Beech E-90 accident near Marietta, Ohio, October 18, 2022
On October 18, 2022 at about 11:09 am local time, a 1974 Beech E-90, registered N515GK, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (IFR final approach) near Marietta, Ohio (Mid-Ohio Valley Rgnl airport). It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
Structural icing on the tailplane that resulted in a tailplane stall and subsequent loss of control.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 18, 2022 · about 11:09 am local time
- Place
- Marietta, Ohio · Mid-Ohio Valley Rgnl · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Beech E-90, built 1974 · all E-90s on the register
- Registration
- N515GK · registry record · serial LW-108
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
Shortly after departure to pick up a passenger at their destination airport about 75 nm away, the pilots climbed and turned onto a track of about 115° before leveling off about 11,000 ft mean sea level (msl), where the airplane remained for a majority of the flight. Pilot and controller communications during the flight were routine and there were no irregularities reported. As the airplane descended into the destination airport area, the airplane passed through areas of light to heavy icing where there was a 20 to 80% probability of encountering supercooled large droplets (SLD) during their initial descent and approach. While level at 4,000 ft msl, the flight remained in icing conditions, and then was cleared for the instrument approach to the runway. The flight emerged from the overcast layer as it crossed the final approach fix at 2,800 ft msl; the flight continued its descent and was cleared to land. The controller informed the flight that there was a vehicle on the runway but it would be cleared shortly, which was acknowledged; this was the final communication from the flight crew. Multiple eyewitnesses and security camera footage revealed that the airplane, while flying straight and level, suddenly began a steep, spinning, nearly vertical descent until it impacted a commercial business parking lot; the airplane subsequently collided with several unoccupied vehicles and caught fire. The airplane was certified for flight in known icing conditions and was equipped with pneumatic deice boots on each of the wings and tail surfaces. The pneumatic anti-icing system was consumed by the postimpact fire; the control switches were impact and thermally damaged and a reliable determination of their preimpact operation could not be made. Further examination of the airframe and engines revealed no indications of any preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal engine operation or performance. During the approach it is likely that the airframe had been exposed to and had built-up ice on the control surfaces. It could not be determined if the pilots used the pneumatic anti-icing system, or if the system was inoperative, based on available evidence. Review of the weather conditions and the airplane’s calculated performance based on ADS-B data, given the speeds at which the airplane was flying, and the lack of any discernable deviations that might have been expected due to an extreme amount of ice accumulating on the airframe, it is also likely that the deice system, if operating at the time of the icing encounter, should have been able to sufficiently remove the ice from the surfaces. Although it is also uncertain when the pilots extended the landing gear and flaps, it is likely that the before-landing checklist would be conducted between the final approach fix and when the flight was on its 3-mile final approach to land. Given this information, the available evidence suggests that the sudden loss of control from a stable and established final approach was likely due to the accumulation of ice on the tailplane. It is likely that once the pilots changed the airplane’s configuration by extending the landing gear and flaps, the sudden aerodynamic shift resulted in the tailplane immediately entering an aerodynamic stall that maneuvered the airplane into an attitude from which there was no possibility to recover given the height above the ground. Postaccident toxicological testing detected the presence of delta-8 THC. Delta-8 THC has a potential to alter perception and cause impairment, but only the non-psychoactive metabolite carboxy-delta-8-THC was present in the pilot’s liver and lung tissue. Thus, it is unlikely that the pilot’s delta-8-THC use contributed to the accident.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of control in flight during approach (IFR final approach) defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Directional control › Attain/maintain not possible
- Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Freezing rain/sleet › Effect on equipment
Pilot
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot, remote
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: unmanned (suas)
- Flight time: 1,940 hours in all; 15 in this make and model; 1,910 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
Co-pilot
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: unmanned (suas)
- Flight time: 2,500 hours in all; 250 in this make and model; 56 in the last 90 days; 23 in the last 30 days; 1,400 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 9,521 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, September 20, 2022
- Maximum gross weight: 10,500 lb
- Seats: 8
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-28 (turboprop); 10,130 hours total
- Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-28 (turboprop); 10,130 hours total
- Fire on the ground
- Operator: Avintel Management LLC
The flight
- Departed from: CMH Columbus OH at 10:20 am
- Destination: PKB Parkersburg WV
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 21, 7,240 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 260° at 3 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 1,400 ft
- Temperature: 37°F (3°C), dew point 34°F (1°C)
- Altimeter: 29.80 inHg
- Observation at 6:53 am from PKB, 3 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KPKB 181053Z 26003KT 10SM OVC014 03/01 A2980 RMK AO2 SLP094 T00330006
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA23FA024.
