



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Timothy W. Monville
Sr. Air Safety Investigator
Eastern Region

Date: July 19, 2021
Person Contacted: Dionisio S. Gamboa
NTSB Accident Number: ERA21LA289

Narrative:

Mr. Dionisio Gamboa was contacted by phone on July 16, 2021, at 1420 EDT. The call was made to [REDACTED]. He provided an e-mail address of [REDACTED]. He also contacted NTSB by phone on July 19, 2021, at 1524 EDT, from the same phone number. The details of both conversations, as well as hand-written notes are incorporated into this document.

At the beginning of the interview he was advised that the NTSB is a federal agency mandated by Congress to investigate aircraft accidents, and NTSB has no authority to take any action against any individual. He was also informed that the purpose of an NTSB investigation is for safety only, and any person NTSB talks with has the right to representation; he agreed to the interview without representation.

He provided an address of [REDACTED] Edgewater, Maryland [REDACTED]. His date of birth is [REDACTED]. He holds a 2nd class medical certificate issued 8/19/2019, with a limitation to possess glasses.¹ His total flight time is 1,302.6 hours and he has accrued 503.3 hours total time make and model. He has been s a contract employee of Navy Annapolis Flight Center (NAFC) for “not quite” 2 years and reported all flights were conducted under Part 141. Prior to the accident flight, he last flew the accident airplane on a 2.3 hours flight July 11, 2021. He indicated that he was the only multi-engine certified flight instructor to fly with the student who was adding on a multi-engine rating to his commercial pilot certificate. He provided a timeline of flights with the student:

July 3, 2021 – Flight lasing 2.0 hours in the accident airplane.

July 5, 2021 - Flight lasing 2.3 hours in the accident airplane.

¹ He did have them with him at the time of the accident.

July 11, 2021 - Flight lasting 2.3 hours in the accident airplane.
July 15, 2021 (Accident Flight) – Airborne About 45 minutes.

He was asked the following questions –

Excluding the accident flight, had he experienced any problems in that airplane during his previous 3 flights?

He asked for clarification whether I was referring to only the left engine and propeller. He was advised that I was referring to the entire airplane. He indicated that on the accident airplane he did notice a problem with the sump drains not flowing properly.

He did know of a problem with the left propeller feathering uncommanded twice on a different airplane operated by NAFC. It was a Piper PA-23-180, N76NA. The first time it occurred to him while on the ground at Cambridge-Dorchester Regional Airport (CGE), Cambridge, Maryland. He was walking out to the airplane after lunch with student Chester Stephanowicz and noted the left propeller was feathered. They could not get it out of feather when attempting to start the engine. A mechanic named Speedy arrived and “serviced” the left propeller and the next day another certified flight instructor named Drew Wray flew the airplane to Lee Airport (ANP), Annapolis, Maryland. The next time it occurred to him was a couple days later when he was flying with a student named Ivan Ivonic. They were at the hold short line and with the throttle at idle the left propeller feathered. They aborted the flight and taxied to the ramp. A mechanic named Larry with Chesapeake Aviation used a wooden paddle to manually get the propeller out of feather. The next day, after being assured the airplane was ok, a person named Taylor Kasler who is no longer with NAFC flew the airplane from ANP to Easton Airport/Newnam Field (ESN), Easton, Maryland.

While N76NA was having propeller problems, N776MC was in for maintenance. To avoid down time, the propellers from N76NA were removed, and the propellers from N776MC were installed onto N76NA. The propellers from N76NA were sent out for repair, and after repair they were then installed onto N776MC.²

He indicated that about a week before the off-airport landing in N776MC, one of the other multi-engine instructor’s (MEIs) named Josue Cruz, informed Nate Warren and himself during their ground briefing that the right propeller on N776MC (which was one of the "feather-problem props" formerly on N76NA) had again feathered on the ground prior to Josue's flight from CGE. The mechanic (Speedy) from ESN looked at it and was able to get it out of feather so Josue could fly it back to ANP. The airplane was not "downed" so we assumed the feathering issue was fixed and not an issue. We flew the airplane several times and had no issues with the propeller feathering un-commanded, until the accident flight³.

