



August 28, 2023

**IN REPLY REFER TO:
L-175-23-049**

Tim Monville
Sr. Air Safety Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board
[REDACTED]
Washington, DC [REDACTED]

**RE: 2009 560XL; Serial number: 560-6026; REG: N560AR
Location: Farmington, CT; D/A: 09-02-21
NTSB report number: ERA21FA346**

Dear Mr. Monville,

Textron Aviation is providing the following submission for the accident listed above based on the information placed in the public docket.

The following checklists state, "PARK BRAKE Set": Preliminary Cockpit Inspection and Before Starting Engines, Shutdown

The following checklists state, "Brakes Release": Static Takeoff, Rolling Takeoff

The following checklist states, "Steering ... Check": Taxi

The following checklist states, "Thrust Reversers ... Check": Taxi

During his interview, Nicholas Scata, was asked, "Explain procedurally how you flew with Mr. O'Leary, checklist usage?" Mr. Scata stated, "It was command and response... Fire everything up with the checklist... Pull it out, fire it up, run through our checks, especially the thrust reversers, yaw, it just became a process. And we would double check our process against each other... 'my question was if something goes wrong on the roll, he says we go. We get to Bradely. We'd handle the emergency in the air and we go.'" Additionally, during the interview Mr. Scata stated, "We would taxi out, do our brake checks, steering checks, autopilot checks."

The Cockpit Voice Recorder report stated, "With the exception of rote callout items, such as calling for gear and flaps, there was no verbalized checklist usage noted. Additionally, there were no crew briefings noted, including takeoff and landing briefings, and no discussion of aircraft performance or takeoff/landing distance calculations."

A review of the Cockpit Voice Recorder transcript found that the crew did not use the following words: Brake, brakes, park, parking, steering, thrust, reverse, or reverser. The word "released" was used once in a radio conversation referring to a release time for takeoff.

The NTSB did not identify any pre-accident aircraft system issues during the investigation.

A review of the records of the pilot identified as second-in-command found it was not possible to determine if the pilot was legally allowed to operate as second-in-command in the accident aircraft.

Based on these findings, Textron Aviation puts forth the following probable cause statement: The pilot's failure to release the parking brake before initiating a takeoff resulted in a runway excursion. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew's failure to follow multiple checklists before the takeoff was attempted, the flight crew's failure to brief the takeoff, and the right seat pilot's probable unfamiliarity with the accident aircraft model.

If further assistance is required, please contact me or another member of our Air Safety Investigations Department.

Sincerely,

A black rectangular redaction box covering the signature of Henry J. Soderlund.

Henry J. Soderlund
Manager, Air Safety Investigations
Textron Aviation

cc: FAA