

# National Transportation Safety Board

Office of Aviation Safety

Washington, DC 20594



ERA23LA328

## **AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL**

Group Chairman's Factual Report

July 9, 2025

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## **A. ACCIDENT**

Location: Charlotte Amalie, Caribbean (CB) Sea  
Date: August 4, 2023 AST  
August 5, 2023 UTC  
Time: 2117 Atlantic standard time (AST)<sup>1</sup>  
0117 coordinated universal time (UTC)<sup>2</sup>  
Airplane: Cessna C172M, N13384

## **B. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL GROUP**

|                   |                                                                                    |
|-------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Group Chairman    | Ruth Rupnik<br>National Transportation Safety Board<br>Washington, DC              |
| Group Co-Chairman | Brian Soper<br>National Transportation Safety Board<br>Washington, DC              |
| Group Member      | Jason Alliston<br>Federal Aviation Administration<br>Atlanta, GA                   |
| Group Member      | Christopher Rosati<br>National Air Traffic Controllers Association<br>Freemont, CA |

## **C. SUMMARY**

On August 4, 2023, at 2117 Atlantic standard time, a Cessna 172M, N13384, was presumed destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, United States Virgin Islands (USVI). The commercial pilot and private pilot-rated copilot have not been located. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 *Code of Federal Regulations* Part 91 personal flight.

According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector the purpose of the flight was for the private pilot to accumulate additional hours for an instrument rating.

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<sup>1</sup> All times are in Atlantic standard time (AST) unless otherwise noted.

<sup>2</sup> UTC is an international time standard using four digits of a 24-hour clock in hours and minutes based on the time in Greenwich, England.

## **D. DETAILS OF THE INVESTIGATION**

On August 11, 2023, the decision was made to form an air traffic control (ATC) work group to conduct an on-site investigation. Notification was made to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in accordance with current protocol, advising our intent to conduct on-site investigative work at San Juan Center Radar Approach Control (ZSU CERAP), the facility that was providing services to N13384 at the time of the accident. The FAA was provided with a list of controllers that the group requested to interview and advised that all interviews would be recorded and provided for transcription<sup>3</sup>. The ATC work group was formed and consisted of the group chairman, group co-chairman, a subject matter expert from the FAA, and an air safety investigator (ASI) from the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA). On-site investigative work was scheduled for the week of August 21, 2023.

On August 21, 2023, the group arrived in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The group chair met with the FAA Event Investigation Manager (EIM) to discuss the agenda for the week and later held an organizational meeting with the group at the hotel.

On August 22, 2023, the group traveled to ZSU CERAP and conducted an in-brief with ZSU CERAP Executive Officer (XO) and other members of his staff. Also present at the in-brief were members from the FAA's Safety Intelligence and Response Group (SIRG), Eastern Service Area Quality Control Group (ESA QCG), Miami district, and Office of Chief Counsel. The group was provided with an operational tour of the ZSU CERAP control floor with a focus on the area and positions that had provided services to N13384. The group was also provided with a Micro En Route Automated Radar Tracking System (MEARTS)<sup>4</sup> playback of the event allowing visibility of the data that would have been available and displayed to the controller at the time of the event. The group then conducted interviews with the sector 7 radar (R7) controllers that were providing services leading up to and during the time of the accident, the relieved controller (R7A) and the relieving controller (R7B).

On August 23, 2023, the group returned to ZSU CERAP, reviewed data, and conducted interviews with the Quality Control Manager (QCM), Operations Supervisor (OS) that was working as the Operations Manager In Charge (OMIC) at the time of the accident, and the Air Traffic Manager (ATM). After reviewing additional data and documentation, the group concluded on-site activities for the day.

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<sup>3</sup> Interview transcripts can be found in Attachment 1 of this report.


<sup>4</sup> MEARTS - Micro En Route Automated Radar Processing System - An automated radar and radar beacon tracking system capable of employing both short-range (ASR) and long-range (ARSR) radars. This microcomputer driven system provides improved tracking, continuous data recording, and use of full digital radar displays.

On August 24, 2023, the group returned to ZSU CERAP, conducted interviews with the management and NATCA Local Safety Council (LSC) representatives, reconciled the data requested/received and concluded the on-site work at ZSU CERAP. The group then returned to the hotel and completed the group field notes, obtained concurrence, and concluded the ATC field investigation.