² Mr. Gamboa indicated that he was, “...reminded of this when we were gathering the maintenance logs for [N]776MC, and the [propeller] logs for [N]76NA.”

³ He added that because N776MC is fuel-injected and sometimes difficult to start, we only do a "soft" shutdown of the non-critical/RIGHT engine during the engine shutdown demo. As soon as the student brings the propeller lever to feather in the one engine inoperative (OEI) flow, the MEI immediately advances the mixture and prop levers so the engine doesn't shutdown in flight.

He was asked to explain the accident flight in detail –

It was his 4th flight with the student. At that stage of the training they were performing the entire Airman Certification Standards (ACS) for the commercial multi-engine. He follows a training profile from the beginning of the training to the last flight, and by the 3rd or 4th flight, that training performed at 3,000 ft mean sea level consisted of -

Two clearing turns of 30° of bank to 90° change of heading

“walking the dog” which consisted of – clean then dirty slow flight, followed by an approach to landing stall straight ahead⁴, departure stall straight ahead, an approach to landing stall base to final in a turn (either direction away from traffic), accelerated stall, steep turns, unusual attitudes, VMC demonstration, engine shutdown demonstration, emergency descent to 2,000 ft mean sea level, and 2 instrument approaches each with a simulated loss of engine power from a different engine (a straight in approach and a circle to land at Easton), and conclude with an instrument approach to ANP.

On the accident flight, the student never got past the approach to landing stalls when the event occurred. The student executed an approach to landing stall (flaps and gear down) and did a recovery. He complained that the throttles felt, “like bungee cords.” The airplane had just been in for maintenance⁵, and he noticed initially after coming out of maintenance that the propeller and throttle controls initially felt tight, but on their flight on 7/15, they did not feel tight. He described the feeling initially as if he let go of the controls, the throttle would creep back. He did note the left engine was spooling up slowly. Because he did not understand the comment from the student, he took the controls from him and performed an approach to landing stall. He felt exactly what the student had described, and noted during recovery the left engine spooled up, “slowly.”

He told the student to perform the maneuver again. The maneuver was started at 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl), with the student lowering the nose from 70 mph (slow flight dirty) to achieve a 500 feet-per-minute descent at 80 mph, and 1,500 RPMs. At about 2,800 ft msl the student initiated the stall by raising the nose and reducing the power to idle, losing about another 100 ft of altitude before the stall buffet around 62 mph. After which he went to full power to recover, and at that time the left engine failed/quit. The airplane, which at that time was at around 57mph (VSO) immediately rolled about 45° to the left into a VMC roll. He immediately took the controls (positive exchange), and executed the VMC roll recovery (the plane was dirty with gear and flaps full down because we were practicing power off stalls), and by the time we had gotten back to blue line airspeed (96 mph) we were below 1,800 ft msl. He applied full right rudder and initiated the OEI flow (rudder, pitch to blue line, all handles in the power quadrant to full power...), and as he reapplied full right rudder, his seat slipped back. That released pressure on the right rudder pedal and allowing the asymmetric thrust of the right engine to put us into a 2nd VMC roll. He executed a second VMC roll recovery. By the time he had gotten back to blue line airspeed the flight was at about 1,200 ft msl and in an approximately 800 FPM descent. He went through the OEI flow again, with his student (also a CFI) trying to restart the left engine almost

⁴ All stalls were performed All Engines Operating.

⁵ According to the maintenance records provided to NTSB by FAA on July 19, 2021, the last annual inspection of the airplane was signed off April 21, 2021. The recorded hour meter reading was 764.90 and the airframe total time was 6,885.50 hours.

encountered a 3rd VMC roll. The student was unable to restart the left engine, and because of the loss of the left engine (engine-driven hydraulic pump on the left engine), we had lost all hydraulics and would have had to hand pump to retract the flaps and landing gear. The flight was below 800 ft msl and descending fast, and with no time or altitude, even though he could see the runway he realized they were unable to reach it. The student pointed out a field nearby and he committed to landing in it as best he could with the time and altitude that were available.

