



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Timothy W. Monville
Sr. Air Safety Investigator
Eastern Region

Date: October 27, 2021
Person Contacted: Vladimir Hascak
NTSB Accident Number: ERA21LA388

Narrative:

Mr. Vladimir Hascak was contacted by phone on October 19, 2021, at 1437 EDT. The call was made to [REDACTED]. He was left a voice mail message was left. He returned the call the same day at 1455 EDT from the same phone number. He provided an e-mail address of [REDACTED].

At the beginning of the interview he was advised that the NTSB is a federal agency mandated by Congress to investigate aircraft accidents, and NTSB has no authority to take any action against any individual. He was also informed that the purpose of an NTSB investigation is for safety only, and any person NTSB talks with has the right to representation; he agreed to the interview without representation.

He was advised that I had received his original statement (attached), and rather than repeat the provided information, he was asked the following questions:

How did he verify the fuel tanks were full?

He removed each fuel cap and visually inspected each fuel tank noting the fuel level in each tank was up to the "brim." They also took a sample from each fuel tank and visually inspected the sample for contaminants. None were found. They then put the collected fuel back into the fuel tank.

Explain the flight from X50 to KGNV including flight duration.

The flight duration was about one hour. The fuel selector was in the "both" position. After departure the flight climbed to between 3,500 ft mean sea level (msl) or 4,500 feet msl. At each altitude change the fuel to air ratio was leaned. At KGNV the student performed a full-stop taxi back landing. While on the ground, the fuel to air ratio was leaned. The flight duration was approximately one hour.

Explain the flight from KGNV to X50 including flight duration.

The student utilized the checklist for departure. With the mixture full rich, he lined up on the runway centerline and performed a normal takeoff climbing to 3500 ft msl. While at altitude with the fuel selector on the "both" position, the student leaned the fuel to air ratio. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic controller directed several descents along the route of flight. The mixture control remained leaned during the descents. After leveling off, the mixture control was leaned again. The FAA controller cleared the flight to descend to 2,500 feet msl then later cleared the flight to descend to 1,600 feet msl. He recognized that the student allowed the airplane to descend below 1600 feet msl and told him to level off at 1600 feet msl. At that time the student advised him there was no engine power. As part of his emergency procedures, the student completed the memory items from the "Engine Failure During Flight" checklist which included in part verifying the fuel selector and ignition switch were each in the "both" position. He pitched for the best glide airspeed and the student informed him that the emergency procedures did not restore engine power. Based on the distance from the nearest airport versus their altitude, he decided to land in a nearby field. In anticipation of the forced landing, all items of the "Emergency Landing Without Engine Power" checklist were completed except for opening the doors and activation of the emergency locator transmitter. Before landing he lowered the flaps to full (30°) and landed "firm." After rolling between three and four seconds, the nose landing gear came down and contacted something on the ground causing the airplane to nose over.

What's seat were you in and what restraint were you wearing?

He was in the right seat and was wearing a seatbelt and shoulder harness. He was not injured. The student pilot was in the left seat and was also wearing the seatbelt and shoulder harness. He also was not injured.

Did you notice any uneven fuel burned during the accident flight?

No. The airplane was equipped with a Garmin G1000. It was a normal flight up to the point of the partial loss of engine power.

The propeller stop?

No, it never stopped. The engine was operating at 800 RPM. Advancing the throttle had no effect on the engine RPM.

What was the engine symptom?

For the descent to 1,600 feet msl the student pilot reduced power to 1,900 RPM, but neither of them had noticed that the engine had lost partial power until the airplane descended below 1,600 feet msl. He added that the partial loss of engine power was not abrupt, but it did become quiet in the cockpit.

Where's the aircraft currently located?

He was not sure.

What is the phone number for the operator?

The contact is Salim whose phone number is [REDACTED]

What is the phone number for the student pilot?

Alex Barrios phone number is [REDACTED]

He added that he (Vladimir Hascak) graduated from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University on September 28, 2021.

The call end time was not recorded.

The digest was e-mailed to him for review on October 27, 2021. He replied on October 29, 2021, at 1519 EDT with comments that were incorporated into the narrative. The corrected digest was e-mailed to him for review on November 1, 2021. He replied the same day at 1550 EDT with, "Looks good, thank you." The FINAL digest was e-mailed to him on November 1, 2021.