## E. FACTUAL INFORMATION

### 1.0 History of Flight

The following timeline was constructed from certified audio re-recordings, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast ADS-B<sup>5</sup> data, and the aircraft accident package, contained in Attachments 2-4, as provided by the FAA. Altitudes are in feet above mean sea level (msl). Figure 1 illustrates the accident flight track overlaid on Google Earth satellite imagery.



**Figure 1.** Overhead view of the entire accident flight track overlaid onto satellite imagery with pertinent information annotated.

<sup>5</sup> ADS-B – Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast - A surveillance system in which an aircraft or vehicle to be detected is fitted with cooperative equipment in the form of a data link transmitter. The aircraft or vehicle periodically broadcasts its GPS-derived position and other information such as velocity over the data link, which is received by a ground-based transmitter/receiver (transceiver) for processing and display at an air traffic control facility.

- 1917 Aguadilla ATCT (TJBQ) called San Juan CERAP's (ZSU) Non-Radar Sector 8, combined on ZSU's Non-Radar sector 4 (D4), requesting clearance on N13384 to Cyril E. King Airport (TIST). D4 issued the clearance on N13384 via B520 (Blue 520) direct TIST, maintain 5000 feet, departure control frequency 118.75 and squawk 0027.
- 1926 TJBQ called D4 requesting release for N13384. D4 issued a hold for release and stated they were going to call back.
- 1930 D4 called TJBQ to release N13384 on a right turn to join B520 maintaining 4000 feet. TJBQ acknowledged.
- 1934 The crew of N13384 checked in on ZSU's Radar Sector 8's frequency 118.75, combined on ZSU's Radar Sector 4 (R4), climbing out of 900 feet. The R4 controller called N13384 radar contact.
- 1939 The R4 controller instructed the crew of N13384 to climb and maintain 5000 feet. The crew of N13384 acknowledged.
- 1948 The R4 controller instructed the crew of N13384 to contact San Juan CERAP's Approach Control Radar Sector 1, combined on ZSU's Approach Control Radar Sector 7 (R7), on frequency 119.4. The crew of N13384 did not respond.
- 1958 The R4 controller again instructed the crew of N13384 to switch to frequency 119.4 . The crew of N13384 acknowledged. The R7 controller attempted to contact the crew of N13384 with no response.
- 1959 The crew of N13384 contacted the R7A controller on frequency 119.4 at 5000 feet. The R7 controller acknowledged and issued San Juan altimeter. The R7 controller was relieved, a position relief briefing occurred and information regarding N13384 was provided stating N13384 was Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) at 5000 feet to St. Thomas, USVI (TIST).
- 2029 The R7A controller instructed the crew of N13384 to change to his frequency 128.65. The crew acknowledged.
- 2030 The crew of N13384 contacted ZSU CERAP eastbound level at 5,000 feet and was instructed by the R7A controller to proceed direct KUTHO<sup>6</sup>. The crew acknowledged.

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<sup>6</sup> KUTHO - A navigational point on the ILS RWY 10 approach to STT.

- 2034 The R7A controller instructed the crew of N13384 to descend and maintain 4,000 feet. The crew acknowledged.
- 2043 The R7A controller asked the crew of N13384 if they would be a full stop at TIST. The crew did not respond.
- The R7A controller attempted to contact the crew a second time, and the crew responded. The crew requested the ILS<sup>7</sup> runway (RWY) 10 approach into TIST, to a missed approach, and then return to TBJQ. The R7A controller acknowledged and provided missed approach instructions of a right turn to a heading of 250° and climb and maintain 3,000 feet. The crew acknowledged with a correct readback.
- 2044 The R7A controller coordinated the intentions of the crew of N13384 with TIST tower.
- 2046 The R7A controller cleared the crew of N13384 for the ILS runway 10 approach into STT. The crew acknowledged with a correct readback.
- 2052 The R7A controller advised the crew of N13384 that ATIS<sup>8</sup> information Zulu (Z) was current at STT. After asking for the R7A controller to say again, the crew acknowledged.
- 2055 The R7A controller instructed the crew of N13384 to contact STT. The pilot acknowledged.
- 2108 The crew of N13384 called the R7A controller upon executing the missed approach and climbing out of 1,000 feet, but initially used the call sign "San Juan Center." The R7A controller did not respond.
- 2109 The crew of N13384 again called saying again "San Juan Center," and reported on the go heading 250 and climbing out of 1,800 feet for 3,000 feet.
- The R7A controller acknowledged, advised the crew of N13384 of radar contact, and instructed them to climb and maintain 6,000 feet

