Hispano Aviacion HA-200 SAETA accident near Bakersfield, California, August 26, 2002
On August 26, 2002 at about 2:44 am local time, a Hispano Aviacion HA-200 SAETA, registered N232DS, was substantially damaged in an accident near Bakersfield, California (Rio Bravo airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
the pilot's improper fuel system management, which lead to fuel starvation, and a loss of engine power. A factor in the accident was the pilot's decision to continue on the second leg of the flight with the gear in the extended position, which increased the fuel consumption and reduced the aircraft's available range.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 26, 2002 · about 2:44 am local time
- Place
- Bakersfield, California · Rio Bravo · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Hispano Aviacion HA-200 SAETA · all HA-200 SAETAs on the register
- Registration
- N232DS · registry record · serial E.14A-16
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The ex-military jet trainer experienced a dual engine flame out during cruise flight and it collided with multiple obstacles during an attempted forced landing to a closed airport. The airplane had not flown for 5 years until a new owner bought it. After an annual inspection, the airplane was to be flown from Lewiston, Idaho, to Los Angeles, California, in two legs. The first leg from Lewiston to Minden, Nevada, used 352 gallons of fuel (full fuel is 367 gallons) and when the airplane arrived, the hydraulic gear extension system malfunctioned and the gear was extended using the emergency blow down system. The pilot then decided to continue on the second leg with the gear locked in the down position. Ninety minutes into the second leg the pilot became concerned about the amount of fuel remaining and was diverting to Bakersfield when both engines flamed out. The pilot was attempting a dead stick landing at a closed airport when the right wing struck the ground and then the left wing struck a telephone pole. First responders noted about 80 gallons of fuel had spilled on the ground from the separated left tip tank. No fuel was found in the right tip tank or either of the fuselage tanks. The fuel system consists of two tip tanks; one aft fuselage tank, and a forward fuselage tank. The tip tanks, which feed only into the aft fuselage tank, are used by porting engine bleed air to the tanks through a pneumatic switch in the cockpit. The switch has positions for LEFT, RIGHT, BOTH and OFF. The forward and aft fuselage tanks are fed to the engines by conventional boost pumps. The proper fuel tank usage sequence is to select the aft fuselage tank while selecting and pressurizing both tip tanks, which then replenish the aft fuselage tank. When the fuel from the both tip tanks and the aft fuselage tank is used, then the forward fuselage tank is selected. Without at least one engine operating, bleed air is not available to pressurize the tip tanks to use any fuel remaining there. No discrepancies were found during an examination of the airframe, engines, or the fuel system components, including the tip tank pressurization system, the boost pumps, or selector valves/switches. The passenger, who holds pilot and A & P certificates stated that the pilot was individually selecting the tip tanks (left or right) during flight and did not use the BOTH position.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: frt
- Injury: no injuries
Other crew
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Last flight review: December 10, 2001
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
- Seat: rear
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Last inspection: annual inspection, August 24, 2002; 3 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 7,300 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Turbomeca Marbore IIC (turbojet); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Turbomeca Marbore IIC (turbojet); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: MEV Minden CA at 1:00 am
- Destination: WHP Los Angeles CA
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 30, 3,000 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: dusk
- Wind: from 310° at 4 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 84°F (29°C), dew point 45°F (7°C)
- Altimeter: 29.98 inHg
- Observation at 2:54 am from BFL, 10 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number LAX02LA264.