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Eastern Region

Date: October 27, 2021
Person Contacted: Vladimir Hascak
NTSB Accident Number: ERA21LA388

Narrative:

Mr. Vladimir Hascak was contacted by phone on October 21, 2021, at 1101 EDT. The call was made to [REDACTED]. He was left a voice mail message. He returned the call the same day at 1458 EDT from the same phone number. He provided an e-mail address of [REDACTED].

He was asked if he had a flight plan filed for the flights that day?
Yes for both legs. He filed the flight plan with ForeFlight.

Did you have flight following for the flights that day?
Yes for both legs. With respect to the flight from X50 to KGNV, they talked to Daytona Approach. With respect to the flight from KGNV to X50 they first talk with Jacksonville Approach and then Daytona Approach.

Explain the departure time for both flights?
They departed X50 at 1200 EDT, while they departed KGNV at 1330 EDT.

The call end time was not recorded.

The digest was e-mailed to him for review on October 27, 2021. He replied the same day at 1213 EDT, with, "Hello Mr. Monville, Yes the information provided in the email is correct. I hope you enjoy the rest of your day. Respectfully, Vladimir Hascak." The corrected digest was e-mailed to him on November 1, 2021.



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Timothy W. Monville
Sr. Air Safety Investigator
Eastern Region

Date: November 5, 2021
Person Contacted: Alexis Barrios
NTSB Accident Number: ERA21LA388

Narrative:

Mr. Alexis Barrios was contacted by phone on October 29, 2021, at 0949 EDT, and left a voice mail message. The call was made to [REDACTED]. He returned the call on November 4, 2021, at 1333 EDT. It was agreed to speak the same day at 1600 EDT. He called the same day at 1738 EDT. He provided an e-mail address of [REDACTED].

At the beginning of the interview he was advised that the NTSB is a federal agency mandated by Congress to investigate aircraft accidents, and NTSB has no authority to take any action against any individual. He was also informed that the purpose of an NTSB investigation is for safety only, and any person NTSB talks with has the right to representation; he agreed to the interview without representation.

He was asked to explain the flights that day:

In advance of the flight from Massey Ranch Airpark (X50), New Smyrna Beach, Florida, to the Gainesville Regional Airport (GNV), Gainesville, Georgia, he performed a preflight inspection of the airplane and reported no discrepancies. They filed a flight plan which included a waypoint at the Northeast Florida Regional Airport (SGJ), St Augustine, Florida. After departure the flight proceeded to GNV where he performed a full-stop taxi back landing. They departed GNV with VFR flight following en route to X50, and after clearing the GNV airspace proceeded direct to X50 flying at 3,500 ft mean sea level (msl). The flight continued and entered Daytona Beach Air Traffic Control Tower airspace. They were directed to descend to 2,500 ft msl, then 1,600 ft msl. After reaching 1,600 ft msl he attempted to level off but could not, realizing there was no engine power. He moved the mixture and throttle controls but that did not restore engine power. The flight instructor mentioned to him to maintain altitude and at that time he informed the instructor that the engine had lost power. There was a positive exchange of control of the airplane from him to the flight instructor, who verified the mixture and throttle controls were in, and the fuel selector was on the "both" position. At about 1,500 ft msl, the flight instructor said the use the

engine failure checklist while he communicated with air traffic control. At that time Daytona Beach International Airport (DAB) was behind them, New Smyrna Beach was the farthest away, and Spruce Creek Airport (7FL6) was the closest to them.

He pulled out his iPad and performed the steps of the engine failure checklist. He also attempted to restart the engine but was unsuccessful. He did not place the transponder to 7700. At that moment he realized the flight was proceeding to 7FL6, and the controller told them that airport was at their 1 o'clock position and asked them if it was in sight. They did not visually acquire the airport. The controller advised them that they were on the downwind for 7FL6 which was to their left. While flying at 200 ft, they could only see trees and houses. The flight instructor said they could not reach 7FL6 and saw a nearby field. The instructor turned to the right, descended, and landed in the field. After rolling about 4 to 5 seconds, the nose landing gear contacted the ground causing the airplane to nose over. Because he did not comply with the emergency landing check, he could not get his door open. His instructor told him to get out his side and both exited the airplane. The flight instructor called 911 to report the accident.

