



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Timothy W. Monville
Sr. Air Safety Investigator
Eastern Region

Date: April 13, 2020
Person Contacted: Steve O'Rourke
NTSB Accident Number: ERA19LA086

Narrative:

FAA inspector Steven O'Rourke was contacted by phone on January 29, 2019, about 1100 EST. He was called at [REDACTED] Ext. [REDACTED]

He indicated that the airplane came to rest on airport property partially in a ditch about 2,430 ft from the approach end of runway 13 and about 120 ft north of the northern edge of runway 13. The main landing gears were extended and the nose landing gear was collapsed. All propeller blades exhibited varying amounts of blade bending. The location was 38.9955° north latitude and -079.1458° west longitude.

He provided the e-mail contact for the pilot.

The digest was reviewed with him during the call and he agreed with the content.



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Date: April 13, 2020
Person Contacted: Darwin Conrad
NTSB Accident Number: ERA19LA086

Narrative:

Mr. Darwin Conrad of Jet Prop, LLC was contacted by phone on June 24, 2019, at 1220 EDT. A message was left with Patrick to have Mr. Conrad contact NTSB. Mr. Conrad contacted NTSB the same day before 1315 EDT.

Mr. Conrad was briefed concerning the circumstances of the accident, and advised that I had several questions for him concerning the conversation his company owns. It was agreed that questions should be e-mailed to him, which was done the same day at 1315 EDT. The following questions were provided:

1. Confirm if the nose landing gear rake angle was changed as a result of the JetProp conversion
2. Provide a copy of the JetPROP Maintenance Manual (needed to document annual inspection requirements for NLG and annual inspection)
3. Confirm if the NLG bungee was changed as a result of the JetProp conversion
4. Provide nose landing gear tire type, # plies, rating, and tire pressure associated with their P/N 560-04-112
5. Provide any JetProp guidance regarding NLG rake angle from the MM
6. Provide a copy of the Flight Manual Supplement regarding the conversion.
7. Confirm if there is a requirement to keep Propeller RPM at a certain value during the landing roll

With respect to the questions he provided the following answers:

- 1) The rake angle was the same as the original. In doing research he found that low nose landing gear tire pressure will cause the nose tire to roll on the wheel assembly.
- 2) He replied by e-mail of 7/1/2019

- 3) The bungee was not changed for the JetProp conversion
- 4) He indicated that they were having problems with nose landing gear tires made in Mexico. With nose landing gear tires made in the U.S, they were OK, but as part of their installation process of larger size tires they “true” the tire. The tire they utilize is their part number (P/N) 560-04-112, Goodyear P/N 385M61-1, a 380X150/15X600-5 six ply with a load rating of 1,600 pounds. The tire pressures were specified to be 47 for the nose landing gear and 55 psi for the main landing gear.¹
- 5) The nose landing gear rake angle is adjusted at the actuator.
- 6) Will provide
- 7) There was no requirement for rpm setting during landing roll.

He indicated that the airplane has good directional control capability to 50 mph. He recommends to apply full reverse at 80 knots, and remove reverse at 50 knots. He also indicated that during flight testing with underinflated nose landing gear tire 10 psi low, the airplane would/could veer off the runway on landing.

The digest was reviewed with the information during the call and he agreed with the content.

¹ The nose landing gear tire for the unmodified airplane is specified to be a 5.00 X 5, Type III six ply rated at 1,285 pounds. According to the Pilot’s Operating Handbook the original nose landing gear tire pressure was 50 psi.



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Date: April 13, 2020
Person Contacted: Tony Beauchamp
NTSB Accident Number: ERA19LA086

Narrative:

Mr. Tony Beauchamp of Midwest Malibu Center was contacted by phone on June 25, 2019, at 1207 EDT. He was called at [REDACTED] He provided an e-mail address of [REDACTED]

He indicated that with respect to the Piper PA-46, he uses his own created checklist for an annual inspection, and he also follows 14 CFR Part 43 Appendix D. With respect to annual inspections, he has an airframe and powerplant mechanic perform the 100 Hour on the airframe, engine and propeller, and then he comes around and does a thorough inspection.

With respect to the nose landing gear rake angle, it is set to 90°.

He was asked if he routinely completes FAA malfunction or defect (M or D) reports for maintenance issues he comes across. He indicated that he does not. He was advised of the importance of completing the reports so trends can be identified. He indicated that he would start doing M or D reports moving forward.

The digest was reviewed with him during the call and he agreed with the content.



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

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Date: June 28, 2019
Person Contacted: Richard Swisher
NTSB Accident Number: ERA19LA086

Narrative:

Mr. Swisher was contacted by phone on June 25, 2019, at 1609 EDT. He was called at [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

He advised that at landing, the yaw damper was off, the rudder pedals were centered, and the rudder trim was near neutral. He did state that he was at flight idle at touchdown. He reported adding right rudder and brake as the airplane veered to the left, but he did not recall how much right rudder and brake he applied. After coming to rest while still at the controls performing a cleanup and shutdown protocol, he noticed the engine was running, which initially surprised him because the propeller was fully stopped, until he recalled how the PT6A-35 engine was designed. Once he was finished with the shutdown, he exited the airplane.

The following day while at the airplane with the FAA, they asked him about the flaps and pointed out that the flap selector was in the up position. He could not recall if he cleaned up the airplane before exiting it.

With respect to the skid marks and/or ground scars, there were 2 marks on the runway that he attributed to be from the nose and right main landing gear tires. A mark from the left main landing gear tire was only first noted in the grass about 20 ft off the runway edge.

