Siai-Marchetti SF-260C accident near Santa Monica, California, January 29, 2009
On January 29, 2009 at about 1:05 am local time, a Siai-Marchetti SF-260C, registered N688C, was substantially damaged in an accident during takeoff near Santa Monica, California (Santa Monica Municipal Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot’s failure to select the proper fuel tank for takeoff, which resulted in a loss of engine power. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to maintain aircraft control while attempting a return to runway maneuver.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- January 29, 2009 · about 1:05 am local time
- Place
- Santa Monica, California · Santa Monica Municipal Airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Siai-Marchetti SF-260C · all SF-260Cs on the register
- Registration
- N688C · registry record · serial 466 (37-004)
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
Witnesses observed the airplane climb normally after takeoff until reaching an altitude between 200 to 400 feet, then the engine sound stopped. The airplane appeared to slow down as it made a right turn followed by a descending spin until impacting the runway. The main wing tanks had been topped off about 1 week before the accident by another pilot. The pilot reported that he taxied the airplane to the hangar with the fuel selector valve in the right tip fuel tank position per standard operating procedures for the airplane. The pilot stated that a small amount of fuel was in the tip tank; however, the exact quantity was not able to be determined. Postaccident on-site examination of the wreckage revealed that the fuel tank selector valve handle appeared to be in the right tip fuel tank position. Based on detailed examination of the selector, and the nature of the cockpit structure deformation, it was later determined that the fuel tank selector valve was out of its detent and was actually between the Right Tip Tank and the Both Tip Tank selections. The fuel tank selector was probably moved out of the selector detent as a result of the crushing forces and structural deformation around the selector handle during the impact sequence. The fuel tank selector valve assembly was disassembled and found to be operational. The approved airplane flight manual for the airplane indicated that the selector valve should be positioned on the left wing tank for starting. Both the manual and the placards on the instrument panel stated that the use of “Tip Tank” and “both Tips” is limited to level flight only. The airframe and engine were examined with no mechanical anomalies identified.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Aircraft inspection event during prior to flight
- Fuel starvation during takeoff defining event
- Loss of engine power (total) during takeoff
- Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
- Loss of control in flight during emergency descent
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel selector/shutoff valve › Incorrect use/operation
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Forgotten action/omission › Pilot
- cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid management
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Not attained/maintained
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 1,600 hours in all; 5 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,655 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, July 1, 2008; 90 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 2,430 lb
- Seats: 3
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Lycoming AEIO-540-D4A5 (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: SMO Santa Monica CA at 1:05 am
- Destination: SMO Santa Monica CA
- Flight plan: not recorded
- Runway 21, 4,973 ft by 150 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 64°F (18°C), dew point 19°F (-7°C)
- Altimeter: 30.13 inHg
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flig | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number WPR09FA102.