He added that the right seat on the accident airplane was notorious for slipping back 2 or 3 notches when the rudder was pushed hard. As a result before each flight, you had to physically push the locking pin into a notch to keep the seat in place. As long as you didn't slam on the rudders which put too much force against the locking pin, the seat would remain in place. Other MEIs and MEI students have had the seat slip back on other flights during the VMC demonstration maneuver during training, and have "griped" it to maintenance, but nothing could be done to fix it so we were just cognizant that it could slip at any time. He also added that the VMC recovery procedure is to reduce power to idle, so a seat slipping back during that type of maneuver with your hands on the engine controls would not be too bad a consequence.

His "hands were full" flying the airplane when discussing the engine-driven hydraulic pump and the need to pump the gear and flaps up following the left engine failure.⁶ He later looked at Flight Aware and noted it was 4 minutes from the engine failure to the moment they were in the corn field.

NTSB Questions Continued –

Did you or the student attempt to raise the landing gear using the hand pump?
On his flow, he identified the dead engine and he had his hands full. The flaps and landing gear were not pumped up.

What was the flaps positioned to?
Full down.

Did the landing gear collapse during the landing roll in the corn field?
The nose landing gear collapsed into the wheel well. The nose landing gear doors were closed on the nose landing gear.

Did he notice anything unusual from the engine instruments before the left engine quit?
As is his standard procedure they check the engine instruments before the maneuver and called aloud "in the green."

Was it the 1st stall that day?
No it was the 3rd stall.

What time did they depart from ANP?
1053 EDT.

⁶ He said it took 40 pumps to retract the landing gear.

NTSB Questions Continued –

What was the time of the accident?

1127 EDT.

What was the planned flight duration?

2 hours.

Were there any injury from him or the student?

Neither were injured.

What restraints were they wearing?

Both were wearing the lapbelt and shoulder harness.

Who is responsible for maintenance?

The maintenance officer is Kevin Phillips, but he is not "responsible" for maintenance, just for maintenance "admin." Maintenance responsibility still remains with Frank Kennedy or Jenny Wong.

What is the student's e-mail address?

[REDACTED]

Did the left propeller windmill after feathering?

No, it stopped and did not windmill.

Explain if the right engine was developing power during the recovery?

All I can tell you is the throttles were full forward.

Were the engine parameters recorded?

The airplane was equipped with a JPI engine monitor. It also had a separate gauge that displayed fuel flow and fuel quantity. The flight departed ANP with 108 gallons. He indicated that a person named "Speedy" postaccident drained 100 gallons.

What time elapsed between the actual 1st and 2nd VMC roll?

60-90 seconds.

Did he previously complain to maintenance about the right seat slippage?

Yes. He personally did.

Did he command at any time of the flight for the right propeller to be feathered?

No he did not. He did not command that. At shutdown of the aircraft, all the engine controls were all aft. He looked at postaccident pictures and saw the right propeller blades were feathered.

Did he have any questions from NTSB?

How long does the investigation take?

Approximately 6 to 9 months. It depends on complexity, reports, and workload.

The call ended at 1520 EDT.

The digest was e-mailed to him for review on July 19, 2021. He replied the same day at 1827 EDT with, "Sir, aligns with what we discussed." His additional comment was incorporated into the narrative. The corrected digest was e-mailed to him on July 19, 2021.



Memorandum For Record

Timothy W. Monville
Sr. Air Safety Investigator
Eastern Region

Date: October 28, 2021
NTSB Accident Number: ERA21LA289

On July 19, 2021, at 1622 EDT, the certified flight instructor (Dionisio S. Gamboa, CAPT, USN (ret)) sent NTSB an e-mail with information that was copied in its entirety below. The font in the 1st paragraph was changed.

