


December 18, 2024

Wesley A. Dixon



ATP/MEI/CFII

Certificate number



Expires: 31Jun2025

Last Flight Review: 25June2024

Prelude:

The following record shall serve as the official statement by Wesley “Wes” Dixon regarding the events that led to an aircraft incident on 7 November 2024. Mr. Dixon was performing duties as a flight instructor for the sole purpose of assuring that Mr. Michael Howard could demonstrate proficiency in aircraft systems knowledge, pilotage, normal and non-normal flight operations as well as emergency procedures. This type of training is typically referred to as “recurrent training” and is designed to provide validation to the insurance underwriter that the client can continue to operate an aircraft safely as pilot-in-command.

Ground Training:

Mr. Howard arrives to training and testified as having over 400hours of P210 time as Pilot-In-Command (PIC). It was clearly understood that this was “recurrent training” so-as to imply that he had already received initial training and demonstrated proficiency in the aircraft.

Mr. Dixon and Mr. Howard met for breakfast on the morning of 7 November 2024. During breakfast, a dialogue began about Mr. Howard’s flying background (as documented above), the expectations of training, and aircraft systems knowledge. The expectation of training was detailed as follows: Mr. Howard will operate as the PIC of the aircraft and Mr. Dixon would be operating as the evaluator/instructor. Mr. Dixon explained that he would be simulating normal “single pilot” flight operations with various non-normal scenarios. During this discussion emphasis was placed on the “Time” vs. “No-time” approach to managing non-normal emergencies. All training is structured around demonstrated manufacturer checklist usage and proficiency for every phase of flight operations.

Mr. Dixon explained to Mr. Howard that he would be demonstrating proficiency in the following scenarios. These simulated scenarios should serve as real-world scenarios to gain experience. Mr. Dixon encourages all students to “learn, ask questions if you have them, and have fun”. The following maneuvers are expected to be performed (not in any particular order).

- 1) Simulated landing gear failure
- 2) Go-around from final
- 3) Simulated dual alternator failure or overvoltage condition.
- 4) Simulated partial loss of power (loss of a cylinder or failed propellor governor) on upwind with a return to landing.
- 5) Simulated loss of pressurization and emergency descent

- 6) Simulated fire or smoke in the cabin
- 7) Simulated engine failure in the traffic pattern
- 8) Simulated engine failure on takeoff (execution of a low level rejected takeoff).
- 9) Simulated engine failure in IMC with a circle to land

Training eventually transitioned from the breakfast table to a classroom at the fixed base operator in Canton/Cherokee Co. Airport (KCNI). A systems review demonstrated that Mr. Howard had an above average and very thorough knowledge of aircraft systems. He was well prepared with strong mechanical understanding.

Prior to taking a break to transition to the flight portion of the recurrent training. Mr. Dixon explained to Mr. Howard that he would be operating as PIC as though this were a single pilot operation. Mr. Dixon also explained that if at any time Mr. Howard feels either unsure or uncomfortable about the expectation, to feel free to ask for clarification. Additionally, Mr. Dixon explained, and Mr. Howard understood that at any time the instructor states, "My Aircraft", the expectation is that Mr. Howard will immediately surrender control of the aircraft to the instructor, without hesitation.

The Flight:

The flight portion began with normal checklist usage for pre-flight, engine startup, taxi, and before takeoff. Mr. Dixon instructed Mr. Howard that he should always utilize a technique to verbally speak aloud his takeoff briefing prior to departure both for himself and his passengers. Mr. Dixon explained that this takeoff briefing should sound like this, "I am departing from a 5000ft runway, my wind is from the left. My airport elevation is 1200ft, my target altitude to return for landing if I lose the engine is 2200ft. If I lose the engine any time prior to 2200ft: I will land straight ahead +/- 45 degrees, If I lose my engine after 2200ft, I will be returning to land in the opposite direction".

N6444W began with a normal flight in the traffic pattern of runway 5 at KCNI. Winds were from the Northwest and presented a mild direct crosswind for both runways. During the first circuit, Mr. Dixon instructed Mr. Howard to "go-around" during the short-final phase. Mr. Howard demonstrated this maneuver well without issue. The subsequent landing was a normal, full stop landing. Due to the complex nature of the P210 aircraft, all landings would be completed to a full stop with the appropriate checklist to follow.

