Embraer EMB-145XR incident near Roanoke, Virginia, September 25, 2025

The NTSB's narrative preliminary · quoted from the NTSB record

On September 24, 2025, at 2117 eastern daylight time (EDT), CommuteAir (dba United Express flight 4339), Embraer EMB-145XR, N21129, experienced a runway excursion while landing at Roanoke-Blacksburg Regional Airport (ROA), Roanoke, Virginia (VA). The airplane overran the end of runway 34 and came to rest in the engineered materials arresting system (EMAS). There were no injuries to the 3 crew and 50 passengers onboard and there was no damage to the airplane. The scheduled domestic passenger flight was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD), Dulles, VA to ROA. According to the flight crew, this was the second leg of day four, of a four-day rotation, and the first leg on the incident airplane. Prior to departure, the airplane had to be deplaned twice for maintenance related anomalies. After boarding for a third time, the flight crew reviewed the weather and briefed the thunderstorms approaching ROA. The airplane pushed back approximately two and a half hours after the scheduled departure time. En route, the flight crew reviewed the Automatic Terminal Information Services (ATIS) weather information for ROA. The ATIS reported calm winds, no precipitation, a cloud ceiling of 15,000 feet, and that runway 6 was in use. The captain, pilot flying, briefed the localizer approach to runway 6. The first officer (FO), pilot monitoring, suggested reviewing the landing performance details for a wet runway, or a runway condition code (RCC) of 5, but the captain declined due to the ATIS not reporting precipitation. During descent, the flight crew checked in with approach control and was informed of precipitation along the approach path to runway 6 and that other aircraft were using runway 34 for landing. The captain requested the FO set up for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 34 and to brief the approach. The FO set up the ILS runway 34 approach, briefed the approach changes, and monitored the weather radar. Figure 1. Jeppesen instrument approach plate for ILS runway 34 approach. After turning on final approach, the flight crew observed the runway and heard the previous landing aircraft report marginal visibility and bumpy conditions. During the approach, the rain intensity increased, and the captain requested that the FO run the performance calculation for landing on a wet runway with a RCC of 5. The FO ran the performance calculations and determined that they would have a margin of approximately 200 feet more than was required, without thrust reverser usage. The captain briefed the go-around procedures and that they would divert to Piedmont Triad International Airport (GSO), Greensboro, North Carolina if they executed a go-around. On short final, the rain intensity increased, and the captain requested windshield wipers at high. As the airplane descended below 500 feet, the FO observed that they were high on the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) and then observed the captain correcting the flight path, but recalled they were still high as the airplane crossed the threshold. After crossing the runway markings, the FO called for a go-around, but the captain continued. About halfway down the runway, the FO called for a go-around a second time, but the captain continued. The airplane touched down and the flight crew applied maximum braking and deployed the engine thrust reversers. The airplane overran the end of the runway and came to rest in the EMAS. The FO attempted to communicate with air traffic control (ATC), but the communications button had disengaged. After engaging the communications button, the FO coordinated with ATC and contacted the flight attendant (FA). The FA verified that there were no injuries. The flight crew completed the emergency evacuation checklist and prepared for an evacuation. Airport rescue firefighting (ARFF) personnel boarded the airplane and assisted with evacuating passengers down a ladder. Figure 2. Airplane main landing gear witness marks in the EMAS at ROA. (Source: ROA) As part of the investigative process, the NTSB invited the qualified parties to participate in the investigation. These included the Federal Aviation Administration, CommuteAir, and the Air Line Pilots Association. In accordance with the provisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, an Accredited Representative from the Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and Prevention Center of Brazil, the State of Manufacture for the airplane, was appointed to support the investigation with Embraer as their technical advisor. The flight data and cockpit voice recorder were sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC. The following NTSB specialists were assigned: Cockpit Voice Recorder, Flight Data Recorder, Airports, Meteorology, Air Traffic Control, and Operational and Human Factors. The investigation is ongoing.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

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