

Factual Report – Attachment 1

Interview Summaries

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

ERA20LA315

Interviewee: Matthew Bennett (CF)
Representative: Mark Tomicich

Date / Time: October 1, 2020 / 1035 eastern daylight time (EDT)
Location: Jacksonville, FL via Zoom for Government
Present: Paul Suffern, Angela Priebe, Karena Marinas
Investigator: Charles Olvis

During the interview Matthew Bennett stated the following:

Mr. Bennett began working for the FAA in April 2006 reporting to the FAA training facility in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. After successfully completing the en route course in June 2006, he transferred to Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZJX ARTCC). He reported to the West Area and was certified on all operating positions. In February 2012, he became an Operations Supervisor (OS) for the West Area. In November 2018, he was detailed as the Executive Technical Representative (ETR) until January 2020 when he became an OS in the North Area. He was certified and maintained currency in the Brunswick, Allendale, and Jekyll sectors. In March 2020 he was detailed as the acting operations manager (AOM) for a 180-day detail that ended on September 24, 2020. On September 25, 2020 he returned to duty as an OS in the North Area and has continued to maintain currency.

Mr. Bennett had no air traffic control (ATC) experience prior to 2006; however, he was a certified pilot. He held a commercial multi-engine instrument rating and was a certified flight instructor and certified flight instructor instrument. He estimated he had about 1,800 hours total time. He maintained a class 2 physical with a restriction for eyeglasses which he reported that he was wearing.

Mr. Bennett believed he was in good health and was physically active. He had experienced no significant changes in his personal life or with his finances. He worked a modified schedule due to COVID¹. The day shifts began at 0630 and ended at 1430. He stated he would awaken at about 0500 for day shifts and arrive by 0620 for 10 minutes of overtime to conduct pre-briefings before assuming the watch at 0630. He would usually remain for about 30 minutes after the watch to discuss operational and administrative activities departing the facility at about 1500.

After departing work at 1500 he would normally run errands with his children and help with the family business. He would usually return home and have dinner by 1900 and then put the children to bed. He would usually go to sleep between 2200 and 2300 each evening before day shifts and added he that he wasn't running late for work the day of the accident or the previous 3 days. He concluded that the week's activities were routine and not out of the ordinary.

Mr. Bennett stated that he had been involved in the post-accident activities and had not been formally interviewed about the accident. He had not filed an Air Traffic Safety Action Program² (ATSAP) report; however, he had completed the post-accident questions with the sector

¹ A modified schedule due to the COVID Pandemic that schedules controllers five days on and five days off and rotated between nights and days.

² A voluntary, non-punitive ATC safety reporting system used to identify safety risks.

13 controller. He stated that he had participated in the Covered Event Review³ (CER) for the accident along with Danny Glover and Kim Sullivan. Additionally, he did answer questions for the air traffic manager during the Services Rendered TELCON⁴ (SRT). Mr. Bennett had watched the FALCON replay of the accident and services provided to the aircraft.

On the day of the accident Mr. Bennet described the traffic and complexity as a two out of five and stated there were no traffic management initiatives⁵ (TMI's) valid for the West Area. He added that there was a heavy to moderate area of precipitation to the west and to the east of the sector 13 controller's area, and that there was an area building near Cross City. He remembered aircraft had been conducting instrument landing system⁶ (ILS) approaches into Albany (ABY).

Mr. Bennett had received a pre-duty weather briefing before the watch and remembered there were AIRMETs⁷ valid for the accident sector for turbulence from the surface to 12,000 feet, and convective SIGMETs⁸ were expected for the day as a result of Tropical Storm Sally. All of this was expected to impact sectors 12/13/28. He added that the standup brief at 0620 included weather and that the CWSU⁹ provided unit briefs at 0830; these briefs included the OS's and STMC. He said that the CWSU always finished the brief that PIREPs¹⁰ were always appreciated. Mr. Bennet stated that if he noticed a controller had not received a pre-duty weather briefing, he would have them complete it as soon as practicable.

