airliner has just wrecked at Medford. so we are going to divert ...so we are going to divert to Grants Pass. figure out which approach we are going to fly in. or if you need to fly in approach whatever. get yourself down to Grants Pass."
16:27:15	The PF acknowledged and said, "okay. well...what I would be doing is going to here and going to...here." The PM responded, "or alternatively...if you wish for Ashland. either one."
16:27:51	The PF wasn't sure if Ashland had an approach, but that Grants Pass did.
16:27:54	The PM stated that Ashland did not have an approach. The PM said, "but you could fly the approach into Medford. break it off and land in Ashland." The PF agreed.
16:28:01	The PM stated that it was up to the PF, but to choose something close to KMFR.
16:28:07	The PF decided to divert to Ashland (S03).

Time PDT (HH:MM:SS)	Observation
16:28:11	The PM said to fly an approach and break it off for S03. The PF concurred.
16:28:15	The PF asked the PM if they were using the RNAV delta. The PM concurred.
16:28:48	The PF said that ZSE had him on discretion down to 12,000 ft. The PF stated that the approach would be broken off when communicating with Cascade approach. The PM stated to ask ZSE for direct wherever the PF wanted to start the approach.
16:29:27	The PF was discussing whether to go to waypoint ROMAEE and not having to do a procedure turn, or to go to waypoint BRKET.
16:29:37	The PM stated you can negotiate with air traffic control.
16:29:42	The PF contacted ZSE. ZSE instructed to contact Cascade approach for all requests. The PF acknowledged the instruction.
16:30:08	The PF contacted Cascade approach and informed them they had information kilo. The PF also notified Cascade approach that they were doing an IFR training. The PF said, "we would like to do the approach into Medford, the R-NAV delta and then break off and go to Ashland."
16:30:25	Cascade approach asked N6924G if they were out of the weather and would be able to accept radar vectors. The PF stated they could do radar vectors or go direct.
16:30:41	Cascade approach instructed N6924G to stand by for vectors to waypoint BRKET.
16:31:14	Cascade approach instructed the aircraft to turn left at heading 210 for a vector RNAV delta approach to KMFR. N6924G was to descend and maintain 10,000 ft. The PF acknowledged the instruction.
16:32:01	Single chime was observed.
16:33:01	Single chime was observed.
16:33:41	Cascade approach instructed N6924G to fly heading 190. The PF acknowledged the instruction.
16:33:49	The PM commented that the controller was going to bring them in closer to KMFR. The PM stated to break off the approach as soon as the PF could make it into S03.
16:34:07	The PF and PM discussed descent rate and charts.
16:34:23	Cascade approach asked for N6924G present heading. The PF responded with 219. Cascade approach instructed the PF to fly a heading of 180. The PF acknowledged the instruction.

Time PDT (HH:MM:SS)	Observation
16:35:00	The PM commented that the controller was setting them up so they wouldn't have to make the procedure turn.
16:35:04	The PM commented, "so kinda on a modified downwind."
16:35:07	The PF said, "but it looks to me like we are going to have a hole right up in here anyway." The PM replied, "given that Medford's broken at forty-four hundred. it might not make it over the ridge. so you may need to fly a bit of the approach to finish."
16:35:34	The PF and PM discussed the location of S03. The PF stated, "I mean...I can do a three sixty and get down there." The PM responded, "it's up to you on how you want to do it."
16:35:56	The PF contacted Cascade approach to call off the approach to KMFR and cancel the IFR flight plan. The PF stated intentions to land at S03. Cascade approach received the IFR cancellation and told N6924G, "to proceed to Ashland via own navigation."
16:36:14	Two chirp sounds were observed. The PF said, "okay. the autopilot's off."
16:36:37	Cascade approach contacted N6924G and instructed them that radar services were terminated and when able, to squawk VFR (visual flight rules). The PF acknowledged the instruction.
16:36:52	The PM commented on how he had the PF flying more VFR in a long time.
16:39:37	The PF was trying to get information displayed on the PFD for S03.
16:39:45	The PM had the airport in sight.
16:39:46	The PF said, "I've got the airport. I don't have the frequency." The PM proceeded to set up the frequency on the PFD to 122.8.
16:40:49	The PF asked if the winds in KMFR were 32. The PM agreed but said that the wind in S03 could be anything.
16:41:50	The PF confirmed with the PM that S03 doesn't have weather. The PM said no weather, but that the airport has a windsock and they could do a fly over the field to figure it out.
16:42:36	The PM proposed contacting S03 UNICOM (universal communications) to see if anyone knew.
16:42:43	The PF contacted S03 via UNICOM to see if anyone knew the winds.