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<sup>7</sup> ILS - Instrument Landing System - A precision instrument approach system that normally consists of a Localizer, Glideslope, Outer/Middle Markers, and approach lights utilized by a properly equipped pilot to conduct an ILS approach.

<sup>8</sup> ATIS - Automatic Terminal Information Service - A continuous broadcast of current, routine information to arriving and departing aircraft by means of continuous and repetitive broadcasts throughout the day or specified portion of the day.

and to proceed direct TJBQ. The crew acknowledged with an accurate readback.

- 2114 The crew of JBU275 that had checked in previously inbound to SJU advised the R7A controller that they required medical personnel standing by on arrival due to a passenger medical event and confirmed they had already notified their company. The R7A controller acknowledged.
- 2115 The R7A controller called the San Juan air traffic control tower (SJU ATCT) to coordinate and advise them of the medical emergency inbound. [During this coordination, N13384 was entering a clockwise climbing turn and was in an area of displayed heavy precipitation.]
- 2117 The crew of FFT4857 checked in on frequency 119.4 climbing out of 2000 feet to 5000 feet. The R7A controller called FFT4857 radar contact, issued climb to 10000 feet and leaving 5000 feet, proceed direct ACONY<sup>9</sup> Intersection. The crew of FFT4857 read back an incorrect altitude. An open mic was heard on 128.65, the frequency that N13384 was communicating on at the time. The R7A controller broadcast on 128.65 to use caution for open mic. The R7A controller then clarified the altitude read back of FFT4857. N13384's data block went to coast (CST<sup>10</sup>).
- 2118 The R7A controller was relieved by the R7B controller and a recorded position briefing took place. The briefing included coordination regarding N13384 stating that flight plan amendment in FDIO<sup>11</sup> and that he was direct TBJQ. Additionally, he coordinated the medical emergency involving JBU275.
- 2119 The R7B controller attempted to contact the crew of N13384 multiple times with no response.
- 2120 The R7B controller called the crew of N13384 and asked if they could hear the transmission to IDENT<sup>12</sup>, no response.

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<sup>9</sup> ACONY - A navigational fix on the ACONY Standard Terminal Arrival Procedure (STAR) into Luis Munoz Marin International Airport (SJU).

<sup>10</sup> CST - Coast Track - Status of an aircraft that is no longer giving a primary radar return. This will generate a track message on the air traffic controller's radar display utilizing the acronym "CST" and will temporarily continue displaying the aircraft's predicted movement based on the last known heading and speed.

<sup>11</sup> FDIO - Flight Data Input/Output - A system utilized to distribute flight plan information, weather information, and general information to associated Air Traffic Control facilities across the National Airspace System.

<sup>12</sup> IDENT - A request for a pilot to activate the aircraft transponder identification feature. This will help

- 2121 The R7B controller attempted to contact N13384 on guard<sup>13</sup> frequency multiple times with no response.
- 2122 The R7B controller requested the assistance of the crew of another aircraft in the area, WIA839, to try to establish communications with the crew of N13384. The crew of WIA839 called the crew of N13384 twice and received no response.
- 2123 The relieved R7A controller, who had remained by the position to assist with the developing situation, contacted the TIST controller from a nearby communication panel to advise that they were attempting to communicate with N13384, ten miles west, they were not responding and the data block was not moving. The TIST controller responded they noticed, were going to check with the binoculars, but did not see anything.
- 2124 The R7B controller called N13384, no response.
- 2125 The R7B controller called N13384, no response.
- 2130 The R7B controller called N13384 twice, no response. The relieved R7A controller called the TIST controller and said that they verified Flightaware and N13384 appeared to be turning back towards TIST but they could not tell because they had no radar data. The TIST controller stated they saw the data block flashing low altitude but not moving. The relieved R7A controller responded that they manually kept the radar data block, but lost radar contact and the crew was not responding. The relieved R7A controller asked the TIST controller if it was able to stay for fifteen more minutes just in case the aircraft returned to the airport. The TIST controller stated they reached out to N13384 but received no response.
- 2133 The R7B controller called N13384, no response.
- 2139 The R7B controller called N13384, no response.

