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**Subject:** ERA24FA136, Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System Data

The accident airplane was equipped with a Honeywell Aerospace MK VII EGPWS. This unit was recovered and sent to the manufacturer where data download was completed under the oversight of the NTSB IIC. The following is an excerpt from the report received from the manufacturer based on the data recovered from the EGPWS.

"After reviewing the downloaded flight history data and the provided ADS-B data (which is not a complete record of all that is needed for a full analysis of all GPWS and EGPWS modes) it appears based on flight path data that the aircraft may have violated the most recent version of the Runway Field Clearance Floor algorithm about 1 mile from the end of the runway. A "Too Low Terrain" aural could have been produced if the following were true:

- EGPWS software was -218-218 or later (it was not, -213-213 was installed)
- EGPWS was configured for direct GPS input (it was not)
- All required inputs were functional (current inputs were functional)
- GPS horizontal and vertical accuracy was within integrity limits (not known/investigated)

Honeywell also notes that the EGPWS installation in N1125A on the day of the accident **did NOT comply with FAA SAIB NM-15-11** (released nearly 9 years before the accident), which advises all MK V and MK VII EGPWS operators to update the software to -218-218 or later and wire GPS directly to EGPWS.

Based on ADS-B flight path data compared to a standard 3 degree approach (per ILS or LOC RWY 25 approach) the aircraft appears to be below the approach path, which may suggest a mis-set altimeter (discussed below). While ADS-B did not provide glideslope deviation information, a derivation of the glideslope deviation using ADS-B data by Honeywell does suggest Mode 5 "Glideslope" alerts may have been given **if the ILS was tuned and providing deviation information to the EGPWS**. The EGPWS did not record any Mode 5 "Glideslope" alert for deviation in excess of 1.3 dots fly up. The CVR presence of a "Smart" (non-precision approach only) 500 foot callout indicates that the ILS was not tuned at that point in the approach.

Looking at the ADS-B data, pressure altitude appears to correspond to ILS approach intercept altitude at 5100 feet. The GPS altitude at this time is approximately 350 feet lower, suggesting that the altimeter may not have been properly corrected, and may have been at 29.92."