



FROM: Philip A. Oppenheimer

14 Aug 2019

TO: Whom it May Concern

SUBJECT: Statement for Extra 300L (N19AM) Engine Failure/Off-Airport Landing

1. On 14 Aug 2019, I was the PIC, mishap pilot (MP) and acting CFI on the mishap aircraft (MA) Extra 300L, N19AM. Richard Marsolais was my student. He is a U.S. Army King Air 200 pilot. The mission was being conducted as part of Aviation Performance Solutions' (APS') Professional Pilot Upset Training (PPUT) Syllabus.
2. The MA departed KIWA at approximately 0625L (1325Z). The MA engine failure occurred at approximately 0715L (1415Z) approximately 9NM ESE of KIWA. The mission was being conducted in its designated training area (also approximately 2NM E of AZ38-Rittenhouse AHP). Weather was VFR/VMC. Winds were approximately 150/07. Altitude at the time of engine failure was approximately 8200' MSL/6700' AGL.
3. The MP completed a rolling maneuver demonstration with the MA as part of the UPRT profile. Upon roll-out, the engine suddenly lost power and the MP was not able to maintain altitude.
4. The MP immediately switched the fuel selector valve from the Wings position to the Center & Acro fuel tank position per POH guidance (most reliable tank and reading just below Full fuel), turned the MA towards the nearest suitable airfield (KIWA), gained as much altitude as the remaining airspeed and engine performance would allow and set up an optimum glide profile at 80 KIAS (best glide speed per the POH based on weight of the aircraft). Based on cockpit indications, the MP assessed that the engine was still operating under partial power (~1800 RPM). The MP performed the POH-prescribed emergency procedures for Engine Failure in Flight, contacted KIWA Tower and declared an Emergency.
5. The pilot advised KIWA Tower that reaching the airport looked likely (based on visual assessment). There was a quartering tailwind from the southeast as reported by the control tower on initial contact. The tower deconflicted all traffic and cleared the airplane to land on any runway. Runway 30R, the closest runway, was selected by the MP.
6. The MP noted that there was sufficient fuel on-board for the airplane to safely return to the airport with more than required fuel reserves. The emergency fuel boost pump was confirmed to be on. The MP also attempted to get engine power back by switching the fuel selector back and forth between both fuel tanks (Center & Acro and Wings) with no effect. The MP then left the selector valve on the fullest tank (Center & Acro), the internal fuselage fuel tank. The MP also confirmed the mixture was set to full rich and the ignition BOTH position was selected. Other than an apparent loss of power response experienced by the MA, the engine instruments otherwise indicated normal operating temperatures, pressures, and quantities consistent with a lower engine speed (~1800 RPM). The MP also attempted to ascertain power status and response by manipulating the throttle.

power and back (several times). Approximately one minute into the glide, the engine and glide performance were again assessed by the MP as sufficient to return to KIWA at an optimum glide profile under what appeared to be a partial power situation.

7. Approximately 4 minutes after the power loss was encountered, and approximately one minute prior to touchdown, an unexpected further reduction in engine performance began to occur (to ~1500 RPM). The engine and glide performance were again assessed by the MP and he concluded further remedial action would be required to sustain the glide profile required to land at KIWA. The MP placed the propeller control in the "feather" position (coarse pitch/low drag). However, it was noticed that when this was attempted, the propeller RPM reduced but the propeller blades remained in the high pitch/high drag position. The MP felt the aircraft slow and noted an increase in rate of altitude loss. The MP returned the propeller control to full forward and reestablished the 80 KIAS glide profile (this also slowed the descent rate). Propeller RPM continued to decay below 1500 RPM with a subsequent assessment that the KIWA runway could no longer be reached. The pilot immediately transitioned to an off-field emergency forced landing profile.
8. The MP notified the student and KIWA Tower of the situation and the change to an off-airport landing. The MP then performed a gliding right turn back into the wind, selected the best available safe landing area, and carried out an emergency off-airport landing.
9. COMMENT: Consideration was given to a road landing or at least landing the MA close to a road but power and telephone lines, the narrowness of the available roads, taller/thicker/rougher vegetation and drainage ditches in the vicinity of the roads led the MP to choose to land in the chosen open field despite the abundance of sage brush bushes in the field.
10. After completing the landing, both occupants immediately and safely exited the airplane. The crew was subsequently medically examined by the Mesa Fire Department's Emergency Medical Technicians when they arrived on-scene and were assessed as uninjured and released.
11. The aircraft was substantially damaged during the landing, including collapsing both main landing gear. Less than 30 minutes after the emergency landing, the fire department, police, and APS maintenance and operations personnel were on-scene to aid the crew and secure the area.



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