[There was no further communication between ATC and N13384.]

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
the controller to confirm an aircraft identity or to identify an aircraft.

<sup>13</sup> Guard frequency - Very high frequency (VHF) 121.5 and ultra high frequency (UHF) 243.0 are "guarded" frequencies reserved in the aircraft operations band exclusively for emergency communications and notifications.


## 2.0 Flight Track Surveillance Information

### 2.1 Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast

Certified ADS-B data was provided by the FAA. This data was provided in comma separated value (csv) format, as well as keyhole markup language (kmz). The ADS-B data provided flight track surveillance information for the entire accident flight. Figure 1 in section E, as well as Figures 2 and 3 (below) were produced by overlaying this data onto satellite imagery in Google Earth. Figure 2 is an overhead view of the final segment of the accident flight with times and altitudes provided, and figure 3 is a profile view of the final segment of the accident flight.



**Figure 2.** Overhead view of the final segment of the accident flight track overlaid onto satellite imagery with pertinent track information provided.



**Figure 3.** Profile view of the final segment of the accident flight track overlaid onto satellite imagery with pertinent information annotated.

### 3.0 Meteorological Information

An Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS)<sup>14</sup> was located at Cyril E King Airport (TIST) in Charlotte Amalie, U.S. Virgin Islands, and was located about 8 miles east of the accident aircraft's last ADS-B track point at an elevation of about 25 feet. The ASOS was augmented by LAWRS<sup>15</sup> certified air traffic controllers at TIST.

#### 3.1 Surface Observations

During the accident period the following augmented and automated observations were disseminated from TIST.

At 2053 AST, TIST reported a wind from 070° true at 6 knots, visibility greater than 10 statute miles, few clouds at 2,100 feet above ground level (agl), scattered clouds at 4,800 feet agl, temperature of 28°Celsius (C), dew point temperature of

<sup>14</sup> ASOS – Automated Surface Observing System – Automated sensor suites equipped with meteorological instruments to observe and report wind, visibility, ceiling, temperature, dewpoint, altimeter, and barometric pressure. These systems generally report at hourly intervals but also report special observations if weather conditions change rapidly and cross aviation operation thresholds.

<sup>15</sup> LAWRS – Limited Aviation Weather Reporting Station – An airport weather station that utilized various degrees of automated sensors and/or other automated equipment (i.e.; AWOS) and is often augmented/backed up by certified tower weather observers at these locations.

26°C, altimeter setting of 30.02 inches of mercury; remarks: station with a precipitation discriminator, sea level pressure of 1016.6 hectopascals, temperature of 28.3°C and dew point temperature of 26.1°C

The longline<sup>16</sup> observations that were disseminated on weather circuits and general flight categories were as follows (observation closest to incident time is in bold for emphasis):

VFR METAR TIST 042353Z 10007KT 10SM FEW022 SCT026 29/26 A3000  
RMK AO2 SLP161 T02890256 10294 20278 53010 \$=

**VFR METAR TIST 050053Z 07006KT 10SM FEW021 SCT048 28/26  
A3002 RMK AO2 SLP166 T02830261 \$=**

VFR METAR TIST 050153Z AUTO 08008KT 10SM FEW023 FEW030 SCT036  
28/26 A3004 RMK AO2 SLP171 T02830256 \$=

### 3.2 Terminal Area Forecast

At 1940, the National Weather Service issued the following Terminal Area Forecast (TAF)<sup>17</sup> for TIST, which was valid for 5 miles from the center of the aerodrome. For the accident time it forecasted: a wind from 110° true, visibility greater than 6 statute miles, few clouds at 2,500 feet agl and scattered clouds at 5,000 feet agl.

