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LT COL
GERALD
TEASLEY

OBSERVER

PART 1 – THE CHECKRIDE - PAGE 1 On August 24, 2016, I was receiving a CAP Form 5 evaluation. The flight was to originate at Fallbrook Airpark, proceed to a maneuvering area 15 miles SE of Lake Skinner for air work and on to French Valley for pattern work. After French Valley I was to proceed to Santa Rosa Plateau for ground reference maneuvers, and then to Fallbrook for additional pattern work and termination. I was asked to demonstrate a short field take-off at Fallbrook then depart to the maneuvering area. At the conclusion of the air work we entered the traffic pattern at French Valley. The first assigned task was to perform a touch and go soft field landing followed by a soft field take-off while keeping the nose wheel off the ground. We re-entered the pattern for the next task assignment. On downwind, abeam the threshold, the engine was reduced to idle and I was tasked to perform a dead stick landing. Soon after, the evaluator remarked that if I continued going downwind I would not make the airport. Based on his comment I turned base. I felt this maneuver was done entirely too early. The result was a high speed go around. We re-entered the pattern. On downwind, abeam the threshold, the engine was brought to idle and I was again tasked to perform a dead stick landing. Shortly thereafter the evaluator once again remarked that I would not make the runway. Again, based on his comment, I turned a very early base leg. At the threshold we were high and fast. Just past the numbers on final, the evaluator sets the flaps to full and I made a full stop landing and taxied back for take-off. Departing French Valley, we proceed to the Santa Rosa Plateau for ground reference maneuvers and then on to Fallbrook for further pattern work. Entering the pattern on an extended base I was tasked to perform a short field landing and a touch and go. Abeam mid-field on downwind, the evaluator asked for command of the aircraft to demonstrate a no flap landing. There was another aircraft ahead of us in the pattern influencing our course over the ground. The evaluator returns control to me and I executed a short field slip to a full stop landing. The landing was slightly long because the other aircraft delayed on the runway. We taxied back for take-off. I was tasked to perform a normal take-off. We re-entered the traffic pattern downwind at an altitude of 1700', 10o flaps and 80K IAS. On downwind the evaluator asked for and received command of the aircraft to demonstrate a no flap approach and landing. He remarked that he would be holding an airspeed of 65-70K during the base leg and final. Just past the threshold on downwind he retracted the flaps, set power and established a descent. Downwind to base the IAS is 65-70K. He turned final and established a forward slip. Just before the threshold he ended the forward slip and prepared for rotation. At the threshold IAS was exactly 84K, altitude was approximately 20'. The touchdown zone was 1/2 to 2/3 down the runway, with approximately 1000' remaining. Heavy breaking followed with a sharp swerve to the right. He briefly recovered from the swerve and had marginal control of aircraft. He lost control near the departure end and the aircraft exited the left side of the runway. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 1. About the airport. Fallbrook is a notorious airfield among the local aviation community. It sits on top of a knoll with at least a 10' drop surrounding the runway, is fairly narrow and relatively short with tricky wind currents. Approaches and landings are challenging and poor judgement can be unforgiving. 2. At the crash site I had a conversation with a senior member of the Fallbrook CAP squadron who stated that he had experienced the same no-flap landing procedure from another pilot. He said the only difference between his flight going off the end of the runway and mine was 10'. This is chilling. Apparently they have been practicing this maneuver. 3. At no time did I feel that safety was an issue as I am a strong believer in the go-around. The go-around option was removed when the evaluator applied hard braking. At this time, I felt that a mishap was a strong possibility. I did not take control and apply power because I did not think I could get him off the brakes. Braking and full engine power are not a good mix and I wanted to be as slow as possible.