



Timothy W. Monville
Sr. Air Safety Investigator
Office of Aviation Safety - Eastern Region

Date: December 6, 2024
Subject: ERA25LA067, Record of Conversation/Interview
Contact: Michael T. Howard

Mr. Michael T. Howard contacted the National Transportation Safety Board Response Operation Center (NTSB ROC) on December 5, 2024, to report an aviation accident that occurred on November 7, 2024, involving N6444W, a Cessna P210N, that occurred at KCNI.

He was advised by e-mail when sending this document for review that it will not be released to the public until the investigation is finished and when published, any personal identifiable information (PII) such as cell phone number, e-mail address, address, pilot certificate number, etc., will be redacted and not viewable in the released document.

The NTSB ROC placed NTSB investigator Monville on the phone the same day at 1242 EST. Mr. Howard provided a cell phone number of [REDACTED], and an e-mail address of [REDACTED].

Mr. Howard later provided NTSB with a statement with pictures that he prepared several days after the accident (Attachment 1). He provided his pilot certificate number, and advised that the flight instructor was Wesley Dixon, who can be reached at [REDACTED].

Mr. Howard advised that after the event, he was informed that the damage to his airplane did not require notification to NTSB. He later reported that damage to his airplane required replacement of 2 bulkheads. His insurance adjuster, Edward Encinas of Starr Adjustment Services, Inc., can be reached at [REDACTED].

Mr. Howard was asked the following questions –

Was there anything mechanically wrong with the airplane that caused the accident?
“No. The aircraft was airworthy it was not due to mechanical failure of any kind.”

NTSB Questions Continued –

Who was the pilot-in-command?

You, know lawyers and insurance companies may argue. His assumption was that he was PIC. He was qualified and current.

Did you have any conversation before the flight as to who would be PIC?

I did not.

At any point did the CFI take the controls?

He did. He said my aircraft after the bounce, and then he took the controls.

Was the airplane damaged because of the bounce?

Yes, the left main landing gear was bent due to the bounce. After the bounce the CFI said my aircraft and applied full throttle immediately after the bounce and before sign impact. He further stated that the elapsed time from the bounce to taxiway sign impact was probably 2 to 3 seconds.

The call ended at 1305 EST.

The digest was e-mailed to him for review on December 6, 2024. He replied the same day at 1244 EST with comments that were incorporated into the digest. The amended digest was sent to him for review on December 6, 2024. He replied the same day at 1448 EST with, “Tim, Approved. Michael.” The FINAL digest was e-mailed to him on December 6, 2024.

ATTACHMENT 1

N6444W Landing Incident

draft dated Mon 11 Nov 2024 16:45 EST

amended Thu 5 Dec 2024 14:00 EST

SUMMARY

A Cessna P210N single engine piston airplane was substantially damaged due to a hard bounce landing that resulted in a runway excursion, impact with airport signage, loss of nose gear, and subsequent engine stoppage due to propeller strike.

The incident occurred while undergoing annual recurrent flight training for insurance purposes, during a simulated loss of engine power immediately upon takeoff.

DETAIL

The incident took place on Thu 7 Nov 2024 at 12:53 EST at KCNI Cherokee County Regional Airport, Canton GA. The airport elevation is 1219 MSL. The single 5/23 runway is 5003 x 75 ft paved asphalt in good condition with standard runway and taxiway lighting/markings/signage. The airport is uncontrolled with no air traffic control tower. Pilots communicate with each other and self-coordinate on CTAF common traffic advisory frequency 123.0

The aircraft involved was a 1982 Cessna P210N Vitatone single engine piston propeller land airplane, USA registration N6444W with standard airworthiness certificate.

The aircraft owner/pilot age 64 held a multi-engine land commercial rating with instrument privileges. Approx 2750 hrs total time, 2000 hours in Cessna high-wing single engine retractable landing gear, 200 hours in type, 185 hours in type in the past 12 months.

On board the aircraft at the time of the incident was a flight instructor conducting business as Fly Max Aircraft LLC

<https://www.flymaxaircraft.com/>

Credentials listed on the web site say:

... is a CFR Part 121 Airline Captain, FAA Line Check Airman, and holder of ATP/CFII/MEI certificates.

Training specifically for the P210 model is described on:

<https://www.flymaxaircraft.com/cessna-training>

with full curriculum syllabus found here

<https://www.flymaxaircraft.com/images/Cessna-210-and-Pressurized-Centurion-Training-Syllabus--2020.pdf>

Insurance for the owner/pilot required annual recurrent training for any pilot of the aircraft. Approval for this specific training on this specific date was documented in an email exchange between the pilot and the insurance agent from 19 Sep 2024 thru 30 Sep 2024.