“I had mentioned that I had two issues with the left prop on 76NA feathering on the ground, once on shutdown at KCGE with Chester Stephanowicz (where we had to leave 76NA at KCGE for our mechanic Speedy from KESN to service it; another CFI, Drew Wray picked 76NA up and flew it back to KANP the next day). It happened again in 76NA during the ground runup/idle check of another flight from KANP with another one of my other students, Ivan Ivonic. Our mechanic, Larry at Chesapeake Aviation had to physically force the prop out of feather so that 76NA could be flown back to KESN (by Taylor Kasler, another MEI) for Speedy to look at it. Speedy ended up removing both props and sending them to the prop shop for servicing. Those "feather-problem" props from 76NA were later put on 776MC when they came back from the prop shop. I was reminded of this when we were gathering the maintenance logs for 776MC, and the prop logs were from 76NA.

About a week before the off-airport landing in 776MC, one of the other MEIs, Josue Cruz, informed Nate Warren and I during our ground briefing that the right prop on 776MC (which was one of the "feather-problem props" formerly on 76NA) had again feathered on the ground prior to Josue's flight from KCGE, and again, our mechanic Speedy from KESN had to come and look at it. Speedy was able to get it out of feather so Josue could fly it back to KANP. The airplane was not "downed" so we assumed the feathering issue was fixed and not an issue. We flew the plane several times and had no issues with the prop feathering un-commanded, until the 776MC off-airport landing event. Note: Because 776MC is fuel-injected and sometimes difficult to start, we only do a "soft" shutdown of the non-critical/RIGHT engine during the engine shutdown demo; as soon as the student brings the prop lever to feather in the OEI flow, the MEI immediately advances the mixture and prop levers so the engine doesn't shutdown in flight.

The reason behind the second Vmc roll was the slipping back of the right seat, which contributed to the huge descent rate that caused us to lose so much altitude in such a short amount of time. The right seat on MC is notorious for slipping back 2 or 3 notches when the rudder is pushed hard, so before each flight, you have to physically push the locking pin into a notch to keep the seat in place. As long as you don't slam on the rudders, putting too much force against the locking pin, the seat will remain in place. Other MEIs and MEI students have had the seat slip back on other flights during the Vmc demo maneuver during training, and have "griped" it, but nothing could be done to fix it so we were just cognizant that it could slip at any time.

After the first Vmc roll recovery, after I had pulled the throttle, achieved Vsse/80mph, I then went back to full power, applying full right rudder. My seat slipped back, causing the right rudder pressure to release, and subsequently resulting in the second Vmc roll. I initiated the second Vmc roll recovery in the same manner as the first, resulting in further loss of altitude.

We started the stall maneuver at 3000', lowering the nose from 70mph (slow flight dirty) to achieve a 500fpm descent at 80mph, 1500RPMs. At about 2800' my student initiated the stall by raising the nose and reducing the power to idle, losing about another 100' before the stall buffet around 62mph, after which he went to full power to recover, and the left engine failed. The plane, which was around 57mph (Vso) immediately rolled into a ~45degAOB Vmc roll. I immediately took the controls, and executed the Vmc roll recovery (the plane was dirty with gear and flaps full down because we were practicing power off stalls), and by the time we had gotten back to blueline (96mph) we were below 1800'. I applied full right rudder and initiated the OEI flow (Rudder, pitch to blueline, all handles in the power quadrant to full power...), and as I reapplied the full right rudder, my seat slipped back, releasing the pressure on the right rudder and allowing the asymmetric thrust of the right engine to put us into another Vmc roll. I executed a second Vmc roll recovery. By the time I had gotten back to blueline (96mph), we were at about 1200' and in an ~800fpm descent. I went through the OEI flow again, with my student (also a CFI) trying to airstart the feathered left engine, but with the loss of the left engine, we had lost all hydraulics and would have had to hand pump the flaps back up. We were below 800' and descending fast, and with no time or altitude, we saw a field below us and committed to landing as best we could with the time and altitude that we had."

