


INTERVIEW OF EDDIE BAGGETT (14:23)
DESOTO NATIONAL FOREST
MARCH 31, 2015 5:45 P.M. CST

TRANSCRIBED BY:
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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording.
Transcript prepared by transcription service.

1 (Interview of Eddie Baggett (14:31) begins.)

2 MR. STEIN: Okay. This is Stephen Stein with the
3 NTSB. It's March 31, 2015. It's 5:45 p.m. Central Time.
4 I'm here with Mr. Eddie Baggett. Eddie, do you consent to
5 being audiotaped?

6 MR. BAGGETT: Yes.

7 MR. STEIN: Fantastic. All right, Eddie. I'm
8 going to turn it over to you. Basically, I just want you
9 to take it from the top. Tell me everything you observed,
10 heard, saw. What were you doing --

11 MR. BAGGETT: How early do you want to start?

12 MR. STEIN: Give me a little bit of background. We
13 don't need to go -- yeah, we don't need to go into the
14 morning.

15 MR. BAGGETT: The background is that I don't drive
16 to Wiggins (inaudible) with the fire boss and, you know,
17 the fire boss flies front seat in the ship so I figure out
18 where I'm going to burn. Me and Jay's talking, you know,
19 starting from 6:30, looking at the weather, you know, if we
20 can burn, where we're going to burn, wind direction,
21 everything else.

22 And once we decide that, he said okay, you know, so
23 I had the burn plans, maps, everything else. Get
24 everything in order. I have to call the forestry
25 commission to get a smoke management permit.

1 And then after I do that, I'll scan the map and
2 then -- if we're burning the whole block and so I label the
3 lines, drains, roads. Have you seen our burn map?

4 MR. STEIN: I just saw a copy. But the more the
5 merrier.

6 MR. BAGGETT: Okay. That's a north orientation.

7 MR. STEIN: Thank you.

8 MR. BAGGETT: That's what we do. We worked out a
9 system. This is the whole burn block. Everything down
10 here was burned last year because of the way we number
11 everything '14 59. Fiscal year '14.

12 MR. STEIN: Okay.

13 MR. BAGGETT: So this block here with the gopher
14 tortoise and everything else that it gets burned every two
15 years so, you know, you have to do a burn plan every two
16 years. Burned this side of the road last year. This side
17 of the road this year. Next year, you move back over here
18 and back and forth.

19 So in talking to Jay, well, we've got light to
20 moderate fog in the forecast so, you know, we're two miles
21 from Highway 49 and that's our main thing is keeping the
22 smoke off the highway but we have a westerly wind. Said,
23 okay, but let's don't burn this fork. So, you know, hash
24 it out and everything. Label land, scan the map, send it
25 to a dispatcher, Jay and Steve Cobb and then at some

1 point -- and then lining everybody else out where we're
2 going to go.

3 And then Steve will call me or I call him and it's
4 just a briefing over the phone. He's got a copy of the
5 map. I've got a copy of the map and then we just kind of
6 work out our firing patterns, everything else. So, you
7 know -- and that was around 8:30 probably. And then -- and
8 we had done a 3,100-acre burn on Sunday so he said, "Okay.
9 I'm going to get up about 9:30 and look at your burn from
10 yesterday, Sunday."

11 So he did that -- I said okay. So we're going to
12 be on today's burn around 10:30. Another thing I do is
13 send an e-mail out to the media. Just put the information
14 out there.

15 MR. STEIN: Yeah.

16 MR. BAGGETT: They're the ones that's getting the
17 calls, you know. People see the smoke. Every good
18 samaritan with a cell phone thinks it's a wildfire and
19 calls it in. So I have all these media contacts and
20 Congressman Palazzo and Senator Wicker's office and then
21 there's a couple other people that just say -- you know,
22 Sandhill Crane Refuge, you know, because they're burning
23 too.

24 So Steve Phillips from WLOX that was asking all the
25 questions in there said, "Hey, I want to come up and do a

1 story." "Yeah, that's fine." "How do you get there?" So
2 I give him directions. And then, "I'll just meet you --
3 we'll be briefing right there and I'll just meet you there.
4 Be there between 10:30 and 11:00."

5 So then Steve gets up -- 50 kilo hotel gets up at
6 about 9:30 and goes and checks the burn from Sunday and
7 then calls -- and relays to dispatch about a green tree on
8 fire and so, you know, I get the coordinates and everything
9 else and write that down. And then he comes over while
10 we're briefing here at the intersection and he'll GPS the
11 whole perimeter of the fire.

12 So while we're having our briefing at 11:00, he's
13 overhead and, you know -- but you're not even -- I mean it
14 happens all the time so you're not even really aware that
15 he's there. So there's nothing unusual or anything, you
16 know.

17 So WLOX does interviews and we have a wildlife
18 biologist so they go and do an interview which happens to
19 be right there where you all are set up over -- just down
20 the road from the crash site, you know. On the other side
21 of the road from the burn.

22 So we start with the burn against the wind. Steve
23 goes back to Wiggins. He put the machine on and we have
24 progressed that I don't even have to call him when I'm
25 ready now. It's just text message, you know. But he

1 called about 12:30 I think about something on Sunday's
2 burn. Was I going to get somebody to come look at that and
3 asked me, "What time are you going to be ready?" I said,
4 "Well, we had some hikers on the --" because we have to
5 close that section, a hiking trail. I said, "Give us a
6 little time. We're kind of running behind. Probably about
7 1:30, we'll be ready."

8 And then he texted me at 1:30 and about quarter to
9 2:00, I said, "Come on." So he comes in and starts
10 gridding out here. Reinforcing the line because we're
11 working against the wind and running north and south.
12 Nothing unusual.

13 So Jay's out there. Jay just said, "I had to get
14 out of the office." So Jay said, "Do you need me to
15 fire --" well, we had a spot over across the line here so
16 we had to get the dozer up there and it's about an acre
17 probably but it didn't throw us behind or anything. It was
18 still running -- you know, never -- but, you know, that's
19 the way we always worked it, you know. We had -- we had a
20 spot before Steve got there and started firing and I got
21 times wrote down. He'll tell me, "Firing on the burn," and
22 it was 1:37 or something like that.

23 So, you know, working north and south. He had
24 checked out the hiking trail. Told me, "I didn't see
25 anybody," because it's only about a three-quarter mile

1 section in there and wide open. You can see it.

2 So progress with the burn. Jay's firing down the
3 road here and I had told Jay, I said, "Well, in my briefing
4 with Steve, since we got the west wind, if we can just get
5 it to this sharp curve where the road turns and goes north,
6 then we'll just let him finish it up." And me and Jay
7 just -- we joked back and forth. He said, "Well, the
8 wind's kind of swapping back and forth so if I pull too
9 much and it comes out the southwest, it's going to smoke
10 him in but if I don't pull it, it's going to run toward the
11 road and it's going to spot across the road." And we just
12 laughed and said, yeah. Whatever we do, it's going to be
13 wrong.

14 So, you know -- so when Jay got to that corner --
15 well, in our briefing, we always talk about an incident
16 within an incident. You know, what are we going to do?
17 You know, we've had, you know, people on the trail, a car
18 wreck or something that hasn't got anything to do with the
19 burn. Somebody's dog got out at home or -- I got to leave
20 the burn, you know, whatever.

21 But on an incident that we never want happen, it's
22 the closest person to the incident takes command of the
23 incident and then -- but if it's me and I take command of
24 the incident, well, then I have to turn the burn over to
25 somebody and they have to be qualified to do that, all the

1 training and everything. So actually, you know, we had,
2 you know, the Montana detailers and me and Jay.

3 So when Steve got up here and then the last time we
4 talked on the radio, he said, "I kind of laid off that two-
5 track but I'm coming down the road." So his last line
6 wasn't 50 foot off -- parallel to the road all the way
7 down.

8 So I said, "Okay. Well, I'm coming your way," and
9 then I call Eric. I said, "Can you all -- if you're all
10 looking good here, just bring the engine on around and
11 watch behind Jay. I'm going to the end of the road." So
12 Steve's flying over so we pass each other. I go to the end
13 of the road. I'm going north and he's coming south and
14 then when I get all the way to the end of the road, then I
15 have to get around and then cut off on this little creek
16 right here.

17 I hear Jay call Eric and say, "Eric, bring the
18 dozer." And I'm thinking, well, it's going to jump the
19 road, you know. It's no big deal. We burned this last
20 year. It's not really -- and we'd already talked about
21 that. If it gets across the road, it's not going to do a
22 whole lot because usually -- it really doesn't burn well
23 until like two years after the burn.

24 And then Jay -- and we're all on the tac channel.
25 Nobody else is hearing it except us so then Jay calls me on

1 the tac channel and says, "I think we may have an incident
2 with the ship. Call dispatch."

3 So I got -- I'm staying off our repeater where
4 everybody hears it and everybody's got a scanner and then I
5 had the southern link phone and then just called dispatch
6 and I said, "Jay says we may have an incident with the
7 ship. You need to start calling some people: The ranger,
8 fire staff officer, whoever."

9 And then -- so I'm on the tac channel. I'm calling
10 Jay. I said, you know, "Did you find out anything?" He
11 said, "We don't know but could you get 25 golf hotel down
12 here?" I said, "Okay." So I called back on the link phone
13 and asked dispatch, said, "Get 25 golf hotel down here. No
14 machine. Just come as quick as you can." And it was
15 pretty quick.

16 And then they get up. Eric's on the dozer and I'm
17 still -- and once I found out that Jay had command of the
18 situation and he had everybody else on the burn which was
19 nine people counting myself and Jay so, you know, I come up
20 the road to -- and Brendan and Cory is already out on the
21 road and Brendan's laying in the road. So I just stop -- I
22 have a 125-gallon pumper on my truck and the fire's
23 about -- the fire's backing up to the road for the whole
24 three-quarter mile there but that's what we do on the burn.

25 He's made his last pass and it's backing out the

1 road but when I get up there and I see Brendan laying in
2 the road and Cory's over him, well, I just crank my pumper
3 up and I just put the fire out right there so there's an
4 unburned strip right there where Brendan was laying in the
5 road.

6 Everybody else is on it so I just turn around and
7 go back to the end of the road and still watch -- you know,
8 I'm not lighting anything. I'm just watching it and that's
9 pretty much all I did.

10 I stayed with the burn and I'm wanting to get
11 around here to check the rest of the burn but there's too
12 many vehicles in the road right there so I'm cut off. So
13 when I get up there to where Cory and Brendan is, then I
14 just turn around and go back and I never heard anything. I
15 never heard any -- there was no radio transmission. I
16 never heard a crash. It was just me and Jay on the radio.

17 And then there was a lot of other traffic about,
18 you know -- I said, "Do you need to get an ambulance?" He
19 said, "I've already made that call." Well, then I get a
20 phone call because WLOX has come up and already done a
21 story that morning and it's Steve Phillips. They've
22 already heard it on the scanner.

23 MR. STEIN: Oh-oh.

24 MR. BAGGETT: Yeah. And I can't say anything. He
25 said, "Well, I heard you all had a situation up there." I

1 said, "Well, I don't know what you heard but we may have
2 had an incident with the ship." "Okay. Well, I'm coming
3 back up there." I'm thinking, well, they're not going to
4 let you in here anyway, you know. And then I get a second
5 phone call is Margaret Baker from --

6 (Audio ends.)

STATE OF IDAHO)
) SS
COUNTY OF CANYON)

I, TAMARA A. WEBER, State-certified and licensed
transcriber, do hereby certify:

That the foregoing transcript is a transcript of an
audio recording made of the proceedings in the matter of
the Interview of Eddie Baggett (14:31), Desoto National
Forest, March 31, 2015, 5:45 p.m. CST; that the foregoing
pages 1 through 11 of this transcript contains as accurate
and complete a transcription of said audio recording as I
was able to make.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 6th day of April, 2015.


___/s/ Tamara A. Weber_____
TAMARA A. WEBER, CSR
Idaho CSR License No. 278
Transcriber

INTERVIEW OF EDDIE BAGGETT (16:23)

DESOTO NATIONAL FOREST

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording.
Transcript prepared by transcription service.

1 (Interview of EDDIE BAGGETT (16:23) begins.)

2 MR. GERHARDT: Hi. This is Adam Gerhardt with the
3 NTSB. I'm an air safety investigator and I am here with
4 Mr. --

5 MR. BAGGETT: Eddie Baggett, B-a-g-g-e-t-t.

6 MR. GERHARDT: And Eddie, do you consent to me
7 recording this conversation?

8 MR. BAGGETT: Yes.

9 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Great. So I know that you
10 talked yesterday. You gave a -- I really appreciate that.
11 As for this conversation, if you can, elaborate on the
12 weather conditions, the smoke levels coming above the trees
13 or down here in the forest. Whatever you saw as for the
14 conditions, winds, visibility, anything that you noted, you
15 can go ahead and --

16 MR. BAGGETT: Well, I do know right off the bat
17 that we had a west wind predicted -- forecast. Our west
18 wind is pretty squirrely and we know that so we just -- you
19 just deal with it so, you know -- and at one point when --
20 and I'm using the weather from the Black Creek Station. I
21 don't know how many miles it is from here but it's about
22 nine miles due east of Wiggins and I get my weather from
23 dispatch. I get the weather when we start the burn which
24 is hand lighting about 11:00 and then when the ship came
25 in, about 1340 something. So I get the weather update

1 every two hours and then at some point, she gave me a
2 northwest wind so I asked her to call another weather
3 station to the south of here to see what the wind direction
4 was there. They were having a little bit of problem with
5 the auto caller software in dispatch getting -- and that's
6 what it is. It's not an hourly update or anything.

7 MR. GERHARDT: Sure.

8 MR. BAGGETT: They can call it up and it's what's
9 at the weather station there. But the wind is a 10-minute
10 average.

11 MR. GERHARDT: Okay, okay.

12 MR. BAGGETT: So, you know, a northwest wind that
13 she gave me from the Black Creek Station, it's just, well,
14 that's what it's doing.

15 MR. GERHARDT: Got it.

16 MR. BAGGETT: You know, so when I called and asked
17 for the Camp Keller weather and then she said there was a
18 problem so she called -- well, I had the current
19 conditions -- and that's within two minutes we had a west
20 wind. That's fine, you know. We're conducting the burn
21 with westerly knowing that it will be anywhere from
22 northwest to southwest.

23 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

24 MR. BAGGETT: Which is -- you know, we're about two
25 miles from Highway 49 and that's what our biggest thing is

1 is smoke management. Keeping the smoke off the highway.

2 So that's -- and then, you know, progressing with
3 the burn, you start downwind and then moving upwind against
4 the wind. So the last thing that the ship did firing, you
5 know, after all the dozer lines and roads are fired out and
6 the ship is burning out the interior, you know, dropping
7 spheres that, you know, I was the last one that had radio
8 contact and when he said that, you know, he was up toward,
9 you know, the northwest corner of the burn coming down, I
10 knew he was parallel with the road.

11 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

12 MR. BAGGETT: So with the -- yeah. At the end of
13 the road here.

14 MR. GERHARDT: Got it.

15 MR. BAGGETT: That's at the end of 415-A and then
16 this is just a two-track road that cuts off into the creek.

17 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

18 MR. BAGGETT: So my last conversation was that, you
19 know, he came north firing and turned and left enough room
20 there and turned and came down parallel to the road. So
21 when I headed -- you know, I called Eric and Sara on the
22 engine and asked them to watch the road behind me because I
23 was going to the end of the road. So, you know -- so we
24 passed each other. You know, the ship's, you know, headed
25 south and I'm headed north in my truck up the road and, you

1 know, he's dropping balls but I'm not seeing any fire yet
2 because it takes a little time. But I'm seeing fire out on
3 in there.

4 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

5 MR. BAGGETT: But knowing he's heading south and
6 knowing he's firing so we pass each other and I go all the
7 way to the end of the road and all I'm seeing is just one
8 burn at this point, you know. I know that he's left a lot
9 of room but I could see, you know, the balls catching up so
10 it's just, you know, small plumes of smoke and stuff like
11 that knowing how much we have left to do to finish the burn
12 up.

13 MR. GERHARDT: And where -- Eddie, where were
14 you --

15 MR. BAGGETT: I passed him somewhere along the
16 hiking trail right here. I'm headed north up the road and
17 he's headed south.

18 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

19 MR. BAGGETT: So -- and then, you know, I come all
20 the way in here and then take the two-track in here to the
21 creek and turn around and then that's when I hear Jay call
22 Eric, bring the dozer. Well, I'm thinking, well, you
23 know -- so Jay has fired the east-west part of the road
24 here. I'm thinking that, well, it's jumped across the road
25 and that's what we do, you know, when it gets across the

1 road. If he can't handle it with an engine, you want to
2 load the dozer and pull it out. So that's all I heard, you
3 know. Bring the dozer.

4 So then I heard Eric's conversation, "Well, where
5 do you need me to come?" You know, we had a spot fire all
6 the way up here on the north end of the burn so the dozer
7 is all the way up here in the northeast corner. So they
8 have to drive all the way back around to get the dozer and
9 come back so then Eric said, "Where do you need the dozer?"
10 And then I hear Jay say, "I think we've had an incident
11 with the ship."

12 MR. GERHARDT: Uh-huh.

13 MR. BAGGETT: And then Jay said -- he calls me on
14 the tac channel and said, "Call dispatch and let them know
15 that we may have had an incident with the ship." So I'm
16 still at the end of the road so I stop, not wanting to put
17 any traffic on the repeater channel where everybody hears
18 it.

19 MR. GERHARDT: Yep.

20 MR. BAGGETT: So I called dispatch on the southern
21 link phone and tell them -- dispatcher, "Baggett with
22 emergency traffic." So, you know, I'm not fooling around.
23 I need help.

24 MR. GERHARDT: Absolutely.

25 MR. BAGGETT: So then, you know -- so I just stop

1 at the turn-around here and then, you know, I know Eric's
2 bringing the dozer. And the way that we progress with the
3 burn, you know, as we get assignments done and then you
4 move resources around so I didn't -- and, you know, I had
5 Jeff and J.T. cut a burn and snag here on the corner of
6 415-A and 415-B and they had already cut one snag here but
7 that was before it all happened because if they were to
8 have heard that call, they wouldn't have cut the snag.
9 They would have just come on.

10 So they had already dropped the snag but they went
11 back and we have a John Deere farm tractor with a water
12 tank on the back of it so they went back and got it. So
13 then Eric comes around with the dozer, unloads, and when he
14 goes in with the plow line which is what we do because the
15 plow line is your escape route, you know. It's a whole lot
16 easier to follow the plow line out, you know, unburned fuel
17 plus, you know how to get out but --

18 MR. GERHARDT: Now, as far -- can you comment on
19 the -- once these -- once the area is, quote, unquote, lit,
20 the smoke levels that you saw from your position here, is
21 there anything that you could comment on as for were you
22 looking to the -- it would be kind of the southeast.

23 MR. BAGGETT: Yeah. Well, that's what -- and then
24 after, you know, I made the conversation -- you know, so
25 I'm still sitting there with Jay and, you know, at some

1 point, he -- he said, "Well, let's get 25 golf hotel down
2 here." I get on the link phone.

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If you would holler at me
4 next, I need to cut out here pretty soon.

5 MR. GERHARDT: Perfect.

6 MR. BAGGETT: So I made the call to dispatch. Just
7 tell them need 25 golf hotel immediately. No machine, you
8 know, because they take time to put the machine on because
9 they're not using the other ship to burn on the north end.
10 I knew that because it wasn't but 120 acres. Just come on
11 and they knew that we needed him down here.

12 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

13 MR. BAGGETT: I didn't tell them we needed him to
14 find the ship or whatever. So they launch immediately and
15 then Charles Grice (phonetic), Scooby, calls and said,
16 "Where do you need me?" Well, he don't -- I don't know
17 whether he knew what was going on but with the wind out of
18 the west, I told him, "You're going to have to come around
19 to the south and look for the dozer."

20 MR. GERHARDT: How high is the smoke on this day?
21 Do you remember seeing how --

22 MR. BAGGETT: Well, with the six-mile-an-hour wind,
23 it's probably laying over, you know, pretty good. I was up
24 under the smoke column, you know. It's not like the burn
25 that we -- we did 3,100 acres Sunday, you know. I think

1 they said the mixing height was like 4,500 feet.

2 MR. GERHARDT: 4,500 feet.

3 MR. BAGGETT: But you build up enough heat, you can
4 break through that, you know, so it's a huge column. But
5 we're right up under it. I have no reference on how high
6 the column is getting but it's kind of -- you know,
7 depending on wind speed, I mean smoke's going straight up,
8 he can still get downwind of it and get up under it.

9 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

10 MR. BAGGETT: But, you know --

11 MR. GERHARDT: As for this particular time between,
12 you know, the call to, you know, get the dozer and you're
13 calling -- you know, the dispatch and emergency response,
14 what was -- did you see what the smoke was doing at that
15 time?