TAF TIST 042340Z 0500/0524 11009KT P6SM FEW025 SCT050 FM050430  
08005KT P6SM VCSH SCT025 SCT040 FM051400 12016G26KT P6SM FEW028  
SCT050=

### 4.0 Air Traffic Control Facility

ZSU CERAP was a level 9 combined center (en route) radar approach control facility located in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and part of the Miami district in the Eastern Service Area (ESA). The radar facility operated 24-hours per day, 7-days per week, year-round. According to the ATM, they were staffed with 38 of the 62 allotted


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<sup>16</sup> "Longline" refers to the dissemination of weather observations with the intent that they are available in near-real time to national databases (effectively, the whole world) and accessible to the general global public from a large number of vendors. This does not include public accessibility to observations from a reporting station's Very High Frequency (VHF; line-of-site) or telephone broadcast, where applicable. Longline dissemination of weather observations is the primary vehicle through which the general global public has access to surface weather observations, particularly outside of the aviation community.

<sup>17</sup> TAF - Terminal Aerodrome Forecast - According to NWS Instruction 10-813: "An NWS TAF consists of the expected meteorological conditions significant to aviation at an airport for a specified time period. For the U.S., this is the area within five (5) statute miles (SM) of the center of an airport's runway complex." [www.nws.noaa.gov/directives/sym/pd01008013curr.pdf](http://www.nws.noaa.gov/directives/sym/pd01008013curr.pdf).

certified professional controllers (CPCs), 28 controllers in training, and 10 supervisors. 42% of the controllers onboard were in training. Further breakdowns between the enroute and terminal sectors showed that the enroute sectors were staffed at less than 50% of their allotted CPCs and had more controllers in training than CPCs. In contrast, the terminal sectors were staffed at 90% of their allotted CPCs and had only five controllers in training.

Figure 4 shows the control room layout, as well as area layout with positions labeled for identification.



**Figure 4.** ZSU CERAP control room layout with pertinent information labeled. (Diagram provided by the FAA).


## 4.1 Pertinent Equipment

### 4.1.1 Microprocessor-En Route Automated Radar Tracking System

ZSU CERAP was one of only four remaining FAA ATC facilities to be equipped with the Microprocessor En-Route Automated Radar Tracking System (Micro-EARTS) and operated in the Fused Display Mode (FDM), or Fusion<sup>18</sup>. Micro-EARTS could display four intensity levels of precipitation to controllers: light, moderate, heavy, and extreme. At the time of the accident, only heavy and extreme precipitation levels

<sup>18</sup> FUSION - The combination of all available surveillance sources (airport surveillance radar [ASR], air route surveillance radar [ARSR], ADS-B, etc.) into the display of a single tracked target for air traffic control separation services.

were selected for display in accordance with facility standard operating procedure (SOP). Figure 4 is a side-by-side comparison with the different levels of precipitation as would have been visible to the controller if those levels had been selected (EX-extreme, HV-heavy, MD-moderate, and LT-light).



**Figure 5.** Comparison of MEARTS display at 2113:30 AST comparing from left to right: Heavy-Extreme precipitation only; Light through Extreme precipitation; light through extreme and NEXRAD precipitation.

#### 4.1.2 En Route Automation Modernization Display

The amount of combined airspace in the terminal area during the evening/midnight shift configuration when sectors were combined required the use of two workstation ERAM<sup>19</sup> displays located side-by-side, and in general included the main island of Puerto Rico on the left display, and smaller adjacent islands and airspace to the east on the right display. Specifically, during the time of this accident, the medical emergency aircraft was inbound to TJSJ on the left display, and N13384 was climbing westbound from TIST and on the right display. Figure 6 is a photograph of the combined radar workstation as configured at the time of the accident.

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<sup>19</sup> ERAM – En Route Automation Modernization - The Next Gen system designed to replace the En Route Host and backup system previously utilized at Air Route Traffic Control Centers and allows for faster processing of route requests and in-flight route changes.




**Figure 6.** Photograph of the R7 position combined as it was at the time of the accident with pertinent information labeled.

#### 4.1.3 Flight Data Input/Output System

The FDIO system was utilized to distribute flight plan information, weather information, and general information to networked ATC facilities across the National Airspace System (NAS). The basic user components of the system were a keyboard input terminal, monitor, and flight strip printer. In the terminal area of ZSU CERAP, there was only one terminal available to ATC and it was located at the Flight Data (FD) workspace in the control room. Air traffic controllers working during the evening or midnight shift configurations when FD was not staffed had to leave their ATC workstation and go to the FD workstation which was located about 8-10 feet away. Controllers were required to routinely access the FDIO terminal during these eve/mid

shift configurations. Figure 7 is a photograph of the FD workstation with pertinent equipment identified.



