



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Timothy W. Monville
Sr. Air Safety Investigator
Eastern Region

Date: April 8, 2016
Person Contacted: Adam C. Guarno
NTSB Accident Number: ERA16LA145

Narrative:

Mr. Adam Christian Guarno was contacted by phone on April 6, 2016, at 0828 EDT, and left a voice mail message at phone number of [REDACTED]. He returned the call the same day at 0945 EDT from the same phone number.

At the beginning of the phone call he was advised that the NTSB is a federal agency mandated by Congress to investigate aircraft accidents, and NTSB has no authority to take any action against any individual. He was also informed that any person NTSB talks with has the right to representation; he agreed to the phone interview without representation.

He was advised that NTSB and FAA would need: a) his written statement, b) a scanned copy of his medical certificate, and c) scanned copies of the front and back of his pilot certificate. He was advised that NTSB would be sending him a separate e-mail requesting these items. He was also informed that NTSB would be e-mailing him a copy of the NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report, and that it was required to be completed and returned within 10 days. That too would be sent by NTSB in a separate e-mail.

He provided an address of [REDACTED] Belle Chasse, Louisiana [REDACTED]. His e-mail address is [REDACTED]. He holds a commercial pilot certificate with Airplane Single Engine Land, Rotorcraft Helicopter, Instrument Airplane and Helicopter ratings. His pilot certificate number is [REDACTED]. He was issued a 3rd class medical certificate with no limitations on 1/30/2013. His date of birth is [REDACTED]. He has 400 hours total flight time, of which between 40 and 45 hours were in the accident airplane.

He indicated that he purchased the airplane on December 19, 2015 (FAA Records indicated he purchased it on December 14, 2015). The airplane was equipped with a Continental GO-300-D engine, and a McCauley constant speed propeller. It was also equipped with an analog EGT/CHT

gauge, and an Apollo GX-20 or GX-60 panel mounted GPS. He indicated that he had a picture of the instrument panel and exterior and would provide. The airplane was not equipped with shoulder harnesses; it was equipped with lapbelts only. He indicated that since purchase excluding the accident flight, there have been no issues with the engine or its systems. He indicated the annual inspection was due the end of February 2016. He located an IA who was recommended (Don Ford) of AeroHead LLC, at KMOB. Prior to flying there from KNEW, he had the fuel tanks filled at Signature Flight Support. He flew from KNEW to KMOB on 2/26/2016; the flight duration was about 1.0 to 1.5 hours. After arrival he remained there that day and the next day. Following his arrival, he assisted the IA with travel check of the mixture control. During that process he was in the airplane and the mechanic was at the engine. The check was related to travel of the mixture control. He indicated that the IA did not mention to him after the annual inspection was signed off that he had to adjust the mixture control linkage/travel. He was asked what checklist the IA used and he indicated he was not sure. He was also asked if the IA gave him a list of discrepancies and he indicated he did. He was informed that NTSB would be requesting a copy of the list and he indicated he would provide it. He left the airplane with the IA for the month of March 2016. After the annual inspection was completed he was asked if the airplane was test flown by the IA, he indicated it was not because the IA did not have a medical certificate, but he did indicate the IA performed a thorough ground run of the engine and ran it to full throttle rpm. The engine redline is 3,200 rpm.

On April 2, 2016, he returned to KMOB, loaded his bags, and performed a preflight inspection of the airplane in advance of his VFR flight to Slidell Airport (KASD), Slidell, Louisiana. He indicated he did check the wing fuel tanks sump drains, but did not check the fuel strainer for contaminants; none were reported. He indicated that each wing fuel tank had about 1/2 capacity. He was asked why he did not check the fuel strainer and he indicated it was because he did not find any contaminants in either fuel tank during his preflight inspection, and also because he was in a rush to meet a friend at Slidell, LA. After engine start he remained on the ground about 5 to 10 minutes with the engine running, and before takeoff performed an engine run-up which included a check of the magnetos at 1,700 rpm; the left magneto drop was 30 to 40 rpm and the right magneto drop was 30 rpm.

He departed KMOB with the fuel selector positioned to the both, reporting the maximum redline rpm attained during takeoff roll and climb was 2,900. About 10 minutes after takeoff while flying between 1,200 to 1,500 feet mean sea level (msl) with the engine rpm at 2,900 rpm, for training and learning he slowly leaned the fuel to air ratio by moving the mixture control between 1/4 inch to 1/2 inch extended, and reported the engine "abruptly" lost rpm going from 2,900 to 1,200. He immediately pushed the mixture control full in but this had no affect. He also pushed the throttle control full forward and reported the engine revved up then went to idle, which was repeated. At that time the airplane was between 800 and 1,000 feet msl. He contacted Departure Control on 121.0 MHz, and informed the controller of the situation. The controller attempted to vector the pilot to a nearby private airport, but because of the altitude he was unable to land there and informed the controller he needed to land immediately. He spotted a dirt road with parallel powerlines and power line poles and then spotted a nearby east/west oriented field with grazing cows. When the flight was closer to the field he realized he did not want to hit the cows and opted for another nearby field. He "floated" to the next field and touched down first on the main landing gear. About 200 feet after touchdown, he noticed a 3 foot deep ditch and pulled

