Grumman American Avn. CORP. AA-5 accident near Rockmart, Georgia, September 4, 2024
On September 4, 2024 at about 3:21 pm local time, a 1974 Grumman American Avn. CORP. AA-5, registered N9659L, was substantially damaged in an accident during emergency descent near Rockmart, Georgia (Paulding Northwest Atlanta Air airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A total loss of engine power for undetermined reasons. Also causal was the flight instructor’s failure to maintain adequate airspeed during the forced landing attempt, which resulted in exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 4, 2024 · about 3:21 pm local time
- Place
- Rockmart, Georgia · Paulding Northwest Atlanta Air · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Grumman American Avn. CORP. AA-5, built 1974 · all AA-5s on the register
- Registration
- N9659L · registry record · serial AA5-0659
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The flight instructor was conducting a dual instructional flight with the student pilot. The accident flight was the flight instructor’s third flight in the airplane make and model and the student pilot’s second dual instructional flight. Recorded flight track data showed that, after departure, the airplane remained within 15 miles of the airport and proceeded in maneuvering flight consistent with a private pilot training profile. During the final 5 minutes of the flight, the airplane turned to and maintained a northeasterly heading for about 4 minutes, followed by a turn to the east, and then to the north. The last recorded ADS-B data showed a gradual left turn about 150 ft above the ground, with a groundspeed of about 74 to 78 mph. The stall speed for the airplane with flaps up and 20° of bank was about 64 mph (indicated airspeed). The last recorded ground track location was about 250 ft east-southeast of the accident site. The airplane impacted wooded terrain at a steep, nose-low attitude, consistent with an aerodynamic stall. The flight instructor and the student pilot were fatally injured and there were no known witnesses to the accident. A postaccident examination of the flight controls did not reveal evidence of a preexisting mechanical malfunction or failure. Both wing fuel tanks were breached, and the airplane’s fuel state at the time of the accident could not be determined from available information. Although no anomalies were found during the examination of the engine and fuel system, the propeller showed no signs of powered rotation at impact. Additionally, the temperature and dew point near the accident site were conducive to the formation of serious carburetor icing at glide (idle) power. Although the carburetor heat knob was found full forward (cold) position, it was partially broken off and the portion of the instrument panel surrounding the knob showed impact deformation; accordingly, the preaccident use of carburetor heat couldn’t be determined. At the time of the accident, the flight instructor did not hold a current Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) -issued medical certificate; however, based on the accident circumstances, the instructor’s impairment or incapacitation from a medical issue was unlikely. Postmortem toxicological testing results indicated that the student pilot had used one or more cannabis products and may have been experiencing associated impairing psychoactive effects during the flight. However, considering the accident circumstances, the student pilot’s limited baseline skill and experience, his limited flight safety responsibilities on the accident flight, and the presence of the flight instructor, it is unlikely that effects of his cannabis use contributed to the accident. Additionally, the low levels of ethanol detected in vitreous fluid indicated that some or all of the detected ethanol may have been from postmortem production rather than alcohol consumption; accordingly, ethanol was also unlikely to have contributed to the accident. The flight track data showed that, during the final minute of the flight, the airplane passed near the end of two fields before it turned over a wooded area toward a clearing, consistent with an attempt to glide the airplane to an area to perform a forced landing. The airplane’s relatively low speed during these final moments of the flight, coupled with the lack of powered rotational signatures observed on the propeller after the accident, suggest that the airplane’s engine may have lost power, though no evidence of any mechanical malfunction or failure of the engine were observed during the postaccident wreckage examination. The airplane’s fuel state and the flight instructor’s use of carburetor heat at the time of the accident could not be determined based on the available information. It is likely that, during this attempted approach, the flight instructor allowed the airplane’s airspeed to decay, which resulted in the exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of control in flight during emergency descent defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
- Unknown or undetermined during enroute
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Angle of attack › Not attained/maintained
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Instructor/check pilot
Flight instructor
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 455 hours in all; 3 in this make and model; 250 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: July 14, 2023
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
Dual student
- Flight time: 2 hours in all; 2 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,227 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, August 30, 2024
- Maximum gross weight: 2,200 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-320-E2G (piston); 523 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: PUJ Dallas GA at 2:33 pm
- Flight plan: none
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 120° at 12 knots, gusting 18
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 72°F (22°C), dew point 52°F (11°C)
- Altimeter: 30.31 inHg
- Observation at 11:15 am from KPUJ, 5 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KPUJ 041515Z AUTO 12012G18KT 10SM RA CLR 22/11 A3031 RMK AO2
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flig | 2 |
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA24FA365.