Time PDT (HH:MM:SS)	Observation
16:42:54	The following information was played: "good afternoon. this is Ashland Municipal automated advisory. winds two two zero at one four. altimeter two niner niner four. conditions favor runway three zero. pilots discretion. for further services click your mic three times for an advisory or four times for radio check."
16:43:14	The PF saw the windsock and confirmed it favored runway 30.
16:43:19	The PF told the PM they were on the upwind leg of the approach into S03.
16:43:29	"autothrottle." [electronic voice callout].
16:43:32	"autothrottle." [electronic voice callout].
16:43:33	"landing gear. landing gear." [electronic voice callout].
16:43:36	The following aural alert played eight times continuously: "landing gear. landing gear." [electronic voice callout].
16:43:37	The PF asked the PM, "did you screw up my landing gear?" The PM responded, "I did." The PF was laughing.
16:43:44	The PM said, "figured I would load you all up."
16:43:57	The PM suggested the PF turn on the autopilot.
16:44:20	The PM indicated to the PF to manually pump down the landing gear.
16:44:54	The PF confirmed with the PM that the landing gear breaker was pulled. The PM confirmed.
16:45:10	The PF put the aircraft into a heading and began to manually pump the landing gear down.
16:45:32	Two chimes were observed. The PF responded, "that happened. we'll do a one-eighty."
16:45:54	The PM said, "it takes a while. I know." The PF responded, "yeah. it's about a hundred pumps."
16:46:25	The PF stated that airspeed was fine and that they had 10 degrees of flaps.
16:46:59	"airspeed." [electronic voice callout].
16:47:01	Four chimes were observed.
16:47:04	The PM said, "nothing like...autopilot to...electronic stability protection."
16:47:10	"autothrottle." [electronic voice callout].
16:47:09	One chime was observed.
16:47:12	The PF said, "well it's...uh. I am starting to introduce flap. uh gear so..."
16:47:27	The PM stated one down. The PF responded with one green.

Time PDT (HH:MM:SS)	Observation
16:47:39	The PM stated two down. The PF responded with, "working up a [expletive] sweat here."
16:48:27	The PM stated that they had 3 down and green. The PF responded with, "three down and green."
16:48:30	The PM pushed the landing gear circuit breaker back into place.
16:48:56	The PF asked the PM what they were doing. The PM responded with an attempt to land in Ashland.
16:49:10	Two beep sounds were observed.
16:49:25	The PF communicated over Ashland UNICOM that they would be lining up to land on runway 30.
16:49:44	The PF said, "okay. gear's down. that's down. yaw damper is still on for a second. I've got the runway. I've got to get my seat fixed. slow things down. we're kind of high."
16:50:09	The PM asked the PF, "if you had a no flap...or if you had a flap failure. would you consider landing at this airport?"
16:50:14	The PF responded with, "uh...probably not. it's kinda short for no flaps." The PM agreed.
16:50:26	"terrain ahead. terrain ahead." [electronic voice callout].
16:50:31	The PF communicated over Ashland UNICOM that they would landing on runway 30.
16:50:43	The PF asked, "now what?" The PF then said, "if I had more time...I would set up the visual...on here."
16:50:48	The PM said, "uh-huh. I'm familiar with that. but you've got the airport in sight...got...approach indicator...and everything is hunky dory."
16:51:01	The PM asked, "have you landed here before?" The 500-foot EGPWS electronic voice callout was observed.
16:51:02	The PF responded with, "yes sir."
16:51:04	The PM asked what the common hazards at this airport were. The PF responded with trees and deer.
16:51:31	The PF turned the windshield wiper on.
16:51:39	"stall. stall." [electronic voice callout].
16:51:40	The PM said, "let's go around."
16:51:41	"stall. stall." [electronic voice callout].
16:51:42	The PF said, "go around."
16:51:43	"airspeed." [electronic voice callout].
16:51:44	"stall. stall." [electronic voice callout].
16:51:45	The PM said, "careful. careful."
16:51:46	The PF said, "I'm trying." "airspeed." [electronic voice callout].

Time PDT (HH:MM:SS)	Observation
16:51:47	Sounds consistent with the aircraft touching down. "stall." [electronic voice callout]. Within the second, another loud noise observed, consistent with the aircraft departing the runway.
16:51:48	Sounds consistent with the aircraft running over gravel, not pavement, is observed. A siren of descending pitch continued to repeat through the remainder of the HOT mic recording.
16:51:49	The PF said, "ahhhhhhhhhhhhhhh dammit."
16:51:50	"stall. stall." [electronic voice callout]. Sounds consistent with the aircraft stopping were observed.
16:51:52	The PF said, "I'm trying."
16:51:53	"stall. stall." [electronic voice callout].
16:51:55	"stall. stall." [electronic voice callout].
16:51:56	The PM said to the PF, "let's get out."
16:51:57	"stall. stall." [electronic voice callout]. The PM said, "and...and cut the engines off."
16:52:05	The PM said, "you were slow a little bit...on the...on the go."
16:52:08	The PF said, "I...I hit it." The PM responded with, "let's get out."
16:52:12	The PM said, "we've got fire." The PF responded, "yeah," and sounds of seat belts unclicking were observed.
16:52:16	The PF said, "we're not going to get out this door," to which the PM responded, "other door."
16:52:20	Sounds consistent with the crew exiting the aircraft.
16:52:24	A fire extinguisher sound was observed.
16:52:32	The PF said, "fuels off."
16:52:33	Sounds of flames were observed.
17:02:10	End of the recording.