aft on the control yoke to clear it. The nose landing gear caught the opposite side of the upsloping side of the ditch causing the nose landing gear to separate. The airplane then impacted the ground and slid about 100 feet before coming to rest upright. After coming to rest he assessed himself, opened the door, undid his lapbelt, and walked around the airplane. He assessed the airplane and accident site area noting the touchdown point. He then secured electrical power. He estimated about 1 to 1.5 minutes elapsed from the time when the engine lost power and the ground contact.

He reported the emergency locator transmitter (ELT) activated, which he left on for about 30 minutes to aid in finding his location. He reported using his cellular phone to call the IA, and also called his mother and work supervisor to inform them of the accident. During his postaccident walk-around the airplane he noted fuel leaking from the left fuel tank vent line.

About 30 to 45 minutes after the accident first responders arrived. He was taken by ambulance to a hospital for examination. While there in the lounge with the IA, the IA said it was weird to him that when he pulled the mixture out a little the engine would quit when compared with what he was used to. He was released from the hospital the same day without injury between 2115 and 2130.

On April 5, 2016, he went to his doctor and x-rays were taken of his back, no issues were noted.

He was asked if as part of his efforts to restore power whether he moved the fuel selector; he indicated he did not. The as-found position of the fuel selector would be the position he selected during the accident flight.

With respect to the throttle control and attempts to restore power, he fully advanced it, and also slowly pushed it forward, and also pumped it.

The digest was e-mailed to him for review on April 6, 2016, at 1445 EDT. He replied on April 7, 2016, at 1103 EDT, with, "[Mr.] Monville, The only phrase I guess I would say maybe needs to be adjusted is "he indicated it was because he was in a rush to meet a friend at Slidell, LA"...indeed I was meeting a gentleman at a specified time, but the reason for not checking the fuel strainer was moreso because I overlooked it. I checked the fuel drains in the wings and since there were no contaminants, I overlooked the fuel strainer...."

Following the e-mail from the pilot, a discussion was held with him and he confirmed that his main reason for not checking the fuel strainer was because he did not find any contaminants in either wing fuel tank during his preflight inspection, and also because of his meeting. This information was included in the narrative.



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Timothy W. Monville
Sr. Air Safety Investigator
Eastern Region

Date: April 8, 2016
Person Contacted: Don Ford
NTSB Accident Number: ERA16LA145

Narrative:

Mr. Don Ford contacted NTSB by phone on April 7, 2016, at 1227 EDT. He called from [REDACTED]. His e-mail address is [REDACTED].

At the beginning of the phone call he was advised that the NTSB is a federal agency mandated by Congress to investigate aircraft accidents, and NTSB has no authority to take any action against any individual. He was also informed that any person NTSB talks with has the right to representation; he agreed to the interview without representation.

He indicated his airframe and powerplant (A&P) certificate number is [REDACTED]. He indicated he has been an A&P for approximately 40 years and an IA for approximately 10 years. He indicated he retired from the U.S. Coast Guard, and met the pilot thru a mutual Coast Guard friend. He has not worked on a Cessna 175 since about 1975.

He performed the annual inspection and was assisted by his son-in-law (Charles Farley) who is not an A&P mechanic. With respect to the annual inspection, the pilot flew the airplane to his airport arriving there on Friday (later determined to be 2/26/2016). After arrival because the engine was hot, the cowlings were removed and a differential compression test was immediately performed on each cylinder. Also because the oil was hot, he drained the engine oil, and added new oil after the No. 4 cylinder was changed. He indicated that the pilot removed the interior, and they worked on Friday until 1600 hours and then the following day. After Saturday, the pilot left and he continued with the inspection with his assistant. He indicated that while in the hospital with the pilot, he informed him that he removed the fuel selector handle, which he indicated he (Don Ford) did not see it removed. He also indicated that neither he nor his assistant removed or installed the fuel selector handle. He further indicated that he turned the fuel selector off to secure the fuel so he could clean the fuel strainer as part of his inspection.

[REDACTED]

As part of his inspection he noticed all seat stops were incorrect, , low compression of the No. 4 cylinder which was attributed to be from a cracked piston and work valve guides, damaged starter, about 1/2 ounce of oil in the airbox, the carburetor had a sheen of oil on it, the engine also was covered in oil but he was unable to find any evidence of an oil leak. He noted evidence of a massive exhaust leak which required him to remove the entire exhaust which he cleaned with oven cleaner. The airplane's brakes were "gone" and corrosion was noted at the wheel bearings. The foam in the front seats was missing, and the rear seat was installed with non-aviation hardware. As part of his inspection even though he could not determine the make of the ignition switch he did perform a check of it per the AD. He did remove the fuel strainer and cleaned the bowl, but he did not recall draining the carburetor bowl as part of his inspection. He did not drain the wing fuel tanks. During the annual inspection he applied ACF-50 to all interior skin surfaces.

