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Accidents · NTSB WPR21FA231 · Final report

Piper PA-28-140 accident near Rush Valley, Utah, June 18, 2021

On June 18, 2021 at about 4:53 am local time, a 1966 Piper PA-28-140, registered N6323R, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Rush Valley, Utah. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s misidentification of a mountain pass at night, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. Contributing to the accident were the pilot’s overconfidence based on her previous aviation experience and fatigue due to both the time of the flight and her work schedule. Also contributing was the pilot’s decision not to install an automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) system, which forced a flightpath close to mountainous terrain to avoid the Mode-C and ADS-B Out veil.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 18, 2021 · about 4:53 am local time
Place
Rush Valley, Utah · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA-28-140, built 1966 · all PA-28-140s on the register
Registration
N6323R · registry record · serial 28-21490
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The accident flight was the second leg of an overnight, multi-leg cross-country from the pilot’s home airport in Northern Montana to her grandfather’s house in Southern California. The pilot was traveling with her granddaughter, and the trip was planned as a Father’s Day surprise. The pilot opted to fly overnight to avoid the heat and turbulence associated with flying over the desert during the day. The airplane was not equipped with an ADS-B transponder. In order to avoid both the Salt Lake City International Airport (SLC) Mode-C and automatic dependent surveillance -broadcast (ADS-B) system out veil an adjacent military operation area (MOA), the pilot chose to fly through a narrow, mountainous corridor. Due to the altitude limitation of the MOA, the pilot could not fly over the mountain range. Radar data confirmed that the airplane passed very close to terrain as it avoided the SLC Mode C veil, and ultimately turned into a valley and rising terrain just short of a mountain pass that led away from the airspace and in the direction of the destination. Although the moon was in a position where it would have silhouetted the mountains, it was only 50 percent illuminated, and a broken cloud layer was present that would have obscured most of the available moonlight. The pilot had already worked a full day and departed on the flight late in the afternoon. The accident occurred at about the halfway point of the trip, about 7 hours after departure from her home airport, almost 18 hours from when she likely woke to report for work, and about the time she would normally have gone to sleep. Therefore, she was likely suffering the effects of fatigue as a result of the flight time and extended time awake. Additionally, her circadian systems were not actively promoting alertness because she was operating the airplane at a time she would normally have been asleep. The majority of the pilot’s flight experience was as an Army helicopter pilot, with about ¼ of her flight time accrued at night, often over desert terrain, frequently with night vision goggles. Since then, she had taken a long break from flying, and recently purchased the accident airplane and attained her fixed wing private pilot’s license. The accident flight was the longest flight she had flown since leaving the Army, and her longest flight single-pilot in a fixed-wing airplane. The pilot’s decision making associated with the timing of the flight over mountainous terrain suggests overconfidence based on her previous flight experience. The pilot was carrying oxygen to aid with her night vision; although she had taken a borrowed GPS moving map system that was capable of displaying terrain features, this was the first time she had used it, and she was likely not proficient in its operation. The airplane crossed into the Mode-C and ADS-B Out veil twice as it followed a meandering track around the SLC airspace and came perilously close to terrain on two occasions, further indicating that the pilot was possibly suffering the effects of fatigue and either not proficient in the operation of the GPS unit or not using it. It is likely that the pilot lost situational awareness and turned prematurely into the valley, possibly mistaking it for the pass, resulting in controlled flight into terrain.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Controlled flight into terrain or object (CFIT) during enroute (cruise) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Situational awareness › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Personality/attitude › Self confidence › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Physical › Alertness/Fatigue › Fatigue due to work schedule › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Physical › Alertness/Fatigue › Circadian rhythms or jetlag › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Navigation system › Dependent position determining › Not installed/available

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot, military, private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 863.4 hours in all; 174.3 in this make and model; 67.2 in the last 90 days; 29.2 in the last 30 days; 790 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: March 14, 2021
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

Passenger

  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,387.1 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, January 13, 2021; 137 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,150 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O-320-E2C (piston); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Departed from: HVR Havre MT at 10:00 pm
  • Destination: CDC Cedar City UT
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 70°F (21°C), dew point 41°F (5°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.00 inHg
  • Observation at 10:55 pm from KTVY, 16 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KTVY 180455Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM CLR 21/05 A3000 RMK AO2

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number WPR21FA231.