During the next few takeoffs and landings, Mr. Howard was performing and demonstrating well and without instructor intervention. The following maneuvers were performed (in no particular order):

- 1) A simulated landing gear failure with a manual gear extension.
- 2) A simulated engine failure from the downwind leg to landing.
- 3) A simulated loss of engine power on the upwind

* This maneuver did require minor verbal intervention from the instructor. Mr. Howard had briefed earlier that if an engine failure occurred prior to 2200ft, he would land straight ahead +/- 45 degrees. He made a good

determination that the engine had only lost approximately partial power and a return to the airport would be a safe decision. However, Mr. Howard was initially planning to make a complete circuit in the traffic pattern to land on runway 5. Mr. Dixon prompted Mr. Howard that we were in a “no-time” scenario and landing opposite direction would probably be a good idea (N6444W was the only aircraft in the traffic pattern). Mr. Howard corrected and made a safe landing on runway 23.

During a particular taxi back for departure, Mr. Howard posed the following question: “When do you like to bring the gear up because I typically bring it up as soon as I takeoff”, he stated. Mr. Dixon explained that his personal preference is to leave the gear down until no suitable runway would be remaining to land. Furthermore, Mr Dixon briefed that they would be performing a rejected takeoff after losing power after the initial climb. Mr Dixon emphasized that the objective is to immediately lower the nose and to retain airspeed while transitioning to land on the remaining runway. This briefing was concluded by, “the last thing you would want to worry about when rejecting a takeoff is putting the gear back down”.

The incident:

Following the appropriate checklist, N6444W would depart runway 5 with a mild left crosswind. The takeoff was normal with 10 degrees of flaps. The rotation was normal and a normal climb and acceleration was initiated. At approximately 50ft, Mr. Dixon verbalized, “You have 3000ft of runway remaining and you are losing your engine”. Mr. Dixon reduced the engine power. Mr. Howard’s initial reaction was to reach for the throttle. Simultaneously, Mr. Howard also began to pitch the aircraft upward in an apparent attempt to extend a glide range. Mr Dixon, Immediately exclaimed, “Watch your airspeed...airspeed...lower the...My aircraft”! In an effort to avoid a potential stall and/or a subsequent spin, Mr. Dixon attempted to lower the nose, while applying full throttle, while simultaneously applying heavy right rudder to counteract an imminent spin. To Mr. Dixon’s surprise, despite his best efforts the nose kept rising above the horizon. Mr Dixon recalls seeing the ground approaching from his right while suddenly realizing that Mr. Howard was still pulling on the yoke in an attempt to arrest the descent rate and provoking an imminent stall.

The aircraft struck the ground as a runway excursion on the right side of the runway. The aircraft bounced back into the air while still under full power. Mr. Dixon again exclaimed, “I have the aircraft, we’re going around”! The aircraft was again airborne at approximately 20 feet AGL, at a very low airspeed, with full power and essentially flying in ground effect. Mr. Dixon repeatedly attempted to lower the angle of attack in order to mitigate an impending stall. However, he was receiving cross controls from the PIC, Mr. Howard. Mr. Howard then pulled the POWER TO IDLE while stating, “Should we land”? A secondary stall initiated and the aircraft struck the runway at a high vertical velocity. The subsequent nosewheel collapsed as the propellor made contact with the runway.

Prior to exiting the aircraft, Mr. Dixon broadcast on the CTAF frequency that the airport is closed and the runway is fouled by a downed aircraft. He requested on the CTAF frequency that Fire

and EMS be dispatched. Mr. Howard exited the aircraft. Mr. Dixon secured the aircraft by pulling the main firewall shutoff valve and assured that battery power was removed prior to exiting. The airport manager arrived on location and the aircraft was removed from the runway. Exterior inspection of the aircraft revealed a nose wheel collapse as well as a substantial hole in the right rear fuselage sheet metal.

This recollection of events is written in an 3rd person format by Mr. Dixon. He believes his recollection of the events to be true and accurate. Mr Dixon can be contacted at the following number for additional inquiries: [REDACTED]

ADDENDUM:

Please reference the FAA Advisory Circular 120-109A "Stall Prevention and Recovery Training" section 2-5.

https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_120-109A.pdf