With respect to the mixture control, he was informed that the pilot indicated to NTSB that after flying to the airport for the annual inspection, a check of the travel of it was performed and questioned. He indicated that as part of his inspection using the previously provided checklist, he did verify that the mixture control had full travel. This was performed with his assistant in the aircraft manipulating the control with him looking in the engine compartment at the mixture control lever. He confirmed the mixture control moved from the idle cut-off to the full rich position, but noted it did not move as far as some he was accustomed to. He indicated he did not adjust the mixture control, nor did he disconnect it. He noted he could tell it was the older style, but, "everything worked." He also indicated that he learned the pilot was pulling the vernier type mixture control rather than rotate it, and informed the pilot to rotate it. He reported it would only come out 4 inches. He did not see any issue wrong with it.

He performed the same test of the throttle control as he did with the mixture control with his assistant in the cockpit manipulating the control and noted the throttle moved full range of travel from idle to wide open. The cracked baffle that was caused by the pilot was repaired.

He ran the engine with the fuel selector positioned to the left and right positions, and also moved it to the off position before removing the fuel strainer. He noted that it did not leak fuel when the fuel strainer was removed. He showed the owner the limits for this engine and propeller combination from the airplane Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) which was 2,640 rpm. During the post maintenance engine run, the engine went as high as 2,700 rpm, but he reported the wind was on the nose and gusting to 30 knots. . The magneto drops were equal at 50 rpm each.

He and the pilot/owner agreed on what was to be repaired and what was to be deferred, and it was planned that the pilot would return on 4/11/2016, to repair some of the interior. The list of repairs is contained in the maintenance record entry. The airplane sat in a hangar for about 1 month, and on 4/2 the pilot called him and said he was about 10 minutes away. After the pilot arrived he indicated he was in a hurry to return, and he indicated he did not see the pilot check the wing tank fuel sump drains, and he was later concerned because the airplane had sat for about 1 month with 1/2 fuel capacity in the tanks.

[REDACTED]

He indicated that after the pilot purchased the airplane, he was not sure if any maintenance had been done between then and the annual inspection.

About 10 minutes after departure, the pilot called him and informed him of the accident. The pilot provided him coordinates of his location, which were 30 degrees 40.52 minutes North latitude and 088 degrees 25.83 minutes West longitude. He passed these to the KMOB ATCT. He was told was hospital he would be taken to and went there. He remained with the pilot in the hospital until 2200.

He indicated the, "aircraft was in really good shape", and was meticulous with the interior surfaces looking good.



The digest was e-mailed to him for review on April 7, 2016, at 1528 EDT, and he replied the same day at 1646 EDT with, "Tim, in paragraph 4 the [underlined] section about the fuel selector, this conversation took place between Adam and me, Saturday night at the hospital. I did not remove or install the fuel selector nor did Charley Farley, my helper. We used the fuel selector to secure fuel to the fuel strainer, so I could clean it during the inspection. Also all the seat stops were wrong, I installed 4 new stops. we did not add the oil until the after the cylinder was changed. We applied ACF-50 to all interior skin surfaces.

In paragraph 9, I showed Adam the limits for this engine and prop combo which was 2640 static. During the post maintenance run, the engine went as high as 2700 RPM but I had winds on the nose gusting to 30 Knots. Adam was going to return to the shop on Monday, April 11, to repair some of the interior."

These changes were incorporated into the digest.



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Timothy W. Monville
Sr. Air Safety Investigator
Eastern Region

Date: April 11, 2016
Person Contacted: Todd Thaxton
NTSB Accident Number: ERA16LA145

Narrative:

Mr. Todd Thaxton of Atlanta Air Salvage was contacted by phone on April 8, 2016, at 0925 EDT. He was called at [REDACTED]

He was contacted to describe details concerning recovery of the airplane. He indicated that with respect to draining the fuel tanks, he removed the hose at the carburetor inlet and allowed the fuel to gravity feed draining the fuel tanks. He did this with the fuel selector position to the left, right, and both positions. He also turned the fuel selector to the off position at one point during the draining process and confirmed the flow of fuel stopped.

He was not able to get a sample of fuel from the fuel strainer belly drain using the cable because it was pinched, so he got direct access to it and took a fuel sample directly from the strainer.

He indicated that the airplane was insured with AIG, but insurance adjuster (Harry Brooks) was assigned to assist AIG with the claim.

He was asked for the estimated cost to run the engine. He indicated it would be approximately \$150.00.

The digest was reviewed with him during the call and he agreed with the content.