



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

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Eastern Region

Date: November 12, 2019
Person Contacted: Lloyd B. Rogers
NTSB Accident Number: ERA20LA023

Narrative:

Mr. Lloyd B. Rogers was contacted by phone on November 8, 2019 at 1454 EST. He was called at [REDACTED] and he provided an e-mail address of [REDACTED]

At the beginning of the call he was advised that the NTSB is a federal agency mandated by Congress to investigate aircraft accidents, and NTSB has no authority to take any action against any individual. He was also informed that the purpose of an NTSB investigation is for safety only, and any person NTSB talks with has the right to representation; he agreed to the interview without representation.

He advised that he was a co-owner of the airplane with Roman Upshaw¹; however, he was subsequently bought out. He provided a pilot certificate number [REDACTED]. He held an airline transport pilot certificate with airplane single engine land rating and a commercial pilot certificate with airplane multi-engine land rating².

The airplane was equipped with a Continental A65 engine and lapbelts only at both seats; no shoulder harnesses were installed. It was equipped with a 12-gallon fuel tank. He indicated that the accident occurred between 1600 and 1630 central daylight time, on October 27th.

He intended to perform a local flight with a 15-year-old passenger (airplane owner's daughter named Jocelyn Upshaw) seated in the rear seat. In advance of the flight he performed a preflight check of the airplane while it was in the hangar which included a check of the fuel tank and

¹ FAA records indicated an Aircraft Bill of Sale dated May 17, 2008.

² FAA records indicated that at the commercial level, he held a single engine sea rating. He also held a flight instructor certificate with airplane single engine, airplane multi-engine, and instrument airplane which expired June 30, 2020.

gascolator/fuel strainer for contaminants; none were found. The single fuel tank was “a little over ½ capacity” of 100 low lead (100LL) fuel or between 7 and 8 gallons, and ½ quart of oil was added to the engine³. The airplane was within weight and balance. He started the engine and taxied to the approach end of the runway where he performed an engine run-up which included a check of the magnetos first, and then checked carburetor heat; the magneto checks were done at 1,700 rpm. He did not recall the rpm decrease amount during each magneto check but reported they were “normal.” He added he did not think the rpm drops were abnormal based on his experience in that airplane over about 10 years span, and between 150 and 175 hours of flying the airplane. He reported that when he applied carburetor heat the rpm decreased 50 rpm. Because of the short taxi time, he allowed the engine to warm up sufficiently (for probably more than 5 minutes) before initiating takeoff.

Having all 2,600 feet of runway available, he applied full power and reported he did not recall the rpm reading or if the engine achieved full takeoff power, but based on his past experience it did not alarm him and was not unusual. He lifted the tailwheel, then rotated and began to climb. When the flight was at about 40 feet above ground level, the airplane “seemed to quit climbing” and the engine rpm was decreasing. He jammed the throttle full forward, verified the carburetor heat was off, and the fuel shutoff valve was on. He added that the engine was not running rough, and was not spitting and sputtering. He advised that he kept thinking the engine would “pick up” but realized it did not, and he would be unable to clear trees and powerlines ahead. He aborted the takeoff and slipped the airplane to lose altitude. He touched down when the flight was about 100 feet before the end of the runway, and he was unable to stop before going off the end. The airplane went through a wooded fence and came to rest on the other side of the fence.

The passenger was not injured and although he had a sore back initially⁴, the pain went away the next day.

The airplane was moved to Mr. Upshaw’s hangar. A FAA inspector said he would come out to inspect the airplane.

He was asked if he thought the temperature and dewpoint were susceptible to carburetor ice. He indicated that since the airplane was not equipped with instrumentation to let him know the temperature of the inlet of the carburetor, he did not know the answer to that question. I advised him I would send him METAR’s as well as the FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) that provides information regarding carburetor ice conditions.

The digest was e-mailed to him for review on November 12, 2019. He replied the same day at 1616 EST, with comments that were incorporated into the narrative. The corrected digest was e-mailed to him on November 13, 2019.

³ Per pilot’s original statement to FAA Roman Upshaw added the oil.

⁴ He had a MRI taken of his neck and back.