16 MR. BAGGETT: Just along the road. Because you
17 know, after -- you know, made a couple of calls. Asked Jay
18 did he need an ambulance. He said, "I've already made that
19 call." So I come back down the road and, you know,
20 probably not really paying attention to the fire but it's
21 all -- there's no smoke on the road so the west wind has
22 got it --

23 MR. GERHARDT: So the smoke is going -- it's kind
24 of --

25 MR. BAGGETT: Into the burn.

1 MR. GERHARDT: So it's traveling hundreds of feet
2 if not thousands of feet above the treetops.

3 MR. BAGGETT: Probably, yeah.

4 MR. GERHARDT: And then it's arcing to the east?

5 MR. BAGGETT: Yeah.

6 MR. GERHARDT: Is that fair?

7 MR. BAGGETT: Yeah, yeah.

8 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

9 MR. BAGGETT: And then knowing from experience
10 that, you know, it's smoked in over here so, you know, I
11 know that he can't come, you know --

12 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

13 MR. BAGGETT: I can't ask for a recon on this side
14 because you're not going to be able to get in there.

15 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah. Could you draw where you --
16 do you think you could show me where you think the smoke
17 from your -- of course from your position. Is that
18 something that's possible?

19 MR. BAGGETT: You know, with the west wind, I
20 mean -- like I said -- I mean I don't know whether it's
21 straight west, southwest or northwest, you know. All I
22 know is on a big scale that it's in a cone like this.

23 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

24 MR. BAGGETT: And then the further out you get, the
25 thinner it's going to get.

1 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

2 MR. BAGGETT: But I do know that there was no smoke
3 on the road here.

4 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

5 MR. BAGGETT: And then that's -- when I came
6 down -- and it's all backing fire. It's backing out
7 against the wind out to the road so when I get down here,
8 Brendan is laying in the road. The fire's still backing
9 out to the road and Cory's kneeled over him so I just crank
10 my pumper up and then just spray the fire out that's
11 getting close to them. That's -- where the toilets are,
12 that's where that green strip is that we just put that
13 out -- or I just put that out.

14 MR. GERHARDT: Got it.

15 MR. BAGGETT: So yeah. The road was clear so it
16 was still -- I have -- well, they hadn't found the ship yet
17 so just to the north of here, you know, being here 30
18 years, I know that there's a road -- an old woods trail
19 that goes all the way in, crosses the drain and then comes
20 back out on the road. And that's right -- well, 415-A1. I
21 know it's below the hiking trail.

22 So it's -- well, it's to the north of us here so I
23 pull up -- well, after I left Brendan and then I pull up
24 and park there talking to Jay, I said do you have, well, a
25 location so I called dispatch on the link phone and she

1 said that he's still positive AFF. I said, "Well, can you
2 give me those coordinates?" So I punch them in and, you
3 know, I'm sitting there --

4 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

5 MR. BAGGETT: -- thinking that I can drive in that
6 road but the fire has already picked up pretty good.

7 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

8 MR. BAGGETT: And I know I can't safely get in
9 there.

10 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

11 MR. BAGGETT: So I'm looking at the GPS trying to
12 find -- and then I did find out later that -- I mean you
13 know, it's relative -- relatively close but the coordinates
14 that she gave me wasn't here.

15 MR. GERHARDT: Right.

16 MR. BAGGETT: It was putting it up somewhere up
17 there.

18 MR. GERHARDT: Got it.

19 MR. BAGGETT: So it was probably a good thing that
20 I didn't go in there because it would have just been a
21 needle in a haystack.

22 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah, yeah.

23 MR. BAGGETT: And then it wouldn't have been safe
24 to go in there anyway.

25 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

1 MR. BAGGETT: The smoke and everything was still in
2 there.

3 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah, yeah.

4 MR. BAGGETT: And then, you know, 25 golf hotel
5 gets down here about the same time asking me, you know,
6 where does he need to go, look for the dozer. And I think
7 Eric got here on the dozer and found it before 25 golf
8 hotel did but I don't know how thick the smoke was, whether
9 he could even -- I haven't talked to Scooby. I mean, you
10 know, I don't -- I don't know if he could even see enough
11 to get in here.

12 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

13 MR. BAGGETT: But Eric did say later that, well,
14 this was already -- you know, because it took some time to
15 get around here and get the dozer in here and by the time
16 he got in here, it was already burned pretty clean. Still
17 hot and smoking but --

18 MR. GERHARDT: Right, right.

19 MR. BAGGETT: But he was able to see where to come
20 to, you know.

21 MR. GERHARDT: Perfect. All right. Let me turn
22 this off.

23 (Interview ends.)

24

25

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COUNTY OF CANYON)

I, TAMARA A. WEBER, State-certified and licensed
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
That the foregoing transcript is a transcript of an
audio recording made of the proceedings in the matter of
the Interview of Eddie Baggett (16:23), Desota National
Forest; that the foregoing pages 1 through 13 of this
transcript contains as accurate and complete a
transcription of said audio recording as I was able to
make.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 6th day of April, 2015.

___/s/ Tamara A. Weber_____
TAMARA A. WEBER, CSR
Idaho CSR License No. 278
Transcriber

INTERVIEW OF J.T. WARDEN (13:29)
DESOTO NATIONAL FOREST

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording.
Transcript prepared by transcription service.

1 (Interview of J.T. Warden (13:29) begins.)

2 MR. GERHARDT: This is Adam Gerhardt. I'm with the
3 NTSB and I'm an air safety investigator. And I am here
4 with Mr. --

5 MR. WARDEN: J.T. Warden.

6 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. J.T. Warden. And can you
7 spell the last name for me?

8 MR. WARDEN: W-a-r-d-e-n.

9 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Perfect. And J.T., are you
10 okay that I record this conversation?

11 MR. WARDEN: Yeah, that will be all right.

12 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Perfect. Well, I'm not going
13 to talk much. I'm going to just be quiet and let you
14 describe what you saw, the conditions, the helicopter, what
15 it was doing, if you saw anything, you know, and just walk
16 me through, you know, what you can remember. So I'll be
17 quiet and just let you talk.

18 MR. WARDEN: All right. I guess I'll probably
19 start from the beginning. We met up at the station, got
20 together and decided which burn we were going to be doing.
21 Met up at the briefing spot back at the junction, Martha
22 Road. The press showed up and they were going to be
23 running film for our briefing and getting some information
24 from the burn boss about what we were doing for the day.

25 Met up. Had our briefing like usual. Went over

1 everything and the burn plan, what our objectives were.
2 Held a safety briefing. Covered what the weather was for
3 the day and what our tactical plans and assignments were
4 going to be.

5 So after that, we broke up and went to our
6 respective areas that we were going to be starting work.
7 Me and one other personnel went up to the north and our
8 objective was to fire out the A line. So we got up there
9 and staged and when we got the go-ahead, we went ahead and
10 started ignition on that A line.

11 It was kind of ops normal. Went real well. We had
12 a favorable wind coming in from the north pulling our
13 lighting away. It would switch every now and again, blow
14 smoke back at us, but it was pretty favorable conditions.
15 Not much to worry about. We did pick up one spot about
16 half way through. Didn't have much potential, much spread
17 but due to the thickness of the fuel, we went ahead and
18 requested a dozer and that showed up promptly. Put line
19 around it and we had the situation taken care of.

20 Finished firing our line around noon. Notified the
21 burn boss and then pulled back off the line after double-
22 checking that everything was okay. Had pulled out black
23 line about two to three chains in most places. Pulled back
24 out to the road and had lunch there.

25 About that time, the burn had been progressing

1 along the road from the A south along the 415-B and they
2 had been having smoke blowing from the west over the line.
3 We were concerned about spots across the road so they asked
4 us to come help patrol with the engine. So we drove --
5 started helping patrol. Burn boss notified us that there
6 was a snag down on the corner so we drove down there, took
7 care of the snag and was just getting our sawyer gear put
8 away when the accident occurred.

9 Jay notified us that there was an incident. At
10 that time, we weren't real sure what had happened so at
11 that time, you know, they made the decision that he was
12 going to take over as IC of the incident and that Eddie was
13 going to continue along with the burn.

14 So at that time, we got in the pickup. We asked
15 Eddie what he would like from us and he told us to go ahead
16 and pick up the tractor and bring everything we had back up
17 the road to the north and assist in helping with the
18 incident up there.

19 We did that and coming back up the road, heard
20 traffic that the dozer was pushing in the line. There was
21 a little bit of confusion. We weren't real sure if there
22 was an escape, a slop-over from the burn. We did notice
23 that we couldn't hear the rotors turning anymore so had a
24 little bit of an assumption that something had happened
25 with the ship.

1 Got up there and staged the pickup where all the
2 other pickups were at that time. Contacted the burn boss
3 and asked for an assignment and he told us to grab all of
4 our gear and head up there and we did and came up to where
5 Jay was taking over the incident. He asked us to grab a
6 medical kit and told us that, you know, the incident was
7 that the helicopter had went down and that we were to grid
8 out off the road and search in the direction that the
9 survivor had come out in.

10 We gridded out and had the dozer following us in
11 for support. Came about 300 yards off the road. At that
12 time, I had eye contact with the ship. I called in,
13 notified everybody, the respective parties on the burn that
14 I did have eyes on the ship. And shortly after, I arrived
15 close enough to confirm that two of the individuals didn't
16 make it and at that time, I called over the radio and told
17 everybody that it was going to be a recovery mission
18 instead of a search.

19 And from there, directed the dozer in and he made a
20 road down to the incident and we just tried to preserve the
21 scene at that time and when the IC of the incident came
22 down, he asked us to do a secondary search of the area
23 looking for pieces of the helicopter to help out with the
24 investigation. Asked us to flag anything we could find and
25 also there wasn't confirmation -- there was confirmation

1 that there was one body and they weren't sure about a
2 second so we were to look for a second personnel.

3 So me and two other guys fanned out and did a
4 counterclockwise search starting at the south and moving
5 towards the north and we did one round and then we spread
6 out further and did another round searching all the way
7 into the green drainage below the accident and we did not
8 find any evidence of mechanical pieces or anything of that
9 nature outside of the crash. It was all confined to the
10 one area.

11 After we did that, the IC called us back and at
12 that point had brought in the cooperators. The cooperators
13 had confirmed that there were two individuals inside the
14 wreck and, at that point, we just had no other purpose for
15 being there so we just pulled back to the road.

16 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

17 MR. WARDEN: And just assisted any way we could in
18 helping traffic and everything happening up there.

19 Shortly after that, the decision was made to pull
20 all four service resources back to the work center so we
21 got all of our gear gathered together and kind of convoyed
22 out. And yeah, other than that, just tried to hold some of
23 the incoming resources and make sure that there was parking
24 available for them at the scene and checked with Eddie.
25 Got approval to let those guys through. Let them through

1 and then went back to the work center.

2 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah. Okay, J.T. Well, it's very
3 helpful. Do you remember the smoke levels at the tree
4 level height? Did you see anything that you remember as
5 to, you know, what the smoke was doing? Was it hanging
6 around the treetops? Was it thick in some areas,
7 especially considering the accident site? Is there
8 anything you remember?

9 MR. WARDEN: When we were patrolling the road for
10 the smoke blowing over it, the wind was coming from the
11 west and the smoke was fairly thick but it wasn't real
12 dense. We had visibility up to like 100 yards and, you
13 know, it was just blowing in the west and over that road
14 and on that private piece that they lit, the B, C and D
15 road, I remember traffic between the burn boss and the ship
16 asking if the ignition on those points was causing smoke
17 levels that the helicopter would not be able to work in and
18 I remember that they made the choice that the smoke levels
19 were acceptable and went ahead and continued lighting.

20 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Okay. Did you -- did you see
21 the helicopter during its flight over this burn area?

22 MR. WARDEN: I did briefly. The only time that I
23 seen the helicopter was when we were patrolling that road
24 and he was lighting north to south in sort of a parallel to
25 the 51 -- or 415-B road. Sorry.

1 MR. GERHARDT: Could you -- when you saw the
2 helicopter, how high was it above the treetops would you
3 say? Is it something that you could judge?

4 MR. WARDEN: I couldn't give you a good answer for
5 that based on the angle and where I was on the road and how
6 far he was on the burn. I couldn't give you a good
7 estimate.

8 MR. GERHARDT: Sure. No problem at all. No
9 problem. Did you hear anything with the helicopter?
10 Personally, did you hear anything with the --

11 MR. WARDEN: No. It sounded ops normal to me and
12 the only audio indicator that I had was after I heard there
13 was an incident, I did not hear any rotors.

14 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Okay. J.T., that's
15 everything on my end. Is there anything else that you'd
16 like to talk about, note?

17 MR. WARDEN: No. You know, I want to give like
18 straight facts, you know, but I guess just personal opinion
19 from everything that I witnessed, the parties in charge
20 both have taken over the incident and the burn. You know,
21 I have a lot of respect for them guys and what they did and
22 I think that the way they handled everything was spot on,
23 you know. I can't find any blame or anything that I would
24 have done personally different.

25 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah, yeah. Perfect. I'm going to

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
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 7th day of April, 2015.

___/s/ Tamara A. Weber_____
TAMARA A. WEBER, CSR
Idaho CSR License No. 278
Transcriber

INTERVIEW OF STEVE MOHR (9:40)
DESOTO NATIONAL FOREST

TRANSCRIBED BY:
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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording.
Transcript prepared by transcription service.

1 (Interview of Steve Mohr (9:40) begins.)

2 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. This is Adam Gerhardt with
3 the NTSB. I'm an air safety investigator and I'm here with
4 Steve Mohr with the Helena National Forest. He's a
5 helicopter manager for November 25 golf hotel. And Steve,
6 do you consent to this being recorded?

7 MR. MOHR: Yes.

8 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Thank you. So I'm going to
9 just be quiet and let you -- let you talk, what you saw.

10 MR. MOHR: Okay.

11 MR. GERHARDT: And then at the end, you know, if
12 there's any questions that come up --

13 MR. MOHR: Okay.

14 MR. GERHARDT: -- I'll go ahead and ask them.

15 MR. MOHR: So do you want me to start when we're
16 actually in the air or do you want me to start from when we
17 were at the hangar to here?

18 MR. GERHARDT: You can start with -- so did you
19 have any interaction with the crew before that morning or
20 before they departed for this flight?

21 MR. MOHR: Yes. I was involved with the
22 installation of the PSD, plastic sphere dispersal
23 machine --

24 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

25 MR. MOHR: -- into the rear of the aircraft.

1 MR. GERHARDT: Uh-huh.

2 MR. MOHR: The guy sitting in the rear is my
3 supervisor, Brendan Mullen, from back in Helena. I had
4 various interactions of course with Steve Cobb and Brandon
5 Ricks, the pilot. Brandon Ricks was the primary pilot in
6 my contract.

7 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

8 MR. MOHR: He was taking 50 for the day. We were
9 told we had a 32-acre burn. Brendan planned appropriately
10 and took three bags of balls I believe which would be about
11 6,000 spheres in the aircraft. I forget the amount of fuel
12 and all that that they put on board. Probably a standard
13 amount of 600 pounds.

14 Anyway, moving on, they loaded up. All procedures
15 normal. Launched to the burn. We had had some issues the
16 previous days with the ICS in the rear of the aircraft.

17 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Okay. What is the ICS?

18 MR. MOHR: It's the internal communication system.

19 MR. GERHARDT: Okay, okay.

20 MR. MOHR: And what it was is the volumes were
21 fluctuating, varying so it was -- it was hard for the guy
22 in the rear, Brendan, to not be blowing his ears out while
23 hearing what was going out up front. The issue had been
24 looked at and gone over and when you talk to Nate
25 Alexander, the manager for 50, I'm sure he'll go over this.

1 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

2 MR. MOHR: But it had been worked on by Brandon
3 Ricks, the pilot, who was also a carded mechanic.

4 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

5 MR. MOHR: With T & M to the best of my
6 understanding.

7 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

8 MR. MOHR: We'd had issues with that where he'd had
9 to pull some of the boxes to make sure everything worked
10 and had actually worked on that. I'd gone out to the ship
11 about an hour before the mission and he was in there
12 changing some ICS boxes trying to get the things to work.

13 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

14 MR. MOHR: So him and Brendan checked it. Ops
15 checked normal. They went off to go fly. Getting towards
16 the end of their mission time, we heard a call over the
17 radio from dispatch saying to launch 25 golf hotel to come
18 find 50 that was missing.

19 MR. GERHARDT: What time --

20 MR. MOHR: I'm sorry. I would have to say it was
21 probably -- oh, gosh, I'm sorry. I'd have to guess maybe
22 2 -- 2:55, maybe before that. I'm trying to figure it out.

23 MR. GERHARDT: No, that's --

24 MR. MOHR: I was right in the middle of kind of
25 doing some paperwork so I didn't have the exact time. I

1 know Wiggins dispatch will have everything on file, the
2 exact time --

3 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

4 MR. MOHR: -- that the call went out. Scooby Grice
5 (phonetic) who -- or Charles Grice, if you will, I'm sure
6 you guys will talk to, was the local guy here so he called
7 dispatch. Dispatch confirmed that they had lost radio
8 communication with 50 kilo hotel and they wanted to launch
9 our ship to go find them.

10 As we do down here, I went along as helicopter
11 manager and an additional set of eyes in the back seat
12 sitting right side behind the pilot. Scooby rode up front.
13 That's what we tend to do down here with them. The local
14 guys, you know, have the local knowledge riding up front.

15 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

16 MR. MOHR: So we launched out to it. We took off.
17 We made three to four calls on the victor trying to get in
18 touch with 50 kilo hotel. The feeling in the aircraft when
19 we took off was that the electronic gremlin had probably
20 manifested itself and they were -- everything was fine.
21 They were still flying.

22 MR. GERHARDT: Uh-huh.

23 MR. MOHR: Because we hadn't heard what was going
24 on on the ground. As we got closer, nothing on the victor.
25 Probably about a mile out from the burn, we heard we may

1 have -- we may have an incident. We may have an aircraft
2 down.

3 We circled around. Started running kind of south
4 to north passes over the fire. We located where they had
5 the dozers and the other stuff up here, the trucks, and
6 then we started flying a path across the wreck trying to
7 locate where it was.

8 While we were doing that, while looking down my
9 right side which would be pilot side, came over -- it would
10 have been directly over the top of the aircraft because I
11 could clearly plain as day see down through there. I could
12 see the rotor, the one that's in the best shape right down
13 there, all in one piece lying down there. I could see what
14 looked to be fire in the aircraft and around the aircraft
15 but not monumental portions of fire. From the air, it
16 looked like an aircraft that was maybe even sitting upright
17 but of course that could have been wrong from my
18 recollection.

19 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

20 MR. MOHR: Lost sight of the aircraft. Came back
21 around, tried to find it again and we had smoke that blew
22 over it. Tried to locate the aircraft two to three more
23 times. The call went out that this was now a recovery and
24 we decided -- the pilot and I made a decision that -- it
25 was kind of unanimous without really being said that it was

1 time to go back because there was no reason for us flying
2 around and adding to the incident because there was --
3 visibility was really, really bad with the smoke and the
4 way the winds were going.

5 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah. That's the next portion.
6 Just if you could elaborate as much as you can remember on
7 the visibility, the smoke and the altitude that you guys
8 were flying at.

9 MR. MOHR: I would have to say the -- I mean I
10 don't have the exact winds for that day.

11 MR. GERHARDT: Sure.

12 MR. MOHR: But the prevailing wind was kind of
13 switching back and forth and I think a lot of that has to
14 do with this being -- coming off this ridgeline right here
15 and possibly the topographically factors might have
16 influenced the winds right in this area.

17 But it was very, very poor visibility because we
18 had the column kind of coming up to the right of us and
19 kind of bending over from the stuff that was burning over
20 here and so when we came through, I'd have to say we were
21 maybe at the highest, 250 -- I mean -- and obviously this
22 is all speculation because I didn't see the actual
23 altimeter.

24 MR. GERHARDT: Of course.

25 MR. MOHR: But anywhere from the highest was

1 probably about 250 down to I think the lowest we got was
2 maybe 125.

3 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

4 MR. MOHR: We tried to stay at a higher altitude
5 given the lower visibility. The pilot took extra care to
6 make sure -- to not add to make another incident --

7 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

8 MR. MOHR: -- while trying to find this one. The
9 smoke made the visibility extremely hard.

10 MR. GERHARDT: Was the -- so the smoke coming from
11 the controlled burn, how -- the thickness to it. It is --

12 MR. MOHR: The thickness of it, it was real -- it
13 was a really dense white smoke. I mean I guess if what
14 you're asking was was there the real black smoke that you'd
15 see from the jet A burning, I didn't see any of that real
16 definite, definite black tire smoke burning. So I don't
17 know at that time if the jet A had ignited yet or whatnot
18 and so --

19 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah, distinguishing between the
20 helicopter --

21 MR. MOHR: A helicopter on fire and the actual
22 vegetation around from the burn.

23 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

24 MR. MOHR: So I guess to answer your question, I
25 wasn't able to really distinguish between the helicopter

1 burning and the vegetation around here. The smoke from the
2 fire was that really white dense smoke with little pockets
3 of black that you usually see when you burn those because
4 you're going to hit those little pockets kind of fuel and
5 it's going to throw out black but I could not see that
6 definite black smoke.

7 MR. GERHARDT: But there was -- there was a decent
8 amount of that white -- that white smoke --

9 MR. MOHR: Yeah.

10 MR. GERHARDT: -- coming off -- was it -- is it
11 solid throughout the controlled burn? Are there -- are
12 there like pockets?