Mr. Bennett remembered that he had talked with the OS's on the day of the accident about soliciting PIREPs and would usually walk through the areas to ensure the PIREP monitors were displayed, check on resource management for staffing to traffic, looked for goals to occur that day, and for briefings to occur. Additionally, he made sure the areas were free from distraction. He remembered that the PIREP monitors were all operational in all the areas for the accident day. He said that each sector had their own section in the PIREP monitor and that sectors 12/13/28 were all colored yellow¹¹ for the AIRMET and for expected rain showers and thunderstorms indicating the need for potential PIREP solicitation.

³ The intent of a CER is to supplement and document the existing required review of air traffic services rendered during an aircraft accident.

⁴ A telephone conference conducted with the ATO Safety Event Response Group, the Director of Operations, Mission Support Staff, Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention, Operations Control Center, the involved facility and others as needed to review and assess ATO services associated with a significant or noteworthy event.

⁵ Traffic Management Initiatives (TMIs) are techniques used to manage demand with capacity in the NAS.

⁶ Instrument Landing System (ILS) is defined as a precision runway approach aid based on two radio beams which together provide pilots with both vertical and horizontal guidance during an approach to land.

⁷ AIRMETs In-flight weather advisories issued only to amend the area forecast concerning weather phenomena which are of operational interest to all aircraft and potentially hazardous to aircraft having limited capability because of lack of equipment, instrumentation, or pilot qualifications.

⁸ SIGMETs are a weather advisory that contains meteorological information concerning the safety of all aircraft. There are two types of SIGMETs: convective and non-convective.

⁹ Center Weather Service Units (CWSU) monitor and provide weather forecasts and advisories to the nation's 21 Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC).

¹⁰ Pilot Report (PIREP) is a report of the actual weather conditions as encountered by an aircraft in flight.

¹¹ The PIREP monitor has 3 color codes, green indicating no PIREPs were required, yellow and red indicating solicitation of PIREPs was required.

Mr. Bennett remembered the day of the accident as routine with light traffic. He said there was relatively low ceilings that mainly affected the low sectors. He became aware of the accident from the CIC about 10 minutes after it had occurred. He began a search for the aircraft by reviewing FALCON¹² and plotting the last known position on Google Earth. He started reaching out to local law enforcement and contacting fixed base operators. Additionally, he notified the ATM of the accident. He stated he used the regional operations center (ROC) a lot as a resource to bounce ideas off and to ensure he has met all his obligations. Mr. Bennett stated he issued an alert notice¹³ (ALNOT) at about 1645 UTC and continued looking for the aircraft.

When he walked over to the sector 13 controller's area, he tried to let the CIC work the issue with the controller. The sector 13 controller stated that she had lost radar and communications with the accident airplane. The CIC said he observed the accident airplane data tag in a Coast Status and saw a small faint area of heavy and moderate precipitation on the controllers display at the data tag. He stated that he had to lean in to see the precipitation. The weather was building fast in that area, and that was typical for the area; they build fast and then go away. He stated that the preference settings¹⁴ (Pref Set) the controller used for intensities was not the lowest he had seen and were average for the building. He said the normal range for the sectors all combined would have been about 115 to 120 nm. If sector 28 was not combined it would have been about 75 nm. Mr. Bennett said the combined sector 12/13/28 controller provided approach control services to 5 individual airports. He added that they assume approach control services for additional airports in the midnight configuration.

Mr. Bennett stated there were two ways to record PIREPs; they could use the en route information display system¹⁵ (ERIDS) or use the paper form. The form is used when the controller is too busy to import via the ERIDS. The controller would fill it out and give to the OS/CIC to be put in the system. He said that with ERIDS, there are a lot more PIREPs being submitted. He added the feedback he had observed with importing PIREPs using ERIDS is that some people were resistant to change. He said that the main issue was the buttons on the ERIDS, and the keyboard can obscure the fields. Feedback has been taken to be fixed when able. Mr. Bennett did not recall if the controller at combined sector 12/13/28 had recorded any PIREPs for the session but did remember seeing PIREPs from the facility that day. He said the controller was aware of the need to solicit PIREPs because she had told him about it during the post-accident questions. He added that the controller stated she did not see the weather displayed on her indicator.