Timothy W. Monville
Sr. Air Safety Investigator
OAS-Eastern Region Aviation

Date: July 14, 2023

Subject: ERA21LA289, Record of Conversation/Interview

Contact: Robert Bayliss

Mr. Robert Bayliss, Director of Maintenance and General Manager of Air Repair, Inc., was contacted by phone on July 14, 2023, at 1105 EDT. He was called at [REDACTED] His e-mail address is [REDACTED] He was contacted as Air Repair, Inc., performed repairs to N776MC as a result of a gear-up landing in September 2020, and returned the airplane to service. The repairs included in part installation of a Hartzell HC-C2YK-2RBF propeller with F7666A-2 propeller blades, serial number BC564B (Figure 1).

He was advised by e-mail when sending this document for review that it will not be released to the public until the investigation is finished and when published, any personal identifiable information (PII) such as cell phone number, e-mail address, address, pilot certificate number, etc., will be redacted and not viewable in the released document.

He was asked the following questions –

What oil was installed into the left engine after it was returned from Penn Yan Aero?
Per Work Order 20-0344, they added a total of 16.0 quarts into both engines (Figure 2). Usually after an overhaul oil change is due at 25 hours.

Was Air Repair, Inc., aware of uncommanded feathering of either the left or right propeller of N776MC?

He was aware of that occurring during the accident flight but was not previously aware of that. They returned N776MC to airworthy status in April 2021 and that airplane was not returned to them between then and the accident date. He did indicate that he personally was not involved with N776MC but the previous owner of the company Richard Brown, Jr. (Speedy) was and was a friend of Frank Kennedy, the Chief Flight Instructor of that airplane.

NTSB Questions Continued –

Did Air Repair, Inc., make the decision to install the HC-C2YK-2RBF propellers onto N776MC during the repairs to return the airplane to service?

No. Frank Kennedy provided the propellers with appropriate airworthy paperwork. And they installed them.

Was Air Repair, Inc., aware of the reported right front seat slippage issue reported by the accident flight instructor during the accident flight, reportedly by other pilot's, but not by Frank Kennedy who flew N776MC regularly?

No sir. At every annual inspection the seats are removed, and thoroughly inspected. They have been in business over 30 years and have refused to maintain an airplane if certain standards are not applied.

At this stage of the conversation he was advised that it was determined during the investigation that the left propeller blades on N776MC at the time of the accident did not match the propeller blade model specified and approved by the Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) (attached as Attachment 1). It was relayed to him that Frank Kennedy indicated that the propellers put onto N776MC came from N76NA, which had 180 horsepower engines, and was a different STC SA899SW. Those propellers did not have counterweight equipped blades and the basic propeller diameter of the blades from N76NA were 2 inches longer than the specified blades by the STC for N776MC.

NTSB Questions Continued –

How can we mitigate having wrong propellers installed onto an airplane?

They now have a full-time inspector. The previous owner of the company (Richard Brown, Jr. (Speedy)) who held an airframe and powerplant certificate with inspection authorization was their Chief Inspector but he passed away on July 30, 2021. For an incoming airplane they do look at Instructions for Continued Airworthiness for STC's.

Is there a way they can add a checklist into their paperwork to make sure any STC installed equipment is appropriate for the aircraft and in compliance with the STC?

When they bring an aircraft in for inspection they complete an aircraft research data sheet. On that document for key components it lists make, model/part number, serial number and any pertinent information. For N776MC, the computerized version (attached as Attachment 2) did not have the make and model propellers because they were damaged. On the hand-written version (attached as Attachment 3) it also did not list the propeller model or serial number. He will add something onto their aircraft research data sheet to require verification that STC installed equipment was proper and in accordance with the STC and require a signature from their full-time inspector (attached as Attachment 4).

Before the call ended he was asked to send me the following. All requested items were received the same day at 1246 EDT:

1. The clean version of the aircraft research data sheet associated with N776MC
2. The hand-written version of the aircraft research data sheet associated with N776MC
3. The current version of the aircraft research data sheet (Attachment 5)
4. The amended version of the aircraft research data sheet

The call ended at 1127 EDT.

