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Accidents · NTSB ERA23FA006 · Final report

Beech A36 accident near Arundel, Maine, October 5, 2022

On October 5, 2022 at about 5:56 pm local time, a 1991 Beech A36, registered N902AT, was destroyed in an accident during approach (IFR final approach) near Arundel, Maine (Biddeford Muni airport). It was a business flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s loss of situational awareness, which resulted in an unstabilized approach, descent below published minimum altitudes, and collision with terrain.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
October 5, 2022 · about 5:56 pm local time · cases in 2022
Place
Arundel, Maine · Biddeford Muni · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
Aircraft
Beech A36, built 1991 · all A36s on the register
Registration
N902AT · registry record · serial E2623
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot and passenger departed on an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross-country flight to the pilot’s home airport at the conclusion of a business trip. Weather radar imagery superimposed over the airplane’s flight track indicated that the airplane was flying toward an area of light intensity echoes associated with light rain to drizzle and instrument meteorological conditions as it approached the area of the destination airport. An AIRMET advisory for these conditions, as well as low-level turbulence, was valid for the accident time. The pilot confirmed to the controller that he had obtained the most recent weather information at the destination and requested the RNAV (GPS) instrument approach procedure. The nearest airport with recorded weather observations, about 11 nautical miles west of the destination airport, reported 2.5 miles visibility, a broken cloud ceiling at 700 ft above ground level (agl), and an overcast ceiling at 1,000 ft agl about the time of the accident. When provided vectors to the final approach course, and when issued his approach clearance, the pilot’s acknowledgements and read-backs of controller instructions were delayed by several seconds and incomplete. Automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) track data indicated that the airplane flew through, then turned left toward, the final approach course. About 30 seconds after crossing the initial approach fix, about 200 ft below the minimum altitude, the controller issued the pilot a frequency change and provided a phone number through which to cancel his IFR clearance once on the ground. As the airplane proceeded parallel to and east of the final approach course, it continued to descend, and remained consistently hundreds of feet below the minimum published altitude for each respective segment of the approach. The airplane passed the final approach fix 750 ft below the minimum altitude at 58 knots groundspeed. The airplane continued to descend over the next .75 miles at a ground speed about 60 kts before the data ended in the vicinity of the accident site. Several witnesses below the airplane’s flight path reported hearing the airplane, but stated that they could not see the airplane due to the low clouds, rain, and fog at the time of the accident. Their descriptions of the engine sound varied from “not normal” to “didn’t sound healthy” to sounding “…usual, just lower and louder.” Examination of the accident site revealed severed tree trunks with clean, angular cuts, consistent with the engine producing power at the time of impact. Examination of the wreckage, as well as an engine test run, revealed no pre-impact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. About 8 months before the accident, the airplane was equipped with dual electronic flight instruments that functioned as the primary attitude indicator and directional gyro. These instruments were integrated with the airplane’s existing autopilot system. Review of the pilot’s logbook indicated that, after receiving about 2 hours of dual instruction, he had flown the airplane about 34 hours since the installation of the avionics, of which 7 hours was recorded as actual IFR. The instrument meteorological conditions the pilot encountered during the approach to the destination airport would have resulted in a loss of outside visual references, requiring the pilot to rely on the flight instruments to maintain his intended course, altitude, and airspeed. The instrument conditions, likely turbulence, and increased workload imposed by beginning the approach phase of the flight presented a situation that was conducive to the development of spatial disorientation and a loss of situational awareness. Given that the pilot maintained a position east of the final approach course for most of the approach and far below the minimum published altitude throughout the approach, it is likely that he had lost situational awareness of the airplane’s position. No information was available to determine the modes or settings of the avionics and/or autopilot during the approach. Whether the pilot’s familiarity with the relatively new avionics and their interface with the autopilot contributed to the accident could not be determined based on the available information.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Controlled flight into terrain or object (CFIT) during approach (IFR final approach) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring equip/instruments › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Altitude › Not attained/maintained
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Ceiling/visibility/precip › Low ceiling › Contributed to outcome
  • Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Tree(s) › Contributed to outcome

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 2,514.3 hours in all; 976.5 in this make and model; 4 in the last 90 days; 0 in the last 30 days
  • Medical certificate: Class 3
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

Passenger

  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,953.2 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, November 1, 2021; 33.1 hours since
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Cont Motor IO-550 SERIES (piston); 561 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Departed from: KPQI Presque Isle ME at 4:19 pm
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 6, 3,000 ft by 75 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 010° at 7 knots
  • Visibility: 2.5 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 700 ft
  • Temperature: 55°F (13°C), dew point 54°F (12°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.97 inHg
  • Observation at 1:56 pm from KSFM, 8 miles away

Weather report (METAR): METAR KSFM 051756Z AUTO 01007KT 2 1/2SM -RA BR BKN007 OVC010 13/12 A2997 RMK AO2 VIS 1 1/2V3 RAB20 CIG 005V010 SLP152 P0000 60002 T01280122 10133 20111 56012

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Photographs from the investigation 6 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them

The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

14 documents, released by the NTSB on June 12, 2024. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Witness Statements PDF, 6 pages · our copy View Download
2 ADS-B Track Images PDF, 4 pages · our copy View Download
3 Engine Examination and Test Run PDF, 9 pages · our copy View Download
4 Excerpts of Pilot Logbook PDF, 13 pages · our copy View Download
5 Pilot and Airplane Information PDF, 4 pages · our copy View Download
6 Photographs PDF, 7 pages · our copy View Download
7 Meteorology Factual Report PDF, 34 pages · our copy View Download
8 Meteorology Attachment 1 - ForeFlight Weather Briefing PDF, 21 pages · our copy View Download
9 Toxicological Report PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
10 ATC - Attachment 1 - ADS-B Data zip file · our copy Download
11 ATC - Attachment 2 - Opsvue Track Data zip file · our copy Download
12 ATC - Attachment 3 - ATC Audio Recording - Pwm Ra audio View Download
13 ATC - Attachment 4 - FAA Aircraft Accident Package PDF, 49 pages · our copy View Download
14 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 15 pages · our copy View Download

The same docket at the NTSB.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

Aircraft
Place

The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA23FA006.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.