Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC135T2 accident near Fargo, Georgia, September 13, 2023
On September 13, 2023 at about 4:55 pm local time, a 2003 Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC135T2 (helicopter), registered N273AM, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering near Fargo, Georgia. It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The separation of the outer span of a tail rotor blade during flight as a result of localized intergranular corrosion due to a diminished protective coating at a critical location on the tail rotor blade surface that, combined with cyclic loading, resulted in fatigue crack propagation initiated at a corrosion site.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 13, 2023 · about 4:55 pm local time
- Place
- Fargo, Georgia · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC135T2, built 2003
- Registration
- N273AM · registry record · serial 0273
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot of the helicopter reported that she had been in cruise flight for about 1 hour about 1,500 ft mean sea level. All systems were normal when she heard a “bang” and felt a “very strong” vibration in the tail rotor pedals. The pilot immediately identified a site for a precautionary landing, which she completed without further incident. Initial examination of the Fenestron, a 10-bladed tail rotor that acts as a ducted fan for anti-torque control, revealed that one blade was separated at its root. The blades were numbered 1-10, with the fractured blade identified as No. 10. The separated portion of the No. 10 blade was not recovered. The examination of the fracture surface of the No. 10 blade revealed features consistent with fatigue. The general construction of each blade comprised a die-forged aluminum alloy blade and integrated root protected with a sealed chromic acid anodization layer. A chromium oxide layer was deposited on the inner and outer bearing surfaces of the blade root followed by a low-friction varnish. The fracture origin area consisted of localized intergranular features (stress concentrations) from which fatigue cracking progressed through approximately 77% of the blade cross-section before ultimately separating in tensile, or bending, overstress. The initiating event could not be identified. The most likely initiation of intergranular cracking was a compromised anodic oxide film that allowed exposure to a corrosive environment (i.e. marine and/or industrial), as evidenced by the presence of chlorine and sulfur on the blade surfaces. The corrosive exposure resulted in the formation of a network of intergranular cracks at the blade surface. The anodic oxide film was most likely compromised due to abrasive wear (erosion) during operation and/or removal during abrasive maintenance processes. The appearance of the fracture origin area on the pressure side surface prior to blade separation was likely a corrosion pit on the order of 100–120 microns (0.004 – 0.005 inch) with similar depth estimated from oxidation patterns on the fracture surface at the origin area. Due to the intergranular nature of cracking at the fracture origin area, the appearance would not resemble a dent or a score, and it would likely be difficult to detect visually or with the aid of other typical non-destructive inspection techniques.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Off-field or emergency landing during maneuvering
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during maneuvering defining event
- Part(s) separation from AC during maneuvering
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Tail rotor › Tail rotor blade › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 5,867 hours in all; 970 in this make and model; 18 in the last 90 days; 8 in the last 30 days; 5,728 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: May 1, 2022
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 9,484 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, September 12, 2023; 15 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 6,237 lb
- Seats: 7
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: Turbomeca Arrius 2B (turboshaft); 4,656 hours total
- Engine 2: Turbomeca Arrius 2B (turboshaft); 4,656 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: MCN Macon GA at 3:48 pm
- Destination: GNV Gainesville FL
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 150° at 4 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 3,100 ft
- Temperature: 86°F (30°C), dew point 70°F (21°C)
- Altimeter: 29.98 inHg
- Observation at 12:55 pm from KHOE, 25 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KHOE 131655Z AUTO 15004KT 10SM SCT031 30/21 A2998 RMK AO2 T02980218
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flig | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA23LA369.