The pilot flew the aircraft to KCNI airport the day before the scheduled recurrent flight training.

On the day of training, the pilot and instructor met for breakfast at 08:00 EST at an off-airport location. Over breakfast they exchanged aviation-related personal histories. The discussion migrated to focusing on P210-specific aircraft systems as part of the training syllabus. There was later in-depth discussion about the importance of checklists, with review of the electric checklist drawn up by the pilot. The instructor offered advice/counsel/feedback on measures the pilot could take to streamline his checklists. Another major topic of instruction was the importance of quick categorization of emergency type ... NO-TIME emergencies where you must get-on-the-ground-immediately vs TIME emergencies where you have time to work through a checklist to identify the problem and address the situation. The pilot felt that overall rapport with the instructor was excellent.

The pilot and instructor drove separately to the airport. The pilot removed overnight luggage and personal items from a rental car. Overnight luggage was placed in the baggage compartment. Other personal items were placed in the aft passenger seating area. Aircraft weight and balance were well within prescribed limits.

After returning the rental car, the pilot performed a complete preflight inspection. This included adding 1 qt of engine oil, sumping all 7 fuel drains, and verifying that fuel ordered the previous day had been added.

Engine start, post-start, radio configuration, and engine run-up were conducted with checklists.

A photo taken by the pilot immediately prior to engine start is timestamped 7 Nov 2024 11:33 EST.



VFR conditions prevailed, with AWOS automated weather reporting a ceiling of 3000 BROKEN, indicating a broken cloud layer at 3000 feet AGL above ground level. Winds were 130@08 kts, essentially an 8 knot cross-wind.

The pilot was instructed to take off RWY runway 5, fly one turn of left traffic to a full stop, with the pilot making all radio calls, with the mutual understanding that the instructor would simply observe the pilot's normal/standard operating procedures. The pilot took off with his standard procedure of holding right hand across the throttle/prop/mixture controls during the takeoff roll and climb-out to ensure full engine power. The pilot raised the landing gear and flaps upon positive rate of climb. The flight was uneventful. After full-stop and taxi-back, the instructor provided some constructive feedback on keeping the pattern close/tight to the runway in case of unexpected loss of engine power, especially during subsequent training flights that day. He specifically recommended turning crosswind at 500 AGL, several hundred feet lower than the pilot's usual practice. New crosswind-turn altitude was established at 1720 MSL. Additionally, the instructor suggested that for training purposes, the pilot should leave the landing gear extended until there was no more usable runway. The instructor also clarified that on upcoming flights the pilot should emphasize *SIMULATED engine failure* when making radio calls, as needed.

On the next lap, after the pilot turned crosswind, the instructor reached under the pilot's hand, gently pulled the throttle back to approx 50% power, and verbally indicated that we had just experienced a partial engine failure. The pilot returned to land on the opposing runway 23. After the landing on the runway was assured, the pilot pulled the throttle, lowered the gear, extended full flaps, and performed a relatively prolonged side-slip (5-10 seconds ?) to quickly lose altitude to make the runway. Once on the ground, the instructor and pilot agreed that the procedure had been well-executed.

On the next lap, the instructor pulled the throttle back completely on left-downwind. The pilot proceeded to the RWY 5 numbers and landed without incident.

On the ground, the instructor told the pilot that he was "better than 90% of the pilots I see". The pilot thanked him, and attributed some of his basic airmanship skills to years spent flying off of a relatively short grass runway in a Cessna R182.

On the next lap, on left-downwind, the instructor told the pilot to pull the landing gear circuit breaker(s) to simulate a landing gear issue. The pilot verbally identified this as a TIME emergency with plenty of time to diagnose the problem. The pilot engaged the autopilot and lowered the landing gear using the manual/hand gear pump. The pilot then pushed in the landing gear warning light breaker to confirm gear down and locked. The landing was uneventful. After exiting the runway the pilot pushed in the landing gear circuit breaker.

On the next takeoff, after rotation and approx 25-40 feet AGL, with landing gear still extended, the instructor pulled the throttle back completely. Airspeed dropped rapidly and the pilot pushed the nose forward to maintain airspeed, planning a landing straight-ahead on the remaining runway. The pilot then pulled back on the yoke to flare, but the airspeed was slow and the airplane mostly mushed down. The aircraft impacted the ground very hard on the main landing gear. There was no prop strike or nose gear collapse at this point.

Bouncing off the mains, the airplane banked right toward the grass off the runway. The pilot applied partial power, to ease the second bounce.

The instructor called "my airplane" and applied full power.

There was a slight bounce on the grass, and the airplane started to climb. There was a taxiway sign ahead.

