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Aviation Accident Investigator
Eastern Region

Date: March 12, 2025

Subject: ERA25LA142

Contact: Greg Jackson, Flight Director of GPI

Mr. Jackson was contacted via telephone to discuss the accident of N27GP. The following is a summary of that conversation and summaries of subsequent email conversations.

Mr. Jackson confirmed that he was the flight director of GPI. He was asked if there had been any recent maintenance on the airplane and he replied "no" but he wanted to verify that. He confirmed that he had the logbooks.

Mr. Jackson was asked if the airplane had insurance. He replied that it did have insurance, but he did not know who the insurance carrier was.

Mr. Jackson asked if he and other personnel from GPI could remove the survey equipment from the airplane before it was taken for storage by the aircraft recovery company. He stated that the equipment was very expensive and sat where the middle row of seats would be. He stated that it weighed about 95 pounds and is insured separately from the airplane. The IIC confirmed that he could have the equipment removed and that the FAA would need to be present, to which he agreed.

Mr. Jackson provided an email address of [REDACTED]

-End of conversation

Mr. Jackson contacted the NTSB IIC requesting an update on the investigation or findings from the examination of N27GP. The IIC informed Mr. Jackson on July 22, 2025 that an engine test run was performed and that no discrepancies were noted.

On July 22, 2025, Mr. Jackson emailed the IIC asking if the engine data was downloaded from the JPI and reviewed. The IIC replied on July 23, 2025 and confirmed that the engine data was analyzed and that a spike in fuel flow was observed. Additionally, the IIC requested "any training records for the pilot that you could send over? In flight, are they using the POH or do you have SOP's that they are following?"

On August 14, 2025, Mr. Jackson provided a Simcom completion certificate for the pilot dated April 11, 2023. He also provided a copy of the GPI SOP manual.

On September 10, 2025, the IIC contacted Mr. Jackson with safety suggestions regarding training, auxiliary fuel pump use, and the SOP manual that he provided. Mr. Jackson responded the same day and stated, "I will get with the staff and review, discuss, and make changes and report back to you."

On September 18, 2025, Mr. Jackson responded that "Concerning your suggestion on the fuel pump. We no longer have the POH for the TU206G. We are currently operating T206H model and we do not see any mention of possible engine flooding due to electric fuel pump usage in that POH. Could you share the documentation you have?"

On September 24, 2025, Mr. Jackson responded with "We have a meeting scheduled with our legal department on Friday to review the requested suggestions. Again, we do not see any mention of flooding risk due to boost pump operation in the POHs. Does the NTSB have any additional information on this?"

On September 24, 2025, the IIC provided information from the POH describing the fuel pump. A chart for the cruise power setting and the cruise performance settings were also provided which highlighted that use of the auxiliary fuel pump in cruise flight could create an excessively rich fuel mixture. The IIC also shared additional information stating the following:

"The engine data shows a spike in fuel flow and a decrease in engine RPM which is indicative of an excessively rich mixture. The engine was consistent at 2488 RPM (about 77% power according to the data) and 28.7 GPH before the mishap. At 14:47:47, the Fuel Flow jumps to 38.7GPH and the RPM immediately dropped to 2050. EGT's also reacted immediately and began to drop. Fuel flow remained in lower-mid 30 GPH range as the RPM continued down to about 1500-1600. Fuel flow remained in the 30's until about 8 seconds before the engine RPM stopped.

The very last picture is the performance numbers from the POH. The engine in cruise flight (between 1600-1700 ft) was almost 10 GPH higher than the book shows.

When I look at the takeoff numbers, he was at 2650 RPM (98% power according to the data) and fuel flow was ~33 GPH at its highest. That would be roughly a 20% power difference with ~3 GPH more when the mishap occurred compared to the takeoff. "