Beech 56TC accident near Winfield, West Virginia, March 18, 2006
On March 18, 2006 at about 3:37 am local time, a Beech 56TC, registered N18LL, was substantially damaged in an accident near Winfield, West Virginia. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's inadequate preflight preparation to ensure an adequate supply of supplemental oxygen, and his inadequate in-flight planning and decision making, which resulted in exhaustion of his oxygen supply, and incapacitation from hypoxia during cruise flight.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- March 18, 2006 · about 3:37 am local time
- Place
- Winfield, West Virginia · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Beech 56TC · all 56TCs on the register
- Registration
- N18LL · registry record · serial TG-65
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
While on the last leg of a multiple day cross-country trip, all communications between the pilot of a non-pressurized, oxygen system equipped airplane, and air traffic control (ATC) were normal until the airplane was detected to have climbed 400 feet above its assigned altitude of FL240. After being notified of the deviation, the pilot responded that he was attempting to look at his contrails. Later in the flight, after leveling at FL270, the pilot queried ATC as to whether they had heard some of his previous calls. This was the last transmission received from the pilot, and attempts to reestablish contact were unsuccessful. After the pilot had not begun his descent for landing, nor joined the arrival course for his destination, ATC requested assistance from the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). After intercepting the airplane, the pilots of the fighter airplanes attempted to look into the cockpit, but were unable to see the pilot. Attempts to gain his attention were also unsuccessful. The airplane eventually descended and impacted terrain. A nasal cannula was connected to the airplane's installed oxygen system and was found near the pilot. An oxygen mask the pilot was wearing was connected to a portable oxygen bottle found on the floor next to him. Both systems were functional, their valves were open, and both were depleted of their contents. The portable bottle was manufactured for industrial use, and modified with an oxygen system fitting. The regulator was manufactured for the medical industry. A review of a journal kept by the pilot revealed that he flew at high altitudes for efficiency, and used an oximeter to monitor blood oxygen. He used a nasal cannula at altitudes exceeding 18,000 feet for comfort, and had used a "cannula and mask" up to 31,000 feet. Examination of his hangar revealed an aircraft oxygen tank and welding tank plumbed to an oxygen-service fitting. The airplane's oxygen system or portable bottle had not been serviced at the airports the airplane operated from during the trip. According to Advisory Circular (AC) 61-107A, "Operations of Aircraft At Altitudes Above 25,000 Feet MSL And/Or Mach Numbers (MMO) Greater Than .75", preflight inspections should include a thorough examination of aircraft oxygen equipment, "including available supply," and that "Oxygen systems should be checked periodically to ensure that there is an adequate supply of oxygen and that the system is functioning properly. This check should be performed frequently with increasing altitude. If supplemental oxygen is not available, an emergency descent to an altitude below 10,000 feet should be initiated." Additionally, it advised that when using continuous flow oxygen systems above 25,000 feet, "very careful attention to system capabilities is required."
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 2,469 hours in all; 757 in this make and model; 26 in the last 90 days; 16 in the last 30 days; 2,383 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: September 1, 2005
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 2,766.7 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, March 1, 2005; 87.4 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 5,990 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Lycoming TIO-541-E1B4 (piston); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Lycoming TIO-541-E1B4 (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: GDV Glendive MT at 11:43 pm
- Destination: STP St. Paul MN
- Flight plan: IFR
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Wind: from 300° at 8 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 39°F (4°C), dew point 19°F (-7°C)
- Altimeter: 30.23 inHg
- Observation at 3:54 am from CRW, 10 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 |
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number NYC06FA079.