The pilot thought the sign was cleared, but subsequently felt an impact from something aft.

Without verbal communication, the pilot re-took control of the airplane, reduced throttle and landed relatively-smoothly on the main gear on the runway. As the nose lowered, the prop tips began to curl back and it was evident that there had been a failure of the nose gear.

The aircraft came to a stop. The pilot asked the instructor if he was OK and the instructor replied "Yes". The instructor asked the pilot if was OK and the pilot replied "Yes".

There were no injuries. Neither party needed assistance exiting the airplane. There was no fire.

The instructor made a radio call to tell the FBO to close the airport. During the radio transmission it was clear that the ELT emergency locator transmitter had been activated, so the pilot reset/turned-off the ELT. The instructor pulled the fuel shutoff valve. Pilot and instructor exited the aircraft.

This photo, taken by the pilot after exiting the airplane, is timestamped 7 Nov 2024 12:54:55 EDT



The airplane was at rest, right of center of the runway, nose down with prop bent.

The pilot called his insurance broker.

The instructor called his insurance broker/agent.

There was evidence of oil leakage under the engine.

There was no evidence of fuel leakage around the airplane.

The port/left main landing gear leg was slightly bent

Inspection showed a significant rupture along the lower starboard/right tail cone and some impact on the underside of the starboard/right horizontal stabilizer. The autopilot pitch servo mounting bracket is slightly bent.

There was no apparent damage to flight control cables.



Visual inspection of the main landing gear seems to show that the port/left main gear leg was bent slightly, presumably due to the initial impact. The left tire/tube had a slow air leak.




The runway showed strakes where the propeller had impacted the runway.



Further back was a taxiway sign, laying on its back, with the breakaway fuses broken/sheared. Painted sheet aluminum clearly shows that the tail cone had impacted the corner of the taxiway sign.

A piece of the nosewheel fork casting was found beside the impacted sign. The nosewheel itself was on the edge of the taxiway beyond the sign. The rubber on the tire sidewall showed cuts.



The pilot believes that the nose tire impacted the corner of the taxiway sign, as evidenced by cuts on the tire, resulting in the broken fork casting and the nose wheel departing the airplane. Subsequently, the tailcone contacted the sign corner, rupturing the tail cone and knocking the sign over.

The lens of one runway light was also damaged. It is likely that this runway light was impacted by the piece of adjacent debris rather than the airplane itself.



Within 5 minutes the FBO-owner/airport-manager arrived with several crew. They removed the cowling and nose bowl. Approx 10 minutes later their forklift arrived. Under the instruction of the FBO owner, the pilot secured the rope around the crankshaft aft of the spinner in a loop that could be lifted by the forklift. The left tire was deflating so a portable air canister was brought to inflate the tire to protect the left main hub and brakes.



The airplane was slowly removed from the runway with the forklift supporting the nose and pulling, with the main landing gear rolling, with occasional stops to refill the left main tire with air.

The aircraft was moved to a tie-down area on the airport.
The nose bowl and cowling were reinstalled.





The runway/airport had been closed for 30-45 minutes.

Later that day at 15:47 EDT the pilot received a call from Ed Encinas of STARR Aviation Insurance, with aviation operations based in Atlanta GA. The representative said that either he or Andrew Maxwell from the insurance company would be at the airport the following day between 10:30 and 11:00 EDT.

The next day, Andrew Maxwell showed up on time. He took photos of the aircraft, the airworthiness certificate, the aircraft registration, the pilot's certificate, and the pilot's current medical certificate. Per request, the pilot mailed electronic copies of the most recent annual inspection log book entries to the insurance company.

The insurance rep asked some questions and quickly seemed to have a sense of what had happened. He said that (unfortunately) this was relatively routine for him.

There was later a meeting with the insurance rep, the pilot, and the FBO-owner/airport-manager. The FBO-owner said that he would be unable to effect repairs to the aircraft because he did not have staff qualified for the required level of metal work. He suggested Air Services Inc. of Carrollton GA

<https://stage.airservicesinc.aero/>

Arrangements were made to directly bill the insurance company for the time spent removing the aircraft from the runway and for damage to the runway signage and runway lighting.

The insurance representative left.

The pilot returned to the aircraft to remove the aircraft avionics as part of securing the assets of the aircraft from theft.



Because the left wing was low, fuel had been cross-feeding and leaking through the left wing fuel vent. While the pilot was removing the avionics the FBO staff drained 47 gallons of fuel from the left wing.

5 Dec 2024

additional photos can be found at:



The aircraft avionics installed in aircraft record engine and flight-instrument data at a rate of 1 sample per second. The pilot/owner has extracted and analyzed this data.

THE END