The digest was e-mailed to him for review on July 14, 2023. He replied the same day at 1442 EDT with, "Received. Looks fine sir, Just add the T to [REDACTED] in the letter. Thank you. Rob." The comments were incorporated into the [REDACTED] L digest was e-mailed to him on July 14, 2023.

Repair Station # CV9R194N

AIR REPAIR
AIR REPAIR, INC. [REDACTED] EASTON, MD [REDACTED]

Date: 9/22/2020; Aircraft: N776MC; Type: PIPER PA-23; S/N: 23-1078; Hobbs: 92.60; Work Done At - Airframe
Time: 6885.50,
Shop Order #: 20-0344, Closed: 4/22/2021

*REMOVED LEFT ENGINE AND PROP.
*INSTALLED LEFT ENGINE P/N 10360-CIC, S/N L-33770-51E AND PROP P/N HC-C2YK-2RBF-F7666A2, S/N BC564B. ENGINE, RAN AND ADJUSTED. ENGINE REPAIRED BY PENN YAN AERO, ENGINE T.T. 550.2. PROPELLER REPAIRED BY SENSENICH PROPELLER "O" SMOH.

The aircraft, aircraft engine, or appliance identified above was repaired and/or inspected in accordance with current Federal Aviation Regulations and is approved for return to service for the work performed. Records are on file at this repair station at Air Repair, Inc.

Signature: [REDACTED] CRS#XR5R175Y
(Representative)

Figure 1: ScreenShot of Left Propeller Logbook Showing Installation of Hartzell HC-C2YK-2RBF Propeller with F7666A-2 propeller blades onto the left engine of N776MC.

Air Repair, Inc.
CRS#XR5R175Y
[REDACTED]
Easton, MD [REDACTED]
Phone: [REDACTED] Fax: [REDACTED]

RAN AND ADJUSTED. ENGINE REPAIRED BY PENN YAN AERO, ENGINE T.T. 550.2. PROPELLER REPAIRED BY SENSENICH PROPELLER "O" SMOH.
(NOTE: Props provided by Customer)

Charges This Item:		40.00 Hours @	98.00	\$	3,920.00	
		Total For This Operation:		\$	3,920.00	
Part Number	Description	Credit	Quantity	Units	Unit Price	Extended
072-306-0	700X6 8PR TIRE		1.00	Each	325.00	\$ 325.00
	S/N: 9047S00194					
15W50	Aeroshell Oil		16.00	EACH	12.950	\$ 207.20
			2.00	Each	1.220	\$ 2.44

Figure 2: Screenshot from Work Order 20-0344 Showing Type of Oil Added to Both Engines.

United States Of America
 Department of Transportation - Federal Aviation Administration
Supplemental Type Certificate

Number SA1306SW

This Certificate issued to Apache Modification Aircraft Corp.,
 a Montana Corporation
 [REDACTED]
 Kalispell, MT [REDACTED]

certifies that the change in the type design for the following product with the limitations and conditions therefor as specified hereon meets the airworthiness requirements of Part 3 of the Civil Air Regulations.

Original Product Type Certificate Number: 1A10
Make: Piper
Model: PA-23, PA-23-160

Description of Type Design Change:

Installation of Lycoming IO-360-C1C engines with Hartzell HC-C2YK-2/C7666A-4 propellers with gross weight increase in accordance with Drawing List No. 29,000 dated 11/13/70, revised 8/5/72; or later FAA approved revision.

Limitations and Conditions:

1. FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual Supplement dated May 4, 1971, is required for Piper Model PA-23; or Supplement dated May 4, 1971, is required for Piper Model PA-23-160.
2. Compatibility of this modification with other previously approved modifications must be determined by the installer.

This certificate and the supporting data which is the basis for approval shall remain in effect until surrendered, suspended, revoked or a termination date is otherwise established by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.