13 MR. MOHR: Well, it was very pockety and that was
14 one of the reasons we were able to locate it.

15 MR. GERHARDT: Right.

16 MR. MOHR: 50. But with the way the winds were
17 prevailing, you lost the pocket very easily so that's
18 about -- yeah.

19 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

20 MR. MOHR: So turned around, went back to the
21 airport, shut down and that's kind of it accidentwise.

22 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Okay.

23 (Audio ends.)
24
25

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I, TAMARA A. WEBER, State-certified and licensed
transcriber, do hereby certify:


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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 7th day of April, 2015?

____/s/ Tamara A. Weber_____
TAMARA A. WEBER, CSR
Idaho CSR License No. 278
Transcriber

INTERVIEW OF CORY RENNAKER (11:23)
DESOTO NATIONAL FOREST

TRANSCRIBED BY:
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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording.
Transcript prepared by transcription service.

1 (Interview of CORY RENNAKER (11:23) begins.)

2 MR. GERHARDT: This is Adam Gerhardt with the NTSB
3 and I am an air safety investigator and I am here with
4 Mr. Cory Rennaker. And Cory, are you okay with -- do you
5 consent to me recording this conversation?

6 MR. RENNAKER: Sure.

7 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Perfect. Thank you. So I'm
8 not going to talk much. Obviously just one -- so you were
9 present in this -- in the accident site area at the time of
10 the accident?

11 MR. RENNAKER: Correct.

12 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. So I'm going to just -- if
13 you could just tell me where you were, what you saw, to the
14 best of your ability, and just tell me about the conditions
15 and what you were doing leading up to the accident.

16 MR. RENNAKER: Okay.

17 MR. GERHARDT: I'll just -- I want to be quiet and
18 let you talk.

19 MR. RENNAKER: Okay. So my role that day was I was
20 kind of the firing boss on this Bravo, Charlie and Delta
21 lines here and our role was just to get those fired out so
22 that they'd be well off the line enough for when the
23 aircraft came to fire up the interior of the burn. So I
24 was -- one guy and I, Jerrod and I who you'll talk to in a
25 few minutes, fired our way on D, rounded the corner and had

1 fired up and met up with John Wesley, J.W., who started up
2 on the B line and we met here in the middle. We let the
3 fire back off for quite awhile and then I called the burn
4 boss and told him that I thought it was getting close to
5 being off enough to where it was safe to bring the ship in.

6 So he brought the ship out. So John Wesley, Jerrid
7 and I met about midway point on the C line and we had a
8 quick bite to eat and BS'd for a few minutes and then J.W.
9 went back to check his lines and I'd go back and check this
10 line. Jerrid had walked all the way out and came back in.
11 We tied in here.

12 So J.W. was over here and Jerrid and I were --
13 actually, I was at this drain right here for quite awhile
14 and then Jerrid and I had met up down here about the
15 corner. And the last thing that I remember hearing the
16 aircraft talk about was making sure somebody was watching
17 on this 415-B road and the Bravo line here because there
18 was getting a lot of smoke over there, getting a lot of
19 heat, didn't want any spots across the road or whatever.
20 Jerrid and I were hanging out at this corner.

21 MR. GERHARDT: If I could just --

22 MR. RENNAKER: Go ahead.

23 MR. GERHARDT: The smoke -- you know, if you could
24 characterize, did you remember seeing the thickness and how
25 it was rising and traveling?

1 MR. RENNAKER: It was -- I don't remember --
2 because we're underneath the column so we can't really see
3 if there's a real developed column when we're underneath
4 it.

5 MR. GERHARDT: Right.

6 MR. RENNAKER: But I do remember when he said that,
7 I looked over and I could see darker colored smoke. I'm
8 not going to say black smoke but it was darker colored
9 smoke over there. And J.W. was -- that was kind of his
10 area a little bit so he was kind of working his way that
11 way a little bit. I believe so. But I knew he was over
12 there and there was also people in trucks out on the road
13 so I wasn't too concerned with that over there. The ship
14 did say that it was getting smoky and that he couldn't get
15 in over there I'm pretty sure to look at it.

16 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Okay. And so as for -- did
17 you -- did you see or hear the helicopter prior to, a radio
18 call or --

19 MR. RENNAKER: When we're firing these lines, we
20 see them going by all the time and he's reconning our lines
21 for us, making sure there's no spots. So he flew over me.
22 I talked to him a couple times on the radio when I was -- I
23 was actually hunkered down in this drain here just because
24 they don't burn as much and there's less smoke in there.
25 So when it was real smoky here, I'd get down in the drain

1 and it -- he flew over and told us about a couple snags
2 that were close to our line that might throw a spot over or
3 something, you know. So we'd go up and check on it and
4 then get out of the smoke and we'd just patrol our lines.
5 I think I talked to him twice or so but it was just about a
6 snag here and there.

7 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Did you -- did you see the
8 helicopter, you know -- how did -- how did you come from
9 your position to then -- did you go to the accident site?

10 MR. RENNAKER: Actually, I didn't make it in to the
11 site but I -- so what -- I'll just tell you how all that
12 happened if that's fine.

13 MR. GERHARDT: Uh-huh.

14 MR. RENNAKER: Jerrid and I were here together at
15 the corner, C, D break, and we heard Jay, the FMO, say that
16 he thought there had been an incident with the aircraft.
17 So Jerrid and I looked at -- we're both on a helicopter
18 crew back home so we looked at each other like we know
19 that's (inaudible).

20 So we pulled our map out and we knew they were
21 firing this road up and bringing it around. Yeah, they
22 were bringing this road around so if Jay thought something
23 had happened, we knew where he was. Jerrid and I looked at
24 the map. Jerrid thought he had heard a boom in this area.
25 I did not hear that first one so -- he was firing kind

1 of -- you know, he was coming through here as near as we
2 could tell but, you know, he may have just been over here
3 when that was happening but his pattern initially was
4 flying on this line and then he'd fly over here a little
5 bit and I don't know exactly his pattern but he was going
6 by us in here.

7 So we thought there was potential it could have
8 been over here so we looked at the map thinking can we --
9 Jerriid thought he heard the boom maybe over here so we
10 thought can we get through that fire and get to it instead
11 of -- because we were, you know, down in here. That's a
12 pretty decent little piece to get out, you know. We were
13 half a mile or whatever.

14 So we looked at the map and said -- we just talked
15 and decided we didn't think we could get through the fire
16 so we just dropped everything -- well, we didn't drop
17 everything. We just tightened up and ran out as fast as we
18 could, got in our truck here and then there was starting to
19 be some more radio traffic, you know, Jay, identifying
20 himself as the incident within an incident commander.

21 And at one point, I made just a quick call to Jay
22 on the radio. Didn't receive any -- but I was going to ask
23 him if he thought we should go through here.

24 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

25 MR. RENNAKER: And he didn't respond. I'm sure he

1 was running up the road or whatever he was doing so I
2 didn't -- and at that point, Jerrid and I decided just to
3 go out. I didn't want to bother him with it.

4 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

5 MR. RENNAKER: So we got in the truck, came up and
6 around. And when we rounded the corner, there was J.W. --
7 we saw J.W. right when we got to our truck here. He'd come
8 out and met us here and we just drove up. He actually
9 hopped in with us. He parked his truck somewhere down in
10 here or something. He hopped in with us. We came up and
11 about this corner here or down in here somewhere, there was
12 some people in the road. They were kind of just deciding
13 what to do, figuring out what to do.

14 And Jerrid grabbed the trauma kit out of our truck
15 and started walking up the road and we were going to try
16 and find a way in or see what was going on. And Jerrid
17 told me to grab the truck and so I walked back and hopped
18 in the truck and came up around the corner and then I saw
19 Jerrid with Brendan -- or Jay with Brendan on the road and
20 I know Brendan so Jerrid -- Jerrid's a first responder and
21 he just pointed at me and pointed at him. So I knew stay
22 with Brendan. So I stayed out there and tried to make him
23 as comfortable as I could.

24 MR. GERHARDT: Did he say anything to you?

25 MR. RENNAKER: Yeah. I mean I was with him for

1 about 30 minutes.

2 MR. GERHARDT: Was he conscious?

3 MR. RENNAKER: Oh, yeah, he was conscious. He kind
4 of started to fade a little bit. I mean started out being
5 like hyped, hyped up on adrenaline and then shock started
6 to set in so he kind of started to -- towards the end right
7 before they loaded him in the ambulance, he was -- his eyes
8 would start to close and they'd stay closed until I'd like
9 yell at him like, "Brendan, wake up. Stay with me," you
10 know.

11 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

12 MR. RENNAKER: He said a couple things that -- you
13 know, he tried, he tried, he tried, he tried. "Are they
14 okay? Did they get out?" He tried to get them out. And
15 then he said he didn't want to give up.

16 MR. GERHARDT: Take as much time as you need.

17 MR. RENNAKER: Okay.

18 MR. GERHARDT: Water too. I drank out of it but I
19 promise I don't have germs.

20 MR. RENNAKER: He -- I asked -- I'm a helicopter
21 guy so I was wanting to know like what happened, you know.

22 MR. GERHARDT: Absolutely.

23 MR. RENNAKER: I was trying to create that
24 conversation with him so I said, "What happened, Brendo?"
25 He said, "We just lost power," and I don't know

1 mechanically what that means but as a helicopter manager, I
2 know what that means doing a low-level flight like that and
3 he said he just got his legs in so he didn't -- he got his
4 legs to where they weren't going to be crushed and that was
5 it. And then I didn't get any details about, you know, why
6 he couldn't get them out or why they couldn't get out on
7 their own or anything like that.

8 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Is there any -- anything
9 else -- there's no more questions that I have and if
10 there's anything else you want to add? Anything?

11 MR. RENNAKER: Not really, man. I just -- I don't
12 think so.

13 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

14 (Audio ends.)
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STATE OF IDAHO)
) SS
COUNTY OF CANYON)

I, TAMARA A. WEBER, State-certified and licensed
transcriber, do hereby certify:


That the foregoing transcript is a transcript of an
audio recording made of the proceedings in the matter of
the Interview of Cory Rennaker (11:23), Desoto National
Forest; that the foregoing pages 1 through 9 of this
transcript contains as accurate and complete a
transcription of said audio recording as I was able to
make.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 7th day of April, 2015.

___/s/ Tamara A. Weber_____
TAMARA A. WEBER, CSR
Idaho CSR License No. 278
Transcriber

VIDEO INTERVIEW OF BRENDAN MULLEN
DESOTO NATIONAL FOREST INCIDENT

TRANSCRIBED BY:
Cany tion



Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording.
Transcript prepared by transcription service.

1 (Video recording begins.)

2 MR. STEIN: I can barely hear you.

3 MR. MULLEN: Yeah, I have you. I got you.

4 MR. STEIN: Okay. All right. Actually, how are
5 you doing?

6 MR. MULLEN: All right, man. A lot better than I
7 was.

8 MR. STEIN: Yeah, I heard you've made a pretty
9 outstanding recovery and had to go through some fairly
10 painful surgeries.

11 MR. MULLEN: Yeah. Getting better.

12 MR. STEIN: Well, I'm sure glad -- I speak for both
13 of us here. We're sure glad that you made it.

14 MR. MULLEN: Thank you.

15 MR. STEIN: You know, we're very sympathetic, you
16 know, to your loss so, you know, please let us know if
17 there's anything we can do. In fact, later on during the
18 call, we'll talk about the group that NTSB has. It's a
19 Transportation Disaster Assistance. It's a terrible
20 (inaudible).

21 MR. MULLEN: Okay.

22 MR. STEIN: But they're available to you 24/7 for
23 counseling and other services.

24 MR. MULLEN: Okay.

25 MR. STEIN: We'll chat about that a little later.

1 For now, basically, just to kind of give you the program, I
2 have a bunch of questions that -- for you. You know, how
3 we typically run these is I'm going to ask you some
4 background questions and really brief rudimentary type of
5 questions and then I'll ask you to describe everything that
6 you remember and then I'm going to have some follow-up.

7 MR. MULLEN: Okay.

8 MR. STEIN: So, you know, just so we're on the same
9 plane. And, you know, at any time you want, you could --
10 you're more than welcome to ask any questions.

11 MR. MULLEN: Certainly.

12 MR. STEIN: So, Brendan, let's go ahead and get
13 started. Okay. First Brendan, I think we already know the
14 answer to this question but you consent to us recording you
15 both visually and audio?

16 MR. MULLEN: Yes.

17 MR. STEIN: With both audio and visual recording?

18 MR. MULLEN: Yes.

19 MR. STEIN: Okay. (Inaudible.) Okay. Okay. So
20 just some background information. Brendan, what is -- may
21 I have your first and last name and if you could spell them
22 for me, please.

23 MR. MULLEN: Okay. It's B-r-e-n-d-a-n. Last name
24 is Mullen, M-u-l-l-e-n. Middle initial is T as in Thomas.

25 MR. STEIN: Okay. And Brendan, what is your date

1 of birth?

2 MR. MULLEN: [REDACTED] 72. [REDACTED] 1972.

3 MR. STEIN: [REDACTED] 1972, is what I have?

4 MR. MULLEN: Yes, sir.

5 MR. STEIN: Okay. How long have you been with the
6 Forest Service for?

7 MR. MULLEN: Let's see. If you count my time doing
8 an internship my first year and then I had several years
9 with the Park Service, this will be -- let's see. '92. So
10 this is my 23rd year.

11 MR. STEIN: Wow, so you've been with them for a
12 while then.

13 MR. MULLEN: Yeah. A lot of it was -- seven years
14 was seasonal time so it was shorter, you know, like ten-
15 month, seven-month, six-month. My internship was only
16 three months so --

17 MR. STEIN: Okay.

18 MR. MULLEN: Primarily, it's been mostly with the
19 Forest Service.

20 MR. STEIN: Okay. How long have you been doing --
21 okay. So I'm going to jump ahead to the -- just some kind
22 of position related questions.

23 MR. MULLEN: Okay.

24 MR. STEIN: On the day of the actual accident, the
25 event (inaudible). On the -- first of all, where in the

1 helicopter were you seated?

2 MR. MULLEN: I was in the rear facing right behind
3 the pilot so it would be the rear right.

4 MR. STEIN: Okay. Were you seated -- were you
5 facing forward?

6 MR. MULLEN: Yes. I was facing forward and I had
7 the plastic sphere dispenser. You know, I was straddling
8 that so it would have been out of the rear passenger behind
9 the pilot's door that was removed.

10 MR. STEIN: You were straddling the what? The --

11 MR. MULLEN: Yes, the PSD machine. It's the
12 plastic sphere dispenser machine.

13 MR. STEIN: What does it stand for one more time?

14 MR. MULLEN: PSD. It's plastic sphere like, you
15 know, a cylindrical spheres dispenser machine.

16 MR. STEIN: Okay. There's a little bit of cutting
17 in and out so I apologize making you repeat that. Go ahead
18 and can you briefly describe to me exactly what that
19 operation entailed?

20 MR. MULLEN: Okay. Yeah, it's basically I'm in
21 charge of -- I'm the sole operator of running the machine
22 that we use for firing operations that -- basically, it's
23 filling the machine with the -- with the balls and then
24 ensuring that it's working properly, it's not jamming, and
25 then I'm in direct communication with the firing boss which

1 is the individual that's up in the front seat next to the
2 pilot and doing it at their -- on their command at the
3 volume and the rate in which that we're dropping these
4 balls. So, you know, he's giving me (inaudible) commands
5 like prepare to fire, start firing, fire 4 slow, prepare to
6 stop firing, stop firing, secure the machine. So it's
7 just -- it's operate the machine.

8 MR. STEIN: Okay. And then from where you were
9 seated, what was your visibility like? What could you see
10 around you and in front of you?

11 MR. MULLEN: I could see -- I could see everything
12 out the door -- directly out the door to my right. That
13 door's removed because the chute -- the machine's actually
14 straddling the lip of the door of the air frame of the
15 aircraft and then it has a chute on it that then drops it
16 next to the skid. So it drops the balls down between the
17 skid and the aircraft. I could see there. I have pretty
18 limited visibility out in the front of the aircraft but
19 then I could see through the door, through the window of
20 the door directly to my left.

21 I could see, you know, it's not a lot but my
22 primary view is out my right side with that door removed.
23 And also I'm looking and making sure that the spheres are
24 coming out and that they're not going across the line and
25 so that's my big priority is that view right there. So it

1 would be out on the pilot's side.

2 MR. STEIN: Okay. On seatbelt, were you wearing
3 any sort of safety restraint?

4 MR. MULLEN: Yes, sir. I wear -- I'm wearing not
5 only the regular seatbelt that the aircraft has but there's
6 a harness. It's called the gunner's strap and I'm wearing
7 -- that's a secondary restraint and it's hooked into a hard
8 point that's hooked directly to where the three-point
9 seatbelt is attached to the -- you know, to the frame of
10 the seat and so I have two belts on. I have this -- my
11 regular seatbelt and then I have this gunner strap and the
12 gunner strap is attached via a carabiner onto that hard
13 point.

14 (Part 1 ends. Part 2 begins.)

15 MR. STEIN: You had just finished telling us about
16 how the harness attaches where the seatbelt is attached.

17 MR. MULLEN: Yes.

18 MR. STEIN: I think it's a stock aircraft seatbelt.

19 MR. MULLEN: Yes. So I'm wearing -- I'm wearing
20 the gunner strap and then the regular seatbelt.

21 MR. STEIN: My last question of background before I
22 hand it over to you is have you ever flown with Brandon
23 before?

24 MR. MULLEN: Yes. I flew quite a bit with him. I
25 flew with him last year. Last -- it would have been last

1 May. I flew with him probably, oh, I don't know, half a
2 dozen times, maybe ten times. And then this year, this
3 season, I flew with him probably 12 to 15 times. It was --
4 we got a lot of bad weather that really wasn't very
5 conducive to burning so it was quite a bit less than what
6 we probably would have but I did. I flew with him quite a
7 bit.

8 MR. STEIN: Okay.

9 MR. MULLEN: Are you there?

10 MR. STEIN: Yeah, yeah, I'm here.

11 MR. MULLEN: Okay, okay.

12 MR. STEIN: Just reorganizing real quick.

13 MR. MULLEN: That's all right.

14 MR. STEIN: Okay. All right. Now, Brendan, I'm
15 going to go ahead and hand it over to you. What I'd like
16 for you to do is go ahead and just describe the entire
17 event for me.

18 You could start -- I'd like for you to start as far
19 back as, you know, the preflight of the aircraft or
20 anything you would have experienced prior to that and then
21 take me all the way through the actual accident event all
22 the way until -- as far as you remember that day.

23 MR. MULLEN: Yeah. Okay. Well, when we started
24 out the day, we knew what we were -- what -- they had these
25 areas blocked off into units and we had an idea -- we knew

1 which unit we were going to. It was an 800-acre unit.

2 And, you know, we briefed on that with the firing
3 boss which was Steve Cobb and Brandon and myself and Nate
4 Alexander who was the helicopter manager. And we all
5 discussed, you know, the basic. Made sure that everybody
6 was happy with -- knew the weather, knew -- was happy with
7 the installation of the machine. We had what's called a
8 manifest completed which indicated what the weight was for
9 that mission of all the, you know, non-standard equipment,
10 anything like the weight of all the passengers, the balls,
11 the machine, the fire shelters, the doors that are removed
12 from the aircraft. So we went over that.

13 We went over, you know, the weight and balance of
14 the aircraft and then we talked --

15 MR. MORTON: Go/no-go.

16 MR. MULLEN: Yeah, we ran through our go/no-go
17 checklist which we fill out. Everybody signs it. We
18 discuss anything that comes up. There's nothing that came
19 up as far as anything out of the ordinary, as far as we
20 knew that we were going to work out of the Wiggins airport.
21 We weren't repositioning.

22 So we did all that. We made sure that we had, you
23 know, had adequate amount of balls and fuel and this being
24 a smaller unit, being 800 acres, we took three bags of
25 balls and I think we had about two and a half hours of fuel

1 on board because I'm pretty light so they were able to go
2 -- typically we went heavy on fuel so it gives us the
3 flexibility to be able to fly and to do what we need to do
4 and not have to come back to the airport if needed.

5 So then we waited till the folks on the ground got
6 word -- we got the word from them that they were ready for
7 us meaning that they got their lines fired off. They did
8 any type of a pre-treatment of fuels or anything like that.

9 So we did that and then -- and then we did -- we
10 launched, you know, everything was going -- was fine. When
11 we first got there, we flew. We reconned all our
12 boundaries. Everybody was in agreement on where the unit
13 boundaries were. It was very -- we've had other areas
14 earlier this season where with the green-up, meaning when
15 the trees start to leaf out, visibility gets a little less.

16 This unit didn't have a lot of areas that were
17 pretty hard to identify from the air so that was pretty --
18 was good because we did have a few areas earlier in the
19 season -- or earlier that it was difficult to see some of
20 the lines. This one wasn't like that.

21 So then we started -- we started to burn and as I
22 remember, we were burning on 4 slow which is a setting of a
23 machine meaning we had four chutes open at a slow speed.
24 There's options of either 2 or 4 on the openings and either
25 slow or fast. So we were on 4 slow. We stuck with that

1 the whole time. It wasn't -- it wasn't overly -- as I
2 remember, you know, I could be wrong but I believe that we
3 were -- we were close to being one full bag which is 2,000
4 spheres down. We were close to being one full bag down
5 when the incident took place.

6 Everything -- there wasn't any indications leading
7 up to this that anything was out of the ordinary. You
8 know, things were actually going real well and, you know, I
9 mean if I could get into the part -- I want to -- I kind of
10 want to stress here that I really do remember a lot of
11 this. There's only -- in the whole picture of what went
12 down, there's only really one thing that I don't -- I can't
13 quite understand why I don't remember but I just don't know
14 what happened to my helmet. I don't know if I took it off.
15 I must have but that's the only thing I can't remember but
16 I definitely -- what I want to reiterate to you guys is
17 that I really remember very vividly what happened.

18 We were going along and everything was --
19 everything was going just fine and I remember, you know, we
20 were having our normal communication. And Brandon was, you
21 know, doing what -- the firing pattern that Steve wanted.
22 The machine was operating just fine. Everything was going
23 good and it was, you know, we were maybe -- we were
24 slightly -- you know, we were above treetop level of course
25 but just -- there was no indication at all, guys, of any --

1 there wasn't any kind of -- I didn't hear any sputtering.
2 I didn't hear any loud sound. I didn't hear anything.

3 Suddenly, I heard just about two simultaneous
4 buzzers go off, you know, alarms go off and it was -- you
5 know, if they weren't simultaneous, they were just about
6 simultaneous and immediately, Brandon said, "We lost
7 power," and then Steve said twice, he said, "We're going
8 in. We're going in."

9 And I always kind of figured in my head that I
10 would pull my leg into the aircraft. I didn't want to have
11 it outside of the aircraft and I'm a smaller guy. I was
12 able to actually pull it in. So I immediately pulled my
13 leg in, straddled it up and over the machine and I -- there
14 wasn't anything at all. It was very -- you know, looking
15 back at it, it was almost strange to me at how calmly -- it
16 wasn't violent at all. It wasn't violent. There wasn't --
17 main rotor wasn't rapping real hard on the tree as we went
18 down. I don't know if you guys can see this.

19 MR. MORTON: Go ahead and use your good hand.

20 MR. MULLEN: So we're going along and we always
21 discussed at least with T & M, with the aircraft vendor, we
22 discussed that, you know, in the event that we would lose
23 power or if we did go in that they wanted to go in if they
24 could and go in tail first so it gave us more of a
25 survivable deal where we wouldn't have trees coming through

1 the front of the aircraft. So it was almost instant. As
2 soon as Brandon said that we were losing power, Steve said,
3 "We're going in. We're going in," and I pulled my leg in
4 that the aircraft did just about a quarter of a turn. Just
5 about a quarter of a turn and just rolled a little bit
6 putting tail oriented down so the tail was facing down now
7 to the ground and we just like slipped through the tree and
8 it was not violent.

9 It didn't -- I would have expected it to be very,
10 very -- a violent, you know, hitting the main rotor but it
11 really wasn't. The next thing that I remember, you know,
12 we made it through the -- we went through the trees and
13 then we hit the ground and that was pretty -- that was
14 pretty abrupt. It was very abrupt actually. I just
15 remember really feeling that on my, you know, my -- where
16 the seatbelt attached and, you know, I probably -- you
17 know, it knocked the wind out of me really good and I
18 felt -- you know, I could feel like I was bleeding on my
19 legs.

20 But we're on the ground at this point. You know,
21 we're on the ground. And we were oriented kind of sideways
22 so we were -- we were kind of just on a sideways kilter and
23 I could hear -- I could hear the crackling. It wasn't
24 very -- it wasn't, you know, extreme fire behavior by any
25 means but it was the fire from which the stuff that we had

1 lit so it wasn't coming from the actual crash site. It was
2 coming from the balls that we had dropped prior.

3 So I could hear this crackling and I immediately
4 started yelling at the guys that I was with, the two up
5 front, I could hear them breathing and I was yelling at
6 them telling them to get up. I told them, "You got to get
7 out of here." And I don't know -- I don't really know how
8 I did it but I ended up unhooking, getting myself out of my
9 seatbelt and taking that gunner strap off and then going --
10 I went out the door that was removed so that the door that
11 was on the side where the machine was sticking out, the
12 chute, and I got outside of the aircraft and I could see
13 that there was a lot more fire coming our way. There
14 wasn't any fuel that I could detect from the aircraft.
15 Like the bladder didn't -- didn't come out or I didn't have
16 fuel all over me or anything like that but it was -- it was
17 just this knowledge that more fire's coming and I had a
18 really difficult time breathing and walking.

19 So I got -- I started walking up a little bit
20 towards the front of the aircraft and I was yelling at the
21 guys at this time. I'm telling them, "We got to go. We
22 got to go," and I was saying both their names. And I
23 realized that they weren't conscious, that I couldn't pick
24 them up. I was in a status that I was having a hard time
25 just standing upright myself.

1 So I yelled at them, I yelled at them and then I
2 realized that I had to move. I don't really know how I --
3 like maybe I saw it from the air but honestly, I don't know
4 but I started -- I started moving at a pretty good decent
5 pace about as fast as I could and I was -- I was holding my
6 gloves -- my hands over my face and I could feel myself
7 burning pretty good. I got through that and I don't know
8 how far it was. I didn't fall at all but I was walking
9 through burning brush, pretty good stuff, and when I came
10 out, I ended out on a Forest Service road.

11 Immediately when I came out of the road, the
12 district FMO, an individual by the name of Jay Boykin, I
13 made eye contact with him and he saw me and I told him that
14 the helicopter was over -- I pointed at the direction I
15 came from. And he -- that was his position -- he
16 immediately took charge of that aircraft and there was
17 another individual in another vehicle, a guy by the name of
18 Cory, and Cory was right behind him and Cory then helped
19 me. So I sat -- I laid down with him on the ground because
20 I was having a hard time by then.

21 And then after that honestly, or -- after that, the
22 guys from -- the Life Flight guys showed up and they loaded
23 me in an ambulance and they told me I was going to be okay
24 and then the last thing I remember was just being in the
25 back of that ambulance and then I woke up here at the

1 hospital.

2 MR. STEIN: Okay.

3 MR. MULLEN: But I remember very, very vividly and
4 it wasn't -- I didn't detect -- there wasn't any type of
5 indication to me other than when those -- when those
6 buzzers went off, those two simultaneous alarms went off
7 that anything was wrong. There was no indication. There
8 wasn't any kind of a sputtering. There wasn't any kind of
9 a, you know, sound. There wasn't anything that indicated
10 any kind of an impact to the tail rotor or anything like
11 that. So I mean that's -- honestly, I mean I remember it
12 very, very vividly.

13 MR. STEIN: So Brendan, I have a few questions.
14 One, regarding the instrument panel, you said two alarms
15 went off?

16 MR. MULLEN: Yes.

17 MR. STEIN: What about the lights on the instrument
18 panel?

19 MR. MULLEN: I couldn't see that, sir. All I could
20 do was hear. I couldn't see through -- I couldn't see from
21 my vantage.

22 MR. STEIN: Okay. What did the alarms sound like?

23 MR. MULLEN: It's the similar alarms that you hear
24 like when you're -- when the aircraft -- they got to clear
25 them out. It's the same sound you hear when you turn on

1 the battery. You know, it's a general -- it's a general
2 horn that goes off and it was two of them and at that
3 point, that's when Brandon, you know, indicated to us that
4 we'd lost power.

5 MR. STEIN: Can you -- and this might be -- I
6 promise this is not an attempt to embarrass you in any way
7 but do you think you could try to recreate the sound orally
8 right now?

9 MR. MULLEN: Yeah. It was like (sound made). And
10 it was like one on top of the other. If they weren't
11 together, they were right -- they were immediate, one after
12 another.

13 MR. STEIN: If we replayed some sounds for you, do
14 you think you could recognize it?

15 MR. MULLEN: Yeah.

16 MR. STEIN: Okay. Regarding your contact with the
17 pilot, you said there were no indications before the power
18 shut off.

19 MR. MULLEN: No, sir.

20 MR. STEIN: So you said that the pilot said that we
21 lost power. Did he say anything else at all?

22 MR. MULLEN: No. He said that and then Steve who's
23 the firing boss said, "We're going in. We're going in."

24 MR. STEIN: Okay.

25 MR. MULLEN: And I think all that was just on the

1 intercom system. I don't think any of that was going
2 across the -- you know, the transmit, you know, outside of
3 the aircraft, the transmit code on the radio.

4 MR. STEIN: Okay. So I take it just by way of how
5 we've been talking that you were able to use some sort of
6 model to take -- to walk us through the attitudes of the
7 helicopter and the direction the helicopter was going
8 during the impact decline?

9 MR. MULLEN: Yeah.

10 MR. STEIN: Did we record that?

11 MR. MULLEN: Yeah.

12 MR. MORTON: Yes.

13 MR. STEIN: We did. Okay. Okay. The last two
14 minutes of the flight, I just want to come back to that
15 real quick. Do you know how fast you were going? Slow,
16 fast?

17 MR. MULLEN: Well, we were going slow because when
18 we're doing this operation, it's a low and slow operation.
19 It's not -- you're not -- when you're dropping the balls,
20 you're not going very, very fast. You know, that's why
21 it's definitely, you know, a high risk environment that
22 we're working in but it's, you know, above treetop of
23 course but it's going slow.

24 MR. STEIN: Do you happen to know exactly how fast?
25 Did the pilot call out the airspeed at any time or --

1 MR. MULLEN: No.

2 MR. STEIN: Did anyone talk about the aircraft
3 airspeed?

4 MR. MULLEN: No. No, it was standard. It was --
5 it didn't -- it wasn't any faster or slower than we ever
6 fly. So I'm not sure to be honest with you guys and I
7 don't want to put out erroneous numbers but it's a low and
8 slow type of attitude of flying and that's why it's a high
9 risk environment. I don't know the speed.

10 MR. STEIN: Okay. That's okay, Brendan. So what
11 direction were you going when the power loss event started?

12 MR. MULLEN: What direction?

13 MR. STEIN: Do you know if you were going north,
14 south, east, west?

15 MR. MULLEN: Gosh. Again, I'd probably be lying to
16 you if I -- I don't want to -- I don't want to even
17 speculate that.

18 MR. STEIN: That's okay. Brendan, a lot of
19 these -- some of these questions are probably more suitable
20 for somebody who was sitting in the flight deck in the
21 cockpit.

22 MR. MULLEN: Yeah.

23 MR. STEIN: But I want to ask you nonetheless.

24 MR. MULLEN: Yeah. No, I couldn't answer that with
25 any type of authority or anything like that so I can't

1 answer that.

2 MR. STEIN: Okay. When the loss of power
3 happened --

4 MR. MULLEN: Yes.

5 MR. STEIN: -- the suspected loss of power
6 occurred, what type of flying were you doing? Was it
7 straight and level? Were you maneuvering?

8 MR. MULLEN: You know, we were -- we were flying --
9 generally you fly like somewhat of a grid pattern and you
10 space according to the fuels and everything but, you know,
11 it was -- it wasn't anything out of the norm. We were, you
12 know, flying -- I don't know what our spacing was to be
13 honest. It could have been anywhere from like a half a
14 chain which is like 30 feet, 35 feet to 60 feet, what our
15 spacing was, but yeah, you know, we were -- we fly in
16 basically like somewhat of a grid pattern and north to
17 south, south to north or east to west, west to east kind of
18 thing. It just depends on what -- what you want the fire
19 to do and where the wind's coming from and you modify that
20 accordingly.

21 MR. STEIN: Any abrupt changes in altitude?

22 MR. MULLEN: No, there wasn't.

23 MR. STEIN: Okay. The next segment is going to
24 take you instead of these last two minutes of flight, we're
25 going to narrow the time and space spectrum a little bit

1 more to only where the aircraft lost power. And we're
2 going to have a few more questions related to that and just
3 do your best.

4 MR. MULLEN: Okay.

5 MR. STEIN: So at the time you lost power, about
6 how high above the trees would you say -- if you were to
7 estimate, what would you say you were?

8 MR. MULLEN: I'd say 20 to 25 feet, 30 feet. 20 to
9 30 feet.

10 MR. STEIN: When the suspected loss of power
11 occurred, was the helicopter in a hover or was it moving?

12 MR. MULLEN: We were moving.

13 MR. STEIN: And then you indicated earlier you were
14 moving slowly, correct?

15 MR. MULLEN: Yes, yeah. It's, you know, the
16 general speed, yeah. We were slow.

17 MR. STEIN: And a little earlier when you were
18 walking us through the accident (inaudible) itself, you I
19 think alluded to doing a quarter turning. Did the
20 helicopter spin at all?

21 MR. MULLEN: No. No, you know, honestly, again,
22 now this -- it felt like that was something that -- it felt
23 like that was something that the pilot -- in that two -- I
24 mean it happened very, very fast but in that two seconds,
25 three-second time frame, that was something that Brandon

1 did in order to orient the aircraft to put us going down
2 through the trees in a more survivable type orientation.
3 It definitely didn't feel like it just happened by dumb
4 luck. It was the pilot that did that.

5 MR. STEIN: No doubt at all but, Brendan, we just
6 need to speak with the factual observations here.

7 MR. MULLEN: Okay.

8 MR. STEIN: Just kind of entering the world of
9 analysis, we need to avoid that a little bit.

10 MR. MULLEN: Yes, okay.

11 MR. STEIN: So you know, if you could -- so you
12 said that going back to the sping, did the helicopter spin
13 at all? If so, you said it did a quarter turn?

14 MR. MULLEN: Yeah, about a quarter turn. It just
15 did a slight -- a slight quarter turn and I'm going to show
16 this but it was flying along like this and it just went
17 like that, turned a little bit and just went down through
18 the trees orienting tail down like that.

19 MR. STEIN: Is that a quarter turn to the right or
20 to the left?

21 MR. MULLEN: I don't know. I can't say that with
22 certainty. I just remember doing somewhat of like a little
23 bit of a corkscrew just to get that tail down below us.

24 MR. STEIN: Okay. That's okay. And then the last
25 question for this segment is what was the helicopter's

1 attitude and that would be in relation to if you were
2 looking at the nose and the tail as straight -- perfectly
3 straight and level in space, do you feel like the nose was
4 in kind of a higher attitude or lower plane --

5 MR. MULLEN: Yes, yes.

6 MR. STEIN: -- a higher plane? Was it up or down?

7 MR. MULLEN: When we were going through the trees,
8 the nose was in a higher attitude. The tail was down. I
9 don't know if it was quite -- if you were talking clock
10 directions, I don't know if I would quite say if it was
11 like the nose would be at 6 -- at 6:00. I don't think it
12 was straight up and down like that but it was -- it was
13 definitely nose higher than tail. Tail was down.

14 MR. STEIN: Okay. Brendan, so far, you're doing a
15 fantastic job. Thank you very much for answering these
16 questions.

17 MR. MULLEN: Okay, yeah.

18 MR. STEIN: To pile one more -- I have several more
19 questions but I'll try to push through them as
20 expeditiously as possible. One question I should have
21 asked you before, are you under the influence of any
22 medications right now?

23 MR. MULLEN: No, I had -- the last time I had
24 anything was about 11:00 and it was -- you know, it was an
25 anti-nausea and then I also had -- it was, you know, a

1 painkiller so, yeah, I did at about 11:00.

2 MR. STEIN: What kind of painkiller?

3 MR. MULLEN: It was Lortab.

4 MR. STEIN: Okay.

5 MR. MULLEN: I don't know what the name of the
6 nausea one was. It began with an S.

7 MR. STEIN: About how many milligrams of the
8 Lortab?

9 MR. MULLEN: I don't know.

10 MR. MORTON: You want me to go ask?

11 MR. MULLEN: Yeah. We could find out right now.
12 We're going to find out.

13 MR. STEIN: Okay.

14 MR. MULLEN: I could talk with you guys. Dennis is
15 running that down right now.

16 MR. STEIN: Okay. On to the next question. We
17 have about six more. I promise.

18 MR. MULLEN: Okay.

19 MR. STEIN: And then we'll open it up to you.

20 MR. MULLEN: That's fine.

21 MR. STEIN: Okay. So these are some questions that
22 the Forest Service requested that I ask you.

23 MR. MULLEN: Okay.

24 MR. STEIN: Just so you know that. Okay. So the
25 first question is what did the mission flight profile

1 discuss during the pre-mission briefing with the relief
2 pilot?

3 MR. MULLEN: With the relief pilot?

4 MR. STEIN: Yes. I think they're referring to --
5 go ahead.

6 MR. MULLEN: I don't remember any relief pilot
7 being there.

8 MR. STEIN: I think they're referring to Brandon.

9 MR. MULLEN: Oh, yeah. Yeah. We discussed that in
10 our briefing, in our go/no-go and in our operational
11 briefing.

12 MR. STEIN: You discussed the flight profile of the
13 low and slow?

14 MR. MULLEN: You know, we didn't address that
15 specifically because that's inherent of this operation but,
16 you know, it does say in the go/no-go that, you know, it's
17 a low and slow environment but it's -- it's one of these --
18 when we're doing this, it's directly a part of the mission
19 profile. It's how -- it's how that we operate when you're
20 dropping the balls. You're not doing it at a, you know,
21 high rate of speed at an excessive -- at a high altitude.

22 MR. STEIN: Okay. Just before the mission began,
23 there was an aborted engine start from what we understand.

24 MR. MULLEN: Okay.

25 MR. STEIN: Were you present for that? Can you

1 describe it?

2 MR. MULLEN: Yeah. I was in the aircraft and, you
3 know, now that you guys said that, I remember that now.
4 You know, that occurred when -- the first time when we
5 tried to fire, to start and then there was a little bit of
6 a cool down period and then he hit it again and he was able
7 to get it started.

8 MR. MORTON: You had two Lortab.

9 MR. STEIN: Do you remember any detail about the
10 aborted engine start, maybe some of the sounds that were
11 made or lack of sounds, possibly some communication from
12 the pilot? Did he say anything?

13 MR. MULLEN: No. He didn't say anything. What it
14 sounds like is and I've been in aircraft a lot that have
15 done this is you'll have -- you'll have a slight start-up
16 and it sounds like it's going to start and then it --
17 you'll hear the turbines starting to crank and then it will
18 just kind of just back down. It will go down. So it
19 really doesn't go anywhere. It just starts to kick off and
20 then it stops. And I don't remember if Brandon -- to be
21 honest, I don't remember, you know, him making any kind of
22 indication like, "Oh, we had a false start," or, you know,
23 anything like that. We just -- we waited about, I don't
24 know, 30, 45, maybe a full minute and then he fired it
25 again and he was able to get it going then.

1 MR. STEIN: Okay.

2 MR. MULLEN: That's not that unusual but, yeah, I
3 forgot about that.

4 MR. STEIN: Were any terms thrown around like "hot"
5 or "hung"?

6 MR. MULLEN: No, not a hot start. No, I don't
7 remember anything --

8 MR. STEIN: Are you familiar with what a hot start
9 is or a hung --

10 MR. MULLEN: Yeah, then you have to stop and you
11 have to wait. Yeah. No, he didn't say anything like that,
12 sir.

13 MR. STEIN: Okay. Brendan, another question I
14 probably should ask, do you have any flying experience?

15 MR. MULLEN: Just in helicopters, I've only been a
16 passenger and in airplanes, I've flown but it's just been,
17 you know, under instruction. But I've been -- I've been
18 working directly with aircraft -- with helicopters, I
19 believe I went to the class in 1997 and I think I've been
20 fully qualified since 19 -- I want to say it was '98 but it
21 might have been '99.

22 MR. STEIN: Okay.

23 MR. MORTON: Tell him you had seven and a half
24 milligrams of Lortab at 11:00.

25 MR. MULLEN: Guys, I have the amount of that

1 Lortab.

2 MR. STEIN: Okay.

3 MR. MULLEN: It was seven and a half --

4 MR. MORTON: Milligrams.

5 MR. MULLEN: -- milligrams of Lortab.

6 MR. STEIN: Okay. Thank you.

7 MR. MULLEN: Yeah.

8 MR. STEIN: I take it Dennis ran out and --

9 MR. MULLEN: Yeah. You talked to the attending --
10 to the nurse's station.

11 MR. STEIN: Thank you, Dennis. The next question,
12 how high above the canopy were you flying when -- while you
13 were dispensing the spheres?

14 MR. MULLEN: I would say -- I would say, you know,
15 at times, you get higher but average would have been about
16 30 -- 25 to 30 feet above the highest, you know, tree. 25
17 to 30 feet. At times, we might be higher but primarily,
18 we're at a fairly close -- so, yeah. I would say an
19 average is about 25 to 30.

20 MR. STEIN: This is just reading this word for
21 word. Were the PSD, the sphere dispenser chutes open at
22 the time of the emergency?

23 MR. MULLEN: Yes. And I wasn't able to close them.
24 I didn't have enough time to close them. There's a pretty
25 significant delay from when you actually close the chutes

1 till they cycle out and all the ones that have been
2 injected with the glycol work through the machine but I did
3 not close -- as far as I remember, I didn't close it. I
4 left it open. It happened really fast.

5 MR. STEIN: Do you remember what direction the wind
6 was coming from?

7 MR. MULLEN: You know, for some reason, I want to
8 say it was -- it was like a south or southwest wind. I can
9 remember that pretty good. It's definitely a south -- had
10 a southerly component. Whether it was southwest or
11 southeast, I think it was a southwest.

12 MR. STEIN: Okay. And then how about personal
13 protection equipment?

14 MR. MULLEN: Yes. I had a flight helmet on. I had
15 sunglasses. I had a Nomex shirt, Nomex pants, leather
16 boots, Nomex gloves -- Nomex flight gloves and then, you
17 know, that gunner strap that we talked about, I had that on
18 in addition to the standard seatbelt. But yeah, that's
19 everything that we had.

20 MR. STEIN: How about the rest of the flight crew?

21 MR. MULLEN: They all had the same. The only thing
22 that they didn't have is that secondary restraint. They
23 didn't have the gunner strap and I don't think -- I don't
24 think Steve was wearing sunglasses. Steve Cobb. I don't
25 think he was wearing sunglasses but I know I was and I'm

1 pretty sure Brandon was.

2 MR. STEIN: Oh, the -- I understand that there were
3 a lot of -- there were a lot of (inaudible) admission the
4 process and the (inaudible) process that was taking place
5 on the ground, I understand there was some smoke in the
6 area. Can you please describe how much smoke, how thick it
7 was and any other information you can provide?

8 MR. MULLEN: Yes. There was -- there was moderate
9 smoke. When we're doing this operation and that day, we
10 make sure that we -- that the pattern in which we're
11 lighting from the air we don't smoke ourselves out meaning
12 that we don't want to obstruct our view in areas that we
13 haven't yet been able to fire off from the air. We don't
14 want to get ahead of ourselves and cover that area in
15 smoke. So there was a moderate amount of smoke but the
16 area that we were operating in was relatively light to no
17 smoke because it's ahead of what, you know -- that way then
18 we're giving ourselves a good view.

19 MR. STEIN: Any (inaudible) especially towards the
20 last two minutes of flight, did you guys fly through any
21 smoke? Did the upper deck of the helicopter, the main
22 rotor experience any -- make any contact with the smoke?

23 MR. MULLEN: No. No, sir. I don't remember any
24 kind of smoke that we flew through other than drift smoke.
25 There wasn't anything -- I mean these burns get very

1 smokey. They can be very, very smoky but we're -- that
2 day, you know, just like most -- I mean we're cognizant of
3 it but I don't -- I don't remember any kind of excessive
4 exposure or flying through any smoke.

5 MR. STEIN: Typically -- and you've flown with
6 Brandon a lot. Typically, how much smoke is affecting
7 the -- I guess making contact (inaudible) or possibly
8 compromising (inaudible) aspects of the flight during these
9 aerial ignition flights?

10 MR. MULLEN: Honestly, if we're doing our job right
11 and we're -- the ignition sequence that we're following,
12 based on what the predominant wind is doing and how our
13 pattern is that we're lighting it, it shouldn't even be a
14 factor and I -- there's been times -- one second. There's
15 been times when it's become an issue in the past but it
16 didn't happen at all this year that I've been a part of it
17 where you'll get somebody that might not have quite the
18 experience and they'll end up -- they'll smoke themselves
19 in because the firing sequence that they're doing, you get
20 a wind shift or something but that was not an issue at
21 all -- at all this day. And honestly, this season as slow
22 as it was, I don't remember it being an issue with Brandon
23 or any of the other pilots I flew with. We didn't have any
24 issues that we had excessive smoke that we ended up flying
25 through or anything like that. Very light.

1 MR. STEIN: Have you ever heard of any other -- I
2 mean you're obviously part of the Forest Service for many
3 years. Actually before I ask this other question, how long
4 have you been doing the PSD, the sphere dispersion?

5 MR. MULLEN: I believe the first -- let me think
6 here. I believe the first year that I -- that I started
7 doing it was in 1999.

8 MR. STEIN: Wow.

9 MR. MULLEN: And I -- you know, you know, it's
10 pretty -- it's fairly straight forward. If you get a good
11 guy sitting up front and you get a pilot that has a good
12 grasp of it, it's -- it works pretty -- it goes across
13 pretty seamlessly. It works pretty well.

14 MR. STEIN: Okay. So the next question. Have you
15 ever heard of -- was there any stories, rumors, any stories
16 really floating around there about people actually losing
17 power, you know, flying through some of this ignition smoke
18 and possibly suffering some sort of engine anomaly?

19 MR. MULLEN: I'm not aware of anything like that.
20 I've never really heard of anything.

21 MR. STEIN: You're not. Okay. Have you ever heard
22 of the smoke affecting flights adversely in any way?

23 MR. MULLEN: No. No, I know what exposure --
24 prolonged exposure to smoke can do to individuals but, you
25 know, I've done it for a long time. I've done it many

1 times that it's never become an issue where I feel like,
2 you know, your ability to think or anything has been that
3 comprised. If that's going on, you're doing something very
4 wrong if you're getting that type of exposure. That's just
5 not -- that's not what -- you need to modify things. I've
6 never been a part of it when it's that bad.

7 MR. STEIN: Okay. That's good. That's (inaudible)
8 because this is an area I wanted to explore so thank you
9 for asking -- or answering those questions.

10 MR. MULLEN: Yeah.

11 MR. STEIN: At this point, Brendan, I actually do
12 not have any further questions that are listed on the
13 program here. Anybody in the room have questions? Adam,
14 no? Dennis, do you have any questions for Brendan?

15 MR. MORTON: No, no. I think he did a great job
16 and no, that's it.

17 MR. STEIN: Okay. Brendan, do you have any --
18 let's turn it around. Do you have any questions for me?

19 MR. MULLEN: No, sir. Not at all. I just -- I
20 just want to -- I mean like I said, the thing I can't -- I
21 can't remember to save my life is what I did with my helmet
22 but I just -- I really want to stress that I remember
23 things pretty darn vividly. I remembered this very, very
24 vividly almost, you know, to a point where I could play it
25 in my head very easily. And, you know, I didn't -- I

1 didn't make any kind of a statement of something that I
2 didn't -- I wasn't sure of. You know, I just -- I'm pretty
3 darn sure of everything I told you and I just want to make
4 sure that that gets carried across in this. I'm not trying
5 to connect any dots. I'm just telling you what I remember.

6 MR. STEIN: Okay. It sounds like a very factual-
7 based report.

8 MR. MORTON: Adam, I just have a question. How
9 long before you guys will get a report out do you think?

10 ADAM: Typically about 12 months.

11 MR. MORTON: Okay. Great.

12 ADAM: A limited report was just published. It
13 should be (inaudible) now. The final report will take
14 about 12.

15 MR. MORTON: Okay. Great. Thank you.

16 ADAM: No problem at all.

17 MR. STEIN: Brendan, what I'd like to do is -- so
18 we can go ahead and stop the recording part now.

19 (Video recording ends.)
20
21
22
23
24
25

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) SS
COUNTY OF CANYON)

I, TAMARA A. WEBER, State-certified and licensed
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That the foregoing transcript is a transcript of a
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the Video Interview of Brendan Mullen, Desoto National
Forest Incident; that the foregoing pages 1 through 34 of
this transcript contains as accurate and complete a
transcription of said video recording as I was able to
make.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 11th day of May, 2015.

___/s/ Tamara A. Weber_____



INTERVIEW OF JAY BOYKIN (19:53)
DESOTO NATIONAL FOREST
MARCH 31, 2015 4:42 P.M. CST

TRANSCRIBED BY:
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A large black rectangular redaction box covering the name of the transcriber.

Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording.
Transcript prepared by transcription service.

1 (Interview of Jay Boykin (19:53) begins.)

2 MR. STEIN: Okay. We're here -- my name is Stephen
3 Stein. I'm an air safety investigator with the NTSB. The
4 date is March 31, 2015. It's approximately 4:42 p.m.
5 Central Time. We're doing our first of I think five or six
6 interviews. I'm here with --

7 MR. BOYKIN: Jay Boykin. That's B-o-y-k-i-n.

8 MR. STEIN: Okay. Jay, do you consent to us audio-
9 taping this interview?

10 MR. BOYKIN: Yes.

11 MR. STEIN: Fantastic. Okay. Sir, so Jay, just go
12 ahead and take it from the top. So I'm going to stay out.
13 I'm not going to ask you any questions for a little while.
14 Tell me your story. Tell me everything you heard and saw.

15 MR. BOYKIN: Okay. All right. I'll give you a
16 little background first based on some of the questions that
17 we heard on the press briefing.

18 The way -- the way we do things with our helicopter
19 -- and maybe I should back up even further and tell you
20 that I'm the district fire management officer. So all the
21 guys that are in here work for me and -- well, except for
22 one. John Wesley Crews, he currently works for me as a
23 detailer. He's normally on the Delta Ranger District but
24 he's here getting some experience with fire.

25 So as the district fire management officer, I'm

1 over all the prescribed burns that we do as well as
2 wildfires, anything to do with fire. One of the other
3 guys, Eddie Baggett who's here, he's the burn boss -- that
4 was the burn boss on so he was in charge of that burn.

5 I happened to be on that burn as I try to do as
6 often as possible. We had two burns going that day: One
7 north of Wiggins and this one is south of Wiggins. Trying
8 to keep myself available to not get too involved in any one
9 particular burn so I can see the big picture and manage the
10 district and all the people and everything that's going on.

11 However, yesterday, I went down to visit the crew
12 that was on that burn and it was going fairly well and I
13 decided to stay a while and just help out a little bit and
14 occasionally I get to do that and I enjoy that.

15 So back to the way we handle the helicopters, once
16 they leave the Wiggins airport, they will flight-follow
17 through our dispatch office in Wiggins. There's a minimum
18 of a 15-minute check-in with the radio and they also
19 flight-follow with the AFF. So they're watching everything
20 on AFF and talking to -- not the pilot but our firing boss
21 who is in the ship.

22 So they'll flight-follow until the helicopter gets
23 to the prescribed burn site and then they will hand off the
24 flight-following to the burn boss which in this case was
25 Eddie Baggett. So Eddie was in -- and there again, it's a

1 15-minute check-in while they're on the burn but while
2 we're on a burn, it's -- it's usually ever 5 minutes or
3 less because the firing boss that's in that front seat of
4 the helicopter is the one who's directing the operations
5 and telling the folks what -- you know, what lines to light
6 and checking fires, be sure we don't have anything get
7 across the line and so he's communicating fairly constantly
8 with the folks that are on the ground.

9 And you all are familiar too with our aerial
10 ignition device and how that works?

11 MR. STEIN: No, no. We've had some discussion on
12 it but not --

13 MR. BOYKIN: Okay.

14 MR. STEIN: No explanations yet.

15 MR. BOYKIN: You probably can get as much
16 information as you want about that but just briefly,
17 there's a machine that we put in the helicopter. It's --
18 it's on -- it's positioned on the back door that we take
19 off and there will be an individual in the back that will
20 be operating that machine.

21 The machine's function is -- we've got spheres.
22 They look just about like ping pong balls and they have
23 these big bags of these and they'll put them in a hopper
24 and run those spheres through the machine and each sphere
25 has potassium permanganate in it and the machine injects a

1 little glycol into each one of those spheres with a needle.
2 And we fly a grid pattern back and forth over the
3 prescribed burn. Usually anywhere from about four to six
4 of those spheres per acre they'll drop out.

5 The reason -- the main reason for doing that is to
6 get the burn done quickly so we don't -- we're not out
7 after dark with smoke that -- in the daytime, the smoke
8 gets up and out a lot quicker so we're able to ignite a
9 much larger area and get it done, get the smoke cleared out
10 during the daytime and just reduce the risk of any smoke
11 issues.

12 MR. STEIN: This device is on the right side of the
13 helicopter or the left side?

14 MR. BOYKIN: Let's see. The pilot is on the right
15 side and then the firing boss is on the left. Ask these
16 guys -- other guys. They'll remember.

17 MR. STEIN: Okay.

18 MR. BOYKIN: In fact, Eric Strickland who's one of
19 them, he does that sometimes. He operates the machine.
20 I'm afraid I might not be remembering correctly. But the
21 one that did survive was the one that was in the back
22 running the ping pong machine as we call it, our aerial
23 ignition device.

24 So anyway, that's just generally how that works.
25 So we just fly back and forth over the area and they ignite

1 the entire area. This particular burn was I think 900
2 acres and it -- I don't know. It probably took him 40
3 minutes and, as it happened, he probably had just one more
4 line, five minutes or less left and he was completing with
5 the aerial ignition when the crash occurred.

6 So the whole -- pretty much the whole burn unit was
7 ignited. Probably some of it was pretty much out. All the
8 stuff that he had recently ignited was, you know, still
9 burning.

10 I happened to be along a road. I was kind of
11 lighting along the road as -- as the helicopter was making
12 his grid pattern. So I was kind of keeping up with the
13 helicopter and lighting along the road at the same time not
14 getting too far ahead or too far behind the helicopter.

15 Like I said, we were getting very close to the end.
16 He was almost done with the burn and I was almost to the
17 point where I could stop firing. It looked to me like he
18 had maybe one more line left and I saw him -- he came close
19 to the road. I saw the helicopter make a turn and go back.
20 Everything looked normal, sounded normal. I've been on
21 hundreds of prescribed burns and helicopters flying over
22 the whole time. Everything sounded completely normal.

23 He made a turn, went back in towards -- in the burn
24 and I don't remember when the previous communication was
25 prior to that. Probably five or ten minutes. Probably not

1 even ten but, you know, he had been talking with Eddie
2 mostly, the burn boss. And in fact, Steve, the one that
3 was flying the front seat, the firing boss, he had
4 mentioned to Eddie that I could go ahead and fire that road
5 on out because he was almost done.

6 So the helicopter made the turn close to the road.
7 I saw it. It looked and sounded normal. Probably five to
8 ten seconds later, after I lost sight of it, I heard a
9 sound like if you unplugged an air hose from a high
10 pressure air tank. I'll try to make it sound like it did.
11 It was a (sound made). And then no more than two or three
12 seconds was the sound of the crash.

13 There was no distress call, no mayday. It was just
14 very immediate after I heard that sound. But not -- I mean
15 it was long enough time -- they're flying probably, I don't
16 know, 75, 100 feet over the treetops. I figure it was just
17 enough time for a helicopter to drop down into the trees.
18 Just two or three seconds at the most. Then I heard the
19 crash sounds.

20 After that, my first thoughts were I don't know if
21 they're in the area they've already fired with the aerial
22 ignition device or just outside of it so I called Eric
23 Strickland with the dozer to come and start trying to push
24 a way into where the sound sounded like it came from along
25 the edge of the fire so maybe we could get to them and cut

1 the fire off before it got to the helicopter, not knowing
2 exactly where it was.

3 After I called Eric -- that was my very first call
4 on the radio. Then I tried three or four times to call the
5 helicopter. Of course there was no answer. And then my
6 next call was to Eddie and I asked him to start talking to
7 dispatch about going through the aviation incident process
8 and making all the calls that our dispatchers have to make
9 for that. So Eddie I think did that pretty immediately.

10 And then I tried to get to it. I just left from --
11 straight from where I was and tried to get through the
12 brush and there was too much fire. I couldn't get there.
13 I tried a couple different ways to get in there and I
14 couldn't. I kind of gave up. I came back out to the
15 gravel road, thought that maybe it was a little further
16 away and the road makes a curve so I thought I'd go around
17 to another point and maybe the fire had already burned out
18 or it was not -- that I could get through there.

19 And so several minutes occurred while I was trying
20 to get -- get in to the crash site and couldn't get to it
21 and I still didn't know exactly where it was anyway. And
22 then I came back and got in my truck and went around the
23 curve and I found Brendan laying in the road so he was the
24 one that had -- had survived.

25 MR. STEIN: Brendan Mullen.

1 MR. BOYKIN: Brendan Mullen, yes.

2 MR. STEIN: Okay.

3 MR. BOYKIN: When I found him, I called for some
4 help, some guys that were first responder trained and asked
5 them to come and help assist with him so several people
6 came from the burn crew. A couple of them I talked to and
7 asked them if they would -- by this point, it looked like
8 there might -- the fire may have cooled off enough that we
9 could go back through the way Brendan evidently had come
10 out which was a different route than what I had tried to
11 get in to the helicopter.

12 And I asked a couple of folks while we tended to
13 Brendan if they would try to get in there. They did. It
14 was only a few minutes and -- I should say this also.
15 During the tense moments while we were trying to locate the
16 downed helicopter, we had another helicopter from the same
17 company, T & M Aviation, that was at the airport in Wiggins
18 and we pretty quickly asked for that other helicopter to
19 come down and help us locate this one.

20 So by the time -- about the time we found Brendan,
21 that helicopter got there and it was searching the area but
22 the smoke was too thick and he tried to get in there and he
23 couldn't see and the smoke was too thick and they had to
24 back out and they were still looking.

25 Well, during that time, I sent a couple of guys in

1 there. Made them be sure they were going to keep safe
2 trying to get in there and they did and it wasn't but a few
3 minutes and they called on the radio and said, "We've
4 located the helicopter." And I said, "Okay. Give me an
5 update as soon as you can." And just a minute or so later,
6 they called back and said, "This is going to be a recovery.
7 Not a rescue." And so I said, "Is there anything you guys
8 need to do in there now?" And they said there's nothing we
9 can do so they came on back out. Yeah. Did you need me to
10 go any further with the details?

11 MR. STEIN: No. Jay, I know -- I think I have
12 actually what I need. When -- just take me back through
13 when you -- so you were driving the line -- you were
14 driving down the road trying to kind of follow the
15 helicopter?

16 MR. BOYKIN: No, I was on foot.

17 MR. STEIN: Oh, you were on foot.

18 MR. BOYKIN: Yes, yes.

19 MR. STEIN: Okay. So you saw that the helicopter
20 made a turn.

21 MR. BOYKIN: Yes.

22 MR. STEIN: So if you wouldn't mind, let's pretend
23 like this is the helicopter.

24 MR. BOYKIN: Sure. Yeah.

25 MR. STEIN: I have an MD model that I usually use.

1 MR. BOYKIN: No, this is fine.

2 MR. STEIN: It's in my rental car. Great place for
3 it. So yes, go ahead and demonstrate to me what you saw
4 when you saw the helicopter come --

5 MR. BOYKIN: Let me show you on the edge of the
6 table here.

7 MR. STEIN: Go ahead.

8 MR. BOYKIN: Because the way the road is -- and I
9 didn't bring one of the maps of the burn unit. But the
10 road makes more or less a 90-degree curve. It's a gravel
11 road. So I was firing along this road as the helicopter
12 was in a grid pattern like this.

13 MR. STEIN: Okay.

14 MR. BOYKIN: So staying inside of me but turning
15 close enough that I could see it and so I saw, I don't
16 know, seven, eight, nine or ten turns that it made as it
17 was progressing and I was on foot firing along this road.

18 MR. STEIN: By firing, you mean you're manually
19 igniting --

20 MR. BOYKIN: Yes, with a drip torch.

21 MR. STEIN: -- between the controlled burn with a
22 drip --

23 MR. BOYKIN: Yes, yes.

24 MR. STEIN: Okay. Got it. Got it.

25 MR. BOYKIN: Yeah. So I was wanting to be sure

1 this road was safe and there was fire because the wind was
2 switching a little bit. We wanted to be sure we didn't get
3 something across the road and it helps the folks in the
4 helicopters see a little more quickly where to turn.

5 So as the helicopter was making the turns, I was
6 coming along. I think he probably only had one more -- his
7 runs were kind of at an angle like this so there was just a
8 little corner left to burn out. Not -- just probably one
9 more pass. He had been turning like this each time. I did
10 notice that on this last one, he came and he turned back it
11 looked like away from his next line that he would need to
12 light.

13 Now, that wouldn't be terribly unusual. He may
14 have been just wanting to -- I think fairly often, he
15 checks to see how the balls are igniting and how things are
16 looking on the burn and then maybe he was going to come
17 around here and make one last pass.

18 So when he came and made this turn this way, it
19 looked and sounded completely normal to me. The helicopter
20 went out of sight. I don't think it could have been ten
21 seconds later that I heard that loud sound and then I heard
22 sounds of the crash. The obvious sounds of metal hitting
23 trees.

24 MR. STEIN: Okay.

25 MR. BOYKIN: Is that what you needed?

1 MR. STEIN: Yeah, that was perfect.

2 MR. BOYKIN: Okay.

3 MR. STEIN: Very good description actually, Jay.

4 Thank you. And also thank you for taking the time to speak
5 with us today because --

6 MR. BOYKIN: Oh, no. I really want to know what
7 happened so I want to give you every -- all the information
8 that I can.

9 MR. STEIN: So do we. We want to find out too.

10 MR. BOYKIN: Yeah.

11 MR. STEIN: We want to help you guys and want to
12 help the industry --

13 MR. BOYKIN: Yeah.

14 MR. STEIN: -- in any way we can. I actually don't
15 have anymore questions for you, Jay.

16 MR. BOYKIN: Okay.

17 MR. STEIN: But I do want to ask you -- I did want
18 to ask you -- it's been such a long day, my vocabulary is
19 now escaping me. That's terrible. I wanted to get your
20 name and contact information.

21 MR. BOYKIN: Yes.

22 MR. STEIN: Jay.

23 MR. BOYKIN: Yeah. Boykin, B-o-y-k-i-n.

24 MR. STEIN: Okay.

25 MR. BOYKIN: Let me give you my cell phone number.

1 It's --

2 MR. STEIN: Okay.

3 MR. BOYKIN: -- [REDACTED]. Would you like an
4 e-mail address?

5 MR. STEIN: Sure.

6 MR. BOYKIN: It's [REDACTED]

7 MR. STEIN: Okay. All right.

8 MR. BOYKIN: And just off the record, I know you
9 can't say anything, but does that sound that I described
10 ring any bells?

11 (Audio ends.)

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STATE OF IDAHO)
) SS
COUNTY OF CANYON)

I, TAMARA A. WEBER, State-certified and licensed
transcriber, do hereby certify:


That the foregoing transcript is a transcript of an
audio recording made of the proceedings in the matter of
the Interview of Jay Boykin (19:53), Desoto National
Forest, March 31, 2015, 4:42 p.m. CST; that the foregoing
pages 1 through 14 of this transcript contains as accurate
and complete a transcription of said audio recording as I
was able to make.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 7th day of April, 2015.

___/s/ Tamara A. Weber_____
TAMARA A. WEBER, CSR
Idaho CSR License No. 278
Transcriber

INTERVIEW OF JAY BOYKIN (9:44)
DESOTO NATIONAL FOREST

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A large black rectangular redaction box covering the name of the transcriber.

Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording.
Transcript prepared by transcription service.

1 (Interview of Jay Boykin (9:44) begins.)

2 MR. GERHARDT: This is Adam Gerhardt with the NTSB.
3 I'm an air safety investigator and I am here with --

4 MR. BOYKIN: Jay Boykin, district fire management
5 officer with the U.S. Forest Service, Desoto Ranger
6 District.

7 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Thanks, Jay. And do you
8 consent to me recording this conversation?

9 MR. BOYKIN: Yes.

10 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Great. So I know that you
11 gave a statement yesterday. Today, if we could -- we have
12 a map in front of us.

13 MR. BOYKIN: Uh-huh.

14 MR. GERHARDT: Talk about the wind conditions again
15 and the visibility that you saw to the best of your
16 ability. And then the smoke levels leading up to, you
17 know -- basically, what you can note with what you saw with
18 the helicopter and the conditions surrounding that. Just
19 whatever you saw and if you didn't see anything, that's
20 obviously -- that's perfect too.

21 MR. BOYKIN: Okay. Okay. Yeah, I was --

22 MR. GERHARDT: You can write with that.

23 MR. BOYKIN: Yeah. Let me just show you just
24 about -- I think that spot right along in there, somewhere
25 right along in here is where I was at.

1 MR. GERHARDT: Josh -- yeah, Josh said he was right
2 about here where the dot is.

3 MR. BOYKIN: Yeah.

4 MR. GERHARDT: Maybe.

5 MR. BOYKIN: I'm going to say it was right in here
6 somewhere.

7 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

8 MR. BOYKIN: So the helicopter was flying the grid
9 patterns I guess something like this.

10 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

11 MR. BOYKIN: And I was lighting by hand with a drip
12 torch along this road and so when I would see it make a
13 turn -- and I was listening. Eddie was the one
14 communicating with the helicopter so I was listening so I
15 could keep up with what all was going on. I wasn't talking
16 directly to the helicopter but Eddie was and I was
17 listening to that conversation.

18 So the helicopter was making passes and it -- the
19 last long run it made, I don't know about up here, but it
20 came fairly close to the road here and back in this area
21 right in here. So just -- just east of where I was,
22 probably no more than 50 yards but over the treetops. So I
23 could see it very clearly when the helicopter made the
24 turn.

25 I was somewhat expecting him to turn and come back

1 this way and finish this last little bit on the corner
2 here, on the southwest corner of the burn. However, he
3 turned and went back over where he had just recently fired.

4 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

5 MR. BOYKIN: Going back to the north. I didn't
6 really think that was very unusual though. He does that
7 fairly often and both Steve and the pilot are very
8 comfortable doing that. They like to go back and look at
9 what they've recently fired. See how well the balls are
10 lighting.

11 So he probably went a couple of lines deep from
12 where he had already fired and it was burning real well so
13 there was a lot of smoke but the wind was just about right
14 for a prescribed burn. It wasn't too strong. It wasn't
15 too weak. If it's too weak, then the smoke just kind of
16 goes straight up and just sets there and it's not good. We
17 want the smoke to disperse.

18 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

19 MR. BOYKIN: So it was dispersing real well to the
20 east. Had pretty much a straight west wind. Now, the
21 reason I was pulling the fire up this road is because it
22 would -- it would fluctuate very slightly. It's very
23 common -- unless you have a real strong wind, it normally
24 fluctuates 10, 15 degrees maybe and it just happened to be
25 almost lined up perfectly with the road so every now and

1 then, it would be just a little bit more northwest and then
2 every now and then, a little bit more southwest. So I was
3 trying to keep up with it so it didn't blow amber across
4 the road.

5 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

6 MR. BOYKIN: So I wanted to get this area safe.
7 The smoke that was being produced around here was pretty
8 heavy but when he made his turn, where he had gridded in
9 front of where he was now at was catching up pretty good
10 but it was just now getting up into the canopy so the smoke
11 was canopy high, maybe just a little higher, and he
12 typically goes right over the top of that. There may have
13 been a little smoke, you know, that he flies through and
14 they do that fairly often but they won't go in anything,
15 you know, very heavy.

16 I've watched them for years and Steve in particular
17 and pilots, they'll get in a little smoke and it doesn't
18 bother them but if it gets just a little bit heavy, they'll
19 pull -- you know, they'll pull on out of that.

20 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah. With this flight, did you see
21 this helicopter going into the smoke on this particular
22 flight at any point in time?

23 MR. BOYKIN: Oh, you mean like earlier?

24 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah. Any time that you were on
25 this burn, is there anything that you can remember about

1 its flight path?

2 MR. BOYKIN: No, I don't remember it being -- I
3 didn't see it go into any smoke.

4 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Sure.

5 MR. BOYKIN: And I didn't -- there wasn't any
6 position where I could hear it and think that they might be
7 in more smoke than normal.

8 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah, yeah.

9 MR. BOYKIN: And this burn, something else that
10 might be helpful. This burn was fairly typical. It was
11 burning pretty hot so there were particulate matter going
12 up and ashes but no more than usual and we've had burns
13 that had a lot more dense smoke and particulate matter and
14 ashes and things like that --

15 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

16 MR. BOYKIN: -- in the smoke column. So this is
17 pretty average.

18 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

19 MR. BOYKIN: Yeah. I really didn't think it was
20 anything unusual when they turned and went back over there
21 where they had already lit.

22 MR. GERHARDT: Now, can you draw the flight path
23 that you saw after the helicopter made the turn? Could you
24 just draw that for -- because I don't know if we did that
25 yesterday.

1 MR. BOYKIN: Do you want me to do it on another
2 sheet so I don't --

3 MR. GERHARDT: This one's okay because we have
4 another one so this is kind of the -- this is the rough --

5 MR. BOYKIN: All right. I don't really know where
6 he was at up in here. I was just seeing him when he made
7 his turns here so what --

8 MR. GERHARDT: Well, if you do have another one, if
9 you don't mind using it.

10 MR. BOYKIN: No, I don't mind.

11 MR. GERHARDT: Perfect.

12 MR. BOYKIN: Eddie was pretty thoughtful and ran
13 some extra copies.

14 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

15 MR. BOYKIN: I'm going to say his last flight path
16 was like this and probably turned this way and came back
17 and I'm not sure exactly where we are in here but I guess
18 we're somewhere in this area.

19 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah. Okay.

20 MR. BOYKIN: Now, he had been -- the rest of his
21 patterns were he'd turn and go this way and then come back
22 and, you know, come back that way and then, you know, come
23 back and go that way. But this time, he turned and went
24 back kind of over where he had already fired.

25 MR. GERHARDT: And your personnel on the ground

1 were lighting the area along the road?

2 MR. BOYKIN: I don't think there was anybody
3 lighting this up here.

4 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

5 MR. BOYKIN: I was like somewhere in this area I
6 guess and so I had -- I had lit all this.

7 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Yeah.

8 MR. BOYKIN: In fact, I lit all the way from about
9 here around like that.

10 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

11 MR. BOYKIN: And right along in here is where I was
12 when I heard the crash.

13 MR. GERHARDT: Got it. Got it. Okay. I'm going
14 to --

15 MR. BOYKIN: So I tried almost immediately to go
16 through this area right here but I wasn't able to.

17 MR. GERHARDT: Can I keep this map?

18 MR. BOYKIN: Yeah, oh, yeah.

19 MR. GERHARDT: Thank you so much. Perfect. Okay.
20 Got it. Well, that's -- that's all I had. Is there
21 anything else that you can think of that you'd like to --
22 there's really nothing on my end.

23 MR. BOYKIN: No. I heard some of those other guys
24 talking about the wind and I think we mentioned it a little
25 bit but it was real average.

1 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

2 MR. BOYKIN: Not very many gusts.

3 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

4 MR. BOYKIN: It was really good for burning.

5 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

6 MR. BOYKIN: And Steve and Eddie and the pilot
7 usually have a little conversation about what's going to be
8 the best way to do it --

9 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

10 MR. BOYKIN: -- to take advantage of the wind so
11 they don't -- they have a little trouble turning with the
12 wind I guess.

13 MR. GERHARDT: Right.

14 MR. BOYKIN: So anyway, they always are thoughtful
15 about that.

16 MR. GERHARDT: Perfect. All right.

17 (Audio ends.)

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STATE OF IDAHO)
) SS
COUNTY OF CANYON)

I, TAMARA A. WEBER, State-certified and licensed
transcriber, do hereby certify:

That the foregoing transcript is a transcript of an
audio recording made of the proceedings in the matter of
the Interview of Jay Boykin (9:44), Desoto National Forest;
that the foregoing pages 1 through 9 of this transcript
contains as accurate and complete a transcription of said
audio recording as I was able to make.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 7th day of April, 2015.


TAMARA A. WEBER, CSR
Idaho CSR License No. 278
Transcriber

INTERVIEW OF JERRID SILVA (21:02)

DESOTO NATIONAL FOREST

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording.
Transcript prepared by transcription service.

1 (Interview of Jerriid Silva (21:02) begins.)

2 MR. GERHARDT: So this is Adam Gerhardt here. I'm
3 with the NTSB. I'm an air safety investigator and I am
4 here with --

5 MR. SILVA: Jerriid Silva.

6 MR. GERHARDT: All right. Jerriid. Can you spell
7 your last name for me?

8 MR. SILVA: First name J-e-r-r -- I don't know if
9 that matters but --

10 MR. GERHARDT: No, it does.

11 MR. SILVA: J-e-r-r --

12 MR. GERHARDT: J-e-r-r.

13 MR. SILVA: I-d.

14 MR. GERHARDT: I-e-d?

15 MR. SILVA: I-d.

16 MR. GERHARDT: I-d, sorry.

17 MR. SILVA: I didn't have a choice in that
18 spelling. Last name is Silva, S-i-l-v-a.

19 MR. GERHARDT: Got it. Perfect. And Jerriid, are
20 you okay with me recording this conversation?

21 MR. SILVA: Yes.

22 MR. GERHARDT: Perfect. So I'm going to -- I'm
23 going to be as quiet as possible and just let you give
24 me -- or let you give me an account of what you saw. You
25 know, weather conditions, smoke levels, you know, whether

1 or not you saw the helicopter, you know, and things related
2 to that nature and anything else that you want to tell me.
3 So I'll just be quiet and --

4 MR. SILVA: Okay.

5 MR. GERHARDT: Let you take it away from, you know,
6 from your --

7 MR. SILVA: Okay. I'll start kind of somewhat in
8 the beginning -- not the beginning beginning but --

9 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

10 MR. SILVA: I was with Cory and we were to burn out
11 Division D and then C here. And so we had the fire backed
12 of D pretty good but then we got to C, it was slowly
13 backing off and the wind was in our face on this line.

14 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

15 MR. SILVA: So the smoke was really heavy on that C
16 line. Actually, it was so bad at one point -- this is just
17 after lunch -- that I was coughing and pretty sick and I
18 told Cory at one point that I'm going to be pulling off. I
19 got to get out of here because I'm just -- I had a headache
20 and just didn't feel good.

21 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

22 MR. SILVA: So he said, yeah, go ahead and pull
23 back to one of these drains as they call them where there's
24 water.

25 MR. GERHARDT: Uh-huh.

1 MR. SILVA: So I pulled back to the farthest drain
2 out of here on the C line still. And the smoke was a
3 little bit less. At that time, the helicopter was firing
4 off of our line. It seemed like it was parallel to our
5 line so he was firing off that line.

6 MR. GERHARDT: So he was dropping the balls like in
7 this area? Is that accurate?

8 MR. SILVA: More so like --

9 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Kind of like --

10 MR. SILVA: At that time, yeah, what I'm talking
11 about there.

12 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

13 MR. SILVA: So that picked up fire intensity at
14 that point. The wind at that point too began to pick up
15 and the fire activity really took off. Then I'm not sure
16 what he did, if he pulled off and started a different
17 direction, because I didn't hear for him for a little
18 while.

19 MR. GERHARDT: Uh-huh.

20 MR. SILVA: Then he came back and he'd fly by
21 again. So he might have been doing this or that and then I
22 believe he was over in here.

23 MR. GERHARDT: Sure.

24 MR. SILVA: So I actually took a picture right
25 before the accident to send to my wife just to kind of show

1 her what we were dealing with because I'd been talking to
2 her about how they treat some of these units with the
3 herbicide and that we were breathing smoke and giving us
4 headaches quite a bit.

5 So anyway, I took a picture and in the picture, it
6 was pretty smoky. You can see the residual smoke but over
7 our head, there was a column pouring over, dark. Dark
8 smoke. Ash was falling everywhere. We were, you know,
9 eating heavy smoke and the helicopter was still flying at
10 that time. We sat down. We both pulled out -- me and Cory
11 both pulled back to almost the corner here and I remember
12 hearing the helicopter and didn't hear anything else for a
13 little while. Didn't think anything of it because I
14 believed he was over here firing. I didn't really know his
15 whereabouts but that's where he was.

16 And then the fire activity picked up really intense
17 at that point. Trees started kind of tilting in so it was
18 sucking air from outside and that just shows that the
19 column's picking up and is pulling air in.

20 At that point, you know, there was lots of smoke
21 pouring overhead and you could just hear the fire -- only
22 the fire. It sounded like -- it sounded like a lot of wind
23 or just like a jet engine all through back in here. Really
24 loud like a train almost passing by. But at one point, I
25 heard a boom and then a smaller boom afterwards. I looked

1 up because I was looking down at my phone. I looked up at
2 Cory. He didn't even budge and I thought to myself, what
3 was that. Didn't say anything. I don't think I said
4 anything but it was enough to -- it didn't sound like a
5 tree but I didn't put anything together. I just heard
6 something. It was unbelievable like what was that in the
7 fire. I guess there had been bombing up there at Shelby,
8 whatever, so just kind of whatever.

9 Shortly after that, that's when we heard Jay
10 calling the helicopter. I believe he called him three
11 times -- two or three times and then he said we have an
12 incident and then I went, "What?" And we were kind of in
13 denial at that point but then I said, "That's what that
14 sound was." I pointed to Cory and I pointed out into the
15 black. "That's what that sound was I heard," and he goes,
16 "What? What are you talking about?"

17 MR. GERHARDT: How long would you estimate from
18 when you heard the two -- the large boom, the small boom
19 and then -- and then the radio calls? Could you estimate
20 or --

21 MR. SILVA: I could estimate.

22 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

23 MR. SILVA: Geez.

24 MR. GERHARDT: Seconds, minutes?

25 MR. SILVA: Minutes probably.

1 MR. GERHARDT: Minutes?

2 MR. SILVA: Probably, yeah. I can't really
3 remember but it seemed like it was minutes. At that point,
4 we -- once we heard it was an incident, we kind of were in
5 denial. We ran back and forth. Pulled out the map. Tried
6 to figure out -- where I heard that sound, I believed it
7 was more over in here. So we contemplated moving into the
8 black but I told Cory, I said, "Do you think we can get
9 through there?" He said, "No, there's way too much fire in
10 there right now. We need -- we should just go to the
11 truck."

12 So we turned and we ran all the way out to the
13 truck. Got in the truck and this direction which is what,
14 south? North. Ran into J.W. He was coming down the road
15 in his truck and we said just head that way. So we turned
16 around, followed him in, ended up parking our vehicles kind
17 of, oh, about maybe a quarter mile down the road here. At
18 that point, I grabbed the medical kit out of the truck and
19 started walking down the road. Then I started running down
20 the road. Came around the corner and saw Jay kneeling down
21 over a firefighter with yellow on. Realized that was
22 somebody from the crash and I ran down the road and yelled
23 at the guys back to get the truck and bring it up.

24 When I got to Brendan, he -- I looked at him, give
25 him a quick assessment, opened up the medical kit and Cory

1 pulled up at that time. I said, "Cory, you take care of
2 him," because he looked stable to me. He had some burns
3 but he was breathing. Didn't see any blood or any issues
4 with circulation. So then I shot into -- I asked Jay, "Can
5 I go in," and he said, "Yep. Take somebody with you." So
6 I grabbed J.W.

7 We turned in here and started walking and then J.T.
8 came in behind us and we decided to do a grid. We spread
9 out. J.T. was on the far right, J.W. was in the middle and
10 I took the far left which would -- and then we gridded
11 through here from the road down.

12 When we first walked in, we actually had to go
13 through backing fire to get into here and it was so smoky
14 and hot that I stopped at one point and I said I don't know
15 if we should be doing this because it was -- it could be
16 our safety as well.

17 We decided to keep going. As we got down in here
18 more, it was less intense as far as heat goes.

19 MR. GERHARDT: How would you know the -- you know,
20 is it something that you remembered looking up and seeing
21 the smoke at the tree levels?

22 MR. SILVA: Uh-huh. I looked up because the
23 helicopter was coming in. I looked up. I'm in aviation so
24 I looked up to see what the visibility would be like for
25 him. That's what I just thought and the smoke at this time

1 was everywhere and it was -- I'd just say it was more -- it
2 wasn't thick like a column at that point. The column was
3 more that direction and going that way. At the time when
4 the other helicopter came in, it was more just -- the whole
5 area just had smoke coming up because everything was still
6 burning in here. It wasn't a front. It was just logs are
7 burning. Sticks had smoke coming off of them. Intense
8 heat just because of -- what do you call that? The --

9 MR. GERHARDT: Ambers?

10 MR. SILVA: Reflective heat.

11 MR. GERHARDT: Oh, yeah.

12 MR. SILVA: And the trees were holding it in.

13 MR. GERHARDT: Got it.

14 MR. SILVA: So it was 100-something degrees in here
15 and humid. And we were looking for black smoke so I was
16 looking up. I did see something over there which that's
17 why I ended up kind of veering off to the north. I saw
18 black smoke which ended up I guess being a log or something
19 because I turned and started coming in more trying to keep
20 these guys on my right the whole time.

21 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah, yeah.

22 MR. SILVA: And then J.T. walked right up on the
23 accident and yelled, "Here it is," and so I came in from
24 the left over here, the north, straight into it. Anymore
25 questions on the smoke or anything like that?

1 I need to go back. Before -- before -- I don't
2 remember him -- the helicopter saying anything on the
3 radio. I wasn't really listening. There was radio traffic
4 going on and I believe he was talking to the burn boss but
5 I don't remember anything really. The last thing I
6 remember him saying which wasn't -- I don't believe it was
7 the last thing he said but the last thing I remember
8 hearing was just the column of smoke, how he couldn't see
9 this road over here --

10 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

11 MR. SILVA: -- in our line because it was actually
12 pouring this way.

13 MR. GERHARDT: And this was coming from the crew in
14 the helicopter?

15 MR. SILVA: Helicopter, yeah, the burn boss.

16 MR. GERHARDT: Okay, yeah, yeah.

17 MR. SILVA: The winds at that time when the weather
18 -- the burn boss got the weather from dispatch and said
19 winds were out of the west which I think they were supposed
20 to be more out of the south. Southwest. So the helicopter
21 couldn't see all this and it was really heating up and
22 putting black smoke in the air and I could look up at one
23 point and you could see where it was getting up high
24 enough -- the smoke was getting high enough that there was
25 -- it looked like clouds. I mean that's how high it was

1 going.

2 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

3 MR. SILVA: The winds at that time were really
4 squirrely. Sometimes they'd be in our face. Sometimes it
5 would stop and then push back --

6 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

7 MR. SILVA: -- into the fire but this line the
8 whole time would just be socked in.

9 MR. GERHARDT: Yep.

10 MR. SILVA: Especially in these drains. Everywhere
11 there was a drain, it seemed like the smoke was just
12 setting in them.

13 Anyway, when I got to the crash -- what do you want
14 to know as far as that goes?

15 MR. GERHARDT: Just what you saw as for, you know,
16 the position of the helicopter, anything else, you know,
17 weather conditions again if they've changed.

18 MR. SILVA: Okay. They seemed calm when I went in
19 there when I got to the aircraft. However, the smoke was
20 pushing this direction so it was coming out of the south
21 more right down here because I came in from the north and I
22 pulled around because I could smell the, you know, toxic
23 fumes from the aircraft and I walked right up on the nose
24 and confirmed there was a body. I could not see the other
25 one but I could see one of them burning and I went around

1 the top of the aircraft looking for another person possibly
2 and started -- I walked around the back side, scouted out
3 here but once again, it was so smoky that I couldn't see
4 very far. I didn't even know these trees back here were
5 green. I thought everything was burnt.

6 So came back and looked again carefully as much as
7 I wanted to or could and thought I saw another head down
8 below the other person. Both the bodies were on top of
9 each other.

10 At that time, there was some -- I believe it was a
11 magnesium or something burning in the aircraft. There was
12 brighter flames crackling, popping in the back and I just
13 told everybody we need to step away from this thing. It
14 was getting bad and so we kind of pulled off.

15 One of the guys asked me for -- at some point, I
16 remember thinking get a fire extinguisher and I called on
17 the radio could we get a fire extinguisher down here. Eric
18 was driving the dozer and he had one so he came out with an
19 extinguisher and tried to spray out the guys and I pulled
20 out a water bottle because he tapped out the whole thing
21 and pulled out the water bottle and tried throwing it on
22 there but it didn't do anything so, in frustration, just
23 threw it down on the ground and walked away. Set my bag
24 down and tried to get my GPS out because they were asking
25 for a lat-long.

1 MR. GERHARDT: Yep.

2 MR. SILVA: Then at that point, we decided we
3 better -- they called us back and said just stay away from
4 it, whatever, and Jay called me and said can you get -- he
5 called my name, Jerriid Silva. I answered. He said, "Can
6 you come back up to the road and assist with Brendan
7 basically?"

8 So I went up there and got up there with Brendan
9 and helped give him water, make him more comfortable. Get
10 some bandages on him. Things like that.

11 MR. GERHARDT: Yep. Did he -- did Brendan say
12 anything to you?

13 MR. SILVA: Yeah. He kept -- he was going in and
14 out. I don't think he was going all the way out but he was
15 repeating himself. He'd say, "I tried." And then he said,
16 "I didn't want to leave. I didn't want to leave them." We
17 just kept saying, "It's okay. Yeah, we know. You did what
18 was right. You did what you had to do." He said, "I just
19 had to go. I just had to go." He kept saying that.

20 And then he'd close his eyes a little bit and then
21 we'd say, "Hey, buddy, wake up. Stay with us," and give
22 him a little water and then he'd repeat the same thing
23 again. "I didn't want to go. I had to leave." And then
24 he said, "It was already there." I'm assuming it was the
25 fire because that's what we were talking about but he said

1 it was already there. That's one of the things that --
2 otherwise he kept saying he was in a lot of pain. "I need
3 something for this pain. I'm in a lot of pain." Asked us
4 to call his girlfriend at one point. Tell his girlfriend
5 he was all right and call him -- call her. He said, "I'm
6 pretty badly burned," and then I told him, "No, you
7 actually don't look that bad." Keep his spirits up. I
8 didn't think he was as bad as what he thought. He was in a
9 lot of pain and I think he thought he was completely
10 crisped out or something.

11 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah, yeah. Did he note anything
12 about what he thought happened? Did he say anything to
13 you?

14 MR. SILVA: No, he didn't say anything to me. Cory
15 said something to me but he didn't say anything to me about
16 that.

17 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Okay. Let's see. Did you
18 see the helicopter -- so did you see the helicopter flying
19 over the site --

20 MR. SILVA: This site?

21 MR. GERHARDT: Yes. Did you actually see --

22 MR. SILVA: No.

23 MR. GERHARDT: It was more -- it was something that
24 you heard.

25 MR. SILVA: You could hear it and you know how

1 you've been around fire, it will take sound and kind of
2 make it sound weird?

3 MR. GERHARDT: Sure, yeah.

4 MR. SILVA: We would see it every once in a while
5 fly over our line but, for the most part, we could not
6 see -- we couldn't see 150 feet in here with the column
7 coming up. I couldn't see anything.

8 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

9 MR. SILVA: I could hear him.

10 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

11 MR. SILVA: And you know, you'd hear every once in
12 a while like a (sound given).

13 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah, yeah. Got it. So you
14 never -- that's helpful. That's good to know.

15 MR. SILVA: Yeah. And when I heard the boom, I
16 never heard a helicopter. I never heard anything. It was
17 before that -- I would say a minute before that maybe, two
18 minutes before that, I never heard any helicopter because
19 he was over here. It was -- the fire was ripping over
20 here. All we could hear was like the jet engine sound.

21 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

22 MR. SILVA: So I never heard him before and never
23 heard it afterwards but that's why it never really made me,
24 you know, lead that sound -- basically, I couldn't tie that
25 sound to an aircraft or anything.

1 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah. So I guess I just wanted --
2 this is very helpful and I really appreciate it. Can
3 you -- when you showed up at the accident site, again, I
4 just want to reiterate, what was the smoke doing at the
5 treetop level and beyond? Is that something that you
6 remember?

7 MR. SILVA: When I got into here?

8 MR. GERHARDT: Yes, when you got into this area.

9 MR. SILVA: When I got into here, I don't know.
10 Let me see if I can describe it. Everything was just
11 lifting. It was more -- it wasn't thick. It was thick but
12 it was more of the white smoke that you would see from say
13 a pile that's been smoldering for a while. But it was the
14 whole area. It was not a column -- like a single column
15 that I could tell but more of everything was almost like
16 residual smoke or like a fog. Everything was kind of like
17 that. Does that make sense?

18 MR. GERHARDT: Absolutely, yeah.

19 MR. SILVA: Okay. Before that though, from my
20 side, it was a column and it was going up.

21 MR. GERHARDT: Could you draw roughly --

22 MR. SILVA: Yep. So I was here. This is the
23 drain. Actually, I was down by this drain right here. So
24 it comes -- both sides of the drain come down like this.

25 MR. GERHARDT: Okay, yeah.

1 MR. SILVA: I'm looking up. As I was looking up,
2 the smoke was going over my head -- over the treetops
3 probably 100, 200 feet up maybe and moving fast to the
4 east.

5 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

6 MR. SILVA: So all this area was really hot where
7 you have these little ball drawings so it was going up
8 enough and then just moving out at that point right before
9 I heard the boom.

10 MR. GERHARDT: So maybe right -- so the smoke
11 was --

12 MR. SILVA: Yeah. Actually I know this area was
13 really hot because he couldn't see in here and I looked
14 back at one point before I took the picture to send to my
15 wife, I looked back in here, it was sucking off our line
16 but we had black -- we had burned everything back to here
17 anyway but all this in here was still brush and it was just
18 moving out to the east.

19 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

20 MR. SILVA: And that was up high enough where -- up
21 high, the smoke was moving fast but down low, sometimes
22 you'd get this wind shift all of the sudden and I'm looking
23 up and the clouds and everything are still moving to the
24 east but the smoke down low would be blowing back -- if I'm
25 facing west, it might be blowing back at my back all of a

1 sudden. So that's why we were in a bad spot with the
2 smoke.

3 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

4 MR. SILVA: Couldn't get out of it.

5 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. That's good. That's good.

6 MR. SILVA: When I got out here at the road, there
7 was no smoke out there. All out there. So it was all
8 going -- so I know it was out here when I came around the
9 corner.

10 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah.

11 MR. SILVA: I don't know where we're at right now
12 so --

13 MR. GERHARDT: I think we're right about here.

14 MR. SILVA: So it was out here. When we came
15 out -- we got through here, this was all smoky.

16 MR. GERHARDT: Yep.

17 MR. SILVA: We came around this corner, it was all
18 smoky and it started clearing up. Everything was clear
19 when we got out here.

20 MR. GERHARDT: Was it -- could you see over in this
21 area on this road? They were burning in this portion.

22 MR. SILVA: Yeah, the fire already had backed to
23 the road. When I got to Brendan, there was flames -- a
24 flame -- backing flames all along this road and it was
25 backing this direction so the fire had just gotten to the

1 road backing but everything else in here had burned this
2 area already up.

3 MR. GERHARDT: Uh-huh.

4 MR. SILVA: So interior, the smoke, you couldn't --
5 like you look -- if you were to look in here between the
6 trees was completely smoked all the way to the treetops and
7 above. When I looked up and saw the helicopter circling
8 above me when I was in the black here, I could see him and
9 then I wouldn't see him. I'd see him and then I wouldn't
10 see him.

11 MR. GERHARDT: So did you see the helicopter fly
12 through the smoke?

13 MR. SILVA: Not the helicopter that crashed. The
14 one that they brought in to search for --

15 MR. GERHARDT: Oh, okay, okay. Got it. Got it.

16 MR. SILVA: He actually said, "I can't see anything
17 in there." They said, "We have crews in there. Can you
18 see them?" He goes, "I can't see anything down there."
19 And he goes -- I think he said something like, "I got to
20 get out of here. I can't see anything." Yeah.

21 MR. GERHARDT: So it's the observation helicopter
22 you saw fly through --

23 MR. SILVA: Yep.

24 MR. GERHARDT: -- the smoke that was obviously
25 picking up.

1 MR. SILVA: Yeah, yeah.

2 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Okay. Okay. Perfect. I'm
3 going to -- is there anything else? I'm going to stop
4 this.

5 MR. SILVA: That's it.

6 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Let me --

7 (Audio ends.)

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STATE OF IDAHO)
) SS
COUNTY OF CANYON)

I, TAMARA A. WEBER, State-certified and licensed
transcriber, do hereby certify:


That the foregoing transcript is a transcript of an
audio recording made of the proceedings in the matter of
the Interview of Jerriid Silva (21:02); that the foregoing
pages 1 through 20 of this transcript contains as accurate
and complete a transcription of said audio recording as I
was able to make.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 6th day of April, 2015.

___/s/ Tamara A. Weber_____
TAMARA A. WEBER, CSR
Idaho CSR License No. 278
Transcriber

INTERVIEW OF JOHN WESLEY CREWS (10:51)
DESOTO NATIONAL FOREST
MARCH 31, 2015 5:30 P.M. CST

TRANSCRIBED BY:
Cany tion



Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording.
Transcript prepared by transcription service.

1 (Interview of John Wesley Crews (10:51) begins.)

2 MR. STEIN: Okay. Stephen Stein with the NTSB
3 here. It's March 31, 2015. It's sometime after 5:30
4 Central Time. Don't worry about them. (Inaudible.)

5 MR. CREWS: No.

6 MR. STEIN: Okay. I'm here with Mr. John Wesley
7 Crews. John, do you consent to me -- to our recording you?

8 MR. CREWS: Yes.

9 MR. STEIN: Okay. Fantastic. Okay. So John, go
10 ahead and -- oh, good. We have some -- we have a diagram.
11 That's awesome. John, go ahead and just tell me your
12 story. Tell me what you heard, saw, witnessed, anything
13 and everything. Leave no detail out. I will keep quiet
14 and let you go ahead and speak.

15 MR. CREWS: Okay. You know, times are, you know,
16 plus or minus I'm sure 30, 45 minutes but yesterday
17 morning, I would say 10:00 -- in between 10:00, 10:30 is
18 when we did our briefing to get the fire started to do the
19 800-acre prescribed burn and everybody had their
20 assignments. My assignment was to fire the north -- the
21 north of this private property on this B line right here.
22 Fire from here meeting two other individuals that were
23 coming from this D line and we were to meet on the C line
24 here.

25 MR. STEIN: Okay.

1 MR. CREWS: That was my -- my assignment. I walked
2 in here. I fired -- I fired off of the road, came to this
3 corner, headed west, proceeded to go south and I kind of
4 held up a little bit at this drain right here just because
5 the intensity of the fire was starting to pick up and I
6 wanted to make sure my line would hold.

7 So I monitored my line a pretty good bit and, you
8 know, it was a good west wind. Kind of a -- it had a
9 northerly component to it which was contradictory to the
10 weather -- weather report because we were supposed to be
11 getting southwest winds.

12 Anyway, so after my line -- I felt comfortable with
13 my line at that drain, I proceeded to go south tying in
14 with these two -- these two guys that were coming north on
15 the C line and we probably met -- I feel like it was half
16 way. Their line was pretty intense so it took them a long
17 ways to get up there as well. We tied in and we held it --
18 no spots or anything on our line and we -- we waited there
19 for a good little while. Ate lunch.

20 I would say around 1:00, we noticed the wind -- we
21 noted it because we all talked about it. It was around
22 1:00 that the wind direction switched from kind of a west
23 with a slight northerly component. It wasn't -- it was
24 more west than anything, was starting to come out of the
25 southwest and we just sat there and talked about that for a

1 minute.

2 We called and said our line was secure. We could
3 call for the ship. So we relayed that to the burn boss and
4 we sat, ate lunch, kind of talked about what we had seen,
5 our line, the fire behavior, that sort of thing.

6 Waited on the ship to come. The ship came and I
7 think they did a recon on the 800-acre burn. They began to
8 fire the C line I believe is where they started. He said
9 he wanted to beef it up a little bit, get a little more
10 depth in between the black and the private -- or the
11 green -- the unburnt fuel. He wanted to burn up some more
12 of it so he did that and we sat there and watched him.

13 And the fire behavior was pretty intense and
14 everybody felt comfortable with what was going on because
15 we talked about it on the radio. He did that. I think
16 this A line -- I don't know what time frame this happened.
17 This A line had a spot and it may have been prior to 1300,
18 1:00. 1300 and whenever they had their spot, everybody
19 started really watching their lines heavy.

20 After he beefed up this line, he began to fire.
21 I'm pretty sure he came up here to my B line, checked it
22 and began to fire up here and he began to fire this east
23 line after -- after everything was secure, everybody felt
24 comfortable. He called back on the radio after he got to a
25 certain point and I heard him say there was a snag here on

1 fire. Could somebody check it. I was within 60 feet of
2 it. I checked that snag. Walked up. I checked another
3 snag. It seems like I remember him saying, "It's very
4 smoky in here. I cannot -- I can't see a whole lot so
5 watch for spots," and that was -- I know it was after 1330
6 whenever that call came in over the radio.

7 After that, it was -- our lines were secure. This
8 was probably I'd say 1400 on. From 1400 on, everything
9 felt comfortable as far as fire intensity and it was just
10 kind of the ship, everybody watching it and watching the
11 fire intensity and -- man, I wish I could help you out on
12 the times more because I think that would help but, like I
13 said, the last transmission I recall on the radio, I would
14 say it was probably 1400 or later about the smoke
15 intensity, the smoke, and that was the last thing I heard
16 from the ship.

17 I heard -- I heard another transmission from
18 someone else that we may have an incident and everybody
19 pretty much knew what they had to do or were committed into
20 helping out with that. We all made our way over there to
21 the incident and the POD operator that was laid out in the
22 road, they began administering first aid to him.

23 Two other individuals -- while that was going on,
24 myself and two more individuals were directed to grid to
25 make sure there was no one else in need of help and see if

1 we could find the crash site. We gridded for, I don't
2 know, 150, 200 yards and I had someone on each side of me
3 and the man on my right told me, "Hey, here it is." I
4 walked over there to it and it was engulfed and we could
5 tell it was a recovery after that.

6 We were then directed to grid around to make sure
7 there was no -- no one else because at this time, we could
8 only see one body. So we wanted to make sure that there
9 was no other survivors or, you know, no one else needing
10 help so we were directed to grid looking for anything we
11 could see, anybody that we could help and we did that and
12 that was pretty much my role in it. I'm sure I'm leaving
13 out a lot of stuff that I'll remember later but as of right
14 now, that's kind of how I recall it.

15 MR. STEIN: Let me ask you a few questions. What
16 does "tied in" mean?

17 MR. CREWS: Tied in?

18 MR. STEIN: Yeah.

19 MR. CREWS: Okay. Whenever you're bringing fire to
20 one another -- okay. Just say this. We're firing all this
21 and they're firing this line because you're getting a
22 southwest wind so you want to burn against the wind. You
23 want to burn that way.

24 MR. STEIN: Okay.

25 MR. CREWS: So when we're burning this way and I'm

1 burning this way, this fire's getting pretty hot and we're
2 just bringing fire and fire so usually when we say tie it
3 in, it's whenever we tie fire to fire.

4 MR. STEIN: Got you.

5 MR. CREWS: Or we also say tie it in. I tie it in
6 with, you know, Eddie because, you know, we've got a
7 face-to-face. It kind of depends on the scenario.

8 MR. STEIN: And when you're looking for a snag,
9 does that mean just a fire that's died out or --

10 MR. CREWS: No. A snag is a burning -- a burning
11 tree. Usually it's dead.

12 MR. STEIN: Oh, yeah.

13 MR. CREWS: Usually it's dead and it's on fire and
14 it has a chance of falling across the line and, you know,
15 our prescribed burn then becomes an uncontrolled burn.

16 MR. STEIN: Right.

17 MR. CREWS: So we usually -- you know, we look for
18 those pretty hard.

19 MR. STEIN: And then the man on your right, was he
20 the person that found the wreckage?

21 MR. CREWS: Yes.

22 MR. STEIN: He was. And who was that?

23 MR. CREWS: His name is J.T. and I do not know his
24 last name. He's from Montana I believe.

25 MR. STEIN: And he is at the hotel in Gulf Port.

1 MR. CREWS: They are staying in Wiggins at Lake
2 Tocoleen. The other four guys and, you know, in my
3 opinion -- I mean I'm sure you all talked to them. Those
4 guys have a lot of information. Probably a lot more
5 helpful than me.

6 MR. STEIN: Yeah, I got a telephone number from
7 Jack of someone to call to coordinate with them.

8 MR. CREWS: Yeah, yeah.

9 MR. STEIN: So I'll do that. John, what is your
10 telephone number?

11 MR. CREWS: My number's (601) 942-5257.

12 MR. STEIN: Okay. 5257. Great. Okay. If you
13 have nothing else to add, I'm going to stop this.

14 MR. CREWS: Yeah.

15 MR. STEIN: I don't know what --

16 (Audio ends.)

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STATE OF IDAHO)
) SS
COUNTY OF CANYON)

I, TAMARA A. WEBER, State-certified and licensed
transcriber, do hereby certify:

That the foregoing transcript is a transcript of an
audio recording made of the proceedings in the matter of
the Interview of John Wesley Crews, (10:51), Desoto
National Forest, March 31, 2015, 5:30 p.m. CST; that the
foregoing pages 1 through 9 of this transcript contains as
accurate and complete a transcription of said audio
recording as I was able to make.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 7th day of April, 2015.

_____/s/ Tamara A. Weber_____
TAMARA A. WEBER, CSR
Idaho CSR License No. 278
Transcriber

INTERVIEW OF JOHN WESLEY CREWS (5:42)
DESOTO NATIONAL FOREST

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording.
Transcript prepared by transcription service.

1 (Interview of John Wesley Crews (5:42) begins.)

2 MR. GERHARDT: Hi. This is Adam with -- Adam
3 Gerhardt with the NTSB and I'm an air safety investigator
4 and I am here with John Wesley Crews. Okay, John. And
5 then could you spell the last name one more time for me?

6 MR. CREWS: C-r-e-w-s.

7 MR. GERHARDT: C-r-e-w-s. Okay. And John, if you
8 could, just describe -- so were you present near the burn,
9 you know, at the time of the accident?

10 MR. CREWS: Yes. I was north of the accident I
11 would say a half mile maybe.

12 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

13 MR. CREWS: I'm looking for my map.

14 MR. GERHARDT: That's okay.

15 MR. CREWS: Well, just so I can get reference. I
16 would say a half mile north --

17 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Half mile north --

18 MR. CREWS: -- of the accident.

19 MR. GERHARDT: -- of the accident site. Okay.

20 Now, as for -- what we didn't talk about yesterday was if
21 you could just describe the weather conditions. And I know
22 you did talk about the wind but if you could just note that
23 again but then also if you saw anything related to the
24 visibility above -- above the treetops and the smoke levels
25 or lack thereof. Whatever you saw, if you could just

1 describe that.

2 MR. CREWS: The winds were out of the west and
3 they'd been out of the west with kind of a northerly
4 component most of the day. Around -- around 1300, give or
5 take, we noticed kind of a southwest component and we
6 all -- not all of us but three of us, we talked about it.
7 It was noted because we noticed a change mainly because the
8 line that we were holding, it was -- that was critical and
9 there was a substantial amount of smoke, a lot of smoke.
10 Visibility was pretty limited where I was just because of
11 the smoke.

12 At the time of the last transmission from kilo
13 hotel, there was a lot of smoke in the air. The sun was
14 blacked out because of the smoke. It was an eerie feeling
15 when you no longer hear the helicopter and there's that
16 much smoke.

17 MR. GERHARDT: Was the -- you know, if you can make
18 a determination, what was the source of that smoke? Was
19 it -- was it the helicopter?

20 MR. CREWS: No, it was the prescribed burn.

21 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

22 MR. CREWS: Which, you know, it's common. We're
23 all used to it, you know. We're all used to the smoke but
24 it was -- you know, with a west wind and being on the east
25 side of the fire, it was a lot of smoke, you know.

1 MR. GERHARDT: Absolutely. Now, as for this smoke
2 and the way that it was rising, is there anything --
3 vertically noting the smoke. Of course you're on the
4 ground here. Do you remember anything about, you know,
5 looking up and, you know, the smoke was doing this, aloft?

6 MR. CREWS: Yeah. I mean the smoke was getting up
7 and doing what it normally does which is -- you know, the
8 idea is to get the smoke up and out and it was doing that.
9 It just seemed to be a lot of it which, you know, I just
10 accounted, you know, there was so much green vegetation,
11 undergrowth, that that's kind of the reason, you know,
12 there was so much of it, you know, which is, you know, one
13 of the main objectives of this burn is to get rid of that
14 stuff so, you know, it's nothing uncommon to be that much
15 smoke.

16 MR. GERHARDT: Uh-huh.

17 MR. CREWS: That's just part of it, you know.

18 MR. GERHARDT: So you would say that this -- the
19 smoke level that you saw for this burn with your experience
20 of course is normal?

21 MR. CREWS: Normal, yeah. It was just -- it was
22 normal.

23 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Okay. Yeah. Well, that's --
24 is there anything else that you would like to say?

25 MR. CREWS: No. You know, as far as when we walked

1 up on the crash site and we found it, it was still pretty
2 hot in here and pretty smoky. And, you know, of course
3 seeing that crash site was pretty -- pretty bad which, you
4 know --

5 MR. GERHARDT: On past missions, have you ever seen
6 a helicopter fly through smoke on their mission?

7 MR. CREWS: I've been in a helicopter and we've,
8 you know, flew through some smoke. You know, from the
9 ground, it's hard to see exactly what they're doing. You
10 know, they try to avoid it as much as they can.

11 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Anything else?

12 MR. CREWS: Not that I can think of.

13 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Let me shut this off.

14 (Audio ends.)
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STATE OF IDAHO)
) SS
COUNTY OF CANYON)

I, TAMARA A. WEBER, State-certified and licensed
transcriber, do hereby certify:

That the foregoing transcript is a transcript of an
audio file made of the proceedings in the matter of the
Interview of John Wesley Crews (5:42), Desoto National
Forest; that the foregoing pages 1 through 5 of this
transcript contains as accurate and complete a
transcription of said audio file as I was able to make.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 7th day of April, 2015.

_____/s/ Tamara A. Weber_____
TAMARA A. WEBER, CSR
Idaho CSR License No. 278
Transcriber

INTERVIEW OF JOSHUA ERIC STRICKLAND (16:37)
DESOTO NATIONAL FOREST
MARCH 31, 2015 5:24 P.M. CST

TRANSCRIBED BY:
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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording.
Transcript prepared by transcription service.

1 (Interview of Joshua Eric Strickland (16:37) begins.)

2 MR. STEIN: All right. Stephen Stein here with the
3 NTSB. It's March 31, 2015, approximately -- the time thing
4 is gone so forget it. Sometime in the late afternoon. Oh,
5 it's 5:24 p.m. local time. We're with Eric Strickland.
6 Eric, do you consent to being recorded?

7 MR. STRICKLAND: Yes.

8 MR. STEIN: Okay. Eric, go ahead and just -- I'm
9 going to let you just tell me -- tell me your story. Tell
10 me what you remember, you know, might have heard or seen or
11 not heard or seen. Just what you might have been just
12 doing that day. Just go ahead and tell me your story and
13 I'm going to sit here and listen.

14 MR. STRICKLAND: You want just right before the
15 incident?

16 MR. STEIN: Yes, and a little bit of background
17 would be great.

18 MR. STRICKLAND: Well, we went out that day to do
19 the prescribed burn. Started it. Was getting all the
20 lines safe and everything. Did some work on the north end
21 of the unit. We was working down. My supervisor Jay was
22 starting to light the south road 415-A and we tied in with
23 him.

24 We were patrolling the road, me and Sara, in an
25 engine and he asked if we'd bump his truck up the hill to

1 where he was going to stop lighting and so I got in his
2 truck, drove up, parked it on the side of the road, got
3 out, was walking back to the engine to get in and the
4 helicopter come over and he started to turn I guess that
5 would have been to his left following the edge of the road
6 and I looked up and I even made a statement to Sara that,
7 you know, it doesn't look like he's dropping any spheres
8 right now.

9 And he turned and went on and we got in the truck,
10 turned the truck around, passed Jay and Jay, I heard him
11 say on the radio, "Get the dozer," and I thought -- I just
12 left him, you know. The fire wasn't doing much. Where's
13 the spot at? So I called him on the radio. I said, "Well,
14 where do you need the dozer?" He said, "Get the dozer.
15 We've had an incident."

16 And then I knew, you know, it was the ship because
17 we always talk about the incident within the incident and
18 -- in our safety brief and so I went and got the dozer. He
19 told me to pick up with a line where he quit firing. We
20 didn't know where it was in there or anything and didn't
21 know if it was outside the fire area, still in the green or
22 what.

23 So I carried a line from the road in until I hit a
24 ravine. I had to end up turning back to the south to get
25 around the end of the ravine and I tied in on black. At

1 that point, Jay told me for us not to get hemmed in by the
2 fire anywhere, you know. Just be safe about it. He was
3 still looking. There was a lot of radio traffic going on.

4 Eddie was on the north end of the unit, our burn
5 boss. He moved down further south. He was making
6 notifications through dispatch. They were trying to get
7 lat-longs off AFF.

8 So at that point, when he told us not to get hemmed
9 up, he said he was further up and he was coming back to the
10 road and I don't remember -- I think -- I think at that
11 point, he turned me around. He said just come on back to
12 the road. We're going to go up further. There was another
13 old woods road north of that. We were going to try to go
14 in on that and before I got back out to the road, me and
15 Sara, he said one of them's come to the road. I need a
16 medical bag.

17 And I had a medical bag that I'd thrown in the
18 dozer with me so I started tracking up the road. When I
19 got up there, Cory and Jerriid were working on I didn't know
20 who. Somebody just behind a vehicle laying in the road.
21 J.T., one of the other guys, come up to me and I threw him
22 the medical bag and they started down the hill and I
23 hollered at Mr. Jay and I said I'm going to go in with
24 them.

25 So I fell in behind them with the dozer and just

1 started just knocking the, you know, stumps and stuff out
2 of the way, the hot stuff going in in case we needed to
3 bring a truck in or something. I didn't know, you know,
4 what we'd find. Went down the hill through a little dip
5 and I heard J.T. say, "Call Jay and say we've found the
6 ship. It's going to be a recovery."

7 So I finished pushing on to them up kind of close
8 and I stayed back a lot further off. They had me back-drag
9 a spot closer to where they taped off later but I stayed
10 back on the edge of the hill as it started to break the top
11 with the dozer. I got my fire extinguisher off, walked up
12 there.

13 There wasn't a lot of fire at the time so I decided
14 to try to put out what fire there was with the fire
15 extinguisher. I sprayed out the nose. I sprayed out
16 where -- what looked like one of them, you know, sprayed
17 the fire off of that, and started working back to where the
18 engine was. It was glowing like a blue orange or something
19 and I sprayed a little more of the open flame that I saw.
20 I didn't spray anything inside.

21 We called get Jeff on the tractor. Well, see at
22 that time, it was J.W., myself, J.T. and I think it was
23 Jeff was the only four in there and Jeff went back to get
24 the tractor. We have water on -- a little water tank on
25 the back and we got to talking about one of them said he

1 thought maybe there was magnesium in that stuff and I was
2 like we're not going to spray it with any water at this
3 point. I don't know what it will do and we're not trained
4 for that.

5 So J.T. took the medical bag back up toward the top
6 of the hill. I turned around and started pushing clearing
7 off more of it so vehicles could get in and fire trucks and
8 whatever they -- was needed in there. I made it to the top
9 of the hill. I turned around. I come back down the hill
10 trying to level it out some more. Pushing some snags and
11 stuff to keep them from falling on anybody. Got back up
12 there.

13 By then, there was I mean all kind of -- I can't
14 even tell you how many people come in. Jay had come down
15 there by that point. Me and him even, you know, briefly
16 discussed we don't know who all these people are coming.
17 We wasn't sure about, you know -- we needed to do something
18 to try to keep people out. Our law enforcement hadn't made
19 it there yet and so we finished pushing that.

20 More of them come down. Some -- Pat Sullivan, all
21 them, I started seeing some of them. You know, some people
22 I recognized from being on fires and stuff before. There
23 was a guy in a white shirt. I did not catch his name. He
24 started, you know, telling people, "Hey, watch what you're
25 doing. This is a crime scene, you know. We got to treat

1 it as such," and so he was making people be more
2 particular. And that's none of the Forest Service people
3 but other people that were coming down.

4 A couple deputies were asking me questions.
5 Pilot's name, you know, and I couldn't give them any of
6 that. I didn't know who was in the ship that day, what
7 pilot. And more law enforcement showed up.

8 I went -- I'm trying to think. I went back up the
9 hill with the dozer smoothing again. They called me back
10 down to pull off a spot so they could put the big flood
11 lights and such.

12 Oh, back up. Before I made that last pass back up
13 the hill before they called me back down to pull off the
14 spot, one of the guys there told us that they did want to
15 put water on it and try to put it out. By then, the fire
16 had picked back up and there was more flames on the ship so
17 we backed our engine down in there. We had about a half a
18 tank of water. We pulled off the hose. Jeff sprayed it --
19 there was a guy standing there beside him telling him where
20 to spray water and then we moved our engine out when it
21 emptied out. And then I made that last push back up the
22 hill before coming back down when they wanted me to pull
23 the top of it off closer to the tape that they had put up
24 and back-drag it for the lights.

25 J.T. and J.W., when we were spraying the -- had the

1 water spraying there off the engine, they were gridding
2 because we wasn't sure -- we could only see what we thought
3 was one person. We didn't know there were two. If one had
4 come out or something and they were gridding. I guess that
5 would have been more to the -- kind of the south, southeast
6 area where it looked like it come through the trees because
7 we could see where the trees were clipped and they were
8 just kind of gridding back through there looking to see if
9 they saw anybody or anything. And Mr. Jay called them out
10 and they said they didn't see anything that they recognized
11 as metal or anything else.

12 And then we went back up the hill and loaded the
13 dozer. There was a lot of -- a lot of people. I do
14 remember that. I don't know how many but a whole bunch of
15 people were down there.

16 MR. STEIN: Usually is. Usually --

17 MR. STRICKLAND: Maybe more than should be at that
18 point.

19 MR. STEIN: Yeah, but it's hard to control,
20 especially when you have so many different departments and
21 agencies involved. A few questions for you. First of all,
22 Eric, how do I spell your first name? Is it E-r-i-c or --

23 MR. STRICKLAND: Yes. Well, that's my middle name.
24 Joshua Eric.

25 MR. STEIN: Joshua Eric.

1 MR. STRICKLAND: J-o-s-h-u-a.

2 MR. STEIN: And then E-r-i-c-k?

3 MR. STRICKLAND: E-r-i-c.

4 MR. STEIN: Okay. Not the weird way. Good. Just
5 kidding. Stupid joke. Okay. So about what time did
6 you -- just thinking back, about what time did you hear --
7 was it Jay on the radio --

8 MR. STRICKLAND: Mr. Jay.

9 MR. STEIN: -- that said get --

10 MR. STRICKLAND: Get the dozer.

11 MR. STEIN: -- the dozer?

12 MR. STRICKLAND: The last time I remember looking
13 at the clock was shortly before 2:00 and I was around -- at
14 that point, we were still on the 415-B road. Me and Sara
15 had sprayed a few snags close to the road out and that's --
16 I did not look at the clock when he said that.

17 MR. STEIN: About what time did you -- you were
18 driving the dozer, right?

19 MR. STRICKLAND: Yes, sir, when we went and got it,
20 I was on the dozer.

21 MR. STEIN: You were on the dozer.

22 MR. STRICKLAND: Uh-huh.

23 MR. STEIN: About what time did you make it to the
24 accident site?

25 MR. STRICKLAND: We had to drive all the way to the

1 turnaround so 15 minutes maybe.

2 MR. STEIN: 15 minutes?

3 MR. STRICKLAND: 15 minutes from the time he said
4 it to maybe the time we pulled up and then another maybe 5
5 to 10 minutes to get it unloaded and on the ground at the
6 most.

7 MR. STEIN: And about how long between the dozer
8 and -- or time -- between the time that Jay called or
9 requested the dozer and the time you started putting out
10 the fire?

11 MR. STRICKLAND: An hour.

12 MR. STEIN: An hour?

13 MR. STRICKLAND: Yeah. It was -- it wasn't a long
14 time -- it felt like a long time. It had to be at least an
15 hour. I mean it takes a little time to push and, you know,
16 by the time we got in there, I'm trying to think, an hour
17 to an hour and a half I would say.

18 MR. STEIN: Okay.

19 MR. STRICKLAND: Before water -- water from the
20 pump was put on it.

21 MR. STEIN: Okay. Okay. I don't think I have --

22 MR. STRICKLAND: I did leave my fire extinguisher
23 there. I left it so somebody would know one was discharged
24 on the scene.

25 MR. STEIN: I saw that.

1 MR. STRICKLAND: I left it there.

2 MR. STEIN: You were the first one on scene.

3 MR. STRICKLAND: J.T., J.W. and Jeff were there
4 first but they were standing back kind of to the side. I
5 was the first one. I approached from the nose to the side
6 and I sprayed what looked like a person to me in that area
7 because there was a small fire kind of under them and to
8 the back side. It looked like plastic burning. And then I
9 worked from there over the top past the -- where the rotor
10 blade was toward the engine compartment where that glow
11 was.

12 MR. STEIN: Were you the first one to spray?

13 MR. STRICKLAND: Yes, sir.

14 MR. STEIN: Okay.

15 MR. STRICKLAND: Yes, sir. With the fire
16 extinguisher.

17 MR. STEIN: Got it. Okay. Before that, were they
18 spraying with water or --

19 MR. STRICKLAND: No, sir. We had just got in
20 there. I was right behind those guys with the dozer.

21 MR. STEIN: Got it. Okay.

22 MR. STRICKLAND: They walked in. When the one come
23 to the road and I threw J.T. the medical bag, they were on
24 foot and a little faster so they got out ahead of me and
25 that's when I started -- I fell in behind them with the

1 dozer shoving the bigger stuff in case we needed to drive a
2 vehicle down there. And not really doing much to the
3 ground, you know, other than just moving the bigger stuff
4 so we could get something in.

5 MR. STEIN: Okay. Eric, what is your telephone
6 number?

7 MR. STRICKLAND: My cell number is (601)928-8868.
8 And I guess I probably shouldn't have sprayed the fire
9 extinguisher at that point. It was just --

10 MR. STEIN: No, you did --

11 MR. STRICKLAND: -- tried to keep it from burning
12 anymore.

13 MR. STEIN: You did what you thought -- are you
14 kidding? I would never fault you for that. In fact, you
15 should be commended for doing that, if anything. All
16 right, Eric. I don't have any further questions. Do you
17 have any questions?

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No, nothing here.

19 MR. STRICKLAND: Well, you got my number if --

20 MR. STEIN: If anything pops in my head, I'll let
21 you know. You know, 100 people out there probably have my
22 telephone number by now. Way more than I was --

23 MR. STRICKLAND: I imagine.

24 MR. STEIN: If you want to get a hold of me,
25 contact (inaudible). Yeah, I know that -- did I give -- I

1 need to get more cards.

2 MR. STRICKLAND: Well, you know, I'll probably be
3 in contact I guess with our agent Greg Knox. He'll
4 probably be contacting me about the investigation too.

5 MR. STEIN: Yeah. Now, however, we can get a hold
6 of each other. If you have any questions, I mean, you
7 know, if you need to reach out, someone will be able to get
8 a hold of me. You can feel free to ask at any time.

9 MR. STRICKLAND: Okay. Yeah. The time, that's one
10 of the biggest things I saw. The time and the confusion
11 there. I think our bunch did good at finding it and then
12 holding it. I mean there was nothing we could do. But the
13 confusion that followed right after when that mass of
14 people showed up --

15 MR. STEIN: Yeah, it was too many departments and
16 agencies in one place.

17 MR. STRICKLAND: Yep, yep.

18 MR. STEIN: How do you control that? It's crazy.

19 MR. STRICKLAND: I don't know.

20 MR. STEIN: Yeah.

21 MR. STRICKLAND: No way.

22 MR. STEIN: Yeah. Exactly. Okay. I'm going to
23 stop this because we don't need to record for 15 years.

24 (Audio ends.)

25

STATE OF IDAHO)
) SS
COUNTY OF CANYON)

I, TAMARA A. WEBER, State-certified and licensed
transcriber, do hereby certify:


That the foregoing transcript is a transcript of an
audio recording made of the proceedings in the matter of
the Interview of Joshua Eric Strickland, (16:37), Desoto
National Forest, March 31, 2015, 5:24 p.m. CST; that the
foregoing pages 1 through 13 of this transcript contains as
accurate and complete a transcription of said audio
recording as I was able to make.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 7th day of April, 2015.

___/s/ Tamara A. Weber_____
TAMARA A. WEBER, CSR
Idaho CSR License No. 278
Transcriber

INTERVIEW OF JOSHUA ERIC STRICKLAND (4:14)
DESOTO NATIONAL FOREST

TRANSCRIBED BY:
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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording.
Transcript prepared by transcription service.

1 (Interview of Joshua Eric Strickland (4:14) begins.)

2 MR. GERHARDT: Hi. This is Adam Gerhardt with the
3 NTSB. I'm an air safety investigator and I am here with --

4 MR. STRICKLAND: Joshua Eric Strickland.

5 MR. GERHARDT: Joshua here. And, Joshua, do you
6 consent to this being recorded?

7 MR. STRICKLAND: Yes.

8 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. So I know that you talked
9 yesterday and, if you could, just to the best of your
10 ability, describe the weather, the winds and then the smoke
11 level. The smoke level coming from the controlled burn or
12 anywhere else about this -- about this particular area that
13 the helicopter was flying over.

14 MR. STRICKLAND: Okay. Here on this corner where
15 we're at, the winds were -- they were a little bit back and
16 forth. We had a little bit of northwest component all the
17 way to southwest. I don't know the actual speed. They
18 wasn't getting that high, you know, for us having control
19 issues with the burn.

20 The smoke, I was down on this corner of the road
21 where it starts to turn back north and the ship come over
22 right at the edge of the road and I looked up at the bottom
23 of it and there was no smoke. It was clear skies. And
24 when he started to make his turn, I guess that would have
25 been a left-hand turn, the smoke -- all the smoke from the

1 burn was to the east side of the burn because he was
2 working it from the east side to the west with the wind.
3 And so it was clear right here where we were.

4 And after -- after the incident, you know, in
5 here -- there was residual smoke in here. There was a
6 little bit of fire out by the edge of the road that we come
7 through but it was just mostly residual smoke down in here.

8 MR. GERHARDT: Uh-huh. Okay. Okay. So did you --
9 again, just -- we may have covered this yesterday but did
10 you see the helicopter -- did you see the helicopter flying
11 over this path prior to the accident?

12 MR. STRICKLAND: When I saw him was when I parked
13 Mr. Jay's truck and he turned on the edge of the road like
14 he was looking at the edge of the road and I made the
15 statement to the one I was with in the engine, Sara, that
16 it doesn't look like he's dropping spheres and he was
17 making that left turn coming this way. I was in the
18 vehicle with her and we got just past where Mr. Jay was
19 firing up the road and that's when he said, "Get the
20 dozer."

21 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Yeah.

22 MR. STRICKLAND: And I asked him, "Where do you
23 need it," because we were thinking spot and he said, "Get
24 the dozer. We've had an incident."

25 MR. GERHARDT: As for the smoke levels rising above

1 the treetops, did you see the helicopter at any point
2 navigating around the smoke or was the smoke a non-factor?
3 What did you see there, if anything?

4 MR. STRICKLAND: Yeah. From my position -- and I
5 run the sphere dispenser in -- the (inaudible) in the ship
6 from time to time. There was -- they were not in any smoke
7 when I saw them at any time because, you know, we start
8 against the wind and work it back across. That's to keep
9 it out of the smoke so we can see what's going on with the
10 firing below. And so no, at no point did I ever see the
11 ship in any smoke.

12 MR. GERHARDT: Okay. Well, that's about -- that's
13 about all I have. Is there anything else, Josh, that you
14 would like to add? Anything?

15 MR. STRICKLAND: No, not that I can think of.

16 MR. GERHARDT: Okay.

17 MR. STRICKLAND: I think I pretty much covered
18 everything yesterday.

19 MR. GERHARDT: Yeah. I'm going to shut this down.

20 (Audio ends.)
21
22
23
24
25

STATE OF IDAHO)
) SS
COUNTY OF CANYON)

I, TAMARA A. WEBER, State-certified and licensed
transcriber, do hereby certify:

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transcription of said audio recording as I was able to
make.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 7th day of April, 2015.

_____/s/ Tamara A. Weber_____
TAMARA A. WEBER, CSR
Idaho CSR License No. 278
Transcriber