**Figure 7.** Photograph of the Flight Data workstation with pertinent information labeled.

#### **4.1.4 Traffic Situation and NEXRAD Displays**

The traffic situation display (TSD) was situated on the terminal side back wall of the control room and was used to provide controllers with greater situational awareness regarding traffic inbound to their areas. Figure 8 is a view from the entrance of the control room with these monitors and other pertinent information labeled.


Additionally, there was a NEXRAD<sup>20</sup> display of the same size on the enroute side back wall of the control room, to the right of the TSD. This display was used to provide controllers with greater situation awareness of the general weather in the vicinity. It also included weather advisory boundaries (i.e., SIGMETs<sup>21</sup>). This display was not visible from the terminal combined radar workstation where the eve/mid controller worked from. There were a couple other displays within the control room that provided this same NEXRAD weather information, however only one was visible from the combined radar workstation in the terminal area, and its visibility was limited

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
<sup>20</sup> NEXRAD - Next Generation Radar - a system of Doppler radars across the US that is used to track the location and movement of storm systems.

<sup>21</sup> SIGMET - Significant Meteorological Information - A weather advisory issued concerning weather significant to the safety of all aircraft. SIGMET advisories cover severe and extreme turbulence, severe icing, and widespread dust or sandstorms that reduce visibility to less than 3 miles.

due to the smaller monitor size and location behind the controller and about 10-12 feet away. Figure 9 is a view of these monitors as seen from the R7 position.



**Figure 8.** View of the operational area from the entrance with pertinent information labeled.



**Figure 9.** From the R7 position looking back toward the secondary NEXRAD display with pertinent information labeled.

## **5.0 Interviewed Personnel**

At the time of the accident, ZSU CERAP was combined down to a single position in the terminal area, a single combined position in the en route area, and a standalone supervisor providing general oversight of the entire operation. The R7 position underwent a position relief while services were being provided to the accident aircraft. There was an OS providing general oversight as the OMIC. The R7A and R7B controllers, OMIC, as well as the ATM, QCM, and NATCA and management LSC representatives were all interviewed. Detailed background information on the involved controllers and supervisor working during the time of the event is provided below. All interviews were recorded, transcribed, and are located in Attachment 5: Interview Transcripts.

### **5.1 Sector 7 Radar Controller - Relieved**

The R7A controller had been the initial controller providing services to N13384 and had been relieved prior to the accident. He was employed by the FAA in September 2008, and after initial training at the FAA academy, began working at San

Juan Airport Traffic Control Tower (SJU ATCT) in November 2008. He transferred and began working at ZSU CERAP in 2012. He had been certified on the R7 position since September 2014 and was current in accordance with facility standards at the time of the accident. Neither post-accident drug nor alcohol testing were ordered nor conducted.

He was 42 years old and held a current second-class medical clearance at the time of the accident, and his last ATC physical was conducted on September 15, 2022. He had no waivers, restrictions, or limitations to his medical clearance. In terms of excellent, good, fair, or poor; he described his health as excellent. His working hours for the week leading up to and including the day of the accident were as follows:

| Day       | Date   | Shift | Hours (AST) | Overtime      |
|-----------|--------|-------|-------------|---------------|
| Saturday  | Jul 28 | Eve   | 1300-2100   | None          |
| Sunday    | Jul 29 | Day   | 0645-1445   | None          |
| Monday    | Jul 30 | Day   | 0515-1400   | 45 min        |
| **Monday  | Jul 30 | Mid   | 2215-0615   | None          |
| Wednesday | Aug 1  | Off   | None        | None          |
| Thursday  | Aug 2  | Off   | None        | None          |
| Friday    | Aug 3  | Eve   | 1245-2230   | 1 hr + 45 min |

\*\* "Quick-turn" from day to mid shifts - both start in same day

## 5.2 Sector 7 Radar Controller - Relieving

The R7B controller was providing services to N13384 at the time of the accident. He was employed by the FAA in January 2019, and after initial onboarding at the FAA academy, began working at ZSU CERAP later that month. He had been certified on the R7 position since June 2021 and was current in accordance with facility standards at the time of the accident. Neither post-accident drug nor alcohol testing were ordered nor conducted.

