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Date: July 22, 2021
Person Contacted: Captain, Pilot Flying; Matthew Baker
Telephone Call
NTSB Accident Number: ERA21LA296

Narrative:

The pilot flying (PF), Baker stated immediately, that he “took a perfectly good first officer and ignored him.” Although it wasn’t his intent. He became “target fixated.” And wanted to land the airplane, thinking that he could salvage the approach and land safely.

It was a nice day with visual flight rule conditions. Air traffic control left them a little high before they began their descent and once they got down to initial approach altitude, they were still carrying a lot of energy.

The PM made several go-around callouts, but there were visual conditions and the PF tried to continue to slow the airplane by adding flaps, spoilers and the landing gear.

During final, he thought he would be able to slow it sufficiently, but it was evident that during the landing, they were carrying too much speed and by that point, they were committed because the airplane was fully configured for landing. They were “eating up a lot of runway” before finally settling onto the pavement. They added full brakes and deployed the reversers but rolled into the EMAS system.

The PF takes responsibility for the breakdown in CRM. We briefly discussed stabilized approach procedures and the culture of the operator, which he stated as very positive.

[END]



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Date: August 4, 2021
Person Contacted: First Officer, Pilot Monitoring; Wyatt Brumm
Telephone Call
NTSB Accident Number: ERA21LA296

Narrative:

The pilot monitoring (PM), Brumm, was sitting in the right seat and handling the non-flying duties at the time. During the initial approach, everything was fine, but after entering the later stages of the approach, about 5 to 7 miles out on the base leg for runway 13 “we remained high and fast.”

The PM informed the pilot flying (PF), Baker that they were high and fast. As they got closer to the airport, about 3 miles out, they were still high and fast. The flaps were activated as soon as they got below 200 knots. Once established on base to final, their sink rate was increasing, and they were still “too fast.”

The pilot flying appeared to be super focused on landing and “didn’t appear to hear or acknowledge the call outs.” The airplane ground proximity warning called terrain, pull up! And he told the PF to “go-around”, but he didn’t appear to hear him. After putting down the landing gear, the airplane was still too fast for landing, and they were within a couple miles of the runway. The PM asked to put in some spoilers to help slow the airplane and put in the last notch of flaps.

The PM called for a go-around again as they were on short final. They were at least 30-40 knots too fast as they crossed the threshold. The PF seemed intent on salvaging the approach and landing. The PM exclaimed go-around again and the PF stating something like, we are landing. They landed very long and didn’t touch down until the midway part of the runway. The PM felt like he was “just a passenger” during the initial approach. He felt like, short of wrestling the controls away from the pilot, there was nothing else he could do. He challenged the PF multiple times during the approach without results.

The operator has a policy and procedures detailing stabilized approaches and the authority of any pilot to challenge a pilot. [END]