

On 5/1/2024, Robert Bateman and I went to Fosters Paint shop at KLAL to pick up and transport N413JM back to the Aviation Section facility located at KVDF. We inspected the work and conducted a preflight of the aircraft seeing no anomalies. At approximately 1545 hours, N413JM departed KLAL bound for KVDF, weather conditions were clear VFR. Robert Bateman was the pilot in command sitting right seat, I was the passenger upon departure in the left seat. After clearing KLAL's airspace to the south, we proceeded westbound. At the area of CR39/HY60 I asked Robert to take the controls to conduct some left-seat flying, as I am training for CFI. After a positive exchange of flight controls, I spotted a field that was clear of hazards, people, or property to conduct a confined area landing training, as well as slope and off-site approaches to landing. I conducted high and low recons to be sure of the suitability, surveying for wires or other hazards. This area is located at 27.54.36N/82.08.36W.

From the left seat, I conducted a confined area approach to land near a pair of trees, terminating at approximately 15 ft AGL without incident. I then searched for another area to conduct a landing approach. Upon making a left turn, from a direction of the southwest back to the north approximately 50 ft AGL and at an airspeed of approximately 20kts, the helicopter began to slow forward airspeed. During this time, I felt the helicopter continue a left turn, slowly at first, then continuing as I attempted to stop the left turn. The helicopter then began to spin more rapidly to the left and my control inputs were ineffective. I estimated 2-3 full rotations of the spin. Realizing that nothing was stopping this I knew impact with the ground would be imminent and mitigated rollover when the helicopter settled to the ground. I was able to keep the helicopter level on impact and saw the main rotor was intact, the engine running, and no signs of fire. I placed the engine into an idle state and shut down the engine, applying the rotor brake on engine shutdown.

I asked Robert if he was injured and he said no, we exited the aircraft, and I inspected the main fuselage area for fuel leaks and found none. I contacted my supervisor (Sgt. Doyle) and advised him of the situation at 1604hrs. Robert and I again made sure there were no injuries and no risk of fire. I was advised by phone by John Thanasis that there was an ELT activation from the aircraft, and I shut the power off on the ELT.

I contacted the NTSB via phone at 1 [REDACTED] and spoke to the duty agent at 1630hrs. I gave preliminary details, and they advised a field agent would call back in approximately 30 minutes. I was given instructions not to remove anything from the site or helicopter. After receiving no phone calls from the NTSB, I called the number listed above again at 1900hrs. I spoke to a different duty agent who connected me to Adam Gherhardt of the NTSB Southeast sector. He also asked preliminary questions about the incident and supplied the FAA notification phone number. Adam Gherhardt requested 360 photos of the helicopters which I texted to him. I called the FAA operations center at [REDACTED] and was connected to Mark Keefer who also asked preliminary questions. Mr. Keefer emailed me later that evening and requested a written statement.