



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Eastern Region – Ashburn, Virginia

Record of Conversation

Who: Joe Swope, Cape Air Pilot (Trainee)

Witness: Ms. Marilyn Rhude, Cape Air Pilot Union

Date: May 6, 2021

Mr. Swope was interviewed via the telephone. He stated that he started with Cape Air in March 2021, and this was his third flight in the Cessna 402. He had flown in the accident airplane earlier that day as an observer, and there were no issues with the airplane or the engines. The purpose of the flight was to prepare for his ATP/Part 135 check ride. Mr. Swope said this was the second time he had flown with training pilot, Craig Stewart.

Mr. Swope stated that Mr. Stewart had provide him with a lesson plan and they had a 20-minute preflight briefing prior to the flight.

Mr. Swope said he used the checklist to start and run-up both engines before departure. He said there were no issues with the engines or airplane, and they departed runway 33 at HYA. They flew to the practice area to perform stalls, steep turns, and unusual attitudes, before returning to HYA to practice approaches. The first approach was the LOC to Runway 24 with a circle-to-land on Runway 33. After the approach to runway 33, he performed a go-around/rejected landing. On climb out, Mr. Stewart reduced power on the left engine to simulate an engine failure on takeoff. Mr. Swope then ran the memory items for an engine failure, which included:

- 1) Advance Throttles/Mixtures/Props
- 2) Gear up, Flaps Up
- 3) Check Fuel Flow
 - a. No fuel flow, Aux Boost Pump to High

Mr. Swope said that he physically placed the Aux Boost Pump to the High position and left it there. While doing this, Mr. Stewart was talking to air traffic control (ATC). Mr. Swope then pulled the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) but was corrected by Mr. Stewart to first turn on the autopilot, and then pull the QRH. While doing this, ATC began to vector them for the ILS runway 24 approach at HYA. The approach was normal, and he flew it down to minimums. When they reached minimums (about 400 ft), Mr. Stewart told Mr. Swope to look up and see the runway. Mr. Swope saw the runway and prepared to land. Mr. Swope could hear Mr.

Stewart telling ATC that they were going to do a low pass, so he knew that they would be executing another go-around. A few minutes later, he extended the flaps in preparation to land. The landing gear was already extended. When the airplane was closer to the runway, Mr. Stewart told him to go-around. Mr. Swope then brought both throttles full forward and retracted the flaps then the landing gear. The airplane began to climb and yaw "off course" to the left. He tried to use the rudder and ailerons to control the airplane, but the airspeed was about 80 knots, and the airplane was low to the ground. Mr. Stewart took control of the airplane and then yelled out "landing gear." Mr. Swope thought Mr. Stewart wanted the gear retracted to reduce drag, but then realized that he wanted it extended so he could land. Mr. Stewart then reached over and extended the gear himself. The airplane impacted the ground, bounced, impacted a ridge, the left wing dipped down, and the airplane slip to a stop. Mr. Swope then began to shut down the airplane and turned off the alternator, and magnetos. He also said that he turned the aux boost pumps to the off position. The left pump from high to off, and the right pump from low to off.

Mr. Swope said that he had practiced simulated engine out procedures about 2-3 times in the simulator, but never in the airplane. On the flight he observed earlier that day, the trainee that was flying performed a simulated engine out. That pilot returned to the airport and made a full stop landing.

Mr. Swope stated that he was trained in the simulator to physically move the Aux Boost Pump to the High position when practicing a simulated engine failure. He did not recall if he had been instructed in either the ground school or in the simulator, to not turn the Aux Boost Pump on to High if the engine driven fuel pump was still operating, since it could flood the engine. He also did not recall Mr. Stewart telling him to not turn the Aux Boost Pump switch to High during the simulated engine-out procedure during the accident flight.

Mr. Swope said that he was trained to only "touch and tell" on the non-memory items of the single-engine out checklist in the QRH, which started at item #9.

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