He was 35 years old and held a current second-class medical clearance at the time of the accident, and his last ATC physical was conducted on June 30, 2022. He had no waivers, restrictions, or limitations to his medical clearance. In terms of excellent, good, fair, or poor; he described his health as excellent. His working hours for the week leading up to and including the day of the accident were as follows:

| Day       | Date   | Shift | Hours (AST) | Overtime      |
|-----------|--------|-------|-------------|---------------|
| Saturday  | Jul 28 | Eve   | 1300-2230   | 1 hr + 30 min |
| Sunday    | Jul 29 | Day   | 0945-1945   | 2 hr          |
| Monday    | Jul 30 | Day   | 0648-1448   | None          |
| Tuesday   | Jul 31 | Leave | None        | None          |
| Wednesday | Aug 1  | Off   | None        | None          |

|          |       |     |           |      |
|----------|-------|-----|-----------|------|
| Thursday | Aug 2 | Off | None      | None |
| Friday   | Aug 3 | Eve | 1430-2230 | None |

### 5.3 Operations Supervisor

The OS was providing general oversight as the OMIC at the time of the accident. He was employed by the FAA in June 2005, and after initial training at the FAA academy, began working at ZSU CERAP in August 2005. He had been certified OS since May 2023 and was current in accordance with facility standards at the time of the accident. Neither post-accident drug nor alcohol testing were ordered nor conducted.

He was 44 years old and held a current second-class medical clearance at the time of the accident, and his last ATC physical was conducted on June 30, 2022. He had no waivers, restrictions, or limitations to his medical clearance. In terms of excellent, good, fair, or poor; he described his health as good to excellent. His working hours for the week leading up to and including the day of the accident were as follows:

| Day       | Date   | Shift | Hours (AST) | Overtime |
|-----------|--------|-------|-------------|----------|
| Saturday  | Jul 28 | Leave | None        | None     |
| Sunday    | Jul 29 | Eve   | 1300-2100   | None     |
| Monday    | Jul 30 | Day   | 1611-1400   | None     |
| **Monday  | Jul 30 | Mid   | 2200-0615   | None     |
| Wednesday | Aug 1  | Off   | None        | None     |
| Thursday  | Aug 2  | Off   | None        | None     |
| Friday    | Aug 3  | Eve   | 1430-0030   | 2 hr     |

\*\* "Quick-turn" from day to mid shifts - both start in same day

### 5.4 Quality Control Manager

The QCM was not working at the time of the incident and was interviewed as the QCM only. He was employed by the FAA in 1999 and after initial training at the FAA academy, reported to ZSU CERAP. He had worked as a CPC and OS on the en route side prior to accepting the QCM position.

### 5.5 Local Safety Council Representative - NATCA

The LSC NATCA lead was not working at the time of the accident and was interviewed as the LSC NATCA lead only. He was employed by the FAA in November 2006, and after initial training at the FAA academy, began working at Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZAU ARTCC). He transferred and began working at ZSU CERAP as an en route controller in April 2009. He had been the NATCA LSC lead since April 2023.

## **5.6 Local Safety Council Representative - Management**

The LSC management lead was not working at the time of the accident and was interviewed as the LSC management lead only. He was employed by the FAA in January 2006, and after initial training at the FAA academy, began working at Washington (ZDC) ARTCC. He transferred and began working at ZSU CERAP in late 2008. He had been the management LSC lead since February 2023.

## **5.7 Air Traffic Manager**

The ATM was not working at the time of the accident and was interviewed as the ATM only. He was employed by the FAA in December 1989 and after initial training at the FAA academy, began working at Craig (CRG) ATCT. He worked at multiple towers as a CPC, OS, and ATM, before accepting the ATM position at ZSU CERAP in June 2018.

## **F. ATTACHMENTS**

- Attachment 1: Interview Transcripts
- Attachment 2: Certified Audio
- Attachment 3: ADS-B Data
- Attachment 4: FAA Aircraft Accident Package

Submitted by:

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