Mr. Bennett stated that as a result of the past corrective action plans¹⁶ (CAP), the facility management collaborated with NATCA and with the safety representative on ways to complete

¹² Tool used to playback track data information from radar systems.

¹³ A request originated by a flight service station (FSS) or an air route traffic control center (ARTCC) for an extensive communication search for overdue, unreported, or missing aircraft.

¹⁴ Unique preferences assigned by the individual air traffic controller to cover a variety of intensities on the TSD.

¹⁵ ERIDS is a real time, interactive, electronic information display system that is used as a replacement for paper sources of information. ERIDS provides controllers, supervisors, and traffic management personnel with access to aeronautical data, weather data, airspace charts, ATC procedures, NOTAMs, PIREPs, and other sources of ATC information.

¹⁶ A plan of action that documents the interim mitigations, factors, corrective actions, and methods of verification to resolve a safety compliance issue.

and implement the CAP successfully; he was not aware if the local safety council (LSC) representative was involved.

Mr. Bennett was asked about the Consolidated Storm Prediction for Aviation¹⁷ (CoSPA) tool available from Lincoln Labs. Specifically highlighting the growth and decay tabs. Mr. Bennett stated he was not aware of CoSPA, but the facility displayed weather on the traffic situation displays (TSD). He said there was a TSD on each side of the area and that a monitor above the OS desk showed areas of weather impacts and a satellite loop. He stated that each area OS sets up their area's TSD individually. He added that the TSD is used more as a traffic tool than a weather tool.

Mr. Bennett stated that the ATM brought the PIREP monitor idea from ZTL. They imported the ZJX site unique data into the system and modified it for ZJX use. It was color coded to know at a glance whether or not a controller needed to be concerned about weather impacts in the area. Mr. Bennet said that having real time PIREPs graphically displayed in the affected areas would be a benefit. To check on whether PIREPs were being solicited, the OM would check GI messages or go to flight data to see what PIREPs were being solicited and reported.

Mr. Bennett said that typically, CICs do not attend standup and that they were usually briefed by the OSs after; controllers are briefed pre-duty and are required to acknowledge the brief. Mr. Bennet felt the pre-duty weather briefing was accurate for the days weather that was observed.

Mr. Bennett said that both he and the NATCA facility representative (FACREP) agreed that they had seen issues in the past regarding preference settings looking different on different BARCO radar displays; they all have small differences with respect to brightness. He said there were nine different BARCO radar displays in the West Area. Mr. Bennett said he could understand why the controller may not have seen the weather displayed; however, did not understand why she had not solicited PIREPs as required.

Interview concluded at 1145 EDT.

Interviewee: Rachel Giovanni (RH)

Representative: Chris Cappel

Date / Time: October 1, 2020 / 1220 EDT

Location: Jacksonville, FL via Zoom for Government

Present: Paul Suffern, Angela Priebe, Karena Marinas

Investigator: Charles Olvis

During the interview Rachel Giovanni stated the following:

Ms. Giovanni began working for the FAA in January 2015 reporting to the FAA training facility in Oklahoma City Oklahoma. After successfully completing the en route training course,

¹⁷ A web-based forecast tool that blends heuristic-based extrapolation forecasts with output from the High-Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) model running at the National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP). A supplemental weather tool that can be made available if requested.

she transferred to ZJX arriving in May 2015. She reported to the West Area, and successfully completed training to become certified on all operating positions.

Ms. Giovanni's previous ATC experience was through the United States Air Force (USAF). She joined the USAF in March 2008 and after completing basic training reported to Biloxi Mississippi for training as an air traffic controller. After completing training, she reported to Tyndall Air Force Base (PAM) for duty as an air traffic controller. After successfully completing position training, she became qualified on all radar positions at PAM. She maintained a class 2 physical with no restrictions. As a result of the accident, Ms. Giovanni had completed a post-accident toxicology screening.