He was asked the following questions –

Did you have any injury?

No.

What restraint were you wearing?

The seatbelt and shoulder harness.

Did you fly to St. Augustine?

No, it was part of their flight leg or waypoint but did not fly there.

What was the fuel load when you departed X50?

Full fuel tanks.

Who did the preflight inspection at X50?

He did, but the CFI also did when he was done.

Do you recall any engine readings from the multi-function display (MFD)?

No, not really. He was focused on the checklist.

Was the MFD displaying engine parameters?

He was not sure.

Describe the loss of engine power?

He added throttle to arrest the descent, and there was no response from the engine. He also noted the propeller slow down. They continued to lose altitude.

Did you move the magneto switch to the left or right positions as part of the emergency checklist?

Yes, but there was no change.

Did the flight instructor move the fuel selector?

No. He verified it was in the both position.

Is this the 1st time you had experienced engine failure?

Yes, although he had trained to react to loss of engine power.

How did your training prepare you to deal with a loss of engine power?

The real thing was more challenging than in training, but it did help. The last 200 ft were scary without a runway in sight.

At this stage of the phone call he was given an update of the investigation.

The call ended at 1754 EDT.

The digest was e-mailed to him for review on November 5, 2021. He replied on November 6, 2021, at 0620 EDT with, "Good morning, After reviewing the facts, [I] see that everything is correct and no changes are needed. Thank you." The corrected digest was e-mailed to him on March 21, 2022.



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Timothy W. Monville
Sr. Air Safety Investigator
Eastern Region

Date: March 25, 2022
Person Contacted: Jose Leyva
NTSB Accident Number: ERA21LA388

Narrative:

Mr. Jose Leyva contacted NTSB by a phone on March 15, 2022, at 1414 EDT. He called from [REDACTED]

At the beginning of the Facetime call the accessory gearbox was in view with the oil filter in place. The oil filter was safety wired. He cut the safety wire and removed the oil filter. Residual oil that remained in the oil filter contained non-ferrous particles. The oil filter was cut open exposing the filter element, which also contained non-ferrous particles.

During the call he indicated that they don't cut open the oil filter at the 100-Hour engine examination unless they find something unusual, or it is a high-time engine. He indicated that he did not recall ever cutting open the oil filter of the accident airplane since performing a pre-buy inspection.

He was asked the following questions-

If you cut open the oil filter, would you cite that in the maintenance records?

Yes.¹ He indicated that his quick review of the engine maintenance logbook revealed no direct entry indicating the oil filter was cut open for inspection. He added that the engine failure of the accident flight was his first since 2008.

¹ He was asked to provide NTSB a good quality copy of the engine maintenance record entries since purchase in 2015. According to the FAA Aircraft Registry, Synyony Holding LLC purchased the airplane on October 15, 2015. He was a managing member of that company.

NTSB Questions Continued -

If he had been cutting open the oil filter and if he had seen the contamination in the oil filter element, what would he have done?

Since it was a high time engine, he would have had the engine removed for overhaul.

Before the call ended it was suggested to him that for every one of the 13 or so airplanes that they operate, they cut open every oil filter to inspect for contaminants, since in the accident engine case, it was likely that the mechanical damage inside the accessory case was occurring over a long period of time and it could have likely been caught. He advised he would incorporate that into their maintenance program and would provide NTSB a statement to that effect.

The call end time was 1455 EDT.

Mr. Jose Leyva was contacted by phone on March 24, 2022, at 1103 EDT. He was called at [REDACTED] and asked about providing the good quality copies of the maintenance records since his purchase. He indicated that he would be able to scan the documents on March 28, 2022. He was also asked about the status of his statement regarding cutting open each oil filter. He provided that by e-mail on March 24, 2022 at 1112 EDT.

The digest was e-mailed to him for review on March 25, 2022. He replied the same day at 1719 EDT with, "Hi Tim, José here. Attachment looks good to me." The FINAL digest was e-mailed to him on March 28, 2022.