

Statement as hand written to FAA june 19 2023:

Started the plane after pre-flight and talked about why I wanted Cody along and taxi to runway 2 for runup. We listened to weather and did run up. Pulled onto the runway and gave full power airspeed came alive gauges were in the green and we rotated at 65 knots and climbed out and headed NE. the CHT – 2 got hot and RPM gauge was off. We decided to cross runway and land. first approach we set up and I turned to late for final and I proceeded to do a go around. We went around got into pattern and lined up for landing pattern. Did notch of flaps on downwind and not of flaps on cross wind. Did gumps check on base and turned final and Cody said watch your speed need to pull back power to decrease speed. So I did. We were coming in what looked to be a good approach and we were maybe 20 or 30 ft above runway and I noticed we started sinking quickly. Just before this point I had checked airspeed again and remember it being 85 knots. When I noticed we started sinking I began pulling back on the stick. I felt full elevator back and we were still (thinking cross out JF initials) sinking so I added 25-50% power about and then we hit the runway hard. I felt like we hit rear wheels first and then immediately after the front nose wheel slammed down. We continued down the runway for a ways and I saw the blade tip damaged. Cody was saying pull the power off, but I had already pulled it back it seemed as it didn't come back that I remember when I pulled it back from his suggestion. Then the nose fell down to the ground and we slid a while longer. I remember after stopping my feet still on the rudder pedals and my hand on the throttle and stick.

When Cody said watch speed on final, we were at 100 ktas I saw.

End of written statement

Slight corrections to written statement: we listened to weather by the fuel pumps, before taxiing to runway 2, the way it reads, it seems like we did it at run up. We didn't.

Clarification to written statement: When I say we started sinking quickly, I meant faster descent than we had on the rest of the pattern.

I was told by Danny cox after the meeting in the lobby of the FBO I could add in more to this statement, so here that is:

I feel there is no way to know what happened for sure, but most likely causes in order of most likely based on all the facts and remembered data. And it is possible the cause is a combination of these also.

1. Downdraft
2. Pilot error
3. Mechanical problem from auto pilot servo attachment catching elevator push rod

We were not over weight and we were within CG limits.

The landing distance after touchdown shows we didn't stall.

Visually the airspeeds seemed about right the whole flight.

The distance between the main wheel marks touching down and the nose wheel touching down left on the runway show that it was likely main first landing, followed quickly by nose wheel, as the distance between them is the same or greater than the actual distance on the plane between them.

The runway shows 3 sets of prop strikes, which must imply the nose was held off the ground from airspeed a ways before it collapsed on cowling on the ground in front.

The nose gear was found after the accident about 20 ft in front of where it broke off and to the right about 40 ft when we went back to see where it was.

And then we slid on the front cowling and main wheels for about 300 more feet, the plane ending up at the 1,000 ft marker.

Both Cody and myself feel I started flaring at the proper time for a normal landing. We were both surprised when we found out later we landed short of the runway by 10 ft, as we both thought it was going to be a normal landing before it started sinking.

I spoke with MR Cox on Wednesday before this flight, after sending him 14CFR 61.3(b) FAR in an email asking about Brazil pilot needed or not.

I sent him the far as we had previously discussed needing to be a Brazil pilot or not.

Mr. Cox said in the meeting, and I agree – that on that call approximately Wednesday, Mr. Cox told me (basically) that in regards to that FAR, and after talking with someone, he didn't see a reason why I couldn't fly the plane.

Because of this call, I then started making arrangements to come out and get PR-ZVL moved to my home airport in Nevada.

In the meeting, Mr. Cox also said that he told me on the phone, "but to wait for further clarification" and whether or not he said that I don't know, I did not hear him say that for sure if he did say it.