Ms. Giovanni believed she was in good health and was physically active. She had no significant changes in her personal life and had just purchased a home in July 2020. She worked a COVID schedule of five days on and five days off and rotated between nights and days. The day shifts began at 0630 and ended at 1430. She stated she would awaken at about 0530 for day shifts and arrive by 0620 for 10 minutes of overtime to attend pre-duty briefings before assuming the watch at 0630. She indicated that after being relieved at 1430 she would immediately depart the building.

After leaving work she would normally go to the gym and then return home. She reported that she normally went to sleep at about 2200 and said her sleep was restful. She concluded that the 3 days leading up to the accident date were routine and not out of the ordinary.

Ms. Giovanni indicated she had been previously interviewed about the accident by Matt Bennett and by Kim Sullivan; she could not recall the length of those interviews. She said she had filed an ATSAP report on the accident and that the ERC accepted the report.

Ms. Giovanni remembered she had received the pre-duty weather briefing but could not recall the details of that briefing. She remembered sectors 12/13/28 had already been combined when she assumed the position. She stated that she had received a position relief briefing (PRB). She was asked if there was a requirement for an overlap by the off-going controller; she said she did not understand the question. After an explanation of the question, she stated she could not recall if the off-going controller remained behind after the initial PRB. She stated the traffic level and complexity was a two out of five. The sectorization was a routine configuration and there were no distractions in the area.

Ms. Giovanni was asked to describe what she had done with the accident airplane after initial contact. She said the pilot checked in and requested an approach into CTY. She confirmed what approach the pilot was requesting and then cleared him for the approach into CTY. When asked to describe the weather near, she indicated she did not see precipitation in any of the sectors she was responsible for. She said that she notified the CIC when she lost radar contact with the accident airplane.

Ms. Giovanni stated that she had seen a replay of the En Route Automation Modernization¹⁸ (ERAM) and heard the communications with the accident airplane. She indicated

¹⁸ ERAM processes flight and surveillance data and generates target data onto the radar display.

that during the replay she had seen the weather near the accident airplane after it was pointed out to her, but when asked to describe the weather she stated she could not recall what was depicted. Ms. Giovanni was asked if the area was requiring the solicitation of PIREPs, she said she could not recall. She said she had not solicited any PIREPs that day and could not recall why. She said she was familiar with the PIREP monitor at the OS desk for soliciting PIREPs; she could not recall what color the monitor was for the day of the accident. She said the CIC did not ask her to solicit PIREPs.

Ms. Giovanni was asked how she determined she had lost radar contact with the aircraft. She responded that there was no primary radar target, no Mode C, or anything like that. She was asked what CST¹⁹ means; she responded that she was not sure. She was asked what a “Coast” Track was, and she responded there is a hashtag where the aircraft should be and indicated radar contact was lost. Ms. Giovanni could not remember when the accident airplane first indicated CST.

Ms. Giovanni said that when she worked sectors 12/13/28 combined she would scan the targets in a clockwise motion. When asked how often she observed the accident airplane in her scan she could not remember, but she did say she was constantly scanning. Additionally, she could not remember how often she observed the data tag for the accident airplane while scanning traffic. Ms. Giovanni could not remember when she declared radar contact was lost with the accident airplane. She said tried to establish communications with the pilot but was unable. She could not recall if the CIC offered any guidance or assistance during the initial loss of radar and communications.

Ms. Giovanni said she found pre-duty weather briefings to be helpful and said they were good for determining if there would be bad weather in the sector for the day. When asked about the weather training provided by the facility and whether it was in a good environment or not, she indicated that she had not really thought about it and that she doesn’t feel any way about it. She was asked if there were any weather tools that could help make her job easier and she responded that she could not think of any.