He reported that the night before the accident flight and also before the accident flight he visually checked the nose landing gear tire¹. He was informed that the expert advised that he checked the nose landing gear tire pressure postaccident.² He was also advised that as part of the

¹ He indicated that while he always carries a pressure gauge to check tire pressure, he was not 100% certain he checked the nose landing gear tire pressure the night before.

² The expert was requested for the information and he advised he provided it but it was not received

investigation I had spoken with Darwin Conrad (facility that had installed the PT6 engine) and I had also spoken with Tony Beauchamp (facility that had performed the last annual inspection). I relayed that during the last annual inspection the nose landing gear rake angle was checked, but because of the damage to the nose landing gear the rake angle could not be determined. He was also advised that Mr. Beauchamp reported to NTSB he had only worked on that type airplane for a very long period of time, and would be likely to know details as to how to properly check the rake angle. Mr. Swisher relayed that as part of the annual inspection, that repair station had installed the fuel nozzles incorrectly, which resulted in damage to the engine. The damage was subsequently repaired and the repair station paid for that.

Mr. Swisher was advised that in speaking with Mr. Beauchamp, he indicated to me that 1 person at his facility does a 100-hour inspection of the airframe and engine, and then he comes along and does an annual inspection of the airframe and engine. Mr. Swisher surmised that in that scenario and the incorrect installation of the fuel nozzles, the second inspection failed to detect the incorrectly installed fuel nozzles.

He was asked about the picture he provided to the NTSB of the damage to the nose landing gear trunnion collar. He indicated that he did not recall looking at the trunnion during his preflight inspection. During the call he was asked to provide pictures which he did. He also provided a video that he took after the accident documenting the marks on the runway and also in the grass.

He was asked during the 2 hours 26 minutes long call if he had any information about the airplane hour meter and during the call he provided a picture of the hour meter; it was reading 2708.7. Based on the reading at the time of the accident, the airplane had accumulated about 55 hours since the annual inspection. He estimated that the average flight time for flight since the annual inspection was between 2 and 3 hours.

He reported that he flew the airplane the night before, and couldn't recall if he had the power lever at flight idle for landing. He recalled it being a shallow approach with power applied. He reported no issue with the nose landing gear bungee the day before.

He was asked when the airplane was taken to Michigan for repairs. He looked through e-mails and reported he estimated it was delivered to the repair station between November 28th and December 21, 2018. He received an e-mail indicating that the engine was delivered to Turbine, Inc., on January 4, 2019.

He was asked whether the flight was fast at touchdown (8 knots). He did not recall the landing being fast. He reported that since the accident, he downloaded data from ForeFlight, and uploaded it to CloudAhoy³. During the call he sent a link to CloudAhoy with the uploaded flight data. He reported that although it was hard to determine the exact moment of touchdown in CloudAhoy, the displayed indicated airspeed in CloudAhoy was about 84 knots at touchdown.⁴

A review of data from ForeFlight⁵ revealed that when the airplane's altitude was about 972.4 ft as depicted in line 15044 (corrected altitude of about 963 ft), or about the runway 13 threshold elevation, the derived speed was about 81.4 knots.

The digest was e-mailed to him for review on June 28, 2019. He replied the same day by e-mail at 1145 EDT with comments that were incorporated into the narrative. The corrected digest was e-mailed to him on June 28, 2019. He replied on June 29, 2019, at 1044 EDT, with comments that were incorporated into the narrative. The corrected digest was e-mailed to him on July 1, 2019. He replied the same day at 1324 EDT with, "This narrative is ok." The corrected digest was e-mailed to him on April 13, 2020.

³ The website www.cloudahoy.com indicates it is a post-flight debriefing tool for pilots, student pilots, and flight instructors.

⁴ According to CloudAhoy when only GPS data is available such as ForeFlight, CloudAhoy computes the wind for every point along the flight path by interpolating wind aloft data from nearby stations, as well as surface wind (if applicable), and also computes the groundspeed. Using the wind and the ground speed, CloudAhoy computes the TAS, and also indicated airspeed (IAS).

⁵ The ForeFlight data depicted the airplane's altitude at the approach end of runway 35 at KAQO as about 1,110.9 ft, while the actual published altitude was 1,101.5 ft, meaning that the ForeFlight altitude was about 9.4 ft too high.



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Timothy W. Monville
Sr. Air Safety Investigator
Eastern Region

Date: June 28, 2019
Person Contacted: Larry Stahl and Randy Watts
NTSB Accident Number: ERA19LA086

Narrative:

The Grant County Airport (W99) was contacted by phone on June 26, 2019 at 1211 EDT, and was asked to speak with the airport manager regarding a gouge on runway 13/31 and also about distances. The call was made to [REDACTED] Mr. Larry Stahl (airport manager of W99) returned the call the same day at 1317 EDT; he called from [REDACTED]

Mr. Stahl advised that the gouge on the runway is actually a “paving seam.” He reported it is located 90 inches from the runway centerline. He also indicated that the runway was 75 ft wide. He indicated he would measure the distance between both marks on the runway and will provide me the results.

The same day at 1547 EDT, Mr Randy Watts of W99 called from [REDACTED] He indicated that the distance between the black tire marks at the runway edge was 94 inches, and the distance between marks near the ditch for the left 2 gouges were 82 inches and the distance between the right 2 gouges were 64 inches.

The digest was reviewed with them during the call and they agreed with the content.