Date of application: October 27, 1970

Date reissued: 11/22/98; 12/27/99

Date of issuance: May 04, 1971

Date amended: 7/20/72; 8/15/72; 3/14/83
 Rev. 3



By direction of the Administrator

[REDACTED] *for*
 (Signature)
 S. Frances Cox, Manager
 Special Certification Office,
 Southwest Region

(Title)

AIRCRAFT RESEARCH DATA

DATE: 9/28/20

A/C TT:

CUSTOMER: NAVY ANNAPOLIS

INSPECTION: ANNUAL

A/C REGISTRATION: N776MC

SPECIAL INSPE IFR DUE:1/22

HEATER HOBBS: N/A

A/C TACH:

ALWAYS ADD 6245.3 TO HOBBS+ AFTT

1957

DISCRIPTION	MAKE	MODEL / P/N	SERIAL NO.	PERTINENT INFO
AIRCRAFT	PIPER	PA23	23-1078	
ENGINE #1	LYCOMING	IO-360-C1C	L-33770-51E	
ENGINE #2	LYCOMING	IO-360-C1C	L-33769-51E	
PROPELLER #1				
PROPELLER #2				
PROP GOVERNOR LEFT	WOODWARD	S26	452346	TYPE 210080R/S-Y
PROP GOVERNOR RIGHT	WOODWARD	S26	452357	TYPE 210080R/S-Y
ALTERN/GENERATOR LT	PLANE POWER	10-1051	H-1062322	
ALTERN/GENERATOR RT	PLANE POWER	10-1051	H-1062322	
CARBURETOR LT	PRECISION	LW-10409	70C50007	RSA-5AD1
CARBURETOR RT	PRECISION	LW-10409	70C50008	RSA-5AD1
#1 MAG LEFT	SLICK	4371	3030304	
#1 MAG RIGHT	SLICK	4370	7071272	
#2 MAG LEFT	SLICK	4371	7080543	
#2 MAG RIGHT	SLICK	4370	7071273	
FUEL PUMP LT	LYCOMING	LW-15473-2907		
FUEL PUMP RT	LYCOMING	LW-15473-2907		
STARTER LT	SKY-TEC	149-NL	FN-081610Z	
STARTER RT	SKY-TEC	149-NL	FN-4415230	
VACUUM PUMP	N/A	N/A		
OIL COOLER LT	HARRISON	8523517	JJ-1610	AP07AU06-02

OIL COOLER RT	HARRISON	8523517	JJ-1742	AP07AU06-02
AIRCRAFT MAIN BATTERY	AIRCRAFT RESEARCH DATA			
ELT BATTERY PACK	ARTEX	366852-034		
ELT	ARTEX	453-6603	188-11570	ME406
IGNITION SWITCH	N/A	N/A		
HYDRAULIC PUMP LT	STRATO POWER	67B025	A0-33 92	
ENG PREHEAT PAD				

Hobbs 2085.7

AIRCRAFT RESEARCH DATA

5.40
37.36
37.08
60.88
100.11
100.11

DATE: 9/28/20

A/C TT:

CUSTOMER: NAVY ANNAPOLIS

INSPECTION: ANNUAL

A/C REGISTRATION: N776MC

SPECIAL INSPE

IFR DUE:

HEATER HOBBS: N/A

A/C TACH:

DISCRIPTION	MAKE	MODEL / P/N	SERIAL NO.	PERTINENT INFO
AIRCRAFT	Piper	PA-23	23-1078	
ENGINE #1	Lycoming	IO-360-CAC	L-33770-SIE	
ENGINE #2	Lycoming	IO-360-C1C	L-33769-SIE	
PROPELLER #1				
PROPELLER #2				
PROP GOVERNOR	LEFT WOODWARD	\$26	452346	TYPE 210080RIS-Y
	RIGHT WOODWARD	\$26	452357	TYPE 210080RIS-Y
LTERN/GENERATOR	LEFT PLANE POWER	10-1051	H-1062322	
	RIGHT PLANE POWER	10-1051	H-1062320	
CARBURETOR	LEFT PRECISION	LW-10409	70650007	MODEL RSA-SAD1
	RIGHT PRECISION	LW-10409	70650008	MODEL RSA-SAD1
FUEL PUMP	LEFT LYCOMING	LW15473-2907		
FUEL PUMP	RIGHT LYCOMING	LW15473-2907		
MAGNETO L	SLICK	4371	03030304	
MAGNETO R	SLICK	4370	07071272	
MAGNETO LEFT	SLICK	4371	07080543	
MAGNETO RIGHT	SLICK	4370	07071273	
STARTER	LEFT SKYTEC	149-NL	FN-0816102	
	RIGHT SKYTEC	149-NL	FN-4415230	
VACUUM PUMP	NA	NA	NA	
	NA	NA	NA	
AC BATTERY	GALL			
OIL COOLER	RIGHT HARRISON	8523517	JT-1742	MODEL APO7AU06-02
OIL COOLER	LEFT HARRISON	8523517	JT-1610	MODEL APO7AU06-02
ELT	ARTEX	453-6603	188-11570	MODEL ME406
ELT BATTERY	ARTEX	366852-034		
IGNITION SWITCH	NA	NA	NA	
AIR FILTER				
HYDRAULIC PUMP	L STRATOPower	G780 25	AO-3392	

NEW AIRCRAFT RESEARCH DATA SHEET 7/14/2023

DATE: CUSTOMER: A/C REGISTRATION: HEATER HOBBS:			A/C TT: INSPECTION: <u>ANNUAL</u> SPECIAL INSPECTION: A/C TACH: A/C HOBBS:		IFR DUE:
DISCRIPTION	MAKE	MODEL / P/N	SERIAL NO.	PERTINENT INFO	
AIRCRAFT					
ENGINE #1					
ENGINE #2					
PROPELLER #1					
PROPELLER #2					
PROP GOVERNOR #1					
PROP GOVERNOR #2					
ALTERN/GENERATOR #1					
ALTERN/GENERATOR #2					
CARBURETOR / FUEL INJ. #1					
CARBURETOR / FUEL INJ. #2					

ATTACHMENT 4

FUEL PUMP #1				
FUEL PUMP #2				
MAGNETO LEFT #1				
MAGNETO RIGHT #1				
MAGNETO LEFT #2				
MAGNETO RIGHT #2				
STARTER #1				
STARTER #2				
VACUUM PUMP #1				
VACUUM PUMP #2				
OIL COOLER #1				
OIL COOLER #2				
AIRCRAFT MAIN BATTERY				
ELT BATTERY				
ELT				
IGNITION SWITCH				
AIR FILTER #1				
AIR FILTER #2				

ATTACHMENT 4

[illegible]

AIRCRAFT RESEARCH DATA

DATE:		A/C TT:		
CUSTOMER:		INSPECTION: <u>ANNUAL</u>		
A/C REGISTRATION:		SPECIAL INSPE		IFR DUE:
HEATER HOBBS: <u>N/A</u>		A/C TACH:		

DISCRIPTION	MAKE	MODEL / P/N	SERIAL NO.	PERTINENT INFO
AIRCRAFT				
ENGINE #1				
ENGINE #2				
PROPELLER #1				
PROPELLER #2				
PROP GOVERNOR #1				
PROP GOVERNOR #2				
ALTERN/GENERATOR #1				
ALTERN/GENERATOR #2				
CARBURETOR #1				
CARBURETOR #2				
FUEL PUMP #1				
FUEL PUMP #2				
MAGNETO LEFT #1				
MAGNETO RIGHT #1				
MAGNETO LEFT #2				
MAGNETO RIGHT #2				
STARTER #1				
STARTER #2				
VACUUM PUMP #1				

AIRCRAFT RESEARCH DATA

VACUUM PUMP #2				
OIL COOLER #1				
OIL COOLER #2				
AIRCRAFT MAIN BATTERY				
ELT BATTERY				
ELT				
IGNITION SWITCH				
AIR FILTER #1				
AIR FILTER #2				
AIR OIL SEPARATOR #1				
AIR OIL SEPARATOR #2				
ENG PREHEAT PAD #1				
ENG PREHEAT PAD #2				
SPECIAL EQUIPMENT INSTALLED				