Ms. Giovanni was asked her opinion about the facility is doing regarding issuing PIREPs and weather. She responded that did not think she could speak for the facility as a whole. She said there had been a facility focus on weather recently but did not know any history behind it or why there was an emphasis on it. She said she usually received convective SIGMETs, AIRMETs, and urgent PIREPs via the [sic] User Request Evaluation Tool²⁰ (URET) as a general information message. She felt that was a good way to see them and checked the URET often. She could not remember if she had received and SIGMETs, AIRMETs, or urgent PIREPs on the day of the accident. Ms. Giovanni said she was not sure if the “COVID schedule” impacted or made slower the dissemination of weather or solicitation of PIREPs. Ms. Giovanni used the ERIDS to input PIREPs into the national airspace system (NAS) and felt it was easier than writing them down. Ms. Giovanni said that she would request PIREPs when they were required and when she noticed pilots reporting bad rides. When asked what the FAA Order JO 7110.65, *Air Traffic Control*

¹⁹The aircraft is in coast status and blinks when a flight's position is frozen, and “CST” is eligible for display in Field E of the data block. The position symbol becomes #.

²⁰ An en route decision support tool that is used by the sector team in performing their strategic planning responsibilities.

requirement was for soliciting PIREPs, Ms. Giovanni conferred with her representative off-line and returned with the proper FAA Order JO 7110.65 requirements.

Ms. Giovanni could not recall previously receiving a performance record of conference²¹ (PROC) regarding weather dissemination involving an American Airlines flight. She indicated that she had received training extensions or had difficulty with training in the past at ZJX but could not describe them or recall why.

Ms. Giovanni indicated that she did not usually lose radar contact on aircraft conducting the RNAV A approach into CTY. She said that the sector could usually see and talk to aircraft pretty low in that area. She said that from where the accident airplane was coming from on the instrument approach, she would have expected the aircraft to turn east if the track had continued. She said that she did not observe the accident airplane turn to the north.

Ms. Giovanni could not recall her radar display preference settings (Pref Sets) regarding weather. She clarified that she did not observe any weather (precipitation) in the path of the accident airplane. She was asked again if she had seen the FALCON and ERAM replays of the accident and she said yes. She said that she had not observed any weather on the ERAM replay. She said there was difference with the display used for the ERAM replay and that the Pref Sets were dimmer on that indicator than her normal Pref Sets on the sector 13 radar scope. She said that she does not work at the sector 13 scope often because the sector would be combined somewhere else. She added that not all the radar scopes look the same when using the same Pref Set.

Interview concluded at 1325 EDT.

Interviewee: Luke Alcorn (LX)

Representative: Chris Cappel

Date / Time: October 2, 2020 / 0835 eastern daylight time (EDT)

Location: Jacksonville FL via Zoom for Government

Present: Paul Suffern, Angela Priebe, Karena Marinas

Investigator: Charles Olvis

Mr. Luke Alcorn began working for the FAA in April 2003 reporting to the FAA training facility in Oklahoma City Oklahoma. After successfully completing the en route course in July 2003, he transferred to ZJX. He reported to the West Area and was certified on all operating positions. He was designated as a CIC in 2006 or 2007, he wasn't certain.

Mr. Alcorn had no previous air traffic control experience prior to 2003; however, he was a certified pilot. He held ATP ratings in single engine aircraft, multi engine aircraft, and helicopters. He maintained instructor ratings as a commercial multiengine instrument rating and was a certified flight instructor, certified flight instructor instrument, and helicopter instructor. He estimated he had about 4,200 hours total time. He maintained a class 2 physical with no restrictions.

²¹ Written documentation of a performance discussion regarding an employee's strengths or weaknesses.

Mr. Alcorn held several collateral duties in addition to being an air traffic controller. He was the vice president of the local union, he was the safety facility representative since 2007, facility ATSAP instructor, facility ADS-B representative, facility airspace representative and has been a member of the local safety council since its inception.

Mr. Alcorn believed he was in good health. He had no significant changes in his personal life or with his finances. He worked a COVID schedule of five days on and five days off and rotated between nights and days. The day shifts began at 0630 and ended at 1430. He stated he would awaken at about 0500 for day shifts and arrive by 0620 for 10 minutes of overtime to conduct pre-briefings before assuming the watch at 0630. He would normally leave after the watch and go to the airport or run personal errands. He would usually return home and have dinner by 1900 and usually go to sleep between 2215 and 2230 each evening before day shifts and added he that he wasn't running late for work the day of the accident or the previous 3 shifts. He concluded that the weeks activities were routine and not out of the ordinary.

Mr. Alcorn said that the day of the accident was routine with no traffic management restrictions and the only potential issue was Tropical Storm Sally in the Gulf. He indicated that he did not file an ATSAP for this accident. He said that he had been interviewed for this accident during the CER. Since he was the safety representative for the facility but had been involved in the accident, NATCA FACREP assumed the responsibilities for the CER. He said he had seen the ERAM replay and heard the communications. He said traffic complexity for the day was a two on a scale of one to five. He said the traffic in the accident sector was common for that time of day.

Mr. Alcorn described the weather in the area as a tropical storm in sector 30 and there were SIGMETs/AIRMETs associated. He said there were AIRMETs for lower ceilings in Georgia. He said there were visual conditions in the low sectors with a scattered 3,600-foot layer near CTY. Mr. Alcorn did not remember what color the PIREP monitor was on the day of the accident. He added that it was usually yellow or red every day.

Mr. Alcorn said on the day of the accident he couldn't remember how many positions he had worked before assuming the CIC responsibilities. He estimated that he had been the CIC for about 30 to 45 minutes when the accident occurred. He said that most of the time had been spent conducting normal coordination and hurricane evac with in-trail spacing. He said that he liked to walk around the area and not stay seated when performing CIC duties. He said that he had been standing at sector 13 (accident sector) evaluating the traffic to possibly combine sectors 12/13/28 with sector 29. He had asked the sector 29 controller if they wanted to combine when they said "yes" but that they thought there was a problem at the sector. Mr. Alcorn looked at sectors 12/13/28 and observed a CST track and the controller said that she could not communicate with the airplane.

The backup transmitter for the sector was located near CTY. Mr. Alcorn said that the controller thought the Backup Emergency Communications Systems (BUEC) was out of service and that was why she could not communicate with the accident airplane. Mr. Alcorn felt like it was more than that and asked what altitude the aircraft was last observed; the sector 12/13/28 controller responded 6,000 feet she thought. He said that the radar was capable of detecting aircraft to about 400 feet near CTY and about 1,000 feet near the CST track. He said the facility utilized a radar located at CTY.

Mr. Alcorn advised the OM of the loss of radar and communications and brought the flight progress strip to the OM for an ALNOT to be issued. Mr. Alcorn said he called the CTY airport and asked if the aircraft had arrived and asked an adjacent sector to have an airborne aircraft attempt to contact the airplane. He contacted the fixed base operator and asked if the aircraft was there. The FBO advised the pilot had contacted them inbound but that there had been no further communications with the pilot. Mr. Alcorn said he checked the controllers display and saw the primary targets were on and there were no history trails available.

Mr. Alcorn said that when he looked at the indicator, he observed the tropical storm out over the gulf and some small moderate precipitation just east of the CST track for the accident airplane.

Mr. Alcorn said that all PIREPs were entered in electronically. He had been instrumental in the facility moving to electronic PIREP recording and said that since moving to electronic PIREP recording, reports had increased; and that he was tracking this information. As the safety representative for the facility, he felt the facility did a good job with PIREP collection and dissemination and added he hadn't seen a paper PIREP in two years.

Mr. Alcorn had been on the same crew with Ms. Giovanni since about July when the facility moved to the new COVID scheduling. He had worked with her occasionally before that. He said that Ms. Giovanni normally called weather to pilots and would request PIREPs when needed.

Mr. Alcorn felt the pre-duty weather briefings were not as useful as some would think. They were not useful for a specific sector and more geared to the facility. He said that as a pilot he would normally check the weather for the area himself and would use SkyVector²² and other tools on the administrative computer at the OS desk. He was not aware of CoSPA or its capabilities. Mr. Alcorn said that the OS/CIC is the one who controls the TSD, but that it usually stayed the same and that they used it for traffic. He added that the CWSU controls the weather overlays for the facility that were on the weather loop for the TSD. He said that most controllers were looking at TSD or WARP for weather information. He had lobbied for monitors to display SkyVector for controllers to use but it was not procured.

Mr. Alcorn said that he normally received convective SIGMETs, via the EDST and AIRMETs and TAFs were displayed graphically on a map. He said that if there was precipitation building in the area the only way to know it would be via the radar display, NEXRAD, SIGMETs and the TSD. He said the TSD would have hundreds of cells displayed because of the unique Florida weather. He said "tops reports" do not help much. Because everything in Florida was above FL400. Mr. Alcorn said that weather dissemination had not changed as a result of the COVID schedules.

Mr. Alcorn said that he had looked up the weather in CTY the day after the accident. He said there was a scattered layer at 3,600 feet and that a previous VFR airplane had cancelled services inbound to the airport. He said that when he worked traffic, if a pilot requested an approach into an airport, he would pull up the weather and issued the current weather if the pilot

²² <https://skyvector.com/>

had not reported it. He added that he wouldn't describe the weather near the accident airplane as building, that it was just a normal band coming off the storm. He said that from a pilot's perspective, any pilot flying around in a tropical storm should expect turbulence, rain, or other weather. And that there were expectations on both the pilot and the controller.

Mr. Alcorn said the CICs do not attend the stand-up briefing. The OSs would bring a briefing sheet and fill it out and share with the OSs and CICs. Mr. Alcorn had not seen the days briefing but that the first CIC probably had.

Mr. Alcorn indicated he had been the safety representative since 2007 and had been on the safety council since its inception. He added that he formed the Local Safety Committee²³ before there was a requirement for an LSC. He said the LSC had assisted with the electronic PIREPs and that they had obtained a bunch of PIREP information from ZAU. He said the LSC is not usually involved in the development of CAPs. He said the LSC usually makes recommendations and send memos to management and that's about it. He said that since the LSC had lost an OM, there had been little support for the last year and a half. Mr. Alcorn said that the LSC interacts with the QC department every now and again but that management acts unilaterally with CAP development.

Mr. Alcorn was asked about the CAPs and weather action plan (WAPs) from the past few years. He said he was familiar with them and that they had been briefed, but that they kept changing every couple of weeks and they were useless. He said that the NATCA local had tried to negotiate with management with the WAP, but that management didn't take any NATCA local recommendations. He said weather OSAs are conducted by OSs and the QC office directly on the control room floor. They had previously tried to use FALCON but that there were too many errors or confusing results. He included one example of an OSA that was labeled a weather issue when the controller had a phraseology issue.

Mr. Alcorn said the LSC was not healthy and that they had no support. He felt like if the LSC could meet they could become effective and assist with safety. He added that the relationship between the NATCA local and management was not good. He felt like the district concept has made that relationship even worse. When the QC office was in the facility, the safety rep and QC office would meet every other day. But now that the QC office is only at the facility every so often, that cannot happen.

Mr. Alcorn was asked if he would have called the weather to the east of the CST track and he said yes. He said that the facility had not done a good job of training controllers that tiny airplanes would need to have the weather more than a Boeing 757. He added that the sector 12/13/28 controllers' weather was very dim but that he could observe it. He felt like the large areas of Tropical Storm Sally were drawing the focus away from the smaller areas of depicted precipitation. He said that when he was at the sector 13 display, he had to lean in to see the CST track and the precipitation. He said that during thunderstorm season, the precipitation can be so bright on the sector 12 display he has to turn down the intensities to not overwhelm him and that the sector 13 display was much dimmer. He also added that the ERAM replay brightness was very similar to the sector 13 scope brightness.

²³ Committee was formed before there was a requirement to form a council.

Mr. Alcorn said that when he watched the ERAM replay, he did not notice the time it took for the controller to notice the airplane going into a CST status.

Mr. Alcorn said that he would like some equipment upgrades like lightning detection. He added that he would like to see some administrative and procedural changes because the ALNOT took too long to issue due to paperwork requirements.

Interview concluded at 0950 EDT.