Sikorsky S-76C accident near New York, New York, October 16, 2008
On October 16, 2008 at about 12:15 pm local time, a Sikorsky S-76C (helicopter), registered N552J, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing near New York, New York (West 30Th Street Heliport airport). It was an executive or corporate flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 6 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of the flightcrew to stabilize the helicopter over its confined landing area during a hovering left-pedal turn, resulting in tail rotor blade contact with a perimeter fence component and a subsequent loss of directional control. Contributing to the accident was the inadequate markings of the heliport and heliport spots, and failure of FAA personnel to detect the inadequate heliport markings during inspection of the heliport approximately 1 month prior to the accident.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 16, 2008 · about 12:15 pm local time
- Place
- New York, New York · West 30Th Street Heliport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 6 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Sikorsky S-76C · all S-76Cs on the register
- Registration
- N552J · no longer on the register · serial 760518
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Executive or corporate flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
While maneuvering over the heliport, the co-pilot flying the helicopter maneuvered it near the center of spot H2 (designated for the size of the accident make and model helicopter), which did not include a shoulder line in accordance with Advisory Circular 150/5390-2B. While making a left pedal turn, the co-pilot allowed the helicopter to hover rearward east of the center of spot H2 towards a 12 foot tall chain link fence located behind spot H2; no ground personnel were assisting. While moving forward towards the center of spot H2, the tail rotor blades contacted a portion of the fence resulting in separation of 4 to 6 inches from each tail rotor blade, and subsequent loss of directional control. The flightcrew lowered collective and the helicopter impacted hard causing collapse of the left main landing gear. No preimpact failure or malfunction was noted to any systems of the helicopter. While heliport personnel reported the yellow line is to be used for ground taxiing only, review of an advisory circular related to heliport design revealed that with respect to taxi lines, they need to be marked as such to provide minimum clearance for the largest operating helicopter the heliport is expected to receive. Inspection of the heliport by FAA personnel 1 month prior to the accident failed to detect inadequate heliport markings.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Collision during takeoff/land during landing defining event
- Loss of tail rotor effectiveness during landing
- Loss of control in flight during landing
- Hard landing during landing (flare/touchdown)
- Landing gear collapse during landing (flare/touchdown)
The NTSB's findings
- factor Environmental issues › Physical environment › Runway/land/takeoff/taxi surfa › (general) › Contributed to outcome
- factor Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Oversight › (general) › FAA/Regulator
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring environment › Flight crew
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 7,458 hours in all; 4,470 in this make and model; 76 in the last 90 days; 31 in the last 30 days; 4,271 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: July 31, 2008
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 3,220 hours in all; 492 in this make and model; 48 in the last 90 days; 39 in the last 30 days; 1,448 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: August 2, 2008
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,506 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, September 11, 2008
- Maximum gross weight: 11,700 lb
- Seats: 8
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Turbomeca ASTAZOU SER (turboshaft); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Turbomeca ASTAZOU SER (turboshaft); 0 hours total
- Operator: Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
The flight
- Departed from: HVN New Haven CT at 11:15 am
- Destination: JRA New York NY
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 200° at 5 knots
- Visibility: 5 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 12,000 ft; a few clouds at 700 ft
- Temperature: 64°F (18°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
- Altimeter: 29.95 inHg
- Observation at 11:51 am from LGA, 6